


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Military Affairs

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Arbatov-Akhromeyev Polemic on Defense Spending Viewed

91UM0187A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 19, Oct 90
(signed to press 23 Aug 90) pp 33-43

[Article by Captain Eduard Gams, USSR people's deputy, and Yuriy Borisov, member of the USSR Journalists Union, under the rubric "Theory and Practice": "Who Is To Pay For Security?—Polemic Commentary on Military Issues Between Academician G.A. Arbatov and Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev"]

[Text]

"Budget Authority" and Real Military Expenditures

If one attentively follows the polemic discourse on military-political issues in which Academician G.A. Arbatov and Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev have been engaged in the pages of our newspapers, he cannot help but note that with each newly published article their discussion is becoming less and less constructive. It is taking on the characteristics of a "dialogue of the deaf" in which the sides strive not so much to understand one another as much as to inflict more pain. Academician Arbatov, it seems to us, thrives to a particularly great extent on this. His recently published materials on military-strategic issues (see *OGONEK*, Nos. 17 and 22 of this year) are permeated with a veritable hunter's zeal. Their "denunciatory ardor" seems to have been rented out by the academician from his recent works on exposing "the aggressive essence of American imperialism."

And although Arbatov states that he is in favor of "honest, principled, and good-natured dialogue" on military issues, the tone of his current pronouncements in the press are more indicative of the opposite. Their clearly confrontational spirit, blunt irreconcilability with anyone's conclusions except his own, a striving to discredit not so much the reasoning of his opponents as the opponents themselves (we need only consider the quite controversial thesis of deceptive generals)—all of this constitutes something far removed from the constructiveness which must comprise the spirit in which such complex problems are discussed. As far as the academician's reasoning itself is concerned, it suffers in a number of particular instances and—most importantly—in its conclusions, in our view, from extreme oversimplification, if not actual bias.

Unfortunately, although the counter-conclusions of Marshal Akhromeyev are sustained in a spirit of far greater propriety, they too, it seems, are a long way from exhaustively uncovering the essence of the problems under discussion.

One gets the impression that both authors are applying the same, entirely simple methodology in their argumentation, which amounts in the final analysis to a scrupulous calculation of the amounts of military expenditures

and quantity of arms possessed by the USSR and United States. Here the similarity of their methodology does not prevent them from pursuing completely opposite objectives in their dispute. Arbatov exerts every effort striving to prove the excessiveness of our military forces, and Akhromeyev insists on their reasonable sufficiency. Appropriate figures result: Arbatov shows those which support his calculations, and Akhromeyev—his own. It must be stated that in no way does everything go smoothly with regard to the factual reasoning of both debate participants. In their polemic zeal they sometimes show no special concern for standing on ceremony with the facts, fitting these in with the conclusions they require. Arbatov, for example, discourses on U.S. military expenditures, insisting that these show a clear trend towards reduction. In this regard, he uses the concept of so-called "budget authority" of the U.S. Department of Defense which, in his view, is "a more indicative and accurate" criterion in determining the level of military effort. The only thing not understood is why—if this is indeed true—the entire world uses the actual figures of states' military expenditures and not some "budgetary authority." Description of the military might of states begins with data on the size of military expenditures in any foreign military reference.

And this contains its own logic. For expenditure, as opposed to "authority," comprises already substantiated military might, armament programs actually implemented—hundreds and thousands of missiles, tanks, aircraft. While "budget authority" is something ephemeral in essence and readily adaptable to adjustment in this direction or that. We have one measure of this authority today, and tomorrow—look, there's another. Any country, especially such a powerful country as the United States, can easily adjust its "budget authority" in the sphere of defense toward augmentation—as was done by Washington, for example, after the United States entered into World War II. In precisely this manner, today's American Congress can vote additional military appropriations if the world situation deteriorates; i.e., in the space of one hour it can sharply increase this same "budget authority." We are all witnesses of recent events in which the United States (after Iraq "annexed" Kuwait in August of this year), without consideration of any financial expenditures, swiftly built up a very powerful contingent of its armed forces in Saudi Arabia and in the Persian Gulf.

As far as real defense expenditures are concerned, according to official NATO assessments published in the magazine *NATO—SIXTEEN NATIONS* (December 1989-January 1990, pp 50-51), U.S. military appropriations in constant 1980 prices grew from \$138,191,000,000 in 1980 to \$194,647,000,000 in 1989. Here we should note for the sake of objectivity that 1989 expenditures are a bit over \$5 billion less than for the peak year of 1986, but are nonetheless \$20 billion greater than the costs incurred by the United States during the period of the Vietnam War, and \$64 billion greater than after it ended. It should be emphasized that all expenditures are cited in constant (i.e., comparable) 1980 prices.

which Academician Arbatov insists upon. Incidentally, we see a curious picture emerging in recent times. According to that same official NATO data, U.S. military expenditures in 1989 were reduced by \$2 billion in comparison with the previous year. But the combined military expenditures of the other NATO states increased by this very amount at the same time! The result: Total volume of NATO military appropriations remained at its prior level.

The data here presented make it impossible to agree with the director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician G.A. Arbatov, in seeing any serious reduction of present U.S. military efforts and those of the military alliance it heads. Of course the situation in this sphere may change significantly in the coming years. But it is very doubtful that the Americans and their allies will capture the initiative with respect to limitations on military effort. The present White House leadership has stated unequivocally that it is prepared to reduce military appropriations only if it becomes convinced there has been a significant decrease in the "Soviet military threat." Recent events in Eastern Europe, the unilateral withdrawal of our forces from this region, and the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men are apparently convincing them of this. So here, as a step taken in response (I emphasize—in response), we see the Pentagon beginning to consider the possibility of curtailing its budget and personnel strength by 25 percent. But this consists only of discussions at present, while on our part we are seeing a real reduction in military readiness.

The emphasis Academician Arbatov makes in his argumentation on comparing military capabilities of the two rival states, the USSR and United States, appears to be unjustified. He completely ignores the indisputable fact that other powers allied with the United States also confront the Soviet Union in the military-political sphere, states with powerful military and economic potential (the FRG, Great Britain, France, etc.), while our own country has no allies equivalent to these powerful states. Arbatov finds it suitable to calculate the correlation of forces on a bilateral Soviet-American basis, since this allows speculative discussion of our "unwarranted advantages" in a number of spheres. But a truly accurate calculation of the correlation of forces can be made only on a bloc basis, taking into account the aggregate military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and NATO—in the manner this is done at the Vienna negotiations on reducing conventional armaments and forces in Europe. In this regard it would be proper to take into account the current crisis situation of the Warsaw Pact and the great likelihood it will be further weakened in the near future.

When Was Academician Arbatov Right?

A strange impression is left by Comrade Arbatov's references to being uninformed earlier in military matters. Here he contradicts himself, on the one hand basing

his competence in this sphere on his experience on the front and 20 years in the position of director of the Institute of the United States and Canada, and on the other—asserting that he had been fooled up until recently with regard to the true scope of Soviet military might. To present things today in such a manner—stating that the director of one of the main research centers in the sphere of foreign policy was operating blindly, developing recommendations over the years concerning key foreign policy decisions without a knowledge of the true state of affairs—is in our view tantamount to Academician Arbatov's directly underestimating the level of education not only of his opponents, but in fact of all his readers. Entirely apparent in this, and not particularly plausible, is his desire to free himself from sharing responsibility for our past policy, which in all fairness is attributable to the academician himself as well as to his colleagues.

Arbatov writes that distorted information lay at the foundation of his former views, that he "did not know the state of affairs regarding the military budget, nuclear armaments, or the state of military forces in Europe." Fine. We will allow this. But what has changed since that time? Could it be that all data on the state of defense of the country has been made public in the USSR? And that this revolutionized the views of the academician? By no means. "Again that damned uncertainty," "our military comrades are very unwilling to stop concealing the truth—you have to squeeze it out of them drop by drop, and this 'truth' is constantly changing; one statement contradicts another," "the main bulk of information remains secret, as before"—this is how Arbatov evaluates the situation today regarding military information in the USSR. And he draws the conclusion: "Again we are forced to consult Western sources." But these very sources were accessible to the prominent academician even in the 1970's. Why did he not arrive then at the same conclusions he is making now? After all, at that time he knew quite well the "truth" he is declaring only today with such fervor. But this is precisely the point—that in the "stagnation" years Arbatov categorically did not agree with it. And now, possessing in fact the same volume of information (our sources, as he himself admits, remain basically inaccessible), he agrees with it. To explain the paradox we face here based on the academician's version, under the assertion that he has finally "recognized the truth," is logically impossible. It would be good if Georgiy Arkadyevich himself acknowledged this circumstance and agreed with the obvious fact that the "revolution" in his world outlook occurred simultaneously with the change of political leadership in our country and the change in main reference points of USSR foreign policy in the mid-1980's. No sooner and no later.

Apparently aware of the decline of his moral position (all the same it is not becoming for such a respectable individual to abandon his prior convictions so readily), the academician can find nothing better than to come down upon his opponent in the fashion of the crude

principle of the marketplace—"And who the hell are you?" (OGONEK No 22, 1990). It is impossible not to note, however, that in accusing Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev of every variety of sin, G.A. Arbatov is in the decisive point entirely unable to "finish off" the marshal—for as opposed to him, Akhromeyev has made no 180 degree shifts in his convictions and today supports, in fact, the very same positions on a number of defense issues he did 10-15 years ago. He may be accused of conservatism on this account, of course, but this can in no way be seen as wishy-washiness or opportunism, of which the academician is clearly guilty. And whatever one might say, these are "two big differences."

Still another aspect of the problem of no small importance emerges in connection with this. The fact of the matter is that practically all the scholarly works of the respected academician—to which he owes his position as the luminary of Soviet Americanology—were written in the so-called stagnation years and devoted to the foundation of that USSR military-political policy Comrade Arbatov has today exposed to debunking. But you do not have several different truths in science. If Georgiy Arkadyevich is correct in his assessments today, consequently he was incorrect at that time. What we have is a situation in which his prior works were written from fallacious positions and must today be categorized as pseudoscientific. But then the question arises—by what proper right does Comrade Arbatov continue to maintain the lofty vocation of academician, to be numbered among the directors of a leading Soviet institute and enjoy all the privileges which come with this position, if his "outstanding" scholarly achievements are, to put it mildly, strongly exaggerated? Would it not be more proper for him, as an honest man and man of principle, to simply give up that portion of his "regalia of honor" which it turns out is not supported by a golden reserve of scientific truths acquired through the sweat of his brow?

What Does Marshal Akhromeyev Hold Back?

The conclusions drawn by Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, for his part, also seem insufficiently convincing in a number of instances. In particular, when he uses indices expressed in current prices to prove the growth in American military expenditures—and not in constant prices (which Academician G.A. Arbatov indicates, and correctly so, is the only scientific approach).

The way in which the Marshal tries to prove the correctness of his calculations of strength of the USSR and U.S. Armed Forces is also entirely subject to dispute. In his article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (12 May of this year) he lists in the most highly detailed manner the combat composition of the American Armed Forces, down to number of divisions, brigades, and combat air wings in the National Guard and Armed Forces Reserves. It would be logical to compare these data with the corresponding indices for our Armed Forces. But S.F. Akhromeyev fails to do this for some reason, leaving

the reader with the involuntary suspicion that he has consciously left out something important.

Also a cause of bewilderment, to put it mildly, is the nature of Comrade Akhromeyev's argument on the advisability of constructing aircraft carriers in the USSR. "At present they are necessary," the Marshal writes. "That is the situation in the world." As simple as that. Understand it as you wish. It is felt that in this instance Sergey Fedorovich should be less laconic. The issue rightly deserves it. A number of experts believe, for example, that the aircraft carrier construction program is nothing other than a vestige of the Brezhnev era when the Soviet naval leadership headed by USSR Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov developed arrogant and ambitious plans for competing with the Americans on all seas and oceans in keeping with the overall spirit of the foreign policy of that time. Perhaps in the light of present-day realities of our foreign policy and the state of the country's economy, construction of aircraft carriers can in no way be justified?! Reference to the presence in the United States of 15 carrier groups is hardly convincing—after all, one must take into account the difference in geostrategic position between the United States and Soviet Union. Defense of sea lines of communication is indeed a vitally important question for America, while for us this is a less severe problem. Marshal Akhromeyev also skirts in silence G.A. Arbatov's question, entirely justified, regarding reasons for the quite substantial difference in rates of production of ground forces armament in the USSR and United States. Indeed, why does the USSR continue annually to manufacture more tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery systems, and certain other types of armament than the United States, when we have a significant superiority in these? The marshal's silence does not add weight to his position.

What Then Is All the Fuss About?

It must be said that several levels are discernible in the approach of the academician and the marshal in assessing the military might of the USSR and United States.

First of all, they are debating the total strength ratios of the armed forces of the two powers. Here each has chosen appropriate statistics to support his view. It appears, however, that neither debater is correct in principle. Comrade Akhromeyev, for example, arbitrarily excludes from total Soviet Armed Forces strength those serving as border and railroad troops. Even in view of the specific nature of their service, these are nonetheless soldiers who wear a uniform and know how to shoot—and in fact border troops are among the most well trained officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers.

And we can hardly agree with the fact that the marshal refuses entirely to take into account in the correlation of forces several million Soviet servicemen in the first-line reserve. But these are our soldiers of yesterday, trained specialists who constitute the mobilization resources of

many cadre divisions. According to data given by the marshal himself, most major units in the Warsaw Pact are maintained in a reduced configuration in peacetime—they have only 12-18 percent of their wartime personnel strength. These units have their armament and combat equipment (PRAVDA, 2 Mar 1989). The question arises: Can we, on the basis of reality, fail to take into account the assigned composition of these divisions which comprise "the majority of Warsaw Pact forces" and which, just a few days after the start of mobilization, are to be deployed to their wartime establishment?

Academician Arbatov, in turn, is also at fault when he clearly underestimates the mobilization capacities of the United States, and when he reduces them in fact to the current strength of the regular American Armed Forces. It is simply awkward to have to remind the academician of the U.S. experience of World War II days when they introduced universal military service and were able to mobilize a multimillion man army in an extremely short period of time. There is no basis for believing that the Americans would not be up to this today as well. Especially since in the event of mobilization the draft contingent would naturally be used in headquarters and major units requiring the least degree of qualification, the backbone of their mass army being comprised of today's professional military servicemen.

Generally speaking, we can conclude that the dispute over who has the greater number of "soldiers" seems somewhat pointless.

With regard to assessments by both parties of quantity of armament possessed by the sides, there is no substantive divergence between them at all. Indeed, as far as naval forces are concerned, both parties agree that the United States has significant unilateral advantages in this sphere. The same applies practically speaking to their assessment of ground forces armament, with the exception that here the participants in the debate agree in the view that the Soviet Union has a definite advantage. Arbatov works actively on proving this thesis using data from fairly well known foreign sources (confirmed to a great degree in recent times by official Soviet statistics), while Akhromeyev prefers not to dispute his calculations, acknowledging for his part that in postwar years the USSR and its allies deployed in Europe a powerful grouping of ground forces, chiefly armor troops, and created a military threat to U.S. allies in Western Europe. Moreover, the marshal agrees with the fact that this threat has existed right up to most recent times (PRAVDA, 30 October 1989).

The question arises: What then is all the fuss about? The point is that from essentially identical establishments of fact, the participants in the debate reach diametrically opposed conclusions on the main question: What do we do with Soviet superiority in the sphere of conventional ground forces armament?

Without any further ado, G.A. Arbatov draws a line under his discussion—this superiority is "unnecessary."

the Army should be radically reduced, including on a unilateral basis. S.F. Akhromeyev, for his part, believes that there exists on the whole a military balance between the USSR and United States, in the framework of which our superiority in ground force armament is compensated by the American prominence in other varieties of military power, primarily in naval systems. The marshal's position proceeds from this—that if something is to be reduced, it must be reduced on an equal footing.

In particular, it is not understood why the well-informed academician takes into account only quantitative indices when discussing the correlation of forces between the USSR and United States. After all, he knows better than anyone that with respect to most of the latest technology—which comprises the basis of modern combat equipment—we still lag significantly behind the Americans. Consequently if we want to maintain a balance, we are compelled to resort to compensating for our deficit in quality through a certain surplus in quantity of armaments. And there is nothing new in this. Our defense has traditionally been structured on an advantage using extensional principles. Good or bad—that is the way it is. Incidentally, in June 1941 we had 20,000 tanks against 5,000 German tanks. And even that did not prevent Guderian from reaching Moscow itself. People will respond: What advantage in quantity of arms must we have today in order to prevent a recurrence of this? Will Comrade Arbatov be daring enough to define this proportion?

Every country and every army has its strong and weak points. We are neither America nor Germany—so what do you do?! Russia has its own historically formulated approaches to ensuring security. And to demand that it turn itself inside out in order to be able to equate itself with America with respect to every index is clearly not the best way to proceed.

It must be said in general that the prosecutorial tone used by the director of the Institute of the United States and Canada in holding the Soviet military-industrial complex up to shame for "living off the people" elicits bewilderment, to put it mildly. The academician is somehow easily distracted from the fact that we are talking about a country that quite recently (in historical terms) experienced a horrible military catastrophe which cost it tens of millions of lives. We are talking about a people who endured such heavy psychological trauma that they were prepared to go naked and hungry if that would prevent another invasion. Is it moral to accuse the political and military leadership of such a country if, in fulfillment of a virtually universal popular command, they used every power and means to create a defensive shield with great toughness? It is fashionable today to talk about "crafty generals" but we feel this should not be done!

On the other hand, the marshal's demand for arms reductions on an equal footing, when we have a significant advantage on the land and the Americans at sea, also seems to be unrealistic. In actuality, in order to

advance this process the Americans should be convinced to effect a radical reduction of their naval forces. And there can be no doubt but that they will not agree to this. A navy is too important in the global role America has no intention of giving up. Consequently we see an impasse here.

Argumentation...On the Level of Oversimplification

So what should be done, taking into consideration the fact that the arms race, in its present hypertrophic state, must be terminated? Can it be there is no way out of the military-strategic impasse we see today which would be acceptable to us—which is not related to capitulatory concessions or setting terms we know will be unacceptable to the other side? It is felt the situation is not quite so—but more about this later.

All figure-based calculations of the correlation of forces between the sides, Marshal Akhromeyev notes justifiably, have meaning only in their linkage with an assessment of the existing and potential military threat. Arbatov's position in this key point is simply not visible—which is somewhat strange, generally speaking, for an individual who claims to be rendering definitive judgments in a given sphere. If his cited references to "lowering the military threat" do prove something, it is only that he is not up to handling this problem area. In essence, the very absence of a meaningful assessment of the military threat turns any discussion on the topic of military structuring into outright speculation.

Arbatov is perplexed at why he is accused of evading an appraisal of the military threat to the Soviet Union. "This sphere—analysis of the international situation and military-political threat—is precisely my specialty, my profession, and it is simply absurd to hear from S.F. Akhromeyev that I am moving away from such topics," the offended academician exclaims. But that is exactly the point. Georgiy Arkadyevich evades serious discussion of this issue, disposing of it through maxims which might be forgivable only for a first-year student: "The fact that the military danger has lessened is clear to everyone who opens his eyes, reads the newspaper, or listens to the radio..." This is the nature of his argumentation, if one can call it that.

And the fact that Arbatov similarly does not even wish to understand how unacceptable such an oversimplified approach is to such a serious question as "threat assessment" does not do him any honor. Or is it that he understands everything while consciously oversimplifying the issue, adapting his views to the mass philistine stereotype?! But that is a completely unscrupulous approach.

Things are somewhat more complicated with respect to this question when we consider Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev's stance. In our view he approaches evaluation of the military threat in entirely too traditional a fashion, assessing it primarily through the prism of "the insidious designs of American imperialism," for which—there is no use in hiding it—few people today

still believe in such a direct interpretation. It seems to us, in the given instance, that we should more thoroughly examine the issue of the nature of the military threat in general, and of the circumstances under which it may emerge and change. We must focus attention on the existence of potential threats proceeding from volatility in the geostrategic situation and the military-economic capabilities of various states in the world. To reduce the entire matter merely to American bases and the Pentagon budget is really too great an oversimplification.

In a certain sense, it is precisely the insufficiency of S.F. Akhromeyev's argumentation on this issue which gives G.A. Arbatov an opportunity to harp on the marshal's excessive suspiciousness, his uncertainty regarding favorable development of the world situation, and present himself as an individual with a much broader understanding of the problem. Nonetheless, the healthy cautiousness of Sergey Fedorovich's approach and his evaluation of probable threats make a much stronger impression than the optimism of his opponent, as limitless as it is groundless.

Is Tranquil Existence Possible in an Extremely Weakened State?

It should be added that it is necessary, in attempting to evaluate the likely military threat, to take into account not only external, but internal factors of its formation as well. The fact of the matter is that the field of actual and potential threats presently existing in the world is formed in accordance with the global balance of power we see today and is subject to changes as this balance evolves. We are experiencing precisely such an evolution today—and as far as we might be able to judge, the course it is taking is not particularly favorable to us. The formation of a new correlation of forces in the world will inevitably be accompanied by modification in the structure of the threats—which, undoubtedly, must increase for those states which become weaker. The clear weakening of the USSR and its system of international alliances we see today points to a high probability of heightened danger for our country in the future. It is necessary for us to realize quite clearly that an assessment of the military threat which actually exists today comprises a far from exhaustive treatment of this topic, insofar as in determining the parameters of structuring the armed forces (calculated to cover decades) it is necessary to predict the probable size of future threats—which in our case, taking into account the general weakness of the USSR, can hardly be expected to decrease. We must precisely understand the fact that the level of USSR interests and rights in the world arena avowed earlier for us was secured through the former, relatively greater military-political potential of our state. Without a doubt, our rights were respected because they were backed up by sufficient strength. With a reduction in this strength, the level of security regarding our interests will fall, and consequently they will be less respected. From this point only one step remains before the emergence of immediate threats which, we must suppose, will not be slow in appearing once our weakness

reaches a critical point. This process has already begun in essence. The Soviet Union has too many "attentive" neighbors—from Germany in the west and Iran in the south, to China and Japan in the east—to allow us to exist in tranquility within our present borders (encompassing one-sixth more or less of the earth's land area) in a state of extreme internal weakness.

In our view, it is precisely within the context of such an interdependence between a state's level of might and the level of threats existing against it that such ideas should be approached as those extremely popular today of hasty, unilateral disarmament and universal disintegration of the Union as an unified state. Academician Arbatov, the ideologist advocating such disarmament, should recognize that the lowering somewhat of military danger to our country which is indeed taking place at present and on which basis he is structuring all his reasoning is the consequence primarily of the USSR attainment of a certain level of military-strategic might, and that with the loss of this level of might the magnitude of the threat will most likely grow proportionally.

The excessive attention devoted by the academician and the marshal in their discussions to calculating the armaments of the sides has somehow shaded the entirely important fact that in evaluating the military potential of states, especially such powerful states as the USSR and the United States, it is clearly inadequate to take into account only the amount they have on hand of warheads, tanks, and soldiers. Not last to enter into this concept, but perhaps even first and foremost, should be such components as overall economic potential, the demographic situation, the geopolitical factor, and the moral-political condition of society. In this regard we cannot help but agree with writer K. Rash, who believes that "there is no subject in nature void of a relationship to defense." In developing his thesis, Karem Bagirovich Rash cites a poignant example. He writes: "The French accused the movie *Foggy Waterfront* of facilitating the destruction of France. At first glance this may seem paradoxical, but only at first glance. Through the interminable grief it depicted, the film destroyed the nation morally. We recall that the French went to see this movie before the war the same way that we, in our time, went to see *Chapayev* and *We From Kronstadt*. I do not know how many armored divisions were saved for the Fascists by *Foggy Waterfront*, but one thing is certain—the film, made in France, did not fight on the side of the French."

To isolate out of the entire aggregate of factors which comprise the defensive potential of states just the "weapons" parameter alone, as is being done by our esteemed participants in the debate, is entirely incorrect from a scientific point of view. If we consider things that way, then we are forced to conclude, for example, that prior to World War II the United States was one of the weakest states in the world, because back in 1940 the American Army was just about as tiny as the Greek Army. At the same time, even then America had at its disposal a colossal military-economic potential which, being put into action, turned the country in a number of months

into the strongest military power in the world. Thus, a truly accurate calculation of the correlation of forces must take into account all components of the defensive might of states. We can limit ourselves to calculations of tanks and soldiers only in the ideal case when all other parameters with respect to rival powers appear to be approximately equal.

There is not even a hint of such equality, however, in the Soviet-American strategic balance. In particular, it is universally recognized how distressing to the USSR is the correlation of Soviet and American economic potentials. Suffice it to say that, according to the latest data from Soviet economists (V. Selyukin, in particular), the gross national product of the USSR comprises something around 15-20 percent of the American level. Nor is a comparison of geopolitical conditions between the Soviet Union and America any more favorable for the USSR. The USSR is situated at the crossroads of the major axes of conflict in the modern world, while the United States prospers on the geopolitical periphery of civilization.

An approach to evaluating the military-strategic balance only by calculating quantities of armaments the sides possess is, essentially, the reflection of an obsolete concept which traces its beginnings to the Brezhnev era, structured basically not on reality but on ideological dogma. The latter stated specifically that "the camp of imperialism" would weaken hopelessly and give up its global positions while the USSR and its allies grew stronger day by day. It is precisely this principle—as optimistic as it was distant from reality—which made it possible for our leadership of that time to pull out of the Soviet-American military-strategic equation its economic, geopolitical, demographic, and socio-psychological parameters.

Today, when we have finally begun to realize how deep is the gulf which separates our economic potential from that of the Americans, it is becoming evident as well that we have been too hasty in abstracting this parameter from consideration in analyzing the correlation of forces. Moreover, in acting this way we have been working against ourselves. And the fact that academician Arbatov even today has no doubts regarding the correctness of such an approach shows how solidly these postulates of the Brezhnev era which have disgraced themselves are etched into his world view.

In continuing to adhere to the narrow (purely military) interpretation of the balance of forces under conditions of a gigantic disproportion in USSR and U.S. economic potential, we are actually working toward the achievement of American world hegemony. Strictly speaking, the Americans are entirely satisfied with the elimination of a great portion of the military arsenals of both sides because in this event the most powerful and decisive trump card—overwhelming economic superiority—will remain on their side untouched. While with us, in such event, nothing will remain, unless you consider our shattered, non-competitive economy. We can argue as

long as we like, of course, with respect to how exactly the Americans will use the break-up in their favor of military-strategic parity—for good or for evil. Certainly you cannot rule out the one or the other. But the important thing for us in this instance is the fact that as a result of seemingly equitable reductions in arms which it would seem should provide equal security for the USSR and the United States, one of the sides—i.e., the USSR—will wind up deprived of any significant instruments whatsoever of influencing the world situation, while the other side, the United States, will continue to possess them in full, as before.

Such is the "algebra" of the military-strategic balance, which argues as we can see with the "arithmetic" for which our esteemed participants in the debate show a preference. Yes, that is how the history of the Soviet Union took shape—it established itself primarily in one-sided fashion as a highly developed military power. Incidentally, there is no telling what the United States would have turned into if it had a past such as ours. The power, security, and tranquility of the USSR have historically been concentrated in military might. America's tranquility and security have been found in its flourishing civilian economy. Both sides embedded their major assets into these priority spheres.

A Captive of Delusions, or Who's Got Who "On the Hook"

They are actually demanding today that the USSR unilaterally repudiate what has historically comprised the basis of our national existence, assuring us that as soon as we manage to do this we will acquire a new importance—in a peace-oriented, civilian economy which will supposedly ensure our stable prosperity. Must we even address how groundless such promises are? Destruction of the basis of our national existence, with subsequent transition to an alternative one, is a process which will take many decades, over the course of which the country will be in a state of utter degradation, lying open to any foreigner regardless of the nobility of his intentions. And with respect to the latter, it would be naive to believe that we are surrounded only by angels and that no one will attempt to take advantage of the USSR's powerlessness to grab a bigger piece of the pie. Examples of this are abundant in the history of our native land and one would be hard put to recall the opposite taking place. And so the question arises—will the country be able to simply exist until such time as it is able to re-emerge on a new basis?

To continue disarmament negotiations on the basis of the ideology being defended by Academician Arbatov constitutes essentially a delusion, whose consequence might in the very near future constitute the conclusive sociopolitical downfall of the Soviet Union. The West makes no effort to conceal its pleasure as it pursues agreements with the Soviet Union in the military sphere, since every such agreement (even arithmetically equal agreements—although we are actually moving readily toward the signing of unequal agreements!) will inflict a

heavy, one-sided strike against the might of the Soviet Union and its capabilities to counteract the pressure of external forces.

Today we are still reckoned with and treated as equals. They try not to strike an authoritative tone with us (you don't want the fish to wriggle off the hook!), but all of that might end tomorrow. It is far from accidental that people have come to refer to the June 1990 meeting in Washington between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush as the last meeting of the leaders of the two superpowers. The theme of a single superpower—America—resounds more and more loudly in the mass media, including the Soviet mass media. But all this is just a taste of things to come, it is felt. Over the years and decades the USSR has ranked as a superpower, and the majority of our citizens have become so accustomed to this that they could hardly even imagine things being somehow different. But well they might—and in the very near future! If we continue along this same road.

What should be done with respect to the situation which has come about? Where can we find a way out? First of all, it is felt, we must reject the arithmetic approach to treating problems of security on which basis the current disarmament negotiations are being conducted. Finally, we must cease adhering to the fallacious conviction that this path is capable of drawing us decisively closer to resolution of our socioeconomic problems or to a radical reformation of the basis of our national existence. We must recognize that the path of accelerated demolition of these bases—even with the most noble of intentions—is a dangerous and foolish undertaking.

We should move on, proceeding from the differences history has shaped in the nature of these national foundations in the USSR and United States, and from an acknowledgement that we cannot allow their radical break-up, especially under conditions where it is impossible to replace them in an adequate and timely fashion. The realistic political course for both sides must be based on a recognition of the historical originality of these foundations and of the right of each to exist, in any case over the course of a certain transition period.

Supporting this logic, it would be unjustified, for example, for the United States to insist on an immediate leveling of USSR military might with its own without corresponding positive moves being taken in the state of the USSR civilian economy. In the meantime, the United States today categorically rejects such linkage, striving to achieve a unilateral weakening of the USSR. The Americans are working toward destruction of our military potential while the civilian sector of the Soviet economy lies in deep stagnation, as before.

Why Should U.S. Security Be Paid For Exclusively by the Soviet Union?

Of course we can agree that the United States' claims to equal security with the USSR in the military sphere are justified. But the question arises—why must this security be achieved not at their expense, but only at cost to us?

In the disarmament process which has begun, realistically speaking, we are reducing our armaments by far greater quantities than is America; i.e., we are suffering unilateral losses amounting to tens of billions of rubles. In essence, this sum constitutes the price at which the national security of the United States is being purchased. The only thing not understood is why an acquisition so valuable to the Americans must be paid for exclusively by the Soviet Union. It would be logical on the part of the United States to agree to at least equivalent expenditures for the sake of assisting the USSR in establishing its civilian economy. This would constitute a truly bilateral movement—we for our part reducing our military potential to a level acceptable to the United States, and the Americans for their part providing us economic assistance in the same amount, thereby facilitating a relatively successful USSR transition to a new basis of national existence.

One must note that the Americans are in no great hurry to share their billions with us, especially since the Soviet side is not insisting on it, agreeing submissively to suffer colossal unilateral losses in the disarmament process. Yet Comrade Arbatov is still not satisfied, as if saying—look fellows, we are too slow in accomplishing disarmament, we are dragging our feet.

We are absolutely convinced that the tremendous military potential which has been accumulated by the Soviet Union cannot be simply thrown out the window for nothing in return. It can and should be put to work for our renaissance. It must become a significant factor of exerting pressure on our Western "counterparts" so as to enable our country to put its economic affairs in order and set out toward new frontiers. In order to do this, we must as a minimum resolutely reject the present perverse concept of disarmament negotiations and espouse a new, more all-encompassing version which integrates the entirety of military and economic issues. This shift must be accomplished as soon as possible, in view of the critical state our country finds itself in.

The West should pay some bills for our economic restructuring if it seriously wants to put an end once and for all to the specter of the "Soviet military threat" which poisons its existence.

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Military CPSU Congress Delegates' Speeches

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[Text]

Speeches by Serviceman Delegates at the 28th CPSU Congress at the Section "Ideological Work"

Col Gen G. Stefanovskiy, Chief of the Directorate of Ideological Work and Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy

Comrades, upon instructions from the section's presidium I have been asked to clarify the figures which my respected compatriots have mentioned here. If I am in error then I request that I be corrected. The representative of Uzbekistan, Comrade Khashimov, said that over the 18 months some 671 representatives of the republic had been killed in the army. I am reporting that according to the statistics available in the Ministry of Defense and the main military procuracy, over the 18 months as a result of accidents and crimes some 240 men were killed last year in the Army and Navy and 74 this year. That is a total of 314 persons. Of this number 72 persons committed suicide and this is 23 percent. In their predominant majority suicide was committed by persons having mental problems, by drug addicts or sick persons. Last year nine men were killed due to the cause of hazing and four persons this year. Unfortunately, this figure is all the same high and it shows that there are many problems both in induction and in education. It should be emphasized that over 60 percent of those killed were among the construction troops.

I would like to report to my compatriots as well as to everyone present here that a decision was taken at one of the last sessions of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Defense and State Security that as of next year the military construction units which are in a number of the civilian ministries are to be broken up and subsequently the military construction units are to be somewhat reduced in the Ministry of Defense and this will provide an opportunity to improve the quality of recruiting the youth into the army as well as the effectiveness of education in the troops.

I would like to mention one further detail. As yet we have not grown accustomed to the fact that as of this year induction into the Army and Navy is to be carried out upon the decision of the Soviet government and not upon the orders of the minister of defense. Considering this, the local authorities, that is, the soviets and their executive committees and not merely the military commissariats, are responsible for the call-up. For this reason I would like to request that in the interest of improving the preparation of the youth for service in the army and reduce the call-up of the unfit for military service, we must harden the demands made on the local bodies, including the military commissariats. Through the USSR Ministry of Defense we are strengthening control over the work of the military commissariats, including on the questions of organizing induction into the Army and Navy. An improvement in this work combined with improving the education of the personnel, which is one of the elements in the reform being carried out in the Armed Forces, will make it possible to raise the effectiveness from the efforts of protecting the life and health

of the servicemen of all nationalities, including the Uzbeks. This is our common pain. There has been a trend toward a decline in the death rate, including from suicide, but this is still insignificant. For these tragedies, I would like to seek the forgiveness of the mothers and fathers who are also in this audience and assure them that we will do everything to exclude the death of persons carrying out their military duty. Let us together and in a concerned manner carry out this important, practical task. Thank you for your attention.

**Speeches of Serviceman Delegates at the Section
"Socioeconomic Policy of the CPSU"**

Col Gen M. Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces

Respected comrades! I am no economist and no manager but I have been brought to this section by one major question which I must report on to the delegates of the 28th Party Congress and clearly request your support.

I am the person entrusted by the Soviet government for the withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces. Over the 34 years of its existence, the Southern Group of Forces has acquired fixed material resources valued at 2.5 billion rubles.

I must say that at present there is a painful situation for us caused by the position of the Hungarian leadership. On 26 June, I met with the Hungarian president and prime minister. They announced their decision that they intended to call for a zero balance for the reciprocal payments, that is, neither they owed us nor we owed them. They consider that we were engaged merely in ruining the ecology of Hungary.

I turned with this request to the government and personally to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and reported at the beginning of the work of this congress. Prior to this I had followed up all channels and at present request that the Soviet government participate in resolving this question. What are the ways for a settlement?

In the first place, we currently are pumping our energy resources to Hungary which as a result in a single year receives \$1.5 billion in profit. We are aware that as of 1 January next year we will convert to a new convertible currency. Clearly, one of the levers is the fact that we could possibly convert to trade with Hungary in this currency as of tomorrow. Then probably some \$750 million would remain in the treasury of the Soviet state.

The second way is to establish joint enterprises and turn over all our property of the Southern Group of Forces as proportional participation to the joint enterprises. We have proposed this to the Hungarian side but, unfortunately, they say that we must leave everything to them and then we will sell all of this to the joint enterprises and then we can purchase all of this from them. That is funny, but we must laugh through our tears.

And thirdly, and I assume in truth, that over there the Hungarians are already saying that I am a very active

general, I propose putting off the withdrawal of the Southern Group of Forces for at least a week. And force them to settle up with us. As of today we have turned over 30 military camps worth 300 million rubles of foreign exchange and for now have not received anything. Moreover, we are leaving on Hungarian territory some 14,300 apartments built with Soviet money. And I am withdrawing to Soviet territory some 13,000 apartmentless persons.

I am appealing to the leaders of the local soviet and party organizations. Of course I realize that where our troops are to be withdrawn there is already social tension over the apartments and we will further exacerbate this. And I would like to ask you to realize that in the army at present are young, healthy persons. I should tell you that a lieutenant, captain or major at present alone cannot feed his family if the wife does not work. I should also say that at present the family of a young officer is unable to have a second child because the officer cannot support it.

I would like to report that here there was a request to tell the Central Committee of those advantages which the leadership has. Allow me on behalf of my comrade generals to report to you the benefits which we currently have. I have served 37 years in the army and during these 37 years I have moved 16 times. And you are aware that each move is a minor conflagration in the home. I served all my years in the Transbaykal, in the Arctic, in the Transcaucasus and overseas. In truth, I studied twice in Moscow. This is the first benefit. The second. Currently Mr. Rood Andersen, the U.S. military attache in Hungary, receives a monthly salary which I receive in 18 months. And for a regimental commander who is a colonel, this would be the equivalent of 2 or 2 1/2 years. And this is his monthly salary. That is our second benefit.

I would like to reply to the mass information media and primarily to the publication KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA which recently has been subscribed to by remarkable persons including scientists, people's deputies in order for there to be balanced criticism. We say that we do have shortcomings, unfortunately people are being killed, there are improper relations, but I would ask the mass information media to take up that enormous service provided in the army as it currently exists. And primarily objectively.

It is painful to realize that at present our party is also on the brink of splitting together with the Soviet people and our nation. The party is being accused of all imaginable and unimaginable sins and it seems to me that this is criminal. How is it possible to accuse the communists of all generations the minor and the steel caster, the equipment operator and scientist, the grain grower, the soldier and the officer merely for the fact that the communists had the right to be the first to go into the attack, and that the communists carried the basic burden on their shoulders during the years of the Great Patriotic War and in the postwar reconstruction of the national economy, for

developing the virgin lands, for building the KamAZ [Kama Motor Vehicle Plant], the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline] and other major construction projects. During the years of the Cold War, the communists established the Strategic Missile Troops and the Navy which currently serve the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. I thank you for your attention. (Applause)

Capt 2d Rank O. Bodruk, Senior Instructor at the Kiev Higher Military Signals Engineer School imeni M.I. Kalinin

I, of course, understand the problems which have been voiced from the rostrum. We have discussed all the problems of all the regions, we have discussed railroad ties, we have discussed the necessity of citrus planting but we have not discussed a specific program for social protection or that position which the party will hold and must work out under the conditions of a market economy. I feel that the government's position in this situation will begin to slip since we are changing the structure of production relations and namely we are changing relations in the process of production and we are introducing new forms of ownership. We are changing relations in the process of exchange and distribution, that is, we are introducing a market, a market for goods and a labor force market. But we are not changing the centralized relations, the relations of distribution and consumption. The party has not voiced its attitude to this minimum which should be defined and for which it must struggle under the conditions of this market and which will guarantee something for the worker; we have not voiced our attitude toward centralized distribution which exists in our country.

I am proposing specifically, I am proposing that we begin writing and give some thought and possibly discuss the question that we should resort to partial decentralization of the public consumption funds. Each of us receives a pension, but no one knows why the state grants it to us. Although during all your life deductions are made from the profit which you produce into the state's fund and later, as is needed, the state opens the valve for various needs and spends these funds for needs far distant from the requirements of a person and then decides the question that there are no longer any funds and here you have the basis of the residual financing for the social sphere.

Lt Gen A. Kuntsevich, Deputy Chief of the Chemical Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Comrades! Both our party and our society at present are showing a very serious attitude toward the defense problem. Let us take a look at the existing geostrategic situation. Yes, parity currently exists in the world. The philosophical essence of this parity is that there has not been a World War III since World War II. But what at present is the fate of this parity? There are two trends.

The first trend which is supported by the Soviet Union is gradual disassembly and the second clearly identifiable

military-ideological concept of the West is the disrupting of parity on fundamentally new qualitative parameters.

In this context we are struggling not against the main direction but only for disarmament. In essence we must set a general course of destroying the military ideology of disrupting parity the basis of which is comprised of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the concept of an air-land operation which comprises a new philosophy of war. While in the years 1941-1945 war was made up of motors in the air and on the land, the next war of the 21st Century is conceived of as a humanless war of high-precision automata with a new power-to-weight ratio. Unfortunately, neither the report of the minister of foreign affairs nor the report of the minister of defense dealt with this main general trend and the specific programs of the West in this area. If we do not follow a path of unmasking these views, we will make a grievous error.

What is the essence of the problem? The essence of the problem is that mankind since the 1950s has entered a period of fundamentally new functioning. The 30,000-40,000 years of mankind has begun to develop at an exponential rate. But over the last 30-40 years civilization has entered a fundamentally new phase. We are now developing according to an exponential rate. Just look at the figures: over the entire period of the existence of mankind some $\frac{2}{3}$ of all products have been produced over the last 30 years.

In this new order of things it is inadmissible to disrupt the balance. For this reason such a concept as strategic parity is the basis of not only our sovereignty but is also the basis of the peaceful existence of mankind. If we tolerate a disruption here, then we will make a major error not only in the interests of our people but also all mankind. This is what must be kept in mind in assessing the development of military affairs in the world at the present stage.

Now on the question of disarmament. Comrades! In assessing its activities the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has excessively publicized its activities as an exclusively profitable policy with the incorporation of elements of socialist competition in concluding the treaties. It must not be forgotten that peace requires payment and respectively disarmament requires payment. Let me give you certain examples. I consider the fact that we have destroyed our missiles without preliminary preparation and without conducting scientific research and experimental design work on developing optimum technology for the maximum utilization of the weapons to be an absurdity and the squandering of the people's money. It is absolutely wrong if we in the future will blow up what was created by the people. It is essential to work out enterprising programs, to invest money in this and clearly show the money in the budget so the people will know how much we are paying for disarmament. For example, the destruction of chemical weapons requires around 3-5 billion rubles. This requires some adaptation. This requires a state program and time. We cannot

simply oblige the people to accept this program. It is essential to see the utility of this program.

The next question is that the funds for disarmament, destruction and conversion not be a component part of the defense budget.

The next matter. What does the reunification of Germany mean for the Western Grouping of Soviet Forces? The Western Grouping of Forces will be paid for by hard currency. Comrades, does our country need this problem? Evidently out of economic considerations we will be forced to further reduce the troops, possibly to the detriment of our defense capability. This is a question requiring discussion at the Supreme Soviet as well as the attention of diplomats and the military. We cannot proceed unilaterally along such a path.

Comrades! About the army. I feel the time has come to hold a nationwide referendum on the question of the army and our "i's. We must not create within our state a fifth column which would destroy the army. We must disclose this fifth column and give it the objective assessment of the people! (Applause)

Speeches of Serviceman Congress Delegates at the Section "The Party, Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements"

MSU N. Ogarkov, Chairman of the All-Union Council of Veterans of the War, Labor and USSR Armed Forces

Dear Comrades! In terms of age I am a contemporary of October. I have been the witness and participant in the founding and development of our Soviet state in all its stages. And at present, as a veteran of the war and labor, the party and the Armed Forces, I cannot help but point out that never since the Civil War have the ideas of October, the ideas of Leninism, our social and state system, its state bodies come under such attacks and such testing for strength. Never before has the authority of our party and the authority of power fallen as low as at present.

This naturally cannot help but disconcert all of us. This has been particularly painful for the veterans who along with the party and the nation have gone through many harsh trials and are well aware of just what hard times are. Under the most difficult conditions with weapons in hand they defended the nation against its enemies and over many years unstintingly turned the once backward, completely destroyed peasant nation into the great Soviet power. A majority of them profoundly understands the need to renew society and the party and to really make their worthy contribution to perestroika. And at present, even often being at the very brink of the abyss, in their majority they assume a firm position in life and defend the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, and like good soldiers are straight and orderly and do not follow the example of those who in the first difficulties, in the very first listing of our party ship, in panic have jumped overboard and now from the shore endeavor to depict the veterans who remained on

the ship as some conservative force incapable supposedly of understanding the processes occurring in the party and society.

I am aware that this is not popular but I cannot help but mention this now because the nonobjectivity and at times the openly insulting tone against the veterans in the various OGONEKS and NOVOSTIS, in the Wheels, Views and Seconds [TV programs] cause not merely an insult but a profound heartfelt wound. Many view this as an intentional desire to drive a wedge between the generations, to scatter the healthy forces and prevent their consolidation on the renewed Platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

Moreover, at present, in my opinion, we can no longer help but see that in the nation there is a purposeful, clearly coordinated and, I would say, controlled campaign to totally mock and discredit all of what our older generations fought for. October is no longer any way like October and there was no enthusiasm of the prewar five-year plans. Stalinist repressions and distortions are strongly identified with the essence of socialism. Even the heroism of our people in the Great Patriotic War and their victory are defiled as if it was achieved solely by the penal companies or soldiers of the Chonkin type. Someone has intentionally put into circulation exaggerated figures of our losses, and our saints, our heroes are besmirched, and certain pygmies have even blasphemously gone after the great Lenin. And all of this is often done with sarcasm, with evil intent and mockery, and the ideological conviction of our people, particularly the youth, is intentionally trampled on. The question arises of why this is permitted as certainly the lethality of this is apparent as empty souls are even worse than empty shelves. There has been a heavy rush of indignation about this and not only from the veterans. In recent years, there has probably not been a single Central Committee Plenum where this question was not raised. And no matter how strange it may seem, the situation has not changed. For some reason, the criticism has been stubbornly rejected and essentially ignored. As a result, there has been a true pogrom of our ideological values.

It is perfectly obvious that leadership over the sphere of ideology by the party Central Committee in recent years has been unsatisfactory. In line with this it seems essential, in the first place, to sharply raise the responsibility of the party Central Committee as well as the mass information media for objectivity and soundness of the publications on party, army and national history as well as on analyzing the processes occurring in society. Secondly, the best forces of social scientists must be tapped for a profound elaboration of the theory of democratic socialism so that the people can be clearly and accessibly shown just specifically just what sort of society the party intends to build. In the draft of the congress Program Statement this still remains a bottleneck.

The second question concerns the situation in the nation. As is known, this is deteriorating or in any event it is not improving. Can we really tolerate what has been

happening up to now in Nagornyy Karabakh and around it; what has happened in Sumgait, Tbilisi, Baku, Kirghizia and Fergana? Hundreds of innocent persons have already perished. But there has been no thorough investigation of these events with the punishing of the criminals or the establishing of their ties with the overseas world. Can we really remain calm now when in Lithuania in essence a state coup has been carried out and it is organizing its own army. When in the Baltic they belittle the veterans, our Soviet people and impudently extol former SS members and police, they terrorize and persecute the communists, thwart induction into the army and insult the Soviet servicemen. Or when in Moldavia they humiliate the people's deputies merely because they defend positions of socialism or kill the young man Dmitriy Matyushin merely for the fact that he is Russian. Armenia actually has the staffs of two national armies and scores of thousands of fighters. Similar detachments, including from draftees, are openly being organized in Lithuania, in Estonia, Latvia, Moldavia and Georgia with their own commanders and staffs, with their own weapons and uniforms. Add to all of this the ubiquitous decline in discipline and the unleashing of crime in our nation. This has never been the case before.

In this context, the All-Union Veterans Council has received a flood of letters and requests and has welcomed delegations of veterans. Many of them have the same concerned question: What is happening? What awaits us? Why has the President been silent and the government idle? Why are not such illegal formations disarmed? Why do they not hold liable the violators of Soviet laws and the ukases of the President? However, in reply we often hear that these are merely temporary, natural flaws in perestroika, everything is being reported to the leadership, it is essential not to panic and do your job better. In this context, an analogy arises naturally. We were reminded yesterday of this analogy by one of our comrades who came from Lithuania. In 1941, many reported to the nation's leadership on a possible surprise attack by Nazi Germany against the USSR. And the response to these reports was approximately the same: we must not panic, we must not provide a provocation and tend to your own affairs. And all the reports, as we know, were ignored. But the results of such actions at that time are also well known to us. Are not the current actions of the leadership reminiscent of the situation a half-century ago? I propose that the party in the existing situation cannot remain an impartial observer. Order must be established in the nation. The time has come to clearly set out the conditions and finally begin to act for everyone who should, beginning with the President. And first of all, we must immediately disarm and disband the illegally established formations and organizations. (Applause)

In conclusion, I want to confirm the idea voiced in the report of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that the CPSU is maintaining firm positions among the veterans. The veterans of the war, labor and the Armed Forces comprise truly an important social support for the party. It is

wise to recall that one out of every six communists in our party is a veteran. During the difficult times they can provide great aid to the party if the party committees will involve them more actively in party and sociopolitical life. The veterans are also providing support for perestroika by their personal labor contribution within their abilities.

But the veterans still have a number of acute problems. In carrying out their orders and let me emphasize that these are precisely orders, I would like to turn with a persuasive request to the delegates, particularly the party and soviet workers, the economic leaders, that they utilize the available opportunities for improving the living conditions of the older generation. Many, very many veterans are experiencing an acute need for this. And we have good examples. In this context I would not like to point out from this rostrum the well-planned actions of the leadership of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Belorussian and Azerbaijan Union Republics and the Ministry of Radio Industry which during the year of the 45th anniversary of the victory carried out important measures in improving the life of the frontline veterans and rear workers of the war years. We are hopeful that this initiative will gain universal support. Certainly how we will be able to be concerned with old age particularly among the defenders of the motherland will determine the moral climate and well-being of all our society and primarily the younger generation and its moral health. With good reason it is said that "you reap what you sow." Thank you for your attention. (Applause)

Capt 2d Rank A. Godunov, senior science associate of a Troop Unit

Simultaneously, I am the co-chairman of the association of Leningrad communists of the Democratic Platform in the USSR. This is not a section. We have our own positions and we have a voluntary association. I would like to emphasize, as comrades from the military delegation requested of me, that to no degree am I speaking on behalf of all the servicemen or deputies of our military delegation. I am also not speaking on behalf of the Navy and in addition I am not speaking on behalf of the CPSU Democratic Platform. What I will say now is my own personal attitude toward the existing problem.

In my speech I will endeavor to keep to the question of our section and from which we periodically diverge, namely the party, the soviets and the public organizations. I cannot say just how I will succeed in this.

So, various persons, at times with opposing views, have repeatedly stated that it is time for the party to come out of the trenches. Alright, it is time to come out, but who will be attacked? That is the important thing. Practice indicates that the object of attack is frequently those forces which the party formally is calling for dialogue, for collaboration and for consolidation on the positions of perestroika. In my view, this is an extremely shortsighted and even dangerous policy, dangerous primarily for the party itself. Because, in the first place, it prevents

us from hearing healthy and constructive proposals and, on the other hand, it raises precisely the authority of these public movements and reduces the authority of the corresponding party committees of various levels. It would be possible to give enough examples of this from the previous election campaign. For example, it is generally known so I will not repeat it that there was the paradox when party committees fought against communists who were elected independently to the soviets.

An attempt has also been observed to block the work of those soviets where a democratic majority has come to power. Although we have repealed Article 6, we still have not been able to overcome thinking in the vain of Article 6 or the psychology of dictatorship. And instead of collaboration we move to confrontation. This is also clearly apparent. I agree with Comrade Lukyanov that there is only one way out. The way out lies in conducting a policy of conciliation. It should be reinforced normatively in our documents, in the party By-Laws and should also be heard at all our congresses. We have experience in a policy of conciliation. But there is also the opposite experience. I cannot help but make a rejoinder. We often say why have we usurped the right to be called democrats? And why is the group of communists from the RSFSR called the "Communists of Russia"? They number just 250 persons and 80 percent of the communists are there and does this mean that all the rest are not communists of Russia? Let us not resort to such a level of semantic struggle. An example of positive movement forward is Yeltsin who initially declared the possibility of collaboration and then he moved on to things, having established a conciliation commission. This is one example. In our Leningrad, initially they attempted to resolve a question with the party press but when they realized that this would not happen, they moved on to establishing a commission on this question. This is a second example. Far from all the party committees accept this collaboration, this policy of real compromise, preferring confrontation to a real policy. But life teaches us.

Life teaches us not to crawl through the trenches, backwards, when one ends up in opposition, but rather to move forward, to dialogue. It taught Comrade Melnikov in the Kuzbass and it is teaching Comrade Gidaspov. He said what I in a brief, condensed form said in April at a party conference. Namely that the party committees with their experience in organizational work should help the soviets. They should move toward them and not carry out in essence an antisoviet policy on the territories. Gidaspov has moved from statements about "different weight categories" to proposals for consolidation and the search for points of contact.

But it must be said that before these points of contact appeared, a political basis had to be established. This is the unique feature of the experience of Leningrad in that it was possible to carry out a particular regional policy on this level. As we now say, the "leftist forces" were sufficiently strong there, but they sought a conversation, a dialogue with the obkom, and so there was something

of a leftist minority in the obkom, a leftist wing. I would say, possibly I am not right and I could be corrected by representatives from the obkom, but in my view this does exist. We were able jointly to work out a document on the position of the Leningrad party organization. We agreed not to argue over those questions where there clearly were differences of opinion. We agreed to study where we could come to terms, where we had the possibility of uniting. And so a document ensued, a document, in my view, even better than the Moscow one which regulates everything but I, possibly, am a patriot of my own party organization in Leningrad to which I also belong.

The statement noted the following, in my view, important provisions that there must be a block with the parties of socialist choice, a recognition of the priority of the soviets in relation to any party, a law on parties must be approved immediately and an anticrisis committee must even be established made up of representatives from various groups, currents and parties existing at the given moment. Here precisely lies the opportunity for carrying out a particular regional policy in the given situation.

We all say that the party must master the methods of parliamentary struggle because we must change over to creating a party organization in the territory and master the new methods of work. But who in the party is ready for these methods of work? We will not learn this by order, there must be experience and the experience exists among those forces which have already converted to these forms. There is the experience and most importantly the desire to work in this manner. There is also the experience of the Democratic Platform. Precisely it can become the connecting link. We are not seeking the aid of the Central Committee and its instructions. We ourselves are endeavoring to work out our own position and our own specific policy.

For this reason I should mention certain positions of the Democratic Platform since we have not been able to make our position known anywhere but I feel that I am not going beyond the context of the given section as it is a question of a public movement. Our aim is democratic socialism, and this has been set out in our program document. The basic values are freedom, progress, justice and solidarity. The social base is an orientation primarily to skilled strata which are capable of working efficiently and want at least to learn to work efficiently. But we should realize that there are many people in the nation who unconsciously or consciously resist the renewal of society. While dictatorship eliminates the opponent, democracy endeavors to win over the opponent. Our task is to turn the inevitable clash of interests among the social groups from hand-to-hand combat into a civilized struggle of minds. The solution to this problem is organized by creating two basic platforms in the party which express the contradictoriness of the main values of socialism: these are, on the one hand, freedom and progress and, on the other, justice and equality. These are two platforms. A platform of progress and a

platform of social protection. In all democratic movements there are three components: freedom, justice and equality. If we accentuate freedom then we obtain a liberal democratic movement. If it is justice and equality to the detriment of freedom and abandon it then we obtain a unitary socialism while a combination is the position of the social democrats.

At present, we actually do not have an ideology. This is the crisis of our ideology. This is an indicator of the party's intellect at the given level. I in no way claim to be the bearer of truth in the latter instance but I should say that, in my view, the party is in the same situation it was at the beginning of the century. It had the experience of the populists, going to the people, the experience of terror, it had the experience of the revolutions in Europe and the rise of Marxism in Europe and it endeavored to transfer this to our Russian soil. At present, we have the experience of Social Democracy in Europe, we have the experience of scientific and technical progress and we are endeavoring to introduce this.

Finally, we must analyze the terminology and discover precisely what stands behind these isms of socialism, democratic socialism, break them down into components and agree that possibly we understand the individual parts in the same way but are merely confused by the terms. We are fighting for the right of the minority not because we fear that we may be expelled as many of us are already ready to leave. You know that we have various currents and platforms and some are ready to leave now and others tomorrow. We state that if we do not achieve the rights of the minority, if we do not have a unity in the struggle of opposites within the party as a motivating force, then the party will simply lag behind social progress and end up on the sidelines.

On the other hand, actually in our movement we also must not be dogmatic and we must not hold positions of dogmatism saying that I want everything all at once and right now, everything in a single package. Democratization is a process. As an example, I am still a military man and I turn to the painful question which now confronts us of the political bodies and party organizations in the Armed Forces. The question has matured and is even overmatured. This can be seen from the polls which we ourselves are conducting in the Armed Forces. I do not know why the Ministry of Defense has not taken part in this. A realistic picture has been obtained of what the attitude of the communists is to the political bodies. In the objective point of fact, no one knows what the situation will be in the nation by autumn. This naturally forces the party to try to maintain its direct effect on the Armed Forces. Precisely they have often saved the situation which the politicians created. This is one point.

The subjective aspect of the problem is that the bearers of a concrete policy, the political bodies, are persons each of whom has his own concerns. Moreover, the party organizations in the Armed Forces perform the role of social protection bodies in the absence of these bodies as such. It is impossible to eliminate all of this at once, it is

essential to speak about this as a goal and then agree on a process in the context of an overall military reform. My time has run out and I would like another minute more. (Noise in the auditorium) Alright, then I will come to a close and skip a portion of what I wanted to say. One last thing. Comrades, we have little time left. Our congress should accelerate the process of democratizing the party so that this anticipated the process of democratization in the nation. And this depends not only upon the Democratic Platform and upon whether or not it leaves the party, believe me. This depends upon how the congress as a whole is conducted, upon what the atmosphere is in the auditorium, how each delegate speaks and what position he defends and how this is reflected outside, beyond the walls of the Palace, in the party organizations. I feel that we have come here not merely to win over our opponents. Certainly we have come here to elaborate a joint solution and this is expected from us. For this reason I propose that we move from declarations to specific actions from the viewpoint of granting rights to the minority, for now at this congress. As you know, for now we have not been given the right to speak at the plenary session. That is all. Thank you.

Vice Adm A. Korniyenko, Military Council Member and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet

Respected Comrade Delegates! At our section there has been a constructive and businesslike discussion of a very important question for the party, the soviets and the public organizations. All the life and activities of the Armed Forces at present, like an exposed nerve, run precisely to these political structures. And the political and moral health of the personnel depends largely upon their attitude toward the Armed Forces.

Yes, in military affairs many acute problems have built up and we are not concealing them. We are also concerned with such vitally important questions as the quality of combat training, the reliability and effectiveness of weapons, social tension, the lack of domestic amenities for the personnel and the decline in the prestige of military service.

Never before over the entire history of the existence of our Army and Navy have the military themselves spoken so honestly, openly and fundamentally about their problems. In a party manner we are admitting the constructive criticism which has been caused by the concern of society with the problems and concerns for the fate of our Armed Forces and we are doing everything to rectify the situation.

What is of greatest concern at present for us, the military communists? First of all, concern for the fate of the party, for the motherland of socialism, and for the defaming and humiliation directed against them. Political deserters have appeared and they, at one time being in the ranks of the CPSU, sought a political career and are now announcing to the entire nation that they are leaving its ranks and apparently are doing so and are seeking new patrons.

In the history of any party such political careerists are no novelty and cowardice has always been despised by the people and political cowardice doubly so. We are concerned and disconcerted by the unprecedented criticism leveled at the Armed Forces, by the absence of a dependable mechanism of social protection for the servicemen, by the political demagoguery and slander directed at us and by the appeals to refuse service in the Armed Forces. The separatist forces in the Baltic, particularly in Lithuania, in resorting to blackmail and intimidation, are inspiring the servicemen to desert and carry out other provocative actions. Here the political and law enforcement bodies are idle and the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet and the ukases of the USSR President are not carried out. This is why we are expecting the 28th Congress to voice its position on the role of the Armed Forces in the contemporary political life of the nation and on the attitude toward service in the army. At present, there have been numerous arguments, often superficial and simply incompetent, about the content of a reform in the Army and Navy. We are not against such advice, but certainly at present a peasant, a steelworker or a miner would scarcely accept me if I began to teach them how to sow, reap, cast steel or mine coal. Many would consider this absurd and insulting. But precisely those who are angered by such a thing are constantly advising what should be done with the Armed Forces and how to proceed with the political bodies and party organizations. I would like to ask them just where they were during the war, when 3 million of the finest sons of the party gave up their lives on the fiery battlefields, having only one party privilege of being the first to attack and let me emphasize upon the irregular order: from the commissar "Communists, Forward!" They were needed then but no one put the question in that manner. I hear the voices of our opponents who possibly even tomorrow will accuse me that the generals and admirals are defending their own honor and their uniforms. Yes, at present the uniform must also be defended. But I draw your attention to an article by an American political reviewer, Michael Davidow, in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA of 1 June. He is not a communist, he is not a commissar and not a general, but this is what he writes:

"At present, the paradox is that in few other places in the world are the propaganda against socialism and the negative interpretation of Soviet history as prevalent as in the USSR." And then: "...At the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, where 86 percent of the deputies were members of the CPSU. However, precisely here a law was submitted on eliminating party organizations at enterprises, in the army and other state institutions and the KGB.... No party in the United States or in the West as well as anywhere in the world would permit such a position of its representatives." I hope that the opponents...do not put M. Davidow in the partocracy.

Currently in our Armed Forces there are 1.1 million communists. Their dedication to the socialist choice is most alarming to those interested in the political destabilization of the nation. Each of these million Army and

Navy communists entered the party out of ideological conviction and voluntarily. It was up to them to decide whether or not they would enter the party. It was up to them precisely and to no one else, whatever sort of advisors there were. And here the experience of an academician is no argument.

Some 80 percent of the officers in the Navy are communists. Does this mean that if they do not want to give up their party card, they must either be dismissed from the Armed Forces or redyed as Social Democrats? Such an approach would mean that an officer who has become a professional must give up party membership for his entire life and possibly this might be easy for some but for thousands of Army communists this would be a personal tragedy.

We understand the political goals of the critics and abolishers of the political bodies and party organizations, that is, to set them in opposition to perestroika and remove the personnel from political education. We are aware that the political bodies need perestroika but we must not break up the party-political structure which has come into being over the decades and has gained a good deal of positive experience but rather we should do everything so that this structure works in a new manner.

I cannot help but mention something else which concerns us. Each state has its traditions, ideals, objects of veneration which no one is permitted to insult or debase. Unfortunately, by the efforts of certain representatives of the mass information media, the feats of the Matrosov and Kosmodemyanskayas have been obliterated and in their place they have put on the pedestal the doltish soldier Chonkin who for a long time has languished in the emigre backyards. We cannot say without pain and injury that in the Baltic republics the superior authorities are adopting anticommunist laws directed at restricting the rights of the servicemen and their families, they instill uncertainty over the refusal to register and assign the label of occupier. Things have reached the point where the families of servicemen are not permitted to reside in housing built by the Ministry of Defense.

Unfortunately, things are not limited to just moral badgering. Extremists in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are moving from threats and apartment arson to the physical insulting of officers and warrant officers.

In line with this we feel that an acute need has arisen for a law which provides the social protection of the Armed Forces, for the honor and dignity of the servicemen, including under the conditions of market relations.

In conclusion, recently society has been fed with the provocative ideas of a growing tension on the part of the Armed Forces toward the party and the state, and they are being frightened by some coup or threats. We are profoundly insulted by this because the Armed Forces have always been and will be with the people and the party. As for the statement by Comrade Godunov on certain autumn events, let that be to his conscience. We

have no involvement in this or to anything voiced by him in his speech. Thank you for the attention (Applause)

Speeches of Servicemen Congress Delegates in the Section "CPSU Nationality Policy"

Col Gen V. Achalov, Commander of the Airborne Troops

Respected Comrade Delegates! The Gauls were a bold and warlike people but before battle they bound themselves together with chains so that not one of them could flinch or turn back and so that all surrendered their personal identity for the sake of the common good. But the chains did not save them. The airborne troops which I have the honor to represent here have in their arsenal something that is stronger than any chain and this is combat comradeship, a feeling of a helping hand, the highest civil awareness, an awareness of the force, responsibility and reliability of the troops in the military structure and defense of the fatherland. I report this as the commander of the Airborne Troops.

As a communist, I would like to state the following: it is very important that the party during this difficult time not split into factions and blocs, into national alliances and sectarian groups and that we have the courage to resurrect an united party of communists from the CPSU members. This is all the more important because there is scarcely anyone who would have thought that such hardships would confront the great state, rich and multinational, powerful and possessing such intellectual potential. Everything must be protected: our historical choice, territorial integrity, the army, the Constitution, our history, culture and traditions, the rights, freedom and life of the citizens. And from all appearances we will soon have to defend such a so-called new historical community of people, the Russian-speaking population. Perestroika and glasnost have created favorable opportunities for the rebirth of nationality self-awareness but in a number of republics this has merely meant the departure from the political scene of the political-economic structure which has been established over the years within the party-state bodies, the revival and growth of the shadow economy, pocket law enforcement bodies, a portion of the nationalistically inclined intelligentsia and the base criminal elements. For this reason there began a major process of changing the personnel in the party organizations of these republics along with the simultaneous search for the "image of the enemy" well known through the ages throughout the world. There were excellent grounds for this including the low standard of living of many people and the social memory of the peoples.

I agree with the conclusions that the party, and in particular the Central Committee, did not pick up on let alone analyze this process. If Karabakh caught us by surprise, the following events in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Uzbekistan and certain other republics showed a fantastic similarity in scenario for the development of the situation. As soon as it was learned that a student and an

unskilled laborer were responsible for Sumgait and December 1986 in Alma-Ata, it was clear that we were confronted with a new level of political crisis. For the criminal potential which had formed within the nation in an organized manner was moving toward political power, sometimes acting under the slogans of national rebirth. Certainly in Armenia there legally exists an army of independence of the so-called Union for Self-Determination, the National Army of Armenia and the Army of the Armenian General National Movement. Yesterday you heard that they number up to 140,000 men. They even have their own minister of defense. Or the regional defense troops in Lithuania and other republics. It is not clear just what steps the nation is to take in this instance.

In one of the issues of the newspaper SOYUZ this year, a hardened criminal shared his impressions. He described how in Azerbaijan they bought flowers cheaply and then sold them in the northern cities of the Russian Federation. With the money earned, they purchased weapons and supported fighters. I cannot now give you an accurate figure as to the number of weapons in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus or Central Asia but I can say certainly that they run into the tens of thousands.

The events in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Baltic have shown and do show that all these armies, detachments, formations and fighting groups are a form and ideology of the reactionary forces fighting for power. For this reason one is not surprised by the rally of former SS officers which is being prepared in the Estonian town of Tori on 7-8 July. Call this what you wish. But scores and hundreds of millions of the world's inhabitants who were killed and maimed in the war years have made a proposal for me: possibly at the same time as this meeting there should be a rally of airborne troops. Isn't that what pluralism means! (Applause)

At present, work is underway to prepare a new Union Treaty. And in order that later on we not say that we underestimated something or erred, provision must be made for the following. As long as the idea of the primacy of the indigenous nation prevails in practice, the current streams of refugees and the death of people will grow.

Outside of Russia there are 25 million Russians, outside of the Ukraine, there are 6.7 million Ukrainians and outside of Belorussia there are 2 million Belorussians. We are speaking not for ourselves but we represent the appropriate party organizations. So the communists of the Airborne Troops have asked that we emphasize that for the airborne troop, for the military generally, ideology and deed are one thing, like both national salvation and rebirth.

We are raised on age-old values: the motherland with its great and difficult history, the land which has raised us, our relatives and close ones who set us on our way, our people who gave us weapons and equipment—all of this must be protected, defended and cherished. It was for

the sake of this that from the winter of 1988 through July 1990, some 55 airborne troops were killed in the Transcaucasus and over 200 wounded.

During the years of 1989-1990, the Ministry of Defense spent over 118.5 million rubles just for delivering personnel to these "hot spots." Here is your housing for servicemen. But from whom has the Ministry of Defense, from what republic has it requested and submitted a bill for this money spent?

The people supply us with clothing, food and footwear while themselves doing without much. But when anarchy and violence reach significant scale and depth, the airborne troops act as the guarantor of order. At times, their presence alone prevents a major disaster.

Extensive blood has been shed in Kirghizia. But why does our soldier save lives, treat and feed the people, while in the teahouses the police workers sit it out for days, saying: "While you are here everything is normal"? But the time will come or, more accurately, it has already come when the wives of the officers and the relatives of the soldier will demand recompense for this. Certainly the living need flowers, too.

At present, we are not amazed but are aroused to the depth of our soul by the irresponsibility of certain Soviet and party workers, particularly on the spot. Our central authorities have not challenged and have not brought charges against Brazauskas, Vezirov, Arutyunyan and many others for the collapse of the party in the republics, for the grief of the people living there, for the military and civilian blood and ultimately for the crowds of refugees during their so-called "rule." We have certainly had enough of these supposed leaders seeking protection behind the army. (Applause) And here Comrade Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, as the secretary of the Central Committee, at present is not to blame.

I, comrades, want to report to you (I am not a close friend of Andrey Nikolayevich) but for a month I watched this secretary of the Central Committee, this courageous, brave and valorous man in Baku who took responsible decisions. And now I would like to tell you responsibly that I do not see any other person on the Central Committee who at present could manage this. (Applause)

Any honest person would recognize that in the state there is no more international institution than the army. In it everyone is linked together by common goals and tasks, by a single system of training and instruction and by a common language. For this reason the strengthening of these roots in the army, respect for military service objectively strengthen the Union. The Soviet soldier is the symbol of the unity of our peoples. Why then so much bitterness, hate and humiliation for our own people in uniform? Just on Saturday I returned from France where I headed a Soviet military delegation. The delegation visited the French airborne troops and for a week we studied the experience of the organizational development of the airborne troops in the French Armed

Forces. And I want to report to you what respect and what an attitude the people and the government show for the French servicemen! Any insult or action against the servicemen is severely judged according to the legislation. And I should tell you that this law works.

Over the 60 years, the airborne troops have worked out a hard and fast airborne law: Don't abandon a friend in the sky or in the area, don't abandon the subunit, protect the commander, don't abandon but protect the motherland.

In conclusion, I would like to quote to you, comrades, the words from a song of our airborne troops which are a motto in service and in life and which are a motto for our officers in training these young men: "For our people we stand like a wall and let the nation count on us, the sky-blue berets, our sober mind and firm hand. We know the price of grain, the price of peace, and it is not in vain that we are airborne troops." Thank you for your attention, comrade communists. (Applause) And, with just a minute left, I would like to reply to the USSR people's deputy from Uzbekistan, I do not see him now, unfortunately he, in my opinion, is not here. In the first place, I would like to invite him and the members of his delegation to the Airborne Troops and to show them how the youth called up from Uzbekistan is serving and at the same time I would like to grant this delegate an opportunity to visit the town of Uzgen, where he should already have been, and show him how our fellows are carrying out their duty there. They are feeding the people, they are clothing them, providing footwear and supplying water. We, the military delegates, today were very insulted by his statement about our attitude toward the Uzbek youth. Our attitude is the same for all, and in the Armed Forces we do not put anyone into any categories, we separate everyone and put them in one category, the Soviet people. Just two weeks ago, I also buried here our Russian fellow who, in escorting and guarding the workers of the law enforcement bodies, having seen the brutality and crimes, ended his life in suicide, leaving a suicide note that he could not live that way any longer. The unit commander, Col Yevnevich, who had served in Afghanistan, reported to me by telephone, saying: Comrade Commander, I had never seen such atrocities, even in Afghanistan. Here, comrades, is what we all must be concerned with, with the educating of the youth, with the educating of our people, and if we reproach one another, if we accuse one another, then we will do nothing except cause harm. (Applause)

Col V. Alksnis, Senior Inspector Engineer of a Troop Unit

Respected Comrade Communists! In registering we received materials, including a booklet which was a review of letters received by the CPSU Central Committee over the last five months. And at the end statistics was given on the distribution of these letters by subject. And the largest number of letters was concerned with the problems of interethnic relations.

At the same time, why in our sociological poll did a majority of the congress delegates put in first place the problems of the party. Precisely this shows just how far we lag behind the demands of today's life. The problems of nationality policy must be discussed by us now in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses by the entire congress, and we must work out in common a party policy on this question. Because we are perfectly aware that we stand on the brink of the abyss.

What can explain this? I would explain this first of all by the fact that we do not know the entire truth about what is happening in actuality in this complicated and delicate question.

So here today they have already said to what degree the CPSU Central Committee is responsible for those problems which have arisen for us in this area. But let us take a look here. I personally feel that one of the reasons for the sharp exacerbation is the informational vacuum which has formed around these "hot spots." Let us be frank. For instance, what do the Siberian communists know about the situation in the Baltic? What do the Baltic communists know about the situation in the Transcaucasus? What do the Far Eastern communists know about the situation in Central Asia? We do not know anything. Things are concealed from us and we are not told the truth. Well, alright, they do conceal things and so let us call it the "yellow" press as some people say. But let us take a look here. Early this morning I was phoned by workers from the editorial staff of the newspaper PRAVDA and told: "The Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Comrade Frolov, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper PRAVDA, yesterday dressed down the editorial personnel for the fact that in yesterday's issue of PRAVDA photographs were published of the congress and in one of the photos there was a delegate sitting reading the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA. For this one photograph, Comrade Frolov, a Central Committee member and Central Committee secretary, dressed down the editorial personnel. Well you know, for such things, I feel, it would be possible to hold Comrade Frolov responsible to the party. (Noise in the auditorium) This is just one such example, seemingly a minor detail. But this also characterizes a good deal. (Noise in the auditorium)"

I feel that our section is incorrectly named. It seems to me that we are discussing not interethnic relations. We are discussing problems of the national state organization of the USSR. Because those interethnic conflicts which are presently occurring in our country are a crisis of our national-state system. For this reason, we should discuss not relations between Armenians and Azeris, not the relations or rather not the conflict between the Uzbeks and the Kirghiz, but we should discuss the problems of our federation. Until we discuss the problems of our federation, blood will continue to be shed and refugees will appear.

Here much has been said that the reason for all our misfortunes is the mistakes and crimes, including those

of Stalin, against our peoples. Yes, actually, we condemn these deportations and those terrible crimes against the national intelligentsia. But let us look from the other side. We have the "hot spot" in our nation in Nagorny Karabakh. Yes, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is, in essence, a territorial conflict.

A voice. No.

V.I. Alksnis. Alright. Let us recall a different situation... (Noise in the auditorium). Let us recall those years at the beginning of the century, when the greatest crime was committed against the Armenian people and a genocide was carried out against the Armenian people on Turkish territory. And age-old Armenian territories were taken by Turkey... (Noise in the auditorium). We condemn this and it actually was genocide. And the Armenians were deprived of their age-old territory. And why do not the Armenian fighters now claim and do not conduct combat on Turkish territory? Because they know that they will be given a smart rebuff there! Turkey will not allow such actions to be carried out on its territory. And so, due to the permissiveness, when we lack a precise response to such illegal actions, only for this reason do such things grow sharper. (Noise in the auditorium. Applause) Certainly what is happening in our nation is following a particular scenario. This scenario—it is brilliant and we must give it its due. I think, and perhaps sometime we will find the authors of this scenario. They must be given their due, as they are talented, intelligent people. Everything begins with fine words about national rebirth, criticism begins of errors of the past on the nationality question, the struggle for a state language begins, a struggle begins for broadening sovereignty, and then gradually, gradually the principle emerges of the primacy of the indigenous nation and then uninational bodies of power begin to be formed and finally the question is raised of withdrawing from the USSR. Here is this scenario and it is being played out and has been played out in the Baltic, it is now being played out in the other republics and it is the same one. (Noise in the auditorium) And so in this situation, when seemingly the goal is clear, the methods are clear and in this situation both the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo show—and it is simply amazing—both toothlessness as well as the same attitude was UN observers. For a year now we have been told stories about the renewed federation. And although I personally do not understand what a renewed federation is and what is simply a federation, I know that in all the legal literature there is simply federation. Well, alright, we have been told stories that we must now live in a renewed federation. And suddenly on one fine day there is a change of course and a thesis appears of the Union of Sovereign States. Well, permit me, such fundamental changes in state policy must actually be carried out having consulted at least with the party. In practical terms the thesis of the Union of Sovereign States means that we abandon the federative principle of our state and change over to confederative relations. Yes, this thesis was heard for the first time in the speech of our President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev upon his assuming of office. When he took the

oath, then for the first time he began speaking about various levels of relations inside our Federation. Well, it seems, it would actually be a good thing to grant one status to some and another to others. But, comrades, I personally feel that this would be a bomb placed beneath our Union and which would finally destroy it. Why? I can back this up. There is no need to test this out or experiment on ourselves, in our own nation. Other countries have already tried it out. For example, the newspaper IZVESTIYA on 24 June carried an article entitled: "Farewell to the Treaty." This was about Canada. In Canada they tried to grant Quebec a special status. And the Canadian Federation was threatened with collapse.

Those who hope that, for instance, Lithuania will receive one status of federation while Turkmenia would not want the same status are, forgive me, naive persons. Here the law of connecting vessels is at work. And that republic which sees that another republic has a different status will immediately demand the same status.

Let us take the problem of the Union and autonomous republics. The autonomous republics, in demanding a higher status, say that there cannot be first-rank and second-rank peoples. But giving the republics varying status, we are dividing the peoples of the Union republics into first rank, second rank, third, fourth and so forth, depending upon the nature of their relations with the center. Is this not a mine underneath the Union?

Certainly in this manner we are depriving ourselves of the basis of our Union which is the equal rights of the republics! If we actually do not have an Union of equal republics, then we will not have an Union itself. For this reason I feel that in this Program Statement we cannot support the thesis concerning a multiplicity of political and legal ties between the republics and centers. This is a bomb underneath the Union and it will explode sooner or later. And most probably it will explode sooner.

Now I would like to move on to the next question. We presently are paying chief attention to increasing the sovereign rights of our republics. I have carefully read the literature on international law and have discovered a surprising thing. It turns out that in none of the federations which have existed in history has a principal of federation ever possessed sovereignty.

It seems to me that we first began talking about sovereignty when the so-called 1936 "Stalin" Constitution was adopted. In precisely the same manner that we incorporated "developed socialism" in the Constitution. We had enough courage to abandon this definition and finally realize that it was absurd. But, unfortunately, we lack the courage to admit that sovereignty within a federation, within the confines of a federation is impossible.

Yes, it is possible for there to be the question of delimiting the competence of the principals of federation, there can even be the issue of the independence of a principal of federation but there can never be any

question of the sovereignty of the principals of federation. Until we understand this theoretical error, until we abandon this, if you will excuse me, confusion, we will never emerge on the right road. I will admit this has seemed a brilliant thing of achieving sovereignty. (Noise in the auditorium)

I personally feel that if we do not halt the processes which are currently underway, then what we will live through will be much more terrible. We have 60 million persons living outside their national state formations. If we now begin carrying out this policy.... Yes, it would be possible, for instance, to follow the path of establishing ethnically pure states. We already know examples when two republics have exchanged persons of the other nationality. Did this solve the problem? It did not! For this reason, I feel that at present the most important principle in our nationality policy should be: a moratorium announced for changing any state frontiers—both external and internal. We should arrive at this consensus, that at present in this situation we cannot change the state system.

When I today heard that Tataria, with all my respect for the Tatar communists, has raised the question of realizing its state sovereignty, that is, withdrawing from the Russian Federation, I realized that we had already reached the point of the absurd. Perhaps we will only solve all the problems when we have reached a situation where each settlement of ours, each village will have its own sovereignty? No, this is the path into a blind alley, this is a path to death. That is it.

Speeches of Serviceman Congress Delegates at the Section "International Activities of the CPSU"

Lt Gen I. Mikulin, Military Council Member and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces

Comrade Delegates! I feel that I would not be revealing a major secret to you if I said that one of the foundations of the national might of the Soviet Union is its military might. Without the stock created in the defense area by the labor, money and at times the last kopeck of the Soviet people, there would be no one for us to talk to or conclude treaties. One reaches agreement with the strong and dictates terms to the weak as can be seen in the case of Grenada and Panama. Let me recall the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from the Political Report that the effectiveness of our foreign policy is backed up by the might of the state and a component part of this is the Armed Forces.

At the same time, certain forces in the nation and in the party are working to eliminate a large portion of the military potential of the USSR, asserting that in the currently existing international and domestic conditions there is no need to keep this.

As for an improvement in the international situation, I feel that we have an example here of the desired in a number of instances being taken as the achieved. Just where, allow me to ask, is this improvement to be found?

Is it not in the fact that the Soviet Union, as is felt in the West, has begun to lose its status as a superpower while the other superpower, the United States, does not intend to abandon its global military role? Is it not that we have virtually lost all our allies in Eastern Europe? Is it not that at present there has been a major disruption in the European military balance which for long years served as a reliable basis for the security of the continent?

But allow me to say as a communist that our comrades in the communist parties (particularly in Hungary) who have remained in insignificant numbers, speak about our actions and call them outright betrayal of the idea of proletarian internationalism.

The impression is created that we for now have misinterpreted the principles of the "new political thinking," taking the political ideas formulated in it as a reality of today. One such chimeral, in my view, realities, is the idea of the so-called common European home. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is acting as if this home had already been built and the Soviet Union had been given the keys to one of its apartments. It merely remains to more speedily clear away the rubble of no longer necessary tanks and missiles to move into the new apartments. At the same time, in imagining things in this manner, we risk falling into a major exaggeration. For now no one has given us any keys from Europe and is in no rush to do so. On the contrary, the completely opposite trends are becoming ever-clearer: the forcing of the Soviet Union out of Europe, the separating of it from its allies and isolation on the outskirts of the European Continent. The situation in Europe is now developing in an extremely unpredictable manner, particularly in line with the unification of Germany. But this does not seem to prevent our diplomats from achieving irreversible decisions in the military political area and involving a significant weakening of our nation's defense capability.

In looking at tomorrow through the rose-colored glasses of illusions "about a world without war and weapons" and without noticing the formation of completely real new threats to our security, we are beginning to tear down our defensive structures and with such enthusiasm that at times one would think that the main threat derived from them. And just what are we being offered instead? Virtually nothing, if one does not count those assurances which at present are arriving for us in abundance from the West. Where are we hurrying to? To what can the current disarmament race lead? Why should our troops be in a rush to leave the nations of Eastern Europe? And why are the Vienna talks to limit conventional weapons carried out in such a manner that they promise again to end in a grandiose and, as always, unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union? I would like to hear the answers to these questions from Comrade Shevardnadze. Will we not tomorrow have to regret this in the same rush with which we are currently surrendering our military-political positions? Certainly we already have lamentable experience in this area and we have merely to recall the defeat dealt to the Armed Forces in the Khrushchev times.

The curtailment of our military-strategic potential has already begun to be felt on the ability of the USSR to defend its positions in the course of international talks. It has suddenly become clear that talks with the West can develop successfully only with one essential condition, a readiness of the USSR to make unilateral concessions. According to American data, 80 percent of such concessions in the military area since 1985 has been made by our side. Is this not the secret to the great successes of our diplomacy recently? And just what sort of success can we consider the signing recently in a state of incomprehensible rush of the agreements on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary? I am serving in Hungary and for this reason I am close to and comprehend the problems which confront the Southern Group of Forces. According to these agreements, we virtually all at once are to be deprived of all our military infrastructure in the designated nations and for which billions of rubles were spent in the postwar years for development. Just on Hungarian territory we are abandoning capital facilities built with our hard-earned rubles and having an estimated overall value of 2 billion foreign exchange rubles or 50 million florints. Here the Hungarian side has virtually not provided any compensation to us for these losses and has reduced everything to a "zero-sum" solution.

Repeated appeals to the Council of Ministers on these questions have not brought any result. But there is a solution: turn over the property with subsequent participation of the USSR in joint-stock companies and for a certain time halt the withdrawal of the troops. In addition, the given agreements force us in a rush to move tens of thousands of servicemen and members of their families to new areas of service without any serious preparation for this. Just in our Southern Group of Forces, 11,000 families of officers and warrant officers do not have any housing in the homeland. Need it be said that a result of this is a sharp rise in the social tension in those regions of the nation where our troops are to be pulled back? Certainly nowhere do we have any surplus apartments, any surplus food or surplus fuel. The impression is created that all of this is being done in such a manner so as to again set the army in opposition to the people, to discredit the servicemen in the eyes of the civilian population.

I would assume that all that has been stated above provides serious grounds to doubt the correctness of the strategy chosen by us in the talks—both in the given specific instance and as a whole. But this in no way means that I in principle am against the carrying out of talks for weapons control and their reasonable reduction. I am merely against those methods by which these goals are being achieved now. In eliminating a significantly larger number of weapons in comparison with the West, we are suffering additional material losses totaling scores and hundreds of billions of rubles. In essence, the West at present is strengthening its security exclusively at our expense! Why are we creating such easy conditions for it? Why do we not demand that the West pay correspondingly for its escape from the Soviet military threat which

so concerns it? They want us to reduce our military might so let them give us real aid in improving our civilian economy. We must switch our talk diplomacy to a sort of cost accounting and this will make it possible to free it of the current losses.

I propose that this proposal be viewed as an alternative to that approach to the talks which currently dominates us.

I would also like to say that the army, unfortunately, is currently becoming virtually the only force which is holding together our society which is splitting along the seams. In the West it is said that militant antimilitarism is the anti-Semitism of the intelligentsia. Well, it must be admitted that such an analogy is characteristic not only for the West. In our nation at present it has reached a point where the military are being turned into second-class citizens, a sort of caste of untouchables. Just take the publication in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 4 July 1990! And again in the forefront are the names of Arbatov, known and unknown scientists, deputies and delegates who are endeavoring to gain political capital from an antiarmy campaign. It is a dangerous confusion to imagine the servicemen as some unresponsive dumb beast which can be tortured to your heart's content.

Let me say directly that such an attitude toward the army carries a strong social danger and in fact is a conscious provocation aimed at destabilizing the Armed Forces.

We must not be like the physician for whom the first symptom of a patient's illness is his death. Some assert that the army is supposedly just ballast. Well, we might agree with this. Yes, it is ballast without which it would be impossible to ply the stormy sea. And at present it is stormy. Our ship is being thrown from side to side while the army carries out the rescuing role of a counterweight or guarantor of the national independence of our state in a too rapidly changing world.

The currently fashionable appeals for the immediate depolitization of the army must be seen in the same light. I should say that the very idea in a single sweep of expelling a million servicemen communists from the party looks rather superficial. Moreover, I fail to understand why a ruling party should give up its control over one of the most important state institutions. In world practice there is no precedent for this. On the contrary, in all nations there is a mechanism of political and very close control over the army by the ruling parties. This is why I feel that arguments about the depolitization of the army are a mere pretext under which the opponents of our party are endeavoring to implement a perfectly specific program to deprive the CPSU of control over the Armed Forces with a subsequent takeover of them.

Army Gen M. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces

Respected Comrade Delegates! The accomplishments of the foreign policy course of the party and the Soviet state the beginning to which was made in the spring of 1985

are indisputable. Apparent is their enormous significance for carrying out the policy of perestroika in our nation. The dialectics of the relationship between foreign and domestic policy is generally known. But at present I would like to take up another relationship, the relationship of foreign policy and national defense.

This is rarely mentioned out loud but over the ages everyone who is concerned with real policy considers this relationship, employs it and relies on it. In bearing this in mind I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the achievements of our present-day foreign policy course are inseparably linked to the defense might of our state. Probably no one would argue against the view that if there was not this might, the military strategic parity, there would not be the current process of talks, and there would not be that political dialogue which defines the essence of the present situation currently in the world. No one would deal with us as equals, as my colleague has said here. As you certainly know, at present our partners at the talks in Geneva and Vienna often still try to find moves and tricks which would make it possible for them to obtain unilateral advantages, in one way or another disrupt the existing balance of forces and achieve military superiority over us.

I feel that it is understandable for what purpose and with what aim this is being done just as it is understandable that we are right not to agree with this or permit this. At the same time, some in the West are endeavoring to use the political processes occurring in Europe and particularly those related to defining the political status of a united Germany, in order to achieve a reduction of the Soviet Union to a status of a "middle-rank power." They plan to do this by a decisive and unilateral reduction in the defense potential of our nation. This is why, in viewing the important problems of foreign policy, we should not for an instance forget its relationship to defense which I mentioned at the outset. For this reason at present it is possible to speak about an effective foreign policy which meets the interests of the nation only proceeding from a correct, responsible understanding of the limits of the necessary sufficiency for defense.

I would like in the briefest manner to explain the essence of this. Sufficiency for defense includes two main components. The first of these is a sufficiency of strategic nuclear forces. This is a level of them which in peacetime ensures military strategic stability and in the event of a war, the causing of a guaranteed, unacceptable damage to the aggressor state in retaliatory actions. At present, reality is such that such a level objectively operates as the main restraining factor in the prevention of war.

The second component is a sufficiency of conventional armed forces and weapons and this assumes a level of them which would securely ensure the repulse of aggression and the defeat of the invading grouping. In other words, it ensures a defense of the nation which you and I are speaking about. It is precisely from such a viewpoint that we are approaching the talks in Geneva and

Vienna. We are perfectly aware that the negotiation process is at present virtually the only form for realistically reducing military opposition and the military threat. For this reason, we are going into an agreement on disarmament not at any price but considering the maintaining of an approximate equilibrium and balance of interests of the parties. Here we have principled positions. Thus, according to the Treaty on the 50-Percent Reduction in Strategic Offensive Arms, the current reductions in strategic weapons will be equal. After the reduction the number of strategic delivery systems will be the same for both sides, some 1,600 units. As for the number of weapons on them, the United States will have an opportunity to deploy on heavy bombers somewhat more long-range, air-launched nuclear cruise missiles than the Soviet Union. We have accepted this step for limiting the range for launching the air-launched nuclear cruise missiles to a limit of 600 km and above which the cruise missiles would be considered as longer-range missiles. This is of fundamental importance for this as our entire national air defense system is based on this. We have firmly held this position. The Americans have met us half way. In addition, the United States was forced, in turn, to make concessions on certain other questions. For example, they accepted a fixed level of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, having limited their number to 880 units and this we had not been able to achieve during the entire negotiation process.

We were able to keep our heavy ICBM, road mobile and rail mobile missile systems. Our positions at the talks provide grounds to assert that the "missile shield" which will remain to us after the 50-percent reduction will guarantee a secure defense of the nation. At the talks to reduce conventional armed forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe, acceptable categories and levels of arms for us have been approved: to have not more than 20,000 tanks on each side, 30,000 armored vehicles, 20,000 artillery systems, 4,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 combat helicopters.

As is known, the talks are being carried out on a bloc basis. But at present bloc principles are scarcely being carried out in the Warsaw Pact countries. On a number of fundamental questions of the talks, our allies refuse to act from uniform positions and are endeavoring to achieve separate actions and withdraw from the military alliance. We are particularly concerned by the circumstance that some of our allies are abandoning the previously agreed-upon approaches in resolving fundamentally important questions for us concerning the setting after the reduction of the arms sufficiency level for one country and for the distribution of the national levels.

Virtually all the allied countries have requested for themselves significantly higher levels than were agreed upon previously and this, in turn, has demanded a significant reduction in the sufficiency level for the Soviet Union. Certainly we cannot reduce the sufficiency level for the USSR and simultaneously raise the national levels for the allied countries as this would lead in

practice to destroying the structure of our Armed Forces and would substantially reduce our security.

All of us who are involved in the negotiation process must never forget that we must not drop below the limit of defense sufficiency. Our military reform is currently aimed at this limit. Otherwise we will be deprived of the status of a great power and we will be spoken to from a position of strength and the dictating of terms.

The existing situation and in particular the emergence in the forefront of the individual responsibility of the Warsaw Pact states for the defense of their national frontiers, has forced us to take a new approach to the strategic planning of national defense, but now solely within the limits of the state frontiers of the Soviet Union.

Proceeding from this, our border military districts assume particular importance. The troop groupings are being adjusted, they are being given a defensive structure, organization and establishment changes are occurring along with the technical rearming of the troops, the entire system of operational and combat training is being reorganized along with command, control, training and educating of the troops and naval forces.

As for the unilateral concessions which are supposedly being made in the talks, I would point out that the Soviet position is the result of enormous work done by the nation's political leadership and personally, I would emphasize, by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, by the various departments and scientific research institutions with the most active involvement of the General Staff and is aimed at preventing a decline in the nation's defense or in the potential of our Armed Forces.

Of course, on the working level, when positions are being developed, we do have hot debates, arguments and disputes of different viewpoints, as there should be. But this is a natural process. It must be considered that the Ministry of Defense is simultaneously solving two tasks which are hard to be reconciled. On the one hand, we bear direct responsibility for the defense and security of the nation and, on the other, it is essential to disarm. It is extremely difficult to resolve such opposite tasks. It is the Ministry of Defense which must answer above all for the security of our nation. There should be thoroughly balanced approaches in resolving these questions. We, for example, cannot help but consider in organizing national defense such a very important question as the unification of Germany and the possibility of its incorporation in the NATO bloc. Certain comrades feel that it would supposedly be an issue "merely of increasing the potential of NATO due to the GDR, when and if the latter becomes a component part of Germany." I cannot agree with such a view. In this instance the entire strategic situation in Europe actually changes abruptly, the balance of forces can be substantially altered and the existing structure of security disrupted. It is simply impossible not to see this.

Even the members of the NATO bloc have viewed with concern the demands of West Germany that the armed forces of the united Germany in terms of number should correspond to the armed forces of Poland and Czechoslovakia taken together or the French Army. It is expected that the summit session of the NATO Council which is opening today in London, the question of monitoring the military policy of the new German state will be given particular attention. It makes a great deal of difference for us, for the military as well as for our people, where the united Germany will be: in the NATO bloc, having strengthened its military might, or will it be turned into a reliable partner for all Europeans without exception. For this reason, the future agreements in Vienna, in our view, without fail should be thoroughly coordinated with the parameters of the armed forces of the united Germany and its place in the military-political structure of Europe with the changed positions of certain of our allies in the Warsaw Pact. Here, I feel, both our diplomacy and we, the military, have some work and thinking to do.

I am sometimes asked whether the General Staff really does not see the positive changes in the military area in the West. We see them perfectly. There are good statements and decisions have even been taken in a number of countries on reducing military expenditures and partially the armed forces. But for now, I should emphasize, there have been virtually no practical deeds. Moreover, in declaring intentions to reduce military might in one area, they are planning to increase this by many-fold in other ones. And we know examples when at present, in preparing for Vienna, our partners on the other side are shifting weapons to the flanks. For now nothing has changed in NATO military doctrine or strategy or in military activities as a whole. For this reason, we must not simplify the situation as we can make an error here. We must not forget the lessons of the past.

An unconditional reduction in the armed forces to reasonable limits is essential. Primarily for our nation and for its economy. At the same time, in my view, we must not approach a solution to this question unilaterally, that is, only by disarmament can we rectify the situation which has come into being in the nation. It is essential to consider all the factors in the development of international events and have a thorough analysis of them for determining the basic directions of our military policy. Thank you for your attention.

Adm G. Khvatov, Commander of the Pacific Fleet

Respected comrades, I feel that no one would deny that the new political thinking has brought positive changes in international relations. But at the same time we must share a number of our considerations. I feel that if we go into talks and reach a compromise, then we should obtain reciprocally an adequate return. How have we achieved mutual understanding? We have achieved it by an unilateral reduction in the armed forces and by the adopting of a defensive doctrine. Seemingly, there should be some adequate response from our probable

enemies. At least the adopting of new military doctrines. Have the doctrines of our probable opponents changed? No, they continue to be offensive and oriented at a position of strength.

Secondly, we speak about the changes which have occurred in Europe. Let us analyze these and take a look. Some now are speaking about the Warsaw Pact. As a military organization there is no Warsaw Pact. It survives as a political organization and a very weak one. In the West we have been deprived of our allies and we did not have them in the East. That is, in practical terms we have returned to the year 1939, when our nation alone opposed all the states which were against socialism. This is the second premise which we must consider. And thirdly, on the question of Europe. At present, the Western press is particularly exaggerating this question on the level that the cost of admission or our agreement to the unification of Germany cost \$3 billion, bearing in mind the loan which Western Germany is to grant us. But the cost of admitting an unified Germany to NATO is judged by them at \$15 billion which are to be provided to us in the form of economic aid. But who is guaranteeing our security? Is it these dollars? I feel that it is not. Hence, we must be on the alert.

A second question which concerns me. We all welcome the successes at the talks in reducing strategic offensive forces by 50 percent. At the same time, there is concern over a number of its provisions which have been pointed out in the press.

Just look what is the basis here and what alarms me. In speaking before Congress, the U.S. secretary of defense said that as a result of protracted talks they had been able to agree that the reductions would be based upon the principles worked out by the United States. What sort of principles are these? These are principles basically on how quantitatively to compare elements of the strategic offensive forces. For example, the 8:12 formula which sets out what strategic aviation should carry. But unfortunately, for now no one on our side carries 8. And for them no one also carries 12 but rather they have 20 or 24 missiles. Why did we present them all at once with such a quantity of missiles?

By common efforts a ceiling has been set for the sea-launched missiles. But the Americans already have 50 percent of these cruise missiles. But we do not have them.

A third question. We have mentioned a limit of 600 km. But why come within 600 km? For the Americans the range of the cruise missiles is 2,500 km. And at present they are developing and testing ones for 3,500 km. The United States feel that a war must be started not with nuclear weapons but with conventional ones. And for this reason they are intensely developing high-precision weapons, including nonnuclear, strategic high-precision weapons in order to knock out our silos and our nuclear potential. Thirdly, we say that the reduction in the

medium-and shorter-range missiles is a major achievement for our diplomacy. But now let us look at this from the military viewpoint. And from the military viewpoint, the ink was scarcely dry on the treaty when the United States compensated for what it had lost with its tactical aviation, boosting the quantity of this in Europe. We should build up our efforts to reduce any types of weapons. Military confrontation does not lead to anything good. But these talks must be carried out so that we do not lose parity. I say this because I remember a letter published in one of the newspapers and written by a woman kolkhoz member who said: "So why were we not told then about the state of the Armed Forces prior to 1941? We would have given our last savings to ensure the security of our motherland." Here is something to think on.

We say a good deal now about conversion. Of course, under the conditions of reducing the Armed Forces conversion is essential. But a conversion is needed which would not encroach on the interests of the Armed Forces so that security could be ensured. Or I would put it—a qualitative rise in the indicators of our weapons. Without this it is very difficult to hope for anything. Let me give the quantitative indicators for our area. The ship repair system is such that it can meet 70 percent of the needs of the fleet. As a result of conversion, in 1995, we will slip over 50 percent. So tell me, in meeting 50 percent of the ship repair requirements for the Navy is it possible to provide high combat readiness? On the question of the comments by Comrade Yakovlev, I as well, when Comrade Yakovlev had spoken, applauded along with everyone else. Actually it was an emotional and fine speech. But when on the next day I picked up the paper and carefully read it, I did not find the answers to the questions for which Comrade Yakovlev was responsible.

Thank you for your attention.

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Col Gen Shlyaga on CPSU Congress, Military Reform

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[Interview with Col Gen Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by Lt Col S. Temirbiyev, editorial writer for the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL: "There Will Be No Return to the Past...."]

[Text] As is known, Col Gen Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga has assumed the post of chief of GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy]. Soon after this he visited the editorial offices of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL and met with its co-workers. In the course of the conversation Nikolay Ivanovich answered the questions of the journalists. In

assuming that this conversation would be of interest not only for the editorial collectives but also for a broad range of readers, we have decided to publish its content. It is doubly pertinent due to the Ukase of the USSR President on the Reorganization of the Political Bodies of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR State Security Committee and the Interior Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Railroad Troops and which decrees that they be transformed into the appropriate military-political bodies for carrying out state policy in the area of USSR defense and security, education and social protection of the servicemen.

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Ivanovich, we recall that on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress you spoke about the reasons which necessitated the maintaining of unity in our party ranks....

[Shlyaga] Actually, I did mention the circumstances which caused such a necessity. Both then and now the main thing is strengthening the unity of party ranks. Moreover, there must be a consolidation of all the healthy forces of society. These circumstances are dictated by the acute political struggle which is going on in our nation. The antisocialist forces, in hiding behind perestroika phraseology, have moved from illusions to the "imperfection" of socialism to an outright attack on it. And so now the October Revolution has been declared by them to be a "tragic error," and the historical victories of the Soviet people are exposed to doubt. The CPSU, the initiator of perestroika, has also been subjected to a more than strong critical thrust. To survive in this struggle, to defend the idea of the socialist choice, and to lead the people are within the capacity only of a consolidated political organization, namely the party of Lenin, the party of communists.... Moreover, in terms of my viewpoint, I did feel and do feel that Marxism-Leninism is actually the strongest weapon of the party and the ideas of these teachings, in my view, will be fundamental in the system of political training for the military personnel and all personnel of the Armed Forces.

[Temirbiyev] To what degree, in your opinion, has the congress been able to find the approaches to the consolidation of the party?

[Shlyaga] I consider this to be the chief accomplishment of the congress. Its documents provide a clear answer to the question of how the renewed CPSU is perceived in a society of democratic socialism. This, in my view, is the main thing that comprises the basis for the party's consolidation. Then there is the very nature of the work done by the congress as it unambiguously demonstrated a sincere desire for consolidation. When at other such party congresses has it been the case that in the course of the congress debates almost 700 delegates were able to voice their opinion—and this was precisely how many delegates spoke at the 28th CPSU Congress, at the plenary sessions and in the sections. Let me add here that representatives of the Democratic and Marxist Platforms, the group's Young Communists, the Initiative

Congress of Russian Communists and other groups of delegates gained the right to state their viewpoint and give the position of the minority at the congress. Moreover, the polemics at the congress did not prevent a majority of the delegates from seeking out and finding common approaches in the interests of perestroika. Finally, it must be pointed out that the elections of the leading party bodies were held in a completely new manner and these also demonstrated to all society that the party has set out firmly on a course of renewal, democratization and the deepening of perestroika. It will not swerve from this path. The ideological-theoretical and political goals of the CPSU as outlined by the congress have been adopted by the party organizations and by the political bodies of the Army and Navy for practical leadership and are supported by the personnel of the Armed Forces.

[Temirbiyev] Nikolay Ivanovich, this is not the first time you have been elected as a delegate to the party congresses and we know that you also participated in their preparation. What do you see as the distinguishing feature of the last congress from the previous ones?

[Shlyaga] If one were to speak about all aspects including form and content, one would note very many differences. However, I would like to take up those aspects which were linked primarily to the work of the military delegation.

On the eve of the congress we held a delegate assembly. Instructions were given to persons who would speak at the congress and in the sections. And here was your first difference: while previously, as a rule, one of the leaders of the military spoke including the minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff or the chief of the GlavPUR, this time the number of speakers was 27 persons at the plenary sessions, in the sections and from the congress microphone.

Another feature was that the congress adopted the resolution "Basic Areas of Military Policy at the Present Stage." There have not been such fundamental documents which defined the attitude of the party to the military department since 1922....

I would like to emphasize that the idea of such a resolution arose in the primary party organizations. We in the GlavPUR supported it and prepared our own version and at the congress we invited the congress delegates to participate in the final working out of the resolution. Each of its four points was prepared by a separate group and this, in my view, to a significant degree determined the meaningful import of the document.

[Temirbiyev] And how was this document submitted to the congress? Usually a committee or commission which has prepared the document registers it at the secretariat and then submits it to the congress.

[Shlyaga] It was proposed that we follow this path. But we refused. If we had submitted the document to the

congress only on behalf of the 32 military delegates, it would have been merely a departmental document. At a meeting of the representatives of delegate groups, we asked Comrade M.S. Gorbachev that the commission be filled out with representatives from the Union republics and particularly the young communists. The proposal was sustained....

[Temirbiyev] You have by now repeatedly spoken to the army communists. What is their attitude toward the congress decisions?

[Shlyaga] I would be going against my conscience if I were to assert that it was unanimous. Many correctly understand party policy at the present perestroika stage. But there are also comrades who for various reasons have assumed not very correct positions.

[Temirbiyev] The reasons for this?

[Shlyaga] One of the reasons is the poor amount of information available. And here I cannot help but rebuke certain communist leaders who are holding a wait-and-see position. They have not taken a sufficiently active part in the work of implementing the congress decisions. While some have spoken 10 or 15 times before the communists and the personnel of the units and subunits, others are still waiting for something. In a word, you can feel the syndrome of "waiting for instructions from above," and it has literally captured the minds of certain leaders. One can also feel an ambiguity related to the decision adopted at the congress on dividing the functions of the political bodies and the party organizations. Certain recently active propagandists now are wondering not so much about their work as about their fate or just where they will end up. From a human standpoint I understand these people. However, I cannot agree with the passivity and slowness which are completely impermissible at present in such a difficult time for the nation and the party. At present, one must think not about oneself but rather about the job, about the fate of the political bodies and party organizations.

Unfortunately, the journal *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* has also introduced a certain confusion into the minds and attitudes of the men by publishing the material "A Time of Choice" (No 11, 1990). One of the participants in the roundtable discussion spoke, for example, about the "proposals to convert the GlavPUR into a Main Directorate for Cultural-Educational Work and Legal Education".

[Temirbiyev] But under the heading "Reflections Before the Congress" there was a discussion with the involvement of scientists, representatives of the GlavPUR, the General Staff, commanders and political workers.

[Shlyaga] I understand perfectly, but certain readers viewed the journal's action as almost a guide for action. Here you could feel a stereotype in thinking, that same syndrome of "awaiting instructions from above"... Many reasoned that now that the press has voiced its opinion it means that it has sought the approval of the

"powers that be," and is expressing a certain "official" viewpoint. However, this viewpoint, in the designated instance, was only a private, subjective one.

[Temirbiyev] We know that you made your first trip to Belorussia in the position of chief of the GlavPIUR. We also know that there you spoke more than ten times to the communists and the personnel of the units. What do Belorussia and the Belorussian Military District mean for you?

[Shlyaga] I will answer with maximum frankness which I always aim for. Belorussia is everything for me. First of all, it is memories. Memories both of pain and joy. I was born in Belorussia and grew up there. Here I completed school, here I began my officer service after completing military school. Here I met my love, Mariya Vasilyevna. Along with her I have served more than 17 years in Belorussia, from a lieutenant and platoon commander to the chief of a divisional political department. Even now there is not a single day when I do not feel the invisible ties linking me with Belorussia and with the Belorussian Military District. My roots lie there.

[Temirbiyev] What do you remember most from your childhood?

[Shlyaga] The war. The smell of burned housing. Oppressive and unforgettable. The raging of fires over the peasant huts. The ferocity of the SS punitive detachments.... Before my very eyes they burned up our village, they drove the inhabitants to the center, they executed many and organized the remainder in a column to lead them to the point of departure for Germany....

[Temirbiyev] How were you able to save yourselves?

[Shlyaga] My father was a forester. Because of his advanced age he was not inducted into the army. My father had a good knowledge of the area and all the nearby woods. We—my father, mother, three sisters and a brother—were able to escape. We took advantage of the fact that confusion arose when the Nazis began to set fire to the houses.... So I went to school, to first grade, only after the war. By that time I was 10 years old....

[Temirbiyev] Was there a school in your village?

[Shlyaga] In ours, burned to a cinder? Where were the children. There were only one or two. No, we went to a neighboring village, 3 km away. And when I transferred to 8th grade, I went even farther, some 8 km. Every day, there and back, it was easy in the summer. But in the winter or the spring muds.... What sort of footwear was there then? The clothing was no better. In a word, we were cold and hungry. But the desire to learn took the upper hand.

[Temirbiyev] Did you describe this to your children?

[Shlyaga] At one time my entire family and I traveled to our home areas. We got off at a stop and then walked on. I would say "we strolled." My daughters who were my same age in wartime could not understand why we had to

walk if you could reach the place by bus. Four times they called a halt along the road. Only later did I reveal the "secret" to them that I had walked along this, if you wish to call it, road on the way to school. [Note. A complete biography of N.I. Shlyaga can be found in issue No 4 of this journal for 1990.]

[Temirbiyev] We all realize that a reform in the political bodies is a command of the times, however, the concern has not left us that this might be reflected on the combat readiness and capability of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Shlyaga] No, it should not be reflected on them. The main thing in the activities of the new military-political bodies, as is inherent also to the current political bodies, remains the shaping in the personnel of the qualities essential for the armed defender of the fatherland. This is totally the purpose of their educational and organizational-political functions, the function of strengthening military discipline, law and order providing a constant, effective influence on carrying out the tasks confronting the Armed Forces.

[Temirbiyev] The impression is formed that individual political workers in the current situation are frankly lost. Do they actually have nothing to say to the young communists and to those who have just intended to link their life to the party.

[Shlyaga] I feel that the state of perplexity is basically present in those who have joined the party out of careerist considerations. For those who are confused out of inexperience, out of insufficient knowledge of life or under the pressure of certain mass information media which have been able to shape public opinion favorable to them, I would recommend that they open their eyes more widely and have a closer look around. It is essential to read more, to compare and correlate facts, to more profoundly understand the processes and phenomena occurring in our life and analyze them. And on the basis of this, to draw correct conclusions. Then there will be no confusion and despondency and there will be something to tell the army youth.

Incidentally, those 2,900 men who left the party in the first half of 1990 were basically the same careerists. But during this same period more than 27,000 persons were admitted to the party. The soldiers who have decided to link their life with the party in such difficult times for ourselves currently comprise the future of the Armed Forces and make it possible to look at tomorrow with optimism.

[Temirbiyev] Servicemen turn to you often. Have there been among them young officers who for various reasons want to leave the army? What role have you played in their fate?

[Shlyaga] Of course there were. None of these requests has gone without attention. And although I certainly know the reasons which might drive a person to such a step including the lack of social protection, a lack of domestic amenities, the absence at times of normal

medical services, family problems, dissatisfaction with service and much else, nevertheless, I try to investigate them in each specific instance, to find out what is going on in order to find a way out of the situation and help the person get along.

I could give now numerous examples to confirm this. But I will limit myself to just one which I for some reason particularly recall. During my service in the Central Group of Forces I was written to by the mother of an Officer Gashchuk, whose first name I do not now recall. In her letter she said that her son, after serving in Afghanistan, had found his career blocked. I began to investigate and found that he was a decent officer, he was conscientious toward his job, however year after year passed.... Certainly he should have been promoted. Someone in this situation had to be responsible for the bureaucracy and inattention to a person. On the other hand, the man had not turned sour, he remained in service and continued serving well in the new job. That was a long time ago but his mother still writes and sends greetings on the holidays. A rather ordinary fact. There were many such. I do not want to give it any exceptional nature as I see in this a standard of conduct for the political worker.

[Temirbiyev] At the congress it was pointed out that one of the main areas of a military reform is a radical restructuring of the entire system of party political work in the Armed Forces. Could you tell us in greater detail, and from the position of the chief of the GlavPUR, just what a structural reform means in the system of the military-political bodies?

[Shlyaga] Life does not stand still. The party is being renewed in transferring administrative, management and other functions to the bodies of soviet power. The new CPSU By-Laws clearly state that all party bodies are to be elective. The political bodies, right up to the GlavPUR inclusively, are to be given the status of state bodies. But the party bodies, from the regimental party committee to the All-Army Party Conference which in turn elects the party committee, will have the status of sociopolitical.

Proceeding from this it is important in a balanced manner, in being guided by common sense and concern for the fate of many, many people, to reorganize the former institution of political bodies and form new military-political bodies: departments and directorates headed by the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces with the granting to their leaders of the rights of first deputy commanders (chiefs) of all degrees. Here it is proposed that we keep the institution of the deputy commanders (chiefs), but now for military-political work in the company—regiment element and in the military schools. The current system for training the cadres of the political personnel will also be revised, the training plans and programs of the military-political schools and the Military-Political Academy (imeni V.I. Lenin) will be revised.

[Temirbiyev] How will the interaction of the political bodies and party organizations be organized?

In speaking about the mechanism for the interaction of the political bodies and party organizations, I want to emphasize that this may be the most complicated question. We are endeavoring to resolve it creatively and in a balanced manner and most importantly in a spirit of those changes which have been brought about by our times. We have set up working groups in the GlavPUR. One of them is working out the draft Regulations on the military-political bodies and another a draft Instructions on the work of the party organizations in the USSR Armed Forces. A third group is drawing up a document which governs the activities of the trade unions within the Armed Forces. The basic positions on this question have been coordinated with the leadership of the AUCCTU. Finally, a fourth group is concerned with the questions of the youth movement. And as much as one would prefer to work in the old manner, we must be strictly aware that the political bodies will no longer directly lead the sociopolitical organizations. In this context there is a sharply increased need for a mechanism of interaction with all the sociopolitical organizations on parity principles.

[Temirbiyev] Is there to be a change in the functional duties of the political bodies and party organizations?

[Shlyaga] I have already mentioned the fundamental distinction of the new political bodies from the previous ones. At the same time, they should, in my view, maintain and develop the functions of political education, ideological work, culture, the strengthening of military discipline as well as political and military information both within the army and outside of it, directing the military press and organizing the work of the sociological and psychological services. We cannot help but mention the task of the political bodies in the area of the social protection of the servicemen and the members of their family. Or the need for close cooperation with the soviets and the public organizations....

[Temirbiyev] And the party organizations?

[Shlyaga] There are more than 1.1 million communists in the Army and Navy. I have no doubt that the Army and Navy party organizations in the future will act as the generators of new ideas in developing the Leninist theory about war and the army and through the communists ensure their influence on all the enormous organizational work in the Armed Forces.

[Temirbiyev] With the passage of the law on parties, will not a multiparty system lead to the depolitization of the army?

[Shlyaga] I have already had to answer this question. Let me repeat that by the depolitization of the army one understands the abolishing of the political and ideological institutions. Their presence in our army, as in the armies of the other nations including NATO, is caused by the need for political education for the personnel and

for shaping their high morale. In the modern world there are no "depoliticized" armies just as there certainly were none in the past, since the armies have always been and at present are an instrument in the policy of any state.

Furthermore, the slogan of "depoliticization" does not strengthen but rather weakens the unity of army and people and undermines the stability of society, since the servicemen are then made into a separate caste with an undetermined appearance and an unpredictable behavior. "Depoliticization" of the Armed Forces cannot be in a society where the politicizing of all spheres of life is not declining but growing.

Finally, the slogan "depoliticization" also runs contrary to the process of the democratization of society, for then a large social group of servicemen is artificially separated from the political process and thereby their constitutional rights are violated. Moreover, the idea of "depoliticization" is unpatriotic as it justifies the rejecting of service in the Armed Forces by the citizens for political reasons.

I am convinced that in actuality the demand for "depoliticization" is nothing more than a concealed desire to politicize the Armed Forces in the interests of certain circles and certain persons.

How can we work with those who have fallen sway to the demands of "depoliticizing" the army? I feel that the best method is persuasion, proof and argument.

As for the presence of multiple parties in the army, at present, when there is no law on parties, the only real political force, the most massive one which in addition has unconditional authority in the army remains the Communist Party. The party stratum in the Armed Forces is 25 percent. The problem is to increase the effectiveness of the work of its cells, to democratize them and in the future, in accord with Paragraph 23 of the CPSU By-Laws, to create the corresponding new organizational structure.

The presence of multiple parties is one of the visible attributes of the democratic process. But there are different viewpoints on the question of the admissibility of allowing various party organizations to function in the army under multiparty conditions. Some feel that in the army only the ruling party should have the right to establish its own organizations. Others delegate this right to all the parties. Still others defend the thesis of no parties in the army. A majority of the Army and Navy communists shares the first viewpoint.

The introduction of a multiparty system into the army will scarcely benefit its combat readiness, organization and discipline, and for this reason certainly this possibility should not be realized on a legal basis. A multiparty system means political rivalry. In the army this is disorder. Under these conditions membership in various parties for the period of service should be canceled or halted. It is possible to permit party work and party membership at places of residence or in the garrisons.

[Temirbiyev] The main theme at present in the nation is that our home which has been built over the millennium is in danger....

[Shlyaga] Everything must be done to protect it. The army, as a part of society, as its very own flesh, should play the role of a stabilizing factor. We must resist in every possible way the attempts to drive a wedge between the army and society, the army and the people. Where there is no community of interests there can be no unity of goals let alone a unity of action. This is well understood by those who are launching from the sidelines all sorts of "little ideas" that, for example, the generals are languishing in luxury and have no involvement with the sociolegal problems of the officers.... All our current generals have gone through all stages of the service ladder, they have "done their time" in the garrisons, they have had more than enough of army "charms" and have endured a good number of life's hardships. The concerns of the officers are close to them in heart and mind.

[Temirbiyev] The realization of the new ideas is causing a varying response in the army and society and here some are asking whether everything will not go back again.

[Shlyaga] Nevertheless, without risking an exaggeration, I can say that all our army, from the soldier to the marshal, is convinced that there is no return to the past. The army is changing along with society, and is being drawn evermore profoundly into the perestroika processes. The new appearance of the Armed Forces should meet the character and nature of humane, democratic socialism. In this is seen one of the main goals of the military reform which we are carrying out. And for the sake of this we must work, a great deal and fruitfully.

[Temirbiyev] The central press at present speaks openly about the opposition between the "great press" and the army.... At the same time, the only military printed organ which reaches the all-Union reader is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Do you not feel that the magazine of GlavPUR should have similar status in order to have a more noticeable impact upon the shaping of public opinion?

[Shlyaga] I realize that you are concerned with the future of the magazine KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL.... What can I say about this? I am well acquainted with the history of your journal. I know that in various periods it was called POLITRABONIK [Political Worker], SPUTNIK POLITRABOTNIKA [Companion of the Political Worker] and PROPAGANDIST RKA [Propagandist of the Worker-Peasant Red Army] and then PROPAGANDIST I AGITATOR [Propagandist and Agitator] and PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA [Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy]. KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL has been the title of the journal since 1960. As of now a new status for the journal is being worked out. Possibly there

are various approaches. No one is out to insult you. Work as you have and even better!

[Temirbiyev] The Resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress "On the Basic Directions of Party Military Policy at the Present Stage" states that the Armed Forces will be manned according to a mixed principle which combines universal military service with volunteer recruitment for military service by contract. This means that the Army and Navy will receive persons with a different psychology who have voluntarily chosen military service as a temporary or permanent profession. Certainly there must be skilled advertising for contract recruitment. And the approaches to educational work with this category of servicemen should be fundamentally different. Has provision been made for this in the new general concept of the military political bodies?

[Shlyaga] Yes, it has. There will be advertising. There will also be the corresponding adjustments in the content and organization of educational work. All these questions are now being thoroughly worked out and certain new aspects have already appeared. For example, as of July of this year in all the Armed Services an experiment has been started which is aimed at testing out in practice the new approaches in the organization, support, and political training procedures for servicemen in the midst of the military reform. What do we have in mind: Instead of dogmatized postulates, the officers begin to study urgent problems of perestroika in the Army and Navy, the history and traditions and the combat experience of the Russian and Soviet Army, the questions of social psychology and pedagogics and culture. A new model can also be seen for political training for regular-service personnel. Its distinguishing features are: efficiency, the ability to respond to social processes and phenomena, the urgent questions of the life of the troops and naval forces and democracy. The leaders of the political studies groups are given the right and opportunity to determine the methods and form of conducting the exercises as well as to rationally allocate time considering the complexity of the question to be studied and the level of preparation of the students. A number of changes will appear in the new political study plans for 1991.

[Temirbiyev] Judging from these facts, the corresponding changes must also be expected in the structural organization of ideological potential in the newly created GlavPUR. Have there been definite studies on this?

[Shlyaga] This is one of those practical questions which we are now concerned with, in preparing proposals for reforming the political bodies. In the future in GlavPUR, in particular, there are to be three independent ideological directorates: military political education, mass information media and foreign military-political information and collaboration. Moreover, there will also be a directorate of technical services and printing enterprises and this will be the main technical base for ideological work. Finally, we can consider as

settled the establishing of an independent department for ties with sociopolitical organizations and movements.

[Temirbiyev] In line with the stronger cultural and educational function in the Armed Forces there is a growing question of restructuring the activities of the Army and Navy cultural and educational institutions. In what areas will this be carried out?

[Shlyaga] The Army and Navy have a rather extensive network of cultural and educational facilities. There are more than 6,000 officer and serviceman clubs, 750 military museums, and 8,000 libraries with total holdings of 125 million books. There are 44 song and dance ensembles and seven dramatic theaters. There are also around 800 TV and radio centers. Cultural services, as is known, are also provided through sponsorship work. We are grateful to the scientific, literary and artistic leaders for their unstinting creative work in the interests of the spiritual enrichment of the military.

It must be frankly admitted that the moral warpings in culture and the neglect of the spiritual life of society could not help but tell on the cultural level of the military. Here there are many problems. At present, it is important to determine the priorities for developing the cultural sphere of the Army and Navy. For us these are: raising the effectiveness of the work done by the officer and serviceman clubs, the Army and Navy creative collectives, the libraries and museums; developing fundamentally new forms of collaboration with the state and public cultural organizations and institutions. We have put definite hopes on implementing in the future the program "The Army and Culture" worked out by the Soviet Culture Fund as well as on new approaches in organizing cultural sponsorship work. We are doing everything possible to support and aid the creation of youth leisure centers which are already working in a number of garrisons.

Clearly, because of the military reform being carried out, there will be structural changes in certain cultural formations. By redistributing production capacity and materiel for movie and video production, within the system of the Ministry of Defense there are plans to create facilities for producing feature films. Attention should also be given to the proposal to create a military museum of fine art with a central exhibit hall on the basis of the holdings of the military museums and the Studio of Military Artists imeni M.B. Grekov.

The cultural physical plant is to be improved as well as work with the personnel. A greater role for the Army and Navy cultural and educational facilities, as centers for political and cultural educational education, will be aided by carrying out a range of organizational and financial-economic measures related to converting them to new management conditions. All of this is aimed at raising the intellectual potential of the servicemen, their aesthetic level, culture and education.

[Temirbiyev] Both we and our readers are concerned by the fate of the political officers. Certainly the reduction in the Armed Forces and the reorganization of the political bodies will create a surplus of deputy commanders for political affairs in the companies and battalions, as well as propagandists and instructors of the political departments. What awaits these persons if they have not yet reached pension age?

[Shlyaga] In line with the pending organizational and establishment measures being carried out within the reform, a certain number of political positions is actually to be reduced. For this reason even now we are taking the necessary measures to shift the political workers whose jobs are being cut back. This is being carried out primarily by dismissing into the reserves those who have reached retirement age and have the right to a pension (up to 2,000 persons in 1990).

Moreover, within the radical reorganization of the political bodies there is to be the transfer of a certain number of party and Komsomol workers from the political personnel. Considering these circumstances and the future further cutback in the Armed Forces, we are in the second year of carrying out a planned reduction in the admission of officer candidates to the military political schools. Thus, in the near future, there should be no unresolvable problems on personnel questions and none of the political officers should be overlooked and the questions of their further service will be justly settled. Each will find a place to his liking.

[Temirbiyev] What is your attitude toward your speeches and writings?

[Shlyaga] I have high demands on the content of my speeches and writings. This is one side. The other is my own system for seeking out the facts and phenomena which underlie the reports.

[Temirbiyev] And what is the essence of this system if this is no secret?

[Shlyaga] I can put it in a single word, a diary. Each day I enter in it the most important. This is very disciplining and enriching. Particularly now, during the period of perestroika which each day raises difficult tasks. And they must also be resolved today. For there will be others tomorrow. The 28th CPSU Congress has guided us in this direction. Its decisions must not be suspended in air but embodied in life. I am firmly convinced that this will be the case. This will make it possible to raise both the prestige of the party as well as the leading role of the communists, including the Army and Navy. This will make it possible to give perestroika a second breath and will change the appearance of the nation and the Armed Forces in accord with the concept of a humane, democratic socialism. For this we must spare neither forces, energy nor time.

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Col Gen Rodionov Assails Army's Critics

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[Article, published under the heading "A Letter to the Issue," by Col Gen I. Rodionov, chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "Both a Dull Blade and a Shoddy Shield"; or the Cunning Plans of the 'Pseudoradicals'"]

[Text] The letter published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA under the catchy title "The Army Needs Protection. From Whom?" (No 151 of 4 July 1990) and sent in by a group of our politicians, military and scientists to the national leadership aroused me to the depth of my soul and forced me to take up my pen to publically answer its authors. Seemingly, they had set the noble goal of undertaking an attempt to defend the Armed Forces from the often unjust, impudent defamation of them in a whole series of printed organs and in many radio and TV broadcasts. Alas, this did not happen. Judge for yourselves....

"At present, it is becoming clear to everyone," the letter states, "that under the influence of perestroika, particularly in the foreign policy area, the military confrontation has declined significantly, and the threat to the interests of the USSR from yesterday's 'potential enemies' is becoming a matter of the past. The radical changes which have occurred on the international scene cannot help but please the Soviet people and cannot help but give them a feeling of stability and confidence in the preservation and strengthening of peace."

There is nothing wrong with what is said here. There are changes in international life achieved as a result of the active spread of the new political thinking upon the initiative, we would point out, of our country. This cannot help but instill optimism and a firm hope for people for a peaceful tomorrow. However, having made such a statement, the authors of the letter immediately move on to intensifying an atmosphere of fear and suspicion for the army.

"At the same time," they argue, "the ongoing processes of the militarization of the economy, the politization and ideologization of the Armed Forces and the domestic crisis which has encompassed all spheres of Army and Navy life cannot help but evoke fears among the democratic forces of the nation. These and other negative aspects brought about by the era of stagnation at present are being preserved due to the fact that the military bureaucratic upper clique has at times unconsciously and more often purposefully impeded the renewal of the Armed Forces and the entire defense sphere."

There you have it: no more, no less. The threat of the army, it turns out, derives from its...generals. And judging from the letter, the Armed Forces first of all must be protected against them. Then the authors go on to use a faulty set of accusations against the army itself

and which have long been too pat. Supposedly things are going bad in it and wherever you look there are flagrant shortcomings all around. And again it is the military-bureaucratic partocracy which is again to blame, the prime cause and source of this terrible situation in the Army and Navy. According to the authors of the letter it turns out that the main danger to perestroika derives precisely from the partocracy.

Just where, we might ask, does the solution lie? This solution, in the opinion of the authors, "consists in the immediate preparation and carrying out of a profound military reform within the limits of establishing a system of nationwide security, a gradual conversion to a professional smaller-sized volunteer army, and the unification of all democratic forces in realizing these goals" (in truth, without the CPSU, for the authors of the letter exclude it from the structure of such forces.—I.R.).

In the given instance, I feel it simply unnecessary to argue back. Certainly the "way out of the existing solution" which the authors of the letter describe is already being realized. And not without the involvement of that entire "military-bureaucratic and partocratic" upper clique of the Army and Navy. So let me point out, respected authors of the letter, that you are beating the air.

You need this in no way because of the "profound concern for the fate of the fatherland." You are actually concerned by something quite different, namely: "the unclear answer to the question 'with whom will the army be in causing a certain tension in society?'..." However, personally for myself clearly and for millions of other Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces, there is no lack of clarity here: the army will not be with you but with the people in the name of whom you have grown accustomed to expand on. I affirm this both as a military leader and as a simple citizen.

Is that not why certain "democratic forces" including the press, radio and television, currently deplore the army so fiercely? I feel that this is worth talking about particularly. In my view, this is happening primarily because of all the structures in society and the Army and Navy are the strongest bulwark of state power. History convinces us that anyone who wishes to destroy the state begins by undermining its foundations, by defamation of the armed forces and forming a negative attitude toward them in the masses.

Unfortunately, such is the disconcerting and hence alarming reality of the current days of our nation. And inevitably in this connection there comes to mind the old but not aged wisdom that a people who do not respect their army will end up feeding a foreign one?! So let us be completely honest and frank: those individuals and groups who through the press, radio and television, including the authors of the mentioned letter, in sowing the evil seeds of disrespect for our Armed Forces under the cover of the need of a military reform, in essence are

destroying them. In all civilized countries such activities are viewed as a criminal, antipopular occupation and are punished by the court.

At one time, Napoleon said that "four newspapers can do more than an army of 100,000 men." History knows a number of harsh confirmations of this. Thus, at various times, hundreds of "yellow newspapers" exposed the Russian and French Armies to mass humiliation. And frankly speaking, this contributed to the defeat of Russia by militaristic Japan and France by Nazi Germany. And it must be emphasized here that both conquered nations then had a powerful military potential. Yes, the "yellow press" adroitly "pulled off" its evil deed then. But the alarming thing is that the methods and arguments employed by it for humiliating the army and which I have mentioned are very close to those which are frequently now used in our press, radio and television. One would call their destructive impact nothing more than the employment of "weapons of mass destruction" in the modern warfare of ideas, although the "pseudoradicals" in their words urgently urge deideologization on us.

Let us recall that at the beginning of the century, the press persuaded readers that no one intended to attack our country. It was loudly proclaimed that the army was an expensive vestige of society. The press proclaimed that there would be no war because all countries were too integrated economically. It vituperated long and loud that war was necessary only for the generals who possessed too much and supposedly all danger to society and the army derived from them. In a word, that same miserable philistine set of ideas consisting of half-truths and semiliteracy and which are now being employed by our semidemocrats and pseudopatriotic journalists.

I feel that it is to the point to also mention the following: the Russian Army in that period, not counting the forced surrender of Port Arthur and Tsushima, did not suffer any other major defeat. And the future victor in the war, Japan, itself was on the brink of collapse. But the press raised such a storm of hysteria, panic and disparagement around this war and the Russian Army that it can be boldly said that the Manchurian infamy of Russia was created not so much by the weapons of the samurai as by the poisoned pens of its detractors. This must not be forgotten.

One can only be amazed in how well the newly appeared defamers of the army have assimilated the "school" of their "yellow" predecessors! They realized that our Armed Forces are the most organized, most united and powerful institution of the state, the guarantor of its independence, territorial integrity and political stability. This is what evokes their secret and obvious hate. And here we must seek out the roots of precisely why the army has become the present brunt of massed attack by those forces which are lining up under the flag of perestroika in the aims of a political reorientation of Soviet society.

However, a lie is easy to distinguish, whatever the clothes it is got up in. It always has the same face, regardless of all its diversity. For example, OGONEK is describing the everyday life of the long-range aviation officers. And immediately the eyes are "struck" by the handsome photographs of the meagerness of their everyday life. And the text?! "Moving"! In each line one can feel, seemingly, the shame and pain for our pilots. One can do little more than cry: yes, those OGONEK writers really hit the nail on the head! What can one say, the life of the officers, possibly the socially most unprotected part of Soviet society, is a difficult one. But in the fate of any of them, in addition to the domestic problems, there are always present minutes of true greatness related to the risk, the selfless devotion and heroism for the sake of the motherland. But there is only an allusion to this in OGONEK. Here is a ready-made half-truth for you.

Just look what the domestic press is writing: "Hazing" supposedly is flourishing in the army while mutual help, a helping hand, true friendship and comradeship are absent there. And again this is a half-truth, for there are both in the army! And it is a half-truth because it was society which infected the Armed Forces with improper relations. Seemingly it should be blamed first. Ah no, again the blame is put on the army!

At one time the well-known French poet Alfred de Vigny wrote about the captivity and greatness of the soldier. These were two sides of one coin. But while the soldier's "captivity" is shown in the basest form in our press, the presence of the obverse side is not even alluded to! The main and most dangerous thing, in my view, is that in the antiarmy propaganda there is a concealed evil, pernicious Russophobia. The enemies of our state realize that in order to destroy it, it is essential to weaken and defame all the historical values of the peoples comprising it and primarily the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.

It is impossible not to see that the anti-Russian and antiarmy elements have always been and remain in a single camp. In the not distant past this was clearly apparent in the so-called Khrushchev thaw. At that time, they closed down not only virtually all the domestic Suvorov schools, the real forge of future officer personnel, but also a score thousand Russian churches of which only a few remained in Russia. At that time they humiliated and insulted not only our officer corps but also our national spirit. Air and naval construction were set back decades. And now this new heightening of the antiarmy campaign founded on Russophobia and threatening unforeseeable consequences.

Yes, the disturbing of the foundations of the state has many appearances. A certain portion of the press, as before, in a skillful and calculating manner sows mistrust between the people and the army, and within the army between the soldiers and officers, and in the officer corps between the senior and junior officers, between the officers and generals. This is done in a shameless,

forceful and hysterical manner. Any, and at times the most dishonest, means are used as the goal justifies everything and everything is written off.

Thus, no normal man can conceive of a serious navy without aircraft carriers. At present, not only the leading powers of the world but also ones such as Brazil and Spain possess this class of ship. To demand the destruction, for example, of an already built aircraft carrier which involves the investment of billions of the people, is tantamount to disarmament "striptease." Where is such wild propaganda possible? Only in our nation! And who preaches such a thing? In particular, G. Arbatov, a people's deputy of the nation and incidentally one of the authors of the letter under discussion.

Another favorite subject of the press, aside from drugged chattering about convertible currency, is the fanning of an unhealthy interest in our generals among the readers. The shameless relishing of the given question clearly shows that some of the journalists and academicians get "steamed up" about domestic defense capability and the good of our people after a regular overseas trip. (We might estimate just how much this cost in money from the pockets of the people.) Many of them would like to conceal their own political flimsiness behind criticizing the army. Have you ever read anywhere that an officer has demanded national recertification, let us say, of all academicians who received their titles during the years of stagnation and whose "scientific works" were based upon the endless quoting of the classics and unrestrained praise for the "dear" Leonid Ilich [Brezhnev]? No. But now Comrade Arbatov for some reason is demanding the recertification of all generals and officers, presenting among other things his "personal idol" which has now become unnecessary. Persecution is clearly a profitable undertaking as soon as it involves even honored state figures with a high academic rank....

Do they not know that in Sumgait and Tbilisi, in Fergana and Abkhazia, in Baku and Karabakh, in Osh Oblast of Kirghizia and Vilnius, the army was only carrying out the direct instructions of the nation's political leadership. And it did this, in suffering profoundly itself, biting its lips until it hurt. Certainly for it an order is sacred. And it would be silly to demand anything else from the army. Certainly it is an institution of the state. An army which does not carry out the will of the state is no longer an army. And such a state is no longer a state.

As for my personal opinion on this score, and here I side with the authors of the letter, I would say: the army could and should be used in carrying out domestic tasks but only when the political levers have not achieved their goal, when all other means have been exhausted and when all capabilities of the Interior Troops and KGB have been employed. Clearly the nation's leadership did not experience any particular joy in calling in a strategic resource, its army, to suppress the arising disorders. It was forced into such a step because the local authorities, as a rule, were paralyzed and the bodies of the MVD and KGB had abandoned their direct obligations.

And so the main "trump" in the hands of the press for defiling and defaming the army: supposedly it is suppressing its own people! Involuntarily the question arises: was this done intentionally? Certainly someone is very aware that to aim at the army means to aim at the backbone of the state.

Let me return again to the tragic events in Tbilisi. At present, many often by their own "clever standard" seek out and proclaim their own "truth" about these. The susceptible reader is fed fables about the victims in the "army pillage" (an expression borrowed from MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 16 of 22 April 1990.—I.R.). The magazine OGONEK also voiced its version on the anniversary of the Tbilisi tragedy, out of habit having fallen precisely into the tone of the "lovers of truth" from Voice of America and Radio Liberty. As always, the main point in the article was avoided while the "advantageous" was intentionally overstated. For example, they were silent about whom had stirred up the Tbilisi events, who was the true guilty party of the bloodshed, and over which the journal shed so many false tears, without forgetting each time to shout: "It was them, the military is to blame!"

Sobchak and Korotich, Gelman and Yakovlev—this is a far from complete list of those who have come forward with this "truth" in order to put political blinders on human grief. Just on what is their "truth" based? They draw on unproven and unverified facts, pseudodocumentary films, "objective" descriptions of eyewitnesses spiced by journalistic fabrications and emotions and simply rumors. Do not Sobchak and Korotich, Gelman and Yakovlev really know who the true initiator of the bloody clashes in Tbilisi was? Do they really not know about the brutal hooligans who spread death around themselves? Do they not know about the mutilated and murdered soldiers and officers? Those who it tried to save and not allow the fallen and wounded residents of Tbilisi to be trampled down? They do know this but are silent! They know this but they say and write differently, fanning the antiarmy hysteria!

In heaping an avalanche of lies on the readers, the "lovers of truth" carry out their dirty deed skillfully. And as a result: to the question "How were the people in Tbilisi killed?" a majority both in our nation and abroad reply: "From combat engineer shovels and gas." The years will pass and the "combat engineer shovel" will remain in the history of domestic and world journalism as a classic example of a Jesuistic lie. Truth will triumph over lies and then no one will doubt that not a single person in Tbilisi was not killed by a chopping or cutting wound made supposedly by a "combat engineer shovel."

But for now let us remember the catchword: four newspapers can do more than an army of 100,000. In truth, the master in the nation is not the one who controls the Armed Forces, the KGB, the police or the trained personnel but the one who controls the press, radio and television! The editor-in-chief of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (which in fact is neither Muscovite nor

news.—I.R.). Ye. Yakovlev, excites the imagination of the reader by relating how he and Gelman, when in Tbilisi, had to say farewell to the "victims of the army pillage": "A wretched apartment. A coffin on the table. In it was a 16-year-old girl. A beauty in a photograph but a terrible dark purple face in the coffin. A soldier had knocked her down with a club and crushed her throat with a boot" (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 16, 22 April 1990).

A cheap and unproven fraud. However, being repeatedly printed in the newspaper columns, it nevertheless does its evil job: in the soul of the philistine the "image of the internal enemy" is formed. Not a true one but a false one. After such monstrous accusations it follows automatically that our soldiers and officers are "beasts, occupiers and murderers" and the army is the "gendarme" of its own people! But is this the real truth about the April events in Tbilisi? No! The real truth, of course, will appear in time. It will appear and become known to the people, regardless of the stubborn resistance of the Ye. Yakovlevs and his sort.

Not so long ago, our minister of foreign affairs stated openly that he was ready to retire from his position if the real truth about the tragedy in Tbilisi were not established. I am respectful of this statement by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze. But, it might be asked, what secret forces are preventing him, particularly as the former political leader of Georgia, from establishing the truth? For now, there is no reply. Just as there is no truth itself. But our ancestors said: "A person who wants the truth is not afraid of it!" This is why, we feel, we must with strict honesty assess the entire tragedy of what happened, without concealing, without falsifying the facts which have already been found out and recognized, but also take a close look at them. And then it will be clear to everyone just who is who in this sad story!

In this regard, I would like to ask our "lovers of truth" from the press: "What has prevented you from publishing the ruling of the forensic medical examination on those killed in Tbilisi?" Then the donkey ears of falsehood would immediately drop off the combat engineer shovels. That is the first thing. Secondly, why have you still not published the conclusion of the UN experts on the gases used in Tbilisi? Are you hoping to keep silent further the truth about the Tbilisi events and are you planning to get away with the dirty lie you have created about them? Thirdly, when will you publish the materials of the commission headed by the deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet G. Tarazevich? Finally, and fourthly, why do you stubbornly keep silent about the materials of the Main Military Procurator's Office on Tbilisi (incidentally, this was not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense but subordinate solely to the USSR General Procurator)? Do you fear that the entire world will learn that on the bodies of the crowd-trampled persons they will not discover a single stab-cut wound from a combat engineer shovel or that in any of the victims they will find traces of chemical poisons?

But lies, as is known, have short legs. The persons who put the "shovels" and "gases" into use were not soldiers. No. As is clear now, they were put to use by representatives of the press! And I would like to ask V. Korotich: Who prevented him from publishing my open letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Shevardnadze who came forward on the pages of OGONEK with serious accusations against me (although, in truth, he was simultaneously forced to admit that Rodionov resisted the use of force longer than others)? Because of this, I was left with no alternative but to turn to the services of a more objective publication, in the given instance KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, in order to endeavor to answer the questions raised by the Tbilisi events and still concerning all of us.

Some are endeavoring to persuade the Soviet people that supposedly the publishing of the materials mentioned by me would evoke an undesirable response in Georgia and give rise to new tension in the region and so forth. I feel that such assertions merely disgrace the Georgian people. For I do not believe that they need a "lie for salvation." Certainly behind their shoulders are the tragic greatness of spirit tested by millennia of harsh fate! Clearly, this is not needed by the Georgian people but only for the pseudodemocrats who are endeavoring behind the hysterical yells about "shovels" and "gases" to conceal more securely the main guilty parties of the death of the people during the provoked tragic events in Tbilisi, namely the extremists, the Mafia and the leaders of unbridled nationalism.

People intoxicated by the TV, radio and newspaper poison often quite sincerely assume that precisely the given category of persons represented as "fighters for democracy" are the true heroes of the day. And then our people's army acting as the real guarantor of stability, order and security of the people is almost their chief enemy. The time has come, I feel, to examine the roots and driving forces of extremism, nationalism, outright anti-Sovietism and Russophobia in the nation. The time has come to tear off the masks of the political and economic Mafia and all of those who are the secret director of events such as the Tbilisi ones, those who break down and connive in the breaking down of our society!

Certainly, each Soviet person has a right to his own opinion. But no one has the right to maliciously drive a wedge between the army and the people. No one has the right to use for these unseemly purposes the press, radio and television, the processes of democratization and glasnost. If one takes a close look at things, it turns out that the army is the socially most unprotected structure in our society, its most sacrificed part which with the bodies of officers and soldiers blocked the nuclear embrasures of Chernobyl, who were killed beyond the Hindu Kush and continue to be killed inside the nation! And such an army without a twinge of conscience is accused by certain politicians and journalists of crimes which it did not commit. The public silently digests this false TV, radio and newspaper cud and does not resist.

But we can be silent no longer. For having begun with "blows" against the army, the "lovers of truth" tomorrow will set on the head of state and other foundations of the state.

I often wonder just why up to now no one has demanded a reply from those organs of the press, radio and television which in essence have become the main centers for the breakdown of our society, the falsifying of its historical past and present, for the destruction of the bases of our statehood and law and ultimately the restoration of capitalist relations in our country? Certainly this is antistate activity. In no nation of the world would it go unpunished. But it is in our country. Or, in proclaiming the construction of a state under law, we are becoming such less and less. Things have reached the point that we have been forced to pass a special law on protecting the honor and dignity of the nation's president! The passivity of the USSR Supreme Soviet in this regard is also surprising. The people's deputies, as I feel, are not living in the clouds and cannot help but see that a certain portion of our press has presently become the chief break on the path to complete democratization, open and honest glasnost.

At the same time, the people and army at present have a rather harsh account to present to such press. Thus, while in 1988, just one officer was killed in the nation, last year it was 59 representatives of the officer corps. They were killed intentionally and basely. Our fatherland has not known such nightmarish abomination over its entire thousand-year history! The blood of these officers, it seems to me, rests on those who for 6 years now have been attacking perestroika, taking cover behind its phraseology, and who purposefully and sordidly persecute the Army and Navy through the "means of mass destruction" headed by the representatives of Central Television (the program View), the All-Union Radio, OGONEK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET, SOBESEDNIK and other printed organs. Due to their completely conscious efforts, many of our young men are now refusing to serve in the army while officers are submitting requests to be discharged. Due to them, the combat morale of our troops is declining, society is breaking down, the state is growing weaker, while heroic patriotic feelings are being driven out from the soul of the Soviet people and primarily the youth.

I was driven to take up my pen again not by any desire for new verbal battles over the question of various publications. Something much more important aroused me to this. Namely, concern for the fate of our multinational, socialist motherland, for its prestige, integrity and independence, for the fate and honor of our Army and Navy and their ability to guarantee the security of the Soviet people. All of us now want to bring closer the birth of a new, nonviolent world. But, in remembering our common sense, we cannot help but see that the language of force has not yet disappeared into the past.

As is known, the United States and certain of its allies are continuing to carry out their far from harmless weapons programs. Nor do they show any shame when they find it necessary to employ methods of force as was the case, for instance, in Grenada and Panama. Here they do not consider either world public opinion or specifically the "authoritative" opinion of some of our academicians. There is a dangerous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. There have been frequent outbursts of regional clashes and wars along the frontiers of our nation. And here we should remind some of our domestic "peacemakers" of the rather unambiguous words of the English Prime Minister M. Thatcher that peace is unpredictable!

Yes, history punishes those who show laxness and weakness. This must be remembered. Particularly in light of the fact that passions over the postwar frontiers as before are not abating. The unification of Germany has become a fact. In the East, Japan has become the third nation of the world in terms of weapons. But our dolt-headed scientists constantly explain that no one intends to attack the USSR. This is a formula designed certainly for the feeble-minded. History teaches that states have strong armies not because a specific enemy intends to attack them at a given moment. Moreover, it teaches that the person preparing for war speaks more frequently and more loudly than anyone else about peace. There is no better corrupter in society than those who weaken its healthy vigilance!

And so V. Korotich in his "Editor's Column" in issue No 17 of OGONEK for this year comments ironically on the sources of military danger: Who would attack us and why? And here, as they say, for greater show and "with knowledge of the matter," he judges the supposed "low combat level of many of our units shown by tragic Afghanistan." Supposedly, our blade is dull and our shield shabby. Other articles of the journal have played upon the theme of "hazing," the unprofessionalism of the officer corps, the haughtiness of the generals, the lack of rights of the soldiers and other such at times real but more often apparent, imaginary or intentionally exaggerated shortcomings.

Every Soviet citizen who is spiritually mature and loyal to the ideas of conscience is aware that, unfortunately, there are many shortcomings in the army. The military people see these better than anyone else. Believe me, they fight against them not out of fear but out of conscience. Specifically, the military reform is aimed at giving the army a modern appearance and at strengthening its might on a qualitatively new level. And we, the military people, have always been grateful to those who, in criticizing us for oversights and shortcomings, at the same time offer something constructive and professional. But what is the aim of a certain portion of the press together with certain representatives of the radio and television, in blackening the Armed Forces, in disrupting the foundations of the state and society, and

frightening the population with panic-stricken shouts about the inevitability of civil war and thereby provoking?

I feel the answer is clear. The entire question is to be found not in the various shortcomings inherent to the army (and they are certainly present in all the other social institutions of society) but rather it is the role which our army plays as the basic factor in the stability of the state, as a special organism which links all the elements, all the families of the state into a single whole, standing above nationalism and separatism and capable of aiding or impeding the struggle of various political forces for power. Here precisely lies all the sly secret of OGONEK and company!

With the beginning of perestroika emerging on the political scene in the nation were forces endeavoring by any means to come to power and to alter our social and state system. And if the nation would be turned into anarchy, into a "bloody and merciless riot" against which even A.S. Pushkin warned, so much the better, it turned out, for them. As they felt, it was easier to catch fish in murky water. But that is a mistake. History cautions us that both irresponsible demigods and irresponsible politicians perish in the greedy catching of a "fish." So be it if they perish themselves but they lead millions of completely innocent people! For such forces the army is a serious impediment. And hence the desire to undermine its authority, to set it in opposition to the people and reduce combat capability.

In particular, the above-mentioned Arbatov has come forward with a straightforward but perfidious "bag" of arguments designed for housewives. No matter what this academician writes about, everywhere one can see his attempt to put the army in opposition to the generals and introduce confusion into the hearts of the young officers. And he depicts himself personally as a fighter against the domestic military-industrial complex and nothing else! But why, one might ask, does such a prominent scholar of American affairs for preserving the parity existing in the world not endeavor to also destroy the American military-industrial complex? Evidently, the academician clearly does not have the time for this as he is threatening his own! And so a new profound thesis appears worthy of his high intellect:

"The nation is threatened now rather not by a military danger but rather by the threat of the collapse of the economy and ecological disasters, by growing social and national tension." Seemingly this is the same old banal tale. But here the academician is pursuing an extra task. Namely, to lull public awareness over the military danger and simultaneously to heat up the feelings of those who plan to resolve our economic problems easily and simply by cutting back on defense expenditures.

If one returns to the problem of the military danger, then certainly the "damned dialectics" from which we can never escape suggests that precisely under the conditions of the "collapse of the economy" which Arbatov warns

of and our other calamities, some of our current "friends" may get itchy hands in order to settle certain disputes with us by force. In order that nothing of the sort happens, we must more quickly escape from these calamities, not merely argue about them, but intelligently and skillfully resolve the pressing economic and social problems. These must be solved without forgetting our security. And not as Arbatov proposes. According to him, it turns out that merely freezing the program for building aircraft carriers would make it possible to resolve both the housing problem in the Armed Forces as well as many others. But let us again return to history which teaches us that the most covert and implacable enemies of Russia have primarily endeavored to weaken the might of its navy! They tried this trick before. And they are trying now.

Of course, we must all give some thought both about the reasonable number as well as the proper quality of the main components in the nation's defense potential. This cannot be achieved by mere appeals and slogans. A rise in the quality parameters of both the equipment as well as the personnel of the Armed Forces requires the corresponding expenditures and means. And these are not paltry amounts. And no matter how hard this may be for us, some must be made if we do not want suddenly to wake up hopelessly behind those who are continuing to actively improve their weapons and equipment and for now do not intend to abandon new military programs.

And here we must recall the proposed method for improving the quality of our Armed Forces of converting to a system of their complete professionalization and voluntary recruitment. In and of itself this idea requires serious study and work. We already have experience in the complete professionalization of the officer corps and the volunteer recruitment of warrant officers and certain other categories of servicemen. But in this instance, too, we must mention the real economic and financial capabilities of the nation and consider that such a transition would require a good deal of additional funds, it would be extended and painful and for a certain time, possibly, reduce the level of the Armed Forces combat capability.

At present, one thing at least is clear: there must be concern for the Army and Navy both by the state and by the entire people and a different attitude toward them is essential. And this forces me to return to the basic subject of discussion and recall the caustic comment by Korotich about the "battlefields" on which our Armed Forces are currently "fighting." The fact that circumstances and the strength of an order force them to participate in carrying out domestic tasks and act, as the editor-in-chief of OGONEK has written, on the squares, of course, is a major drama and even a tragedy for the today of our nation. The real glory and valor of our Army and Navy have not been won in such "battles." We must all remember this and do everything so that we never have such "battles" in the future.

However, I feel that to gain political capital from such a serious subject and to use this for intensifying hostility

toward the Armed Forces, toward the soldiers and officers, is not merely immoral but is criminal! Here it is essential to be as objective as possible and judge everything specifically and in a balanced way. Yes, to our great regret, there were blood, victims and tragedy on both sides both in Tbilisi as well as in other regions of the nation and these evoke pain in the heart of every honest Soviet man and everyone who loves the motherland. But people were saved from pogroms and murders, from the raging of the most evil extremist forces and from complete chaos and disorder. This was done by the soldiers and officers of the Interior Troops and by individual units of our army for the sake of the interests of the people. This was done without consideration for their own lives, for the sake of the life of others. This is the truth. And it must not be extinguished by lies.

Footnote

* "Yellow press" was a collective name for the corrupt reactionary press which played to the basest tastes of certain strata of readers; in picking up scandals it did not steer clear of slander, the distorting of facts and so forth (editor's note).

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Lt Gen Pankratov on Carpathian MD Political Situation

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 90
(Signed to press 31 Oct 90) pp 18-23

[Lt Gen Yu. Pankratov, Political Directorate chief, Carpathian Military District, answers questions furnished by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL editors under the "Theory and Practice" rubric: "Sore Spots of Democracy"; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] A complex socio-political situation has arisen in many areas of the country. Certain movements and organizations are paying "special" attention to attacks on the Armed Forces. What are political organs and party organizations doing under these conditions? The editors' questions on the subject are answered by Lieutenant General Yu. Pankratov, Military Council member and chief, Political Directorate, Red Banner Carpathian Military District.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How would you characterize the socio-political situation in the oblasts in which the district's troops are stationed?

[Pankratov] The situation is complex of course and varies with the particular location in the district. I can say that the situation in Zhitomir, Volyn, Khmelnytsky, Vinnitsa, and Chernovtsy oblasts is more stable and does not give particular cause for alarm. The local organs of authority and the population of the cities and rayons get

along well with the servicemen. Any problems that do arise are resolved in a businesslike and constructive manner.

That is not the case in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, and Transcarpathian oblasts. While the latest elections were being held, the leadership of the soviets was approached by representatives of the so-called "Democratic Block of the Ukraine (DBU)." The majority of them have taken an antisocialist position and stand opposed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which they declare is "incompatible with democracy."

Forming in this area are structures of new political organizations: the Ukrainian Republic Party, the Ukrainian Peasant Party, the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), and a number of others. What are their goals? On the whole, their main purpose is to work toward secession of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union. This is the motivation behind active propaganda and other actions (rallies, processions, boycotts) intended to discredit socialist values, the Communist Party, the Armed Forces, and to derogate our history. Certain representatives of the Democratic Block of the Ukraine (DBU), including UkSSR People's Deputies Ya. Kendzor, V. Chervoniy, and S. Khmara, suffer no qualms as they inflame nationalistic and religious passions. All this destabilizes the situation. To understand the causes of such variation in conditions in various areas of the district, it is necessary to take a look at history, in this case of the western oblasts of the Ukraine. For a long time they were under Austro-Hungarian and Polish authority, becoming a part of the Soviet Union only in 1939, after they rejoined Soviet Ukraine. The nationalist bands OUN-UPA [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurrection Army], under the leadership of the notorious S. Bandera, Ya. Steisko, R. Shukhevich, and other ringleaders, were active on the territory of the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol oblasts. Unfortunately, it was not possible to neutralize their ideologies completely. Now, in the period of glasnost, the old slogans have surfaced. I cannot fail to mention that the nationalistic and separatist mood of some of the population is being fuelled by speculations about the repressions that took place in that area in the 1940s.

That is the situation, to put it briefly. It should be understood that it is also greatly influenced by the presence of healthy forces. I must admit, however, that they do not take an active position in all locations.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Since we are taking a look at history, it may be appropriate to recall that the Soviet Army played a decisive role in liberating the Ukrainian people from the fascists. Nevertheless, certain Rukh activists and this movement's press are intensifying their attacks on the Armed Forces with every passing day. What is the reason? Also, what can be done to counter these attacks? Are we not strictly on the defensive here?

[Pankratov] This has already been mentioned in the press. I can say that there is variation in Rukh relative to makeup and views. There are healthy, constructive strata. There is also a confrontational, even an extremist wing. That is what is promoting the antiarmy hysteria. The Soviet Army is accused of supposedly "occupying" the Western Ukraine in 1939. There is a clamor for organizing a "Ukrainian National Army," with attempts to set up obstacles to drafting youths into the Armed Forces. In addition, demands are being made to turn over to local authorities various Ministry of Defense facilities and buildings; military commissariats are being picketed.

We are countering these antiarmy manifestations with expository work among the population, servicemen, and dependents of the latter. For example, this work was carried out most actively in connection with the 50th anniversary of reincorporation of all the Ukrainian lands into the Soviet Union and the 45th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. We are continuing the work with the same intensity. In addition, we conduct seminars, conferences, and press conferences with the ideological aktiv and representatives of creative unions, organizations, and mass media in the oblasts in which the district's troops are stationed.

All this has had a definite influence on reducing antiarmy tensions in the area. This, however, is not a time for complacency. Many problems remain unsolved. We are not always at our best in predicting and handling possible development of events.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In meetings conducted by Rukh there is undisguised agitation to encourage youth to avoid military service. Appeals are made to organize its own armed units. Is this not a repeat of the Lithuanian condition? Or is there something different about this campaign? What opposition is being offered by the Military Council, the district Political Directorate, local organs of authority, and social organizations?

[Pankratov] No, I can say nothing about the Lithuanian condition. However, much has been borrowed from it. For example, in rallies and in picketing of military commissariats, certain unofficial persons, especially SNUM representatives, demand that Ukrainians serve only in the Ukraine and that soldiers of other nationalities serve in their republics. I have already spoken of their plans to organize national military units (registration for the "Ukrainian Army" is actually under way in Lvov). There have been cases where military service cards and residence identifications have been burned. However, this has not occurred on a mass scale, in spite of all the efforts made by the "Snumites."

I wish to emphasize once again that in the Rukh leadership there is considerable difference of opinion on these questions. Not everyone supports extremist tendencies. Voices of reason are to be heard both at rallies and in the periodical press.

Relative to the Military Council and the Political Directorate, we mount major efforts to oppose attempts on the part of destructive elements to undermine the authority of our Army, and we seek ways to effect productive cooperation with the healthy forces of the new social movements. Dialogues and discussions that we set up with the leaders of the unofficial associations on our initiative have been successful in dissipating a considerable amount of social tension in this sphere.

We are also invoking a wide range of measures intended to improve the effectiveness of draft age youth training and the forming of a healthy social opinion relative to callup for military service.

We are inviting party and Komsomol organizations of the area, war and labor veterans, and internationalist soldiers to participate in this important work. We are holding open door days in military schools and open house activities in military commissariats. Highly successful have been rallies called by soldiers' mothers, servicemen, and draft age youth.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] There is reason to believe that not all local party organs are doing all they can to resist those who promote antiarmy sentiments. The press has reported that the previous leadership of the Lvov Party Obkom was led around by extremist forces for a considerable period of time. How does the district Political Directorate presently relate to the CPSU obkoms and gorkoms?

[Pankratov] Our political organs have a fairly good idea of the difficult environment in which party committees must operate in certain locations. Indeed, not all of them were prepared to wage political combat; many could not consolidate the party forces.

Thus, the previous leadership of the Lvov Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, its former first secretary Ya. Pogrebnyak, could not make a proper evaluation of the situation and adopt an active position. At first it levied sharp and irreconcilable criticism at the unofficial organizations, without attempting to determine "who is who." No room was made for reasonable compromise, even in cases where there was a crying need for this. Later, the criticism virtually ceased. The obkom leadership exhibited growing confusion and indecision, eventually permitting itself to fall behind. The result was defeat for communists running in the elections for USSR people's deputies, especially for people's deputies of the Ukraine and local soviets.

I say that we on many occasions did provide the local party organs with our evaluations of how the sociopolitical situation may develop in the area. Time and again we brought the party leadership's attention to the dangerous nature of the political and psychological climate that was being shaped by extremist-minded associations, movements, and groups with the Armed Forces in mind. Unfortunately, we were paid little attention.

New persons have joined the leadership of many oblast and city party organizations. The Political Directorate has established normal businesslike relations with all the obkoms, and, through the political organs, with most raykoms and gorkoms of the Ukrainian Communist Party. First secretaries and bureau members participate regularly in meetings held by the District Coordinating Council on questions of patriotic education of youth and training for service in the Armed Forces, and in the work of the military councils. However, 100 communist servicemen have been elected to serve in local party organs. Mutual support and coordination of actions have contributed to strengthening party and Army authority among the population.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Commanders and workers in political organs, the party political apparatus in military units evidently will find the going even more difficult.

[Pankratov] It is definitely more difficult for them. A complicating factor is the number of additional difficulties—something commanders and unit political workers did not have to face in the past—that has arisen under the present conditions. For example, there were previously no problems associated with parcels of land set aside for combat training. Now these problems loom large. It is sufficient to say that the Lvov Oblispolkom has computed a bill in the neighborhood of one billion rubles for—of all things!—use of the land on which the training center is situated. There is no end to the rally euphoria aimed at eliminating a number of military facilities: airfields, radar stations, etc. Attempts are being made to take away officer club buildings located in certain garrisons, including Lvov.

The ties commanders and political workers have with local soviets have been encumbered. Some new leaders in the latter avoid contacts with unit and garrison authorities, ignore the interests of servicemen, and refuse to meet with officers and other personnel, in spite of repeated offers to do so.

The most pressing problem is housing. In this case, much depends upon the local organs of authority. On the basis of the debt accrued from past years, they are supposed to provide the district with more than 1,000 apartments. As of 1 October, in Ivano-Frankovsk and Vinnitsa oblasts and the city of Rovno, not a single meter of living space was made available under the 1990 plan. One or two apartments were provided to servicemen in the Khmel-nitskiy and Chernovtsy garrisons. The picture is better in Zhitomir and Volyn oblasts. The new leadership of the Lvov Oblast Soviet made the assurance that the 150 apartments slated for delivery next year will be made available to servicemen. This, however, is merely a promise. Meanwhile, officers have nowhere to live.

I am not speaking about the growing difficulties involving residential registration and employment opportunities for servicemen's dependents. The language problem is formidable. It has assumed a dominant

position as far as job placement of wives of officers and warrant officers is concerned. There are difficulties facing children, also: Under way is a reduction in schools where Russian is the language of instruction. All this in combination with a hostile attitude on the part of the local population and youth toward persons in uniform and their relatives. At rallies and during picketing you often can hear the insulting shouts: "Occupiers!"; "Get out of the Ukraine!"; etc. That is why now, as never before, questions of social protection of servicemen and their dependents have come to the forefront. The USSR Presidential Decree on Certain Measures for Strengthening the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen issued by country President M. S. Gorbachev in September is encouraging. We need more rapid implementation of new legislation that would insure the legal and social protection of servicemen and their dependents.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How many servicemen have been elected to the republic and local soviets? What is your opinion as to their contribution to the resolution of Army problems?

[Pankratov] I would like to answer that by saying that the latest elections were more difficult than ever before, especially for us, servicemen. We fought hard for each of our candidates and strove to seat servicemen as deputies in each soviet. The elections placed 407 servicemen into deputy positions in soviets of the various levels. This includes four people's deputies for the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Organizational sessions have elected a number of our comrades to serve on various commissions of local soviets. I feel that it is too early to evaluate the work of the service deputies. Nevertheless, first impressions indicate that there they suffer from a certain amount of inertia and lack of confidence. That is why our deputies do not in all cases actively stand their ground.

The Political Directorate intends to organize a group that will work with the deputies to coordinate their actions and develop unity in position and approaches.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How does the situation you were discussing affect sentiments in the military rank and file? Especially youths called up in the Ukraine? The point is that, judging from letters we receive from our readers, Transcarpathia is witnessing the appearance of various youth organizations of a nationalistic, pro-Bandera type, which cannot fail to influence the outlook of youth. How is this handled by commanders and political workers?

[Pankratov] In general, morale is healthy. However, it is clear to us that the activity of the SNUM and of similar organizations has a definite effect on the youth environment, and, as a result, on people called up for military service.

Ukrainians make up the majority of personnel in district units. Commanders and political workers take this into account in their political education work. They study

personality traits, interests, and activities of each serviceman, his feelings about the service, and his attitude toward various socio-political phenomena and processes.

Interethnic relations groups that are organized in each unit take an active approach to international education and strengthening of friendship and troop comradeship.

Compared to previous years, in propaganda, cultural, and enlightenment work, more attention is devoted to the history of formation of the USSR, the united struggle of the Soviet peoples in the years of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, brotherly understanding, and mutual action in the peaceful construction process. We are doing a great deal to acquaint soldiers as much as possible with the area in which they are serving and with the history and culture of the Ukrainian people.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] A person cannot fail to notice that in a number of areas—the western oblasts of the Ukraine are no exception—nationalism is closely linked to antisovietism. Under this kind of condition, it seems that some commanders, even some political workers, have fallen into a state of bewilderment. This in spite of the growing ideological hunger, to coin a phrase, in military collectives. If we do not satisfy this hunger, the vacuum will undoubtedly be filled by other ideas.

[Pankratov] Faced with this difficult situation, some party activists, especially those serving in remote garrisons, have not particularly suffered bewilderment; rather, they have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. This passivity is fraught with serious omissions. Initially, it was caused by a lack of factual information on events occurring in the area and on existing social forces.

By regularly providing information to officers and the party aktiv, and, through them, to all personnel, we were able to get across to the people the meaning of current events, counter the numerous rumors and insinuations, cool to a significant extent the intensity of passions, and reduce tensions.

We actively employ mass information media to pursue these purposes. We are not afraid of offering our ideological opponents the opportunity of presenting their opinion. Thus, in May of this year, the district newspaper interviewed V. Chernovil, who is the chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet. He was frank in his manner as he explained his position to the correspondent. The readers were able to judge for themselves in what he said just what was constructive and what—to put it mildly—is not in tune with our realities and the interests of perestroika.

We have set up in the Political Directorate a center, and, in political organs, groups, which furnish factual information. The time has come to create in the Political Directorate special departments that would collect and

analyze information and develop instructions for organizing work in each particular situation. They would also be capable of forecasting the development of events in a particular area.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] We obviously also cannot be satisfied with the level of ideological work performed by party organizations, especially primary organizations. Party committees and party bureaus are increasingly prone to becoming absorbed in patently intraparty issues, losing sight of the spiritual life of people. What do you think this can be? Shortcomings in training of the party aktiv? Shortcomings in party ideological work in general?

[Pankratov] Yes, the level of ideological work commenced to lag behind life's requirements at some stage of our development. I have more than the Armed Forces in mind: There were serious shortcomings in party ideological activity in general. When glasnost and openness opened the gates to delivering insults—and at times outright slander—a considerable segment of the ideological aktiv was incapable of opposing the antagonistic forces and confidently defending its ideological values.

After the 28th CPSU Congress, the district Political Directorate identified the ideological orientation as its priority effort. Some progress has already been made. Nevertheless, ideological work is still associated with inertia, passivity, and adherence to former stereotypes and obsolescent procedures. Here is a specific example. Certain party organizations elected deputy secretaries for ideological work. And they went no further. They decided that the level of the work is improving automatically.

I wish to emphasize that we are proceeding from the belief that, in ideological and nurturing work in the existing situation, communists cannot be divided into active and passive; each party member should be a convinced defender of the party's positions and ideals. The center of gravity in restructuring of work with people is shifting in favor of the revolutionary and transformational function of ideology. In addition to improving the quality and effectiveness of political training, we are aggressively introducing active forms of instruction: discussions, dialogues, political contests, and "round tables."

Now the conclusion. We are in possession of forces, means, and experience. If we are able to employ them in full measure, there can be no doubt as to positive results of our work. However, in this connection, we must not ignore the realities of our time, the fundamental tasks of perestroika in the country and the Armed Forces.

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Supreme Soviet Committee on Afghan Vets Viewed

91UM01884 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview by Andrey Barkovskiy with Pavel Shetko: "There Is a Committee But No Powers"]

[Text] The name of Pavel Shetko is widely known among the Afghan veterans as for several years now he has been defending their interests on all levels. In April of the current year, Pavel headed the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Affairs of the Internationalist Soldiers. How has his work gone in this area? With this question a brief conversation was commenced between our correspondent and Pavel Shetko during a break between sessions of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans which was held at the end of November.

[Shetko] My work has gone satisfactorily.

[Barkovskiy] What has this been due to?

[Shetko] Primarily to the fact that up to now there has been no clear provision on our committee. There is, as they say, a committee but there are no powers. We lack experience in parliamentary, legislative activities. But the most depressing is, as you can imagine, in our nation as of now we do not know how many of our people (and I have in mind not only the servicemen) went through Afghanistan, how many disabled, families of deceased and so forth. This is unbelievable but it is the fact. Without such statistics it is simply impossible to work effectively and make serious statements about state policy in this question.

[Barkovskiy] What is the solution?

[Shetko] Is it essential to aid the Afghan veterans and the other internationalist soldiers. There are two ways. The first presupposes an increase in benefits and the second the creating of conditions so that the Afghan veterans would have an opportunity to earn a good salary. Which way is preferable? It seems to me that we should follow both. For this we must have the corresponding state decisions and again, let me repeat, maximally complete statistics as well as a commercial bank capable of financing the economic activities of the associations of internationalist soldiers.

[Barkovskiy] What is the future?

[Shetko] We must tell the people honestly that life will not become better. At least not in the near future. A market economy will strike the youth first, including, of course, the Afghan veterans. For this reason as we are able we must move from charity and put the emphasis on a state policy making it possible for the young people to obtain high skills in their selected profession and feel themselves to be not the pariahs of society but rather full members of it. This is the main task of our committee and we are now focusing our activities primarily on this.

Vice Adm Larionov on Republic 'Provocations'

91UM0153A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with First Deputy CinC Fleet Vice Admiral V. Larionov, Sevastopol Garrison commanding officer, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Black Sea Fleet correspondent, date and place not specified, under rubric "Timely Interview": "The Time Has Come To Act"]

[Text] *It is known that on 27 November USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. T. Yazov gave an address on Central Television in connection with lawless actions in a number of republics which threaten the country's defense capability. This was done by direction of the USSR President. Our Black Sea Fleet correspondent interviewed First Deputy CinC Fleet Vice Admiral V. Larionov.*

[Correspondent] How did the Fleet and you personally receive the speech by the Minister of Defense?

[Larionov] To tell the truth, we have long awaited both such a speech and, most important, specific measures in defense of the honor, rights and dignity of servicemen and their families. The fact is, the situation in places has become heated to the limit. In some regions of the country the military feel themselves to be outcasts, second-rate citizens. It is not enough that they are not settled in the everyday sense and carry an enormous load and responsibility; they also are subjected to various attacks. This is simply inhuman.

I believe that many Black Sea Fleet personnel are suited by measures aimed at increasing servicemen's social protection and stopping acts of vandalism toward monuments and graves of Soviet soldiers. Passiveness and spinelessness can no longer be displayed.

[Correspondent] Does it not seem to you that we have gone to the absurd? A powerful state institution such as Armed Forces, called upon to protect the state, itself needs protection. And not just social or legal protection, but physical protection as well.

[Larionov] The military's restraint in response to extremists' provocative, instigative actions is not at all weakness or indifference, as some may believe. It is rather an awareness of one's military duty to protect the country, awareness of high purpose and responsibility to the people. Hence the ability to squelch emotions and the soberness of assessments, although this is also difficult. But there is a limit to any patience, and we obviously have reached it. It is impossible to further suffer insults, including physical insults, to monuments of history, to our sacred things, and to symbols of the state and Armed Forces, and attempts upon the honor, dignity, and even the life of servicemen.

[Correspondent] In his speech the Minister of Defense notes that encroachments are occurring on the honor and dignity of officers and enlisted men and their families. Military installations are being subjected to armed

attacks. We know about many of them from the press. Obviously there also are similar facts in regions where Fleet units and subunits are stationed

[Larionov] There have been such instances both in the past and this year. For example, we were forced to fly naval infantrymen to the area of Georgia to protect Fleet installations against attacks. Even now, it is restless in the garrison where Captain 1st Rank Tsubin serves. Already this fall a guard stopped the black designs of five armed extremists. Three of them made their way onto a military installation, evidently with the objective of seizing weapons, but were stopped thanks to the soldiers' vigilance and decisiveness. Silent weapons and firearms were discovered on them. There have been attempts to penetrate a military installation in Kerch as well.

[Correspondent] Only a few days have gone by since the Minister of Defense spoke, but perhaps something specific already has been done to stop attempts on servicemen and attacks on military installations and to maintain stability and order in military garrisons, particularly the Sevastopol Garrison, where you are the commanding officer?

[Larionov] The situation in the Sevastopol Garrison is less tense and more stable than, for example, in garrisons of the Baltic, Transcaucasus and Western Ukraine. Nevertheless... A CinC Fleet order already has been prepared and is beginning to be implemented on taking counter-measures to criminal groups and measures supporting the security of servicemen and their families. For example, a non-T&E commandant's subunit has been formed to perform priority missions of opposing criminal groups. If necessary, subunit personnel will be issued authorized weapons, which will help safeguard servicemen. Each day a duty subunit will be assigned to assist the non-T&E commandant's force elements impose and maintain order near military installations and in the city, and if necessary to protect monuments to the Revolution, the war, and Black Sea Fleet history.

Of course, one would not wish to resort to drastic measures, but if the need arises, we must be in readiness. Obviously the time has come to act.

Col Gen Stefanovskiy on Army's Declining Prestige

91UM0153B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Dec 90 First Edition p 1-2

[Article by Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, Deputy Chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The People and the Army: Reflections on a Timely Topic"] [Text] *Until quite recently our Army was one of the state institutions most respected by the people, but today it is experiencing hard times. Just what happened? Why did our Armed Forces, which were the pride of society, in recent years become an object more often of malignant criticism and a subject of nationalistic arguments as well as of profound concern by honest-minded people who sincerely feel for their destiny and authority?*

Matters have come down to where certain forces have begun to speculate about a military overthrow allegedly being prepared and about the Army's ominous plans against its own people

The difficult situation in which the Army finds itself today was thoroughly examined at a meeting USSR President M. S. Gorbachev held in November of this year with people's deputies in the service. Speaking about all kinds of insinuations regarding the Armed Forces, he emphasized with all definiteness: "It is necessary to decisively deflect such attempts in the face of the country and all the world. The Army knows its role and responsibility, and it always will be with the people."

But just why did a situation become possible where the Army experiences serious discomfort in society? Why are the military not comfortable everywhere among their own countrymen? The situation demands urgent, honest answers to all these questions, since it is impossible to treat the disease successfully without a precise diagnosis, especially as it is a question of a state body on whose normal vital activities the further destiny of the country and its people depends.

In carefully tracing the dialectics of relations between the Army and people over the more than 70 years of our state's history, it is impossible not to notice that several very dissimilar stages stand out vividly here. The first takes its origin with the birth of the Army and ends in the early 1960's before the "celebrated" reduction of the Armed Forces. This was a stage, I would say, of the heyday of national love for the Army, which paid a terrible price for the people's freedom and independence during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, created a new society together with them, and protected them. It was a love not even dulled by the revelation of "thousands of enemies" of the people in Red Army ranks.

The second stage from the beginning of the 1960's until the mid-1980's can be called the stage of a gradual fading of spiritual arsenals and of traditions by which the unity of Army and people was maintained. This unity acquired declarative forms more and more and often reduced to its "stipulation" during noisy campaigns and the ringing celebration of jubilees and other banner dates in the life of the Armed Forces. Different forms of sponsorship by local party, soviet and Komsomol entities and creative organizations over the Armed Forces assumed a more and more unbalanced character. It is no secret that it also often came down to where new recruits who had criminal records would arrive on a movement order in units and aboard ships that had received honorary names. The quality of the draft contingent deteriorated, which had a serious effect on the state of military discipline. More and more problems accumulated in the social-everyday sphere of life of officers, warrant officers and their families. The ideological aims of a "stagnant center" often reduced to creating the appearance that everything was completely all right in the Armed Forces and shielding them from the light of glasnost.

We will not play the hypocrite: such "intercession" impressed many in the Army. But no "aims" could hide the truth about the Army from the people. Those who returned home after having served their time spread it around the country, and parents' hearts no longer were filled with pride, as in past years, but often with bitterness in seeing sons off into the Army...

Then perestroika burst out. The truth began to resound in full voice, breaking down the fences of restricted areas and topics. Figuratively speaking, there was a volcanic outburst of democratic processes. New thinking began to work, including in the sphere of defense policy. A reduction in forces began. Meanwhile, destructive forces also began to show themselves more and more actively on the wave of democratization and glasnost. Active attacks began on the CPSU and its military policy. Calls to remove the party and politics from the Army began to be heard more and more loudly. New public associations began to spring up one after the other, with the Armed Forces also in their sphere of attention. Here and there, interethnic conflicts flared up, into whose orbit the Army again was drawn as a restraining force. The litigation of a number of republics with the center struck painfully at the military and its vital interests. Servicemen's social lack of protection was laid bare with all acuteness. Extremist leaders of many informal associations actively preached the idea of establishing national armies, instigating the youth to desert. In the process of forming new political parties, some of their leaders began to regard the Army with apprehension and hostility, viewing it as a serious obstacle in the path of realizing their political ambitions. Mass defamation of the Armed Forces unfolded at their initiative under the guise of "sincere concern" for their prestige.

This is a far from complete list of known factors and features of that very complex ideological situation at whose epicenter the Army now finds itself. It is a paradoxical situation, for it turns out that instead of providing reliable protection for the peaceful labor of its people against possible attempts from without, the Army is forced to beat off the attacks of internal destructive forces disguising themselves as "the people." The person who does not see this is incapable of assessing the situation in which the Armed Forces find themselves today in a politically correct manner.

Tell me, will the worker, kolkhoz member, teacher, employee, and mothers and fathers who have sent their sons into the Army stand on all corners taunting its deficiencies? Ask those who are wholly engaged in honest work and who are not indifferent to everything occurring in the country whether they really consider their defenders the cause of all our present troubles. That can be stated only by political speculators who are playing the "Army card" in their miserable games. Nevertheless, it is not they who determine the people's attitude to the Army today. They are making attempts on the unity of the people and Army, and these attempts are taking on a more and more zealous, purposeful, even aggressive nature, especially when we consider that attacks on the

Army in many of the mass media have assumed an uncontrollable character and that in many regions local authorities are taking the status of the military to a dangerous boiling point by various decisions and actions in a nationalistic, egotistical fit...

And it must be admitted frankly that in this situation many unit commanders, political entities and political officers and the Army and Navy party and ideological aktiv did not immediately get their bearings, became confused, and began to await instructions "from above." Considering all this, the Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate were forced to take a number of steps aimed at strengthening the unity of the Army and people and strengthening contacts of Armed Forces representatives with local soviet, party and Komsomol entities, creative organizations, and workers of the mass media at all levels. I will concisely recall only a few.

There were meetings of the Minister of Defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate with writers, journalists, representatives of the movement of soldiers' mothers, and parents of soldiers missing in Afghanistan. A Ministry of Defense press center was established for more competent coverage of Army and Navy life and greater openness of their vital activities, and such press centers will begin to function in the near future under military district and fleet military councils. The military departments of many of the country's central newspapers were strengthened. Regular visits to military units and ships by civilian journalists, soldiers' parents and representatives of labor collectives and their meetings with command and political personnel at various levels became the rule. Public reception rooms under military district political directorates and army and division political departments were set up in major garrisons and are operating successfully.

This year traveling agitation-propaganda teams made up of the best trained ideological personnel worked actively in the Carpathian, Kiev and Belorussian military districts. Ideological "assault forces" were sent from the Siberian Military District to Kuzbass miner collectives, from the Kiev Military District to the Donbass, and from the Volga-Ural Military District to Vorkuta. We already witnessed how the impression of the Army, its life and tenor changed as a result of numerous meetings held by candidates and later also people's deputies in the service with workers, peasants, employees and the intelligentsia. How did such "travels to the people" enrich the military? What did they give civilians? Above all, these were extremely useful lessons in developing mutual understanding and common responsibility for the country's destiny.

Problems of strengthening the unity of the Army and people demand a countermovement under present conditions as never before. Much already is being done in this respect at the level of the President, Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers. The Ukase on Social Protection of Servicemen has been adopted. Laws of vital importance for the Army soon will enter into force.

By direction of the USSR President, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. T. Yazov spoke on Central Television on 27 November in connection with lawless actions in a number of republics which are threatening national defense capability. All this will certainly permit ensuring an appropriate standard of living and training for personnel under the difficult conditions of the nascent market economy and complicated social tension in a number of regions of the country.

At the same time, many servicemen express wishes both to the President and the Supreme Soviet to arrange a more reliable mechanism for implementing the ukases and laws being adopted. The fact is, we already have bitter experience. Here is just one example. According to a USSR Council of Ministers decree, discharged servicemen must be assigned apartments within a three-month period, but this decree was being fulfilled almost nowhere. Many such anomalies can be cited. Moreover, decrees which do not correspond to the realities of life create social tension artificially.

It is well known that tens of thousands of servicemen who today have no housing have gotten into such a situation because of the effects of a number of negative trends. The roots of this problem go back to our seriously sick economy. But then, corresponding laws also must be realistic, and once they have been adopted, they must be fulfilled unconditionally. Let us speak frankly: the country's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers are not yet ensuring implementation of decisions.

I speak about all this because now many questions of strengthening the unity of the Army and people have begun to bear an acutely political and ideological character. Some are attempting to speculate, voluntarily or not setting the interests of the Army and the people in opposition and thereby driving wedges between them. Allegedly all our economic troubles come wholly from the Army: it eats people out of house and home, takes clothes off their backs, and swallows up unprecedented material and monetary resources. It must be stressed especially that this line is followed rigidly in many central mass media. Unfortunately, we are still making timid and unconvincing attempts to offensively oppose what I would say is ideological adventurism and an attempt to turn the Army into the bugaboo of its own people and show it in the image of this voracious monster that pushes people to the verge of poverty.

The debauch of such amateurish speculations conceals enormous danger, since people thereby form a distorted impression and as a result a corresponding attitude toward the Army. That which was created over many, many decades is being demolished.

Let us turn to statistics which largely confirm what has been said. Based on results of the spring callup, the shortfall of first-term servicemen is 400,000 persons. As of today, just for the Russian Federation the detail for calling up 2,000 young men has not been fulfilled.

And all this as a rule is being passed off as the true "will of the people," although in essence it is a screen for the goals of a small group of political demagogues skillfully warming their hands on nationalistic or consanguineous feelings of people and on the infantility of part of the youth. Anti-Army propaganda has done its job. Its metastases have gone far.

I would like to express the following thought in this connection. There are special entities in many civilized countries of the world which monitor materials on the armed forces coming to the mass media. Is it not time to adopt their experience? No, I am against again fencing off the people's own Army from their attentive eyes. I am not against businesslike, constructive, creative criticism, but I am fundamentally opposed to turbid streams of mud, defamation, grotesqueness, lies and slander in covering Army life, which undermines its authority and its moral-psychological state and in the final account affects combat readiness.

And further, a tragic paradox justified by nothing lies in the fact that in taking part in putting out interethnic conflicts, the Army most often ends up between two fires and often finds itself in the role of victim. I have not seen a more terrible picture than an 18-year-old boy who put on shoulderboards yesterday murdered at the hands of a countryman... Therefore Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Moldavian, Lithuanian, Tajik and other mothers furiously protest against sending their sons to places of interethnic conflicts, and how can one not understand them? Our society should not allow our children to die through the fault of those who fan nationalistic bonfires... Such a policy has begun to take on a dangerous character of late, provoking intolerance or even attacks on military units. The military's patience is not infinite. Realizing this, all honest people together must stop provocations against the Army.

It would of course be unobjective to reduce the weakening of unity of the Army and people which has become apparent merely to purely external reasons not dependent on the Armed Forces. We do not hide the fact that we ourselves commit serious mistakes in this area and often hand the initiative to unhealthy forces. The present ideological situation demands that commanders, political entities, party and Komsomol organizations, the entire ideological aktiv and the military press go a vigorous offensive against everything that alienates the people and Army and opposes their political and state interests. We cannot allow the dirty hands of nationalists, extremists, political plotters and duplicitous persons of every stripe to push between the closely pressed shoulders of the Army and people.

Today all of us who are in the combat formation of the homeland's defenders are obligated to take broader steps toward our people and restore much of what at one time ensured the Army of monolithic solidarity with them, expressed in the brief and capacious formula: "The people and Army are united." There probably is a need now as never before to turn to the rich experience of past

years which made up our valuable arsenal of forms and methods of strengthening this unity: ceremonial sendoffs into the Army in the presence of unit representatives; reciprocal trips by emissaries of military and labor collectives; real, I will emphasize, and not formal sponsorship of the Armed Forces by the Komsomol and creative intelligentsia; granting the best draftees the right to serve aboard ships and in units with honorary names, and much more, but with one invariable condition: that all this bear not a shadow of formalism. It was this unique virus of ideological work that destroyed more than one artery, figuratively speaking, linking the hearts of the Army and people.

Servicemen-deputies at all levels unquestionably also are called upon to play a more vigorous role in strengthening the living bonds. Yes, there are good examples, but unfortunately we do not see for now that activeness in many of those servicemen who are working in the parliaments and local soviets.

Many completely new public associations and organizations have originated of late which also strive to affect the Army's life by their efforts. Take just the movement of soldiers' mothers. This is a complex democratic institution. It has a broad program and its own mission that is noble for the majority of positions. It is very important for us to work in a psychologically subtle and thoughtful manner and support really useful, valuable initiatives.

Problems of strengthening unity of the Army and people today must be viewed in the context of military reform. Soviet citizens must have a complete idea of the future of their Armed Forces and of the concept of their reform which is being submitted for consideration of the supreme entity of Soviet authority. Unfortunately, it is impossible not to see that we are late in resolving a large number of fundamental questions in the sphere of strengthening unity of the Army and people, we are not working in anticipation, and we are poorly forecasting the possible development of events. For example, was it really only yesterday that the voice of the people was heard about the need to introduce alternative service? Of course not. And only when an entire wave of rallies and actions occurred and when just demands were sounded to take specific practical steps did we begin to stir, as the saying goes. How important it is to learn the most serious lessons from previous short-sighted decisions and learn to look into tomorrow. Take the following not-so-simple question: Where will military units coming from abroad be stationed? Is it not really already possible today to coordinate options with local authorities and prepare public opinion so that citizens do not greet their own countrymen in shoulderboards with posters "Get out!" and "There is nothing to eat even without you!"...

These and other reflections lead me to the conclusion that a unionwide "Army and People" program is necessary for the next 5-10 years which, for example, would include a broad set of measures of a political, economic, legal, and agitation-propaganda nature coordinating the

principles of relations of military and local entities. I assume that this program would include regular joint conferences, seminars and other conferences and, most important, practical steps of military leaders with leaders of all-union and republic ministries, departments, and the mass media

Perhaps it will seem unexpected to some, but based on an analysis of the situation which has formed in the Baltic, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova I am arriving at the conclusion that the time has come to legislatively incorporate rules for the presence of troops in union republics and precisely define guarantees of personnel safety which are called upon to be supported by local authorities. Life also suggests something else: any attempts on servicemen must be severely punished by law.

Unfortunately, the supreme soviets of a number of union republics already have adopted those laws which, to the contrary, infringe on the Army's interests and make it clash with the local populace. Such legislative documents must be repealed without delay, since their negative consequences are difficult to predict...

Each time introduces new colors and hues to relationships of the Army and people and tests them for strength. The complexity of the present political and economic situation in the country, multiparty passions, interethnic conflicts, development of new mechanisms of republic sovereignty, preparation of the Union treaty for discussion, and active work by informal associations all seriously test the strength of unity of the Army and people. With all the extreme changes of political temperatures and with all the socioeconomic collisions, this unity must remain immovable. We cannot lose, nor do we have the moral right to lose, the sacred investment accumulated by age-old history obtained by the labor of tens of generations and washed with their blood. The people and Army are united!

Regimental SDPR Organizer Profiled

91UM0154A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula: "'One's Own' Truth Is Closer: Glasnost Is Glasnost"] [Text] *Today many know about Warrant Officer L. Makarova in the Volga-Ural Military District. The fact is that Lidiya Mikhaylovna, chief of the military-technical property depot of Motorized Rifle Training Unit "X," has been secretary of a Social Democratic Party of Russia [SDPR] primary organization for several months now, and at the same time is a board member of the SDPR oblast organization.*

As I was told in the district political directorate, this fact initially generated a multitude of questions in the regiment. Was this conceivable in a unit which had just left the Western Group of Forces?!

When the first passions subsided, public opinion in the regiment and garrison was sharply divided. Some were

delighted: good girl, Lidiya Mikhaylovna; she confirms pluralism in action in the activity of public structures. Others were openly angry: better that she look after the children and not poke her nose into other people's affairs. True, there were also many of those who perceived the birth of the Social-Democratic cell as the first swallow of a future multiparty system in the Army.

I admit, however, that first off I wanted to find out just why this woman decided to dedicate herself not to a communist or even monarchic party, but specifically the Social-Democratic Party.

"At first she did specifically wish to join the CPSU," I was told by Lieutenant Colonel M. Yuldashev, chief of the unit political department. "And I have to say that many party members were ready to give her a recommendation. But after Makarova was refused in her request to have a child accepted in the kindergarten out of turn, she changed political orientation."

"Yes, all that is so," Lidiya Mikhaylovna confirmed to me. "But while I decided to dedicate myself by and large to the struggle for social justice in the Army, I believe that here it is most correct specifically to be a Social Democrat of Russia."

Makarova began the struggle for social justice on the military post with formal requests, statements and protests about abuses allegedly committed by the regimental commander; unfair distribution of apartments, commodities and vehicles; and violations in accepting servicewomen for work. She signed all these documents as a member of the Social Democratic Party and sent them to three addresses: Chairman of the Russian Parliament B. Yeltsin, the district commander, and Ye. Polshchikov, cochairman of the SDPR oblast organization.

Commissions from the district became constant visitors on the post. Inspection followed inspection and, as a rule, the facts about which Makarova was sending signals were not established.

But now counterclaims have followed: Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Gridnev sent a statement to the warrant officer comrades' court of honor on holding Makarova liable for slander. Ten servicewomen also decided to make Lidiya Mikhaylovna responsible for having created an unhealthy, nervous situation in the women's collective.

Deciding that she was being persecuted and infringed upon in service, however, Makarova sent an ultimatum message addressed to the district commander: if your subordinates do not stop morally terrorizing me, I will organize a political hunger strike.

I questioned Lidiya Mikhaylovna a long time about what she sees as the meaning of her political activity.

"I do not understand political questions!" she exclaimed emotionally. "I am a fighter for social justice. In time, of course, I will attempt to delve into our party program, but for now I am getting by even without this..."

I noted that now and then in the conversation Makarova was speaking on behalf of the party organization, although all work stems only from her.

"Who else is part of your organization?" I inquired of Warrant Officer Makarova.

"There are 15 of us all told. There are junior officers and warrant officers... But I will not give names for now; otherwise the command authority will begin to persecute them."

But as it turned out, the garrison command authority makes no secret of the fact that it has known about all members of the "underground" SDPR organization for a long time. I clarified the fact that even so, no one is being subjected to any persecution. I was even given an opportunity to meet with one of the Social Democrats, platoon commander Lieutenant V. Shelekhov.

"At first certain points of the Social Democrats' program seemed attractive to me," said the officer. "For example, the point about removing ideology from the Army. In short, I decided to try working in a different party structure than my colleagues, but there is no work at all. All of us are party members on paper; everything essentially reduced to paying Makarova 15 rubles membership fees. Now I no longer consider myself a member of the SDPR. I have become disillusioned."

Even Makarova does not hide the fact that many soon will be leaving the party organization. Generally this is understandable, for it is not at all mandatory to be a Social Democrat in order to demand a fair resolution of everyday problems and distribution of the shortage, and to monitor the kindergarten waiting list. This is being done successfully by unit women's councils and the public control commission and the Officer Meetings.

A few words about Makarova's struggle on the social front. Lidiya Mikhaylovna told me, not without pride, that when she sent off the latest "paper" through channels, where she gave names of what were in her opinion illegally employed servicewomen, she also mentioned her girlfriend among them.

"After this I went to her and told her everything. We cried a bit together, but then I firmly declared: 'Although you are my friend, truth is dearer.'"

Many have told me that Makarova will not hold out for long, that she will have to leave the front of struggle for social justice, and everything will be decided here according to conscience and honor. That is what evidently would have happened, especially as Makarova herself declared that she is not a political fighter. But the fact is, time after time of late a reason is found for the vigilant Lidiya Mikhaylovna to arouse the public. Take the following instance for example. The regimental commander issued an order forbidding the use of soldiers to build personal garages, but a short time passed and Makarova caught Major A. Reshetnikov, unit party commission secretary, red-handed, as they say. The

officer received punishment, and Makarova repeated tens of times: "That is what the leadership echelon of the regimental party apparatus is like!"

Or take the cadres question.

"Now you explain to me why political officer Captain Bedarev departed from us almost secretly to go to Moscow," Lidiya Mikhaylovna assails me. "No one here knows the answer to this question."

I confirm that neither the unit political department nor the district political directorate cadres department, where I later inquired, as yet know for what services Captain A. Bedarev, deputy for political affairs of a motorized rifle training company, departed for the capital on an urgent basis without submission of documents, and with an advancement at that. It remains for the CPSU's antagonists in this "dark" situation only to dot the "i's"—protectionism, nepotism, party degenerates—and to agitate for their own "open" and "honest" party.

I have to say that one more SDPR primary organization formed in the district not long ago, also on a large post. The chief working slogans here are not political, but social.

Of course it would be wrongful in this regard to generalize that in themselves the personal faultlessness of officers in charge and the fair resolution of all questions of life and service will weaken people's attraction to the formation of new public and political structures. The time now is such: a time for seeking answers to reasons for the wretchedness of our life, economic instability, social inequality and lack of protection. And often it seems to many that only new forms of political activity will untangle the Gordian knot of stratified problems. And Makarova repeated more than once: "I am seeking answers to questions that our life poses." Just why doesn't she find them? Is it because she is seeking not a solution, but exclusively "her own" truth, rejecting everything different and alternative? This just what her opponents do, however. By the way, political personnel of quite varied levels have conversed with Lidiya Mikhaylovna more than once, and also the result is zero. Does this not also mean that political as well as party work has begun to lag behind life? And who will give a guarantee that this gap will not increase as more and more new cells of different parties appear in Army structures?

...We chatted, but Lidiya Mikhaylovna looked at her watch more and more often. She explained:

"Tonight I am traveling to Sverdlovsk, to the 2nd SDPR Congress. You see, I am on leave to care for a child."

"But how about the children?" I asked.

"It's all right, let them get used to it. I too did not have a sweet time in childhood."

**Supreme Soviet, Government Action on
Dedovshchina**

91UM0178B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Response by USSR People's Deputy A. Sebentsov, chairman of a USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation and Legality Committee subcommittee, to readers' letter: "On Instructions From the President"]

[Text] "In mid-November an ukase of the USSR president "On Measures To Implement Proposals of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers" was published. The first clause of that ukase stated that a special commission was to be formed to look into complaints from mothers. How is this presidential ukase being fulfilled?"

[Signed] V. Samoylova, G. Shilova, and other mothers of servicemen (a total of eight signatures).

USSR People's Deputy A. Sebentsov, USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation and Legality Committee subcommittee chairman:

In fact, this commission was set up in accordance with the USSR presidential ukase. Its name is the Commission To Verify the Objectiveness and Completeness of Investigations Into Reasons for the Death and Injury of Servicemen and Military Construction Workers in Peacetime. It is made up of people's deputies from the USSR, Russia, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, and also representatives of the USSR Procurator's Office, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers (nine parents), the USSR Bar Association, and other public organizations, including the "Shchit" society, a total of 41 persons. The commission chairman is Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, who is also the chairman of one of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees. I am the commission deputy chairman.

We have met in full session three times. We have reviewed letters and complaints from the parents of dead servicemen, questions of organizing the work of the commission, its status, and so forth. With each passing day the stream of letters coming to our address (Moscow City, Center, Rybnyy Pereulok, D. 3) is swelling; the parents of servicemen and military construction workers are asking for checks to be made on the objectiveness of the investigations into the death or injury of their sons.

The work of the commission is on a time limit (it is to report the results to the USSR president before 1 January). We are, therefore, drawing up proposals to extend the duration of this activity, possibly within the framework of some special committee.

Time will tell how objectively our commission will be able to investigate everything. In any event, despite the criticism that has been directed toward us from the dais of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, I hope that we shall be able to cope with the difficulties, and

will, with the help of the soldiers' mothers who are in the commission, get to the truth, no matter how difficult it may be.

Other work is also being done in parallel to comply with the ukase of the country's president. Thus, N.I. Ryzhkov has given the Council of Ministers specific instructions to work on matters relating to material compensation for families for losses associated with the deaths of servicemen and military construction workers doing their service during peacetime, and also to introduce a system of regular leave for soldiers and sailors.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Law and Order and Battle Against Crime Committee has sent deputy groups to five places where the most violations of the law have taken place. These are just some of the steps that have been taken to comply with the ukase from the country's president.

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Lt Gen Tarasov Ponders CPSU's Fate

91UM0178A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant General B. Tarasov, member of the Volga-Ural Military District Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate, RSFSR people's deputy: "A Course Correction Is Needed"]

[Text] The time has come for straight and honest talk, without wile.

What we are talking about today is the fate of the party posed in real terms—to be or not to be.

If the answer is "not to be" then the conditions are most favorable for that. There is no need even to trouble ourselves particularly. Just let everything happen as it is.

And we can see what is happening. Party prestige and authority are falling catastrophically. While our leaders console themselves with the sweet thought that the CPSU is the most influential force in society, the party is disintegrating. The trend of Communists resigning from its ranks is also gathering force, and they are by no means the worst Communists. Ideological and organizational unity is collapsing. The CPSU primary party organizations are being driven from the enterprises and state institutions. At the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum it was stated directly that "it must be recognized that some of our comrades have not stood their ground under the conditions of the fierce political struggle, and have lost their bearings." And we are calling ourselves the ruling party through inertia. In that case, whom and what do we rule if, while enjoying a majority in most organs of power, we are nevertheless making concession after concession and have already moved beyond the limits of reasonable compromise.

And this is also happening, so to speak, in the upper echelons of the party leadership. After failing to propose

any clear and understandable prospects, the party leadership is surprised by the confusion in the lower party committees and is criticizing them for their inability to find their place in the new political situation.

All this is so. It all really is happening, and it is to the detriment of the specific business of organizing the party masses. And the assessment that was voiced at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was right: It is time to move from words to deeds. It is time to act.

But the question of questions is this: How to act?

And here, the Central Committee—our intellectual center—is in my opinion resorting to apophysis, or its recommendations are so vague that they are not of much practical use.

In short, the lack of constructive ideas and the inability to come up with attractive and clear slogans for the times are dooming the party to political inertia. To condone this now means to observe a growing discord in the party structures and the collapse of the party. What is to be done? What is needed to keep the party in being?

In my opinion, what is needed is to see that given all the deformations and distortions of the past, the socialist idea has put down deep roots among the people. Tens of millions of those living now have linked their destinies to it. This idea will not be eradicated or wrecked, despite all those who are trying to bury it. Communists must express this idea in a very definite way. They must make it clear, in simple and accessible slogans, that it means gaining the sympathy of millions and millions of people for the party.

Yes, we do favor compromises, but only up to a certain limit. Yes, we do favor agreement and consolidation, but not to the detriment of the interests of the people.

Yes, we do favor justice. We are in favor of the burdens of the transitional period being laid not only on the shoulders of the workers, but also the experimenters who cold-bloodedly calculate how many unemployed there will be during the switch to the market, suggesting such-and-such many people, while the prospect will not affect them; who suggest that private property is a boon, while "exploitation" in the interests of society differs in no way from the exploitation of man by man.

What should we, the Communists, do first, and what second? It seems to me that first of all we must in short order rid ourselves of what provides grounds for political speculation about the party.

Privileges must be abolished. Let the people see that the party is pure before the people.

In the immediate future it is also important for all party organizations to have more precise instructions on issues such as attitude toward private property, the draft Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Constitution, the parade of the sovereignties, and other problems of enormous public interest.

The people are demanding order and discipline and the sensible organization of economic and social life; the party is also in favor of this. The workers are against the virtual partitioning of Russia; so are we Communists.

Without stipulation, we must affirm in our ideological arsenal the demands for freedom, equality, and the brotherhood of people. And for a start it would be a good thing to do in our party home. It seems to me that it is of no less importance to put forward and realize demands for proper remuneration for labor, the restoration of fairness in the evaluation of simple and complex labor, and strengthening labor and public morality and other slogans understood by working people.

The tactics to be used in actions by the party, the party committees, and the primary party organizations stem logically from the main strategic task. Despite all possible kinds of objections, we shall not advance a single step if we do not examine the way we handle our affairs, and bring proper order to this. It would seem essential to conduct hearings and do an evaluation of each Communist in each party organization. All who speak out against the party and its policy and bring shame to it by their conduct, or who are inactive, should be forced to resign their party membership.

There is no need to fear strong steps. The honey-tongued sirens are again singing their song of conservatism and again beginning to browbeat us with disintegration and other misfortunes. But it is a great lie. I am convinced that the enormous majority of Communists favors a firm, disciplined party. Public scrutiny of the activity of each primary party organization would also be just as important. Within the framework of this action it would be advisable to offer a political assessment of those leaders who have in the recent past compromised the party by their own actions and conduct.

Urgent measures are needed to provide assistance for the primary party organizations. For what is happening? Deprived of the right of control over the activity of the administration and of their former contacts with state and economic organs and public organizations, they are rapidly losing their influence and authority. As specific steps, we propose the introduction of at least partial wages for primary party organization secretaries who are not full-time secretaries. For this it is necessary to move to the strictest economy measures and bring proper order to the system of moral incentive—establishing memorial badges, pennants, and banners, and introducing ceremonial rituals and practicing comradely dealings among Communists. It would be of great importance to create reserves within the framework of the party funds used for aged and sick Communists.

And how essential it is to impart new impetus to the activity of the rayon wing of the party. For a process involving contraction of that wing has been started. This is a great mistake. To reckon, for example, that in a city of half a million with a leadership of hundreds and with thousands of primary party organizations, one city party

committee [gorkom] will suffice is simple naiveness, if not something worse. And another extreme has appeared. There is now much discussion in the press on the new role of the rayon party committees [raykom] and gorkoms, and here we have analysis and sociological studies and predictive activity. In general, what we have is some kind of pseudoscientific laboratory rather than a group of the best, most capable and devoted workers who are able to organize things, help the primary party organizations, and be constantly among the masses. The matter again hinges on cadres. Our Central Committee faces enormous work to find, indoctrinate, and establish a new generation of party works whose element is the meeting, the gathering, the demonstration, and public debate, and whose main weapon is high intellect, passion, and combative qualities. These people must be well paid. Calls to return to the minimum party emoluments are most inappropriate today. Many Communists are saying that it is essential to focus attention quickly on party science to help party cadres master the humane teaching and methodology of Marx and the very rich experience in organizing mass political work.

I know from my own experience that great effort is required to master the art of legislative struggle. It would seem necessary at the republic, oblast, and kray levels to introduce posts for legislative organizers, and party groups. It is of no less importance to set up party clubs for deputies that maintain ties with the press and devise tactics and work methods for the sessions of the soviets. Initial experience has shown that this is an art, and we still have mastered it only poorly.

I do not want to end my remarks in a minor key. There have been difficult times, even desperate situations, in the history of our party, but the older generations of Communists never lost their faith in socialism, and they moved boldly to meet the dangers and overcame them. I think that the present generation of Communists will also demonstrate its ability to cope with the historical tests that it has to face.

Note From the Editor.

It is probable that some of Lt. Gen. B. Tarasov's opinions and assessments will be controversial. We are prepared to give space to those who have different opinions on the processes that are taking place. In any event (and here, in our view, the thought expressed by the author of the article is beyond dispute), the time has come for straight and honest talk, without wile."

Alksnis, Petrushenko on Army, Politics

*JUM02274 Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No. 50, 14 Dec 90 pp 8-9*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputies N. Petrushenko and V. Alksnis, by P. Yemelin; place and date not given: "The Army and Politics"]

[Text] Judging from the editorial mail, the statements of USSR people's deputies N. Petrushenko, V. Alksnis, and

Ye. Kogan at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which were published in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No. 45 under the heading "We Cannot Relate This to the Achievements of Our Foreign Policy," touched many people, although not all readers felt the same about them. "Apparently these statements were not to the liking of the powers that be," assumes Muscovite Vladimir Niki-forovich Yatsenko, not without justification, "if they were not published in other newspapers and were not shown on TV."

"What are they doing to the country!" exclaims a Lenin-grader V.P. Ivanov. "Just recently they 'berated' the Soviet Army for the war in Afghanistan, and now they are getting into another battle to please Uncle Sam..."

A.S. Anuchkin-Timofeyev, who worked for 30 years in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, categorically disagrees with the deputies' position and assessments: "You would have to be blind or an adherent of the old political thinking not to see the unquestionable achievements of our perestroika foreign policy, which is strikingly distinguished from the foreign policy of the years of stagnation by dynamism, sober-mindedness, creativity, high content level, and the large amount of work that has gone into it."

"During two years of service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany," as if seconding the statement of the professional diplomat, a "worker with economic education" (that is how he signed his letter) Anatoliy Rudikov says, "I never met a single angry person... it should be drummed into the heads of people like Petrushenko and Alksnis that it is more advantageous for civilized capitalist countries to trade than to fight. If there were socialism in the West, whom would we buy food from? The Ethiopians perhaps?..."

It might seem that the authors of the letters are going to extremes. But, in our view, these readers' responses are a quite explicable reaction to the confusion that is now being created in our homeland. Just try to understand who is a friend and who is not...

The much vaunted "new thinking" has begun—we recall the recent past—out of the concentrated destruction of the "image of the enemy." Who has not tried to convince us of the love of peace in the West, of their readiness to help us learn about political pluralism, to acquire "true democracy!" That would be all right, but our home-grown democrats for some reason immediately shifted the fire of criticism to our own people, having discovered that almost the major threat is the ... Soviet Army and its commanders. They are trying to represent the people's deputies who are military servicemen—the same N. Petrushenko and V. Alksnis—as proteges of the military and industrial complex, the "black colonels" who dream of nothing but a military coup and the suffocation of democracy...

The mail from readers which has arrived on the threshold of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies gives us the occasion to meet once again with Deputies N. Petrushenko and V. Alksnis. How firm and correct is their

position? How do they themselves feel about the "compliments" that are being hurled at them.

[Petrushenko] If an article appears in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA after our conversation I would like it to be called "The Army and Politicians" or, better, "The Army and Politickers." In my opinion, this title fully reflects the situation that is developing today. Incidentally, this is apropos...

And now—down to business. When two or three regiments of paratroopers arrived in Moscow to participate in a parade, the "democrats" raised a stink about some military coup that was supposed to be in the works. But literally a month later in a telegram signed by the leaders of Russia, the local soviets were instructed to call their people to Moscow—deputies wearing rifle slings. And at this conference, which was held without the knowledge of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was suggested that they adopt a resolution that would drive a wedge (if it were adopted) between the Army and the Union Government, between the officer corps and the leaders of the Ministry of Defense. Why did our omnipresent "democratic" press not devote any attention to this?

The Army today is an obstacle on the path of those who are eager to gain power by unconstitutional means. Otherwise what would be the point in struggling for influence among the troops? After all, the regular elections are not far away... We are being fed ideas of depoliticization and elimination of the role of the party in the Army. Our radicals would like to drive the Army out of the "game" and make it passive or at least neutral in opposition to the forces that are beating the drums of democracy in the streets. The series of rallies held in Moscow and other cities shows that there is justification for this assertion.

[Yemelin] I myself was witness to how V. Urazhtsev, leader of the not unknown union "Shchit," at that time a candidate RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, directed the crowd that had gathered in front of the Park of Culture imeni Gorkiy shouting: "Down with Yazov!" One can read about this in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No. 9. That was in February...

[Petrushenko] 25 February. "X" Day.

[Yemelin] What is "X" day?

[Petrushenko] The night before I was handed two leaflets: One called for a rally and the other warned patriotic forces that they were preparing a provocation, an uproar that could lead to illegal seizure of power. Where did these leaflets come from? Who wrote them? Nobody could answer these questions. Then at the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet I asked the question directly: "What is the KGB being paid for?" The situation was complicated and future historians will obviously have to analyze this day—25 February. And this is typical: Again people want to lay all the blame on the people who raised

this issue in the legislature, and those who led the crowds of thousands of people to the square remain in the shadows.

When speaking about the provoking announcements one cannot but recall the statement on Leningrad television by A. Sobchak and other deputies. When they "warned" the population about the Jewish pogroms that were supposed to have been in the works... And when the pogroms did not transpire Sobchak forgot to make apologies to those he had frightened, and he did this quite persistently. And since we are on the subject of Sobchak, we have not yet done the main thing, in my opinion; we have not clarified what caused Anatoly Aleksandrovich to give false reports about what happened in Tbilisi. It would not hurt if your newspaper would go to the military procuracy and publish the materials of the Tarazevich commission—this commission told the real truth about the Tbilisi tragedy.

[Yemelin] Let us return to the beginning of our conversation. You have the floor, Viktor Imantovich.

[Alksnis] Nikolay Semenovich Petrushenko and I have somewhat different approaches but we understand one another completely and we work very well together. I know from my own experience what political disputes in the army environment mean. In Latvia the situation is more ideologized and it involves the Army as well. Now if, say, the Peoples Front of Latvia wants to create its own local organization in a collective of soldiers, there are no obstacles to this. I see this as a serious danger, the more so since we are constantly making concessions and abandoning many draftees in our republics. Now in the enlisted men's barracks we already have dedovshchina [abuse and mistreatment of recruits] and interethnic strife, and God forbid that we add interparty squabbles to this.

I agree with Nikolay Semenovich: The attacks on the Army that are being waged by present-day politickers pursue quite definite goals. I see these as a repetition of Bolshevik tactics. Remember when the Bolsheviks came into power they sent their agitators into the Army environment. Now it is simpler: All the barracks have television, newspapers, and magazines...

[Yemelin] Quite recently, I myself, as a reserve officer, went through retraining in "Vystrel" courses and I felt how painfully regular military personnel are reacting to the anti-Army campaign in the left-wing radical press and on television. But whether we like it or not, apparently, there are various political tendencies in the Army. What, in your view, is the alignment of forces here?

[Alksnis] I think these problems are largely imagined. Perhaps within the Arbat Military District this stratification between the generals and the officers and the masses of enlisted men does indeed exist. But in the "hot spots" of the country all are subjected to discrimination—from the general to the rank-and-file soldier. There is a great deal of difference in the moods of military servicemen, say, in Latvia and here in Moscow.

Here there is no moral terror not to mention physical. All this is in a milder form here and there is the possibility of discussion and certain dissenting opinions.

[Yemelin] But still, serving in the same unit there can be, say, both Major Lopatin and Colonel Petrushenko—people, as far as I understand it, who have quite different ways of thinking. And one must assume that oppositions like this are not just individual cases.

[Alksnis] Lopatin is already a major in the reserves. But that is not the point... I respect him—he has a backbone, that is, he can defend his viewpoint. At the same time, there is much in his position which I do not accept. In his striving for popularity, it seems to me, he has forfeited the good things for which we engaged in the battle. At one time we thought the same way. I was one of the 19 officer-deputies who signed the first variant of the concept of military reform, of which Lopatin was an initiator. But after Lopatin with his "amicable agreement," including with my opponents from the People's Front of Latvia, decided to "push through" the idea of national military formations, our paths diverged. As a professional I cannot but understand that this idea is suicide for the army.

[Petrushenko] Lopatin went to the United States recently...

[Alksnis] He spoke at the National Press Club of the United States. This question was asked of him not by any conservatives, stagnation stalwarts, or partocrats but by Americans: "The logical conclusion from your statement is an appeal for a split in the USSR and the transfer of Army formations to the jurisdiction of individual republics. But that could lead to an outbreak of military actions between the republics in the Transcaucasian region or Central Asia and even to conflicts among individual oblasts of these republics, to which we have already been witnesses..."—that is, even the Americans understand the total absurdity of suggestions about national troop formations. [Petrushenko] I think this is a matter not of Lopatin but of those who stand behind him. Just look. The school reform and other undertakings have failed and suddenly they announce to us: The military reform is a success. I also understand that the Army cannot do without reform, but I am afraid it will end up in the same old way: We will dismantle the old structures but we will not create new ones. There is another thing I cannot understand: How could the Russian leadership appoint Lopatin deputy chairman of the RSFSR state committee for social security. You know that Lopatin turned in his party card, but the most politicized people in the Army today are those who were in a hurry to leave the CPSU.

[Alksnis] I do not see anything so terrible about the fact that Lopatin left the party. That is a normal phenomenon.

[Petrushenko] It has turned out that probably no less than 90 percent of the officer corps are communists and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth

League] members. When Lopatin and others speak of a mass exodus from the CPSU I mentally ask myself the question: How many of them are officers? They number in the dozens out of a million communists—no more. In America it takes the recommendations of two or three congressmen—equivalent to our members of the Supreme Soviet—to be sent to a military academy. And since the principle of party affiliation is strictly in effect there, 100 percent of the officers belong to either the Republican or the Democratic Party. But for some reason we talk about withdrawal from the party and are trying to artificially accelerate this process.

Who stands behind this? One can quote Z. Brzezinski's article from the magazine *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*—it appeared almost a year before Viktor Alksnis's speech on the ties between the U.S. special services and the so-called democratic movements in our western republics...

[Alksnis] What is interesting is that this article, "Post-communist Nationalism," according to my information, was not recommended for publication in the Soviet press...

[Petrushenko] With no good reason!

[Alksnis] It was not recommended because it was a programmatic article and a very intelligent one; it gives a merciless analysis of what is happening in our country. It reveals the program on which these things are based and suggests what to do to make sure that these processes continue. Here is just one excerpt: "A decentralized confederation will be able to a considerable degree to create the best conditions for the present social renewal and, undoubtedly, it will be considerably less dangerous for mankind. In response the outside world must offer broad support in strengthening this pluralism by means of granting credit, forming joint enterprises, and expanding trade ties. The appearance of a pluralistic Soviet confederation will mean an end to the Cold War. Russian imperial control, and the immense military expenditures associated with this... One of the concrete actions on the part of the United States could be a doubling of the \$15 million budget of the National Fund for Democracy in order to render support to the national democratic movements in the Soviet Union..."

[Petrushenko] Emphasize—"democratic movements." We know which of us are democrats and which of us are patriots.

[Alksnis] Brzezinski goes on to write: "... those Balts, Ukrainians, Georgians, Tajiks, Russians, and other peoples who strive to create a new type of relations based on mutual respect and equal rights among nations deserve respect and support."

Not so long ago SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA ran a long article about contacts between certain USSR people's deputies and international funds which, as it turned out, were linked to the CIA. They also mentioned the American National Fund for Democracy—it delivered to

certain of our deputy groups reproduction equipment, computers, telefaxes, and so forth.

[Yemelin] What deputy groups are you talking about?

[Alksnis] Specifically—the Moscow Deputies Group.

[Petrushenko] They all made a lot of noise when Alksnis, Kogan, and I raised the question of conducting an investigation of the ties between certain deputy groups and foreign special services. But when I.D. Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, submitted to members of the Supreme Soviet information about the departure of deputies abroad I was struck by one interesting phrase to the effect that we do not rule out the possibility of traveling on invitations from government organs of the United States. And the CIA is a government organ...

[Alksnis] Nikolay Semenovitch, excuse me for interrupting. The CIA is not so stupid as to send an official invitation to some deputy.

[Petrushenko] No doubt.

[Alksnis] One extremely respected deputy came up to me either as a joke or out of real concern and said: "What am I to do? Is it going to turn out that I am a CIA agent too?" It turns out that he went to the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States and asked that they give him the documents regulating the activity of this serious institution. Our deputy required this information in order to work on the Law on the USSR Committee for State Security. And the CIA sent him the papers... So let us not lapse into spy-mania.

[Petrushenko] But let us not forget that the only place you find free cheese is in a mousetrap.

[Alksnis] At the session I introduced certain information about CIA ties with the "fronts" of the Baltic republics and Belorussia and Rukh in the Ukraine. This information is objective—it is reported at the very "top" and our highest leaders are familiar with it. Now they are accusing me, or, rather, they are demanding proof...

[Yemelin] In ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No. 48, the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in the USSR, J.L. Bullock stated that "there is no basis for such unsubstantiated assertions."

[Alksnis] I doubt that Mr. Bullock would confirm information to the effect that the CIA is participating in plans to destabilize the USSR. But Z. Brzezinski's article, which we quoted (and Brzezinski is not the last person in the brain center which determines U.S. foreign policy), openly sets the task of transforming the USSR into a confederation. I do not think that Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that this winter because he had nothing else to do, with no purpose in mind. And here is something else. I personally learned about plans to create a Baltic-Black Sea confederation during the first days of November from one of our top secret intelligence documents. And here this idea, about which hardly anybody had heard,

was being discussed at the parliamentary level in Minsk during 23-24 November. Parliamentary delegates from Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine came to Belorussia.

[Yemelin] What kind of confederation is this anyway? Can you give us more details?

[Alksnis] They wanted to cut off a part of the country's European territory and create the confederation on this space, and Poland was to be included in addition to the aforementioned republics. The goal was to unite into some kind of unified system to solve their economic and political problems.

[Yemelin] But then the Soviet Union would be left without many of its ports on the Baltic and the Black Sea. Would Russia have to cut another window to Europe?...

[Alksnis] The "confederates" have their own problems. As far as I know, serious disagreements have arisen between the Ukraine and Lithuania because of Rukh plans to create a new superpower in the not so distant future and certain figures are stating this outright.

[Yemelin] In LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No. 48 we reprinted O. Vitovich's speech. He is not very original: "The Ukraine—for the Ukrainians!"

[Alksnis] How is one idea or another usually introduced? It begins with a brain washing through the mass media. When the idea is well publicized and the population knows about it, the discussion begins at the parliamentary level. But with this Baltic-Black Sea confederation it was the other way around: an idea about which few know and which is to be realized practically from the ground up. This shows that there are certain behind-the-scenes maneuvers and there are certain forces that pushed these plans through.

[Petrushenko] Sometimes I look through my old lectures on ideological sabotage. And it all coincides: the crisis of the Communist Party, the interethnic conflicts, the attempts to weaken the Army... I do not intend to accuse anyone personally of subversive activities dictated by the CIA but I cannot figure out why the person who is respected in our country today is the one who destroys the Union, destroys the state. When they abolished Article 6 of the Constitution, our "democratic" publications wrote avidly about who voted and how. But why not look at who "vetoed" my suggestion about the declaration of the incomes of the president and the deputies? How did our most democratic democrats vote on this issue?

[Yemelin] Do you have this information?

[Petrushenko] Here. The list begins with academician Arbatov and ends with A.N. Yakovlev. Both are "against." Burlatskiy—"against." Yevtushenko—"against." Korotich—"against." Sobchak—"against." Chernichenko—"against."

[Yemelin] The attacks by the "democrats" on the Army are nothing new. Moreover, some people seriously think

that the Army and democracy are incompatible. But whenever they need anything, when it is necessary to harvest the crops or clean up after an emergency or natural disaster, when it is necessary to feed the people—then these same “democrats” call on the Army for help. But you are probably well aware of all this.

[Petrushenko] Of course. The notorious Sobchak and Popov... Both of them, as soon as they became the mayors of their cities, immediately changed their views. While previously they were vehemently opposed to “forced military labor,” now they are asking that the military construction detachments in the systems of the Moscow Soviet and Leningrad Soviet be retained for five to seven years. I wrote a letter to Comrade Sobchak asking him to declassify coded communication to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security. The Leningrad Soviet is using almost 2,000 military construction workers as an unpaid work force. The position of the chairman of the Leningrad Soviet in this issue is some how not linked to the kind of law upholder and democratic reformer whom millions of television viewers came to know as they followed the work of the USSR people’s deputies. And another thing. When they hold gatherings of mothers of soldiers, there are always representatives of the Ministry of Defense and generals there who are transformed into “whipping boys.” But where are the emissaries from the 17 other ministries and departments that have jurisdiction over the military construction battalions?! The unfortunate women who have lost their sons would have every right to make the same charge against them.

Why must the Army pay for everything and anything? And now our “ryndems”—market democrats—are raising the question of having the army act as a stabilizing force during the changeover to the market economy. On whose side? On the side of the successful entrepreneurs. They are hoping that we will take up arms to defend their many thousands in profits. But look at how those same “democratic circles,” those same politickers who complained the loudest about sending our troops into Afghanistan and “prudently” remained silent when the United States invaded Grenada, are literally pushing us into conflict in the Persian Gulf zone...

[Yemelin] In your view, how real is the possibility of our troops participating in this conflict?

[Petrushenko] Impossible! I was speaking about this question with the minister of defense recently. Dmitry Timofeyevich said right out: As long as he is defense minister not a single soldier will go there.

[Yemelin] At the beginning of December there was a founding congress of the “Soyuz” deputy group. There were people’s deputies from rural, village, city, oblast, and republic soviets. And, of course, USSR people’s deputies. But for some reason I did not see any people’s deputies from Russia at your congress...

[Alksnis] One comrade who was an RSFSR people’s deputy came up to me during the recess. He introduced

himself but I will not give his name. The first thing he said was: “I just ask that you not tell anyone anywhere that you saw me here for if you do it will not go well for me.” Why is that?! Have we really reached the point of this kind of ostracism being motivated by political considerations?

[Yemelin] But did you invite all of them to the congress?

[Alksnis] Naturally. In the hall I saw Oleg Rumyantsev, the leader of the Social Democrats in the Russian parliament. But there was no mass attendance. Although I know that the majority of RSFSR people’s deputies are in favor of Soyuz.

[Yemelin] Perhaps some people are scared away by the active aggressiveness of your position. Nikolay Semenovich here has already earned the epithet “hawkish”...

[Petrushenko] I prefer to go into battle in an open manner.

[Alksnis] The “Soyuz” group includes both Colonel Petrushenko and Professor Komarov—people with different ideologies, to put it mildly. We have different views of the future of the Communist Party and socialism, but we are united in one thing—we are disturbed about the destiny of the state. We are disturbed by the fact that human rights, the rights of millions of people are being flouted in the country.

[Yemelin] What can you say about the present policy in Russia?

[Alksnis] It is painful for me to speak about this. The situation is such that the present leadership of Russia has betrayed the Russians living in the national republics. And regardless of how loud and eloquent their phrases may be, I still say: The leadership of Russia has betrayed their compatriots, including those in the Baltic area. When the “Equal Rights” faction, which basically represents the interests of the Russian-speaking population of Latvia, tried to meet with B.N. Yeltsin, who was vacationing in Yurmat (he met with the Latvian People’s Front and other groups during those days), and when Boris Nikolayevich refused to speak with them, you know what kind of slap in the face that was to the Russian population in the Baltics! How can they be under the thumb of the nationalists with their ideas about nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries and so forth? As a result, they have cast the people to the whims of fate...

[Yemelin] The work of the Fourth USSR Congress of People’s Deputies will begin soon. What do you expect from this forum? And...excuse me for being so frank—will the opposition between your deputy group and the president not grow into an open confrontation?

[Petrushenko] Of course, we would like to find a path to mutual understanding and consolidation. But today there are forces much further to the right—for everything has shifted here: Where the “left” used to be has become the “right” and vice versa... Take the recent statement of

the Interregional Group. This was an ultimatum not only to the president but also to the executive organs. I can see that these people intend to wage a final, resolute battle at the congress. This is why the fight will be so ferocious.

[Alksnis] I would compare the present situation to October 1941 near Moscow. There is nowhere to retreat further. We are faced with a catastrophe—economic, political, and interethnic. And this is explained largely by the mistakes of the country's leadership. The main thing is that there is no clear cut program for perestroika. The trial and error method... Such experiments might be all right for an enterprise or kolkhoz [collective farm] but to set up such experiments in an immense country is a suicidal policy. And at the congress we must name the names of the "heroes" of perestroika and give them their due...

As for M.S. Gorbachev himself, I have a complicated attitude toward him. I myself am a "Gorbachevian" and I understand quite well that he is an outstanding political figure. But at the same time I see Gorbachev's weak points—his inconsistency, his indecisiveness at the turning points in our history. Therefore I support and will continue to support Gorbachev's policy. And I will criticize Gorbachev for his mistakes, shortfalls, and omissions.

[Yemelin] Certain forces are openly demanding that Gorbachev retire...

[Alksnis] This is quite a real threat. The "timing" mechanism has been started. I spoke of 30 days and was expressing my purely personal opinion but now I can see that these words fell on plowed, prepared soil. The accounting has begun, and I am not the only one who has been summing things up...

[Yemelin] Goodbye until we meet at the congress.

[The following resolution is printed in a box adjacent to the above article on page 9]

RESOLUTION of delegations of deputy groups of the Supreme Soviets of Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine on the creation of national armed forces.

1. The delegations, observing the priority of international law, recognizing the principles of the Helsinki agreements, and speaking out in favor of maintaining stability in the Baltic-Black Sea region, support the aspiration of the countries of the region to become states without arms for mass destruction.

2. The delegations consider it necessary to create national armed forces and are in favor of consultation and coordination of actions in the process of their formation and they are also in favor of friendly relations among them.

3. The delegations, being in favor of negotiations with the USSR Government on questions of a temporary presence and the status of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea

region, declare the inadmissibility of political activity on the part of the USSR Armed Forces and any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign states.

4. The delegations recommend that their governments coordinate their actions to provide a military and alternative service for citizens, render mutual assistance in questions of observing human rights in relations of military servicemen, and contribute to their return for service within their states.

5. The delegations propose that their states make efforts to regulate problems of voluntary return of military servicemen who are in the reserve and are retired, along with their families, to the territories of the republics from which they were called up.

From the delegation of the faction of the People's Front of Latvia to the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet

[signed] Mikhail Stepichev

From the delegation of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet

[signed] Virgilyus Chepaytis

From the delegation of the Belorussian People's Front in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet

[signed] Zenon Poznyak

From the delegation of the Opposition in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet

[signed] Levko Lukyanenko.

Minsk, 24 November 1990

[following three paragraphs are printed diagonally at the bottom of the resolution]

The delegations have begun consultation on the following questions:

1. Determination of the possibilities of interstate agreements on political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation among these states and also conditions for withdrawing Soviet troops from the Baltic-Black Sea Region and creating national armed forces.

to conduct a coordinated policy for dividing up the gold and diamond supply of the USSR.[end diagonal]

These copies of documents from the "Minsk Conference" were turned over to the editors by USSR People's Deputy V. Alksnis.[end box]

Military Procurator Completes Investigation of Vilnius Incident

91UM0196D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by V. Zhitarenko, special correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from Vilnius and Moscow: "The Echo of Severnyy Gorodok"]

[Text] Many newspapers provided information on the events of 17 November in Vilnius. It scarcely seems the place to return to a question without the appearance of new circumstances. In the first place, the garrison military procuracy has just completed an investigation of the actions of the officials in the troop unit who issued the command to use force against the pickets around the KPP [control point] at Severnyy Gorodok [Northern Camp]. Secondly, it could also be heard that supposedly the orders had come from Moscow and everything had supposedly been programmed by the military in anticipation of the known statement of the USSR minister of defense of 27 November.

I arrived in Vilnius on 7 December, on the eve of the Saturday meeting by the supporters of signing the Union Treaty. The leaflet on this issue explained that the rejection of such a treaty by the current republic leadership would be a path toward a catastrophic socioeconomic situation, to poverty and unemployment. Among its authors were garrison personnel along with the Civil Committee, the Lithuanian CP (CPSU), the Lithuanian Komsomol, the Federation of Workers, the Veteran Council and the Lithuanian Intermovement. In addition, the leaflets were spread from a military helicopter. Hundreds of officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers from the garrison as well as members of their families decided to participate in the meeting itself.

"Has this action been approved by the district and Moscow?" I asked the Deputy Garrison Chief for Political Affairs Col V. Smokarev, recalling that "version." He looked at me as if I had come from outer space and merely silently shrugged his shoulders.

On Saturday the gate of the KPP at Severnyy Gorodok was opened by a sentry wearing an armored vest and the garrison set off to the site of the meeting. By company. Accompanied by the regimental band. A certain portion of the city silently gazed at us from the sidewalk while another applauded. On that frosty day, around 80,000 city residents assembled, as was later learned, on the square in front of the Sports Palace. Flowers were given to the soldiers and officers were invited to the rostrum.

"And what if some of 'those' took it into their heads to cause a provocation?" This question of mine was apparently to the point because the Unit Chief of Staff Col V. Shevelev replied briefly but willingly: "We would answer force with force and in the camp there was a subunit on duty with a 15-minute alert status...."

On alert duty was the same 2d Motorized Rifle Company which on 17 November, in firing blanks into the air for a warning, having employed procedures of hand-to-hand combat, dispersed from the unit's KPP the so-called pickets or, more accurately, the provocateurs or terrorists. For what they had long caused against the servicemen and members of their family cannot be put in any other words. The materials of the procurator investigation on the case brought initially against the very same Unit Chief of Staff Lt Col V. Shevelev, and the Commander of the 2d Motorized Rifle Company, Sr Lt O. Zelenskiy, who gave the order to use force, scarcely leave any doubt on this question.

It turns out that on 16 November, leaflets were distributed through the city and these contained a threat-appeal after the meeting on Cathedral Square to seal off the military compound. In other words, to tickle the nerves of the garrison. In the afternoon of the following day, there were bold hooliganistic actions as neither the soldiers on leave nor the wives of servicemen going out to shop could pass through the gate of the KPP, and neither could a vehicle carrying the meal for the guards get through. Stones, bottles, boards and debris were thrown over the fence. Along with the now customary "Russians out of Lithuania!" much more threatening ones could now be heard: "You must be hanged!" An explosive packets were thrown across the fence. Just try to figure out whether they were grenades.

From the explanation to the question of the military procurator at the garrison: "In the aims of preventing an antiarmy action, loudspeaker equipment was employed: "Attention! The territory of the troop unit is a facility of the USSR Ministry of Defense and is protected by the USSR Law. In the event of entering the territory without permission of the command, weapons will be employed. We urgently request you halt the provocation and show restraint. Col Smokarev."

From the explanations to the military procurator:

Jr Sgt A. Astukevich: "Even after we had been forced to disperse the crowd from the KPP, it attacked an officer but the soldiers hurried up and dispersed the enraged persons...."

Pvt S. Markevich: "Three or four attacked my friend Jr Sgt A. Shimko who was returning from leave...."

Pvt I. Bryzgalov: "My fellow servicemen Petrov and Kuzmenko were dragged into the crowd.... Three persons tried to take away the assault rifle of Pvt Nadirov...."

The wife of the serviceman S. Slezinin: "We have already grown accustomed to much as we live in a dormitory where the entire floor has just one tap with cold rusty water, ration cards for scarce items are not issued by the local authorities and without a knowledge of the Lithuanian language you cannot find work. And finally there are the threats that they would hang us...."

The wife of the serviceman N. Annikov: "Prior to October we rented a one-room apartment in the town for 150 rubles. But the owner demanded that we move out as we were 'occupiers.' Now we live at the KTP [technical maintenance point] where it is wet, the roof leaks and we have a small child.... On 17 November I was afraid to go to the city. Then we heard explosions and only later did we learn that they had thrown explosive packets."

The procurator recognized that the actions of the servicemen had been forced on them and that they were defending a military installation and their own families. Lt Col V. Shevelev, Sr Lt O. Zelenskiy and the other servicemen had acted in strict accord with the requirements of the Internal Service Regulations and the garrison and guard duty regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. They did not exceed the limits of necessary defense. For this reason, a decree was adopted by the military procurator to refuse initiating a criminal case against the above-named servicemen as there was nothing criminal in their actions.

Among the eight "pickets" who sustained injuries after the personnel of the 2d Motorized Rifle Company employed methods of hand-to-hand combat were the organizers and leaders of the malicious hooliganistic actions carried out with particular boldness: K. Kamanulis and M. Marashka. Ultimately a criminal case is now being initiated against them as well as against E. Krishchunas, L. Kukauskas, V. Shuparis and R. Rogayshis.

Incidentally, in the near future one can scarcely count on just retribution for the committed crime. The reason is understandable as the current rulers of the city and the republic will not give offense against "their own."

However, there is a more important conclusion that from their side, from the side of the "victims" there have not been valid claims against the actions of the garrison. One can scarcely take seriously the statement by the Presidium of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet expressing "angry protest and condemnation" of the garrison's actions. Certainly immediately after the Presidium was forced to adopt another statement that during any meetings slogans should not be employed which "are insultingly directed against the nationalities of people, threats and actions which heighten tension in our society." In a word, they admitted those who attempted to test the strength of the army and the inviolability of its units got what they deserved.

The Vilnius Garrison began to defend its rights not a month ago but much sooner. And what was mentioned in the statement of the USSR minister of defense at the end of November could not help but be applied here in the summer as well as in the spring.

Incidentally, the monuments to V.I. Lenin and I. Chernyakhovskiy have been put under guard. The threat of pulling them down was more than real.

And when the municipal utility services "informed" the garrison command that the military camp was to be disconnected from the power and water supply systems, armored personnel carriers were placed near the corresponding substations....

A "brandishing of force"? Understandably the hotheads ready to leave the soldiers and their families without light and water and who already employed force shouted that the military was supposedly provoking a clash.

Something else strange: from Moscow they also endeavored to "hold back" such actions by the garrison. From other directorates and departments there were urgent instructions, recommendations and advice to remove the guards from the monuments, to maintain tact and restraint in dealing with the local authorities and do not provide grounds for antiarmy actions. But what could not be seen from Moscow was, as they say, being felt by the garrison on their very hides. Here they had realized that army restraint was seen by some as confusion, tact as a weakness and the failure to take measures to defend their own interests as capitulation.

Also very complex was the situation with the so-called political orientation. The garrison political workers were clearly aware that things had reached the point of the disintegration of the Lithuanian CP. And long before the accomplished fact they had begun morally to support those who subsequently formed a party on the platform of the CPSU.

As they say, the garrison chief Col V. Uskhopchik, his deputy for political affairs Lt Col V. Smokarev and other officials were caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. On this trip to Vilnius I heard from one of the "well-wishers of the army" that for dispersing the pickets the first had become a major general and the second a colonel? Of course not. It was more likely that last year they could have been deprived of their jobs, for they firmly were standing their ground. The situation in the city and the republic did not make it possible for them to do nothing. The so-called "Tbilisi syndrome" was too obvious, the echoes of all those conceivable and inconceivable sins of which Gen I. Rodionov was judged guilty. There were few who wanted to repeat his plight and support the garrison.

Incidentally, the same sort were also found here. Those who were afraid in any event to take responsibility for the measures initiated by the command of the Vilnius garrison. Here with particular warmth they recall the visits paid by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Army Gen V. Verennikov, the Deputy Commander of the Baltic Military District, Maj Gen V. Ovcharov, and certain other senior officers; they all understood and decisively supported and, if need be, sanctioned the necessary reasonable initiative.

But, alas, there were few of these. And now, after the statement by the minister of defense, almost everyone is stating with determination that provocations against the army can no longer be tolerated! It is not to be excluded

that precisely they who previously were tolerant and advised others more than strongly to do the same thing, will soon portray themselves as "ultraprincipled" persons. But then the others must not be forgotten, those who were the first to take a stand.

The Vilnius Garrison was one of the first to do this.

During this trip I was again convinced how our officer corps has grown in political terms. And it is not a question that not a single communist in Severnyy Gorodok even gave it a thought to give up his party card. Certainly life there, frankly speaking, is no honeymoon. But everyone in the garrison realizes that it is not the CPSU which brought this about. They are constantly confronted with the others, the true guilty parties.

One other essential point: their development as officers who think independently, take intelligent decisions and act decisively. Officers who do not fear responsibility for their actions and deeds. In truth, the army which for so long has been in an unique psychological blockade is breaking out of it. And due to such as Maj Gen V. Uskhopchik, Col V. Smokarev, Lt Col V. Shevelev and Sr Lt O. Zelenskiy.

...Incidentally, the latter did not fail to tell me:

"Had it happened on 17 November that I had been alone with my company in the garrison, I would have done precisely the same. Had it happened that there was only one soldier from my company here, he would have been a barrier blocking the path of those encroaching on the dignity of the army."

Need anything else be said?

Baltic MD Statement to Latvian Prime Minister

91UM0196A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[TASS article: "Statement of the Military Council"]

[Text] On 18 December, the Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military District, Lt Gen P.G. Chaus, on behalf of the district Military Council made a statement to the Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers Ivars Godmanis which, in particular, stated:

"The official authorities of the Latvian Republic, the leaders of the People's Front, the Congress of Latvian Citizens and the mass information media in the republic have sharply intensified antiarmy activities.

"In the leaflets disseminated among the personnel of the district, the soldiers are urged to violate their oath and the USSR Constitution, endeavoring thereby to put them into conflict with the Soviet laws, in impelling the young persons who have just set out on their independent life into the defendant's bench, and attempts are being made to carry out terroristic acts using explosives.

"In seeking in words an improvement in the material and everyday conditions of the servicemen and heaping the blame for all problems on the CPSU, the leaders of the People's Front have consciously overlooked the fact that precisely at their insistence, the Latvian Supreme Soviet on 4 August 1990 adopted a decree which deprived servicemen of the right to register at the location of the troop unit and precisely under their pressure the Latvian Council of Ministers on 19 October 1990 prohibited the allocating of plots of land for building housing for the servicemen, and it was precisely under the leadership of the People's Front that an extremely discriminatory decree was worked out and approved on 14 November 1990 by the Supreme Soviet and which deprived servicemen of their elementary human rights. Finally, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of 30 November 1990 actually reinforces all of the previously issued illegal legislative enactments against the servicemen.

"The leadership of the People's Front, the Citizens Congress and other such organizations realizes that the district command is making every effort not to leave the servicemen in the barracks, the children and wives in the housing compounds without heat, water, light and food. The leaders of the extremist organizations are forcing us into extreme measures.

"We demand that the Latvian Supreme Soviets, the Council of Ministers and the local authorities provide normal life for the military units, the military compounds on the territory of Latvia and exclude instances of moral and physical disparagement of the servicemen and the members of their families.

"We consider it our duty to recall that the troops of the Baltic Military District are loyal to the oath given to their people and will not submit to provocations by the so-called "defenders of the people's interests" in the form of the leaders of the Latvian People's Front, the Latvian Citizens Congress and other such."

Explosion Near Riga Garrison Procurator's Offices

91UM0196B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by M. Koshevatskiy, published under the heading "By Direct Wire; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS Correspondents Yesterday Transmitted From Riga," "And Again Explosions Are Heard"]

[Text] During the night of 18 December, a powerful explosion occurred by the building of the military procuracy of the Riga Garrison. Here is what we were told by the deputy military procurator, Lt Col Just A. Anokhin:

"At 0315 hours, the garrison procurator, Col Just V. Stepanenko, and I arrived at the site of the incident some half hour after the explosion. By the building we could see a crater and here they had discovered the remnants of

a Bickford fuze. The explosive wave had knocked out the glass of all the quarters of the three-story building. Fortunately, there were no human casualties. The material damages are being determined and a criminal case initiated. The military commandant of the Riga Garrison has taken a decision to put the building of the procuracy under armed guard. The leadership of the republic MVD and the procurator of Latvia were informed of the sabotage.

"At approximately the same time, around 0300 hours during the night, there were explosions near the monument to V.I. Lenin in Riga and near the building where the Riga Gorkom, the Kirovskiy and Moskovskiy Raykoms of the Latvian CP (CPSU) are located."

Armenian Supreme Soviet Representatives Meet With General Staff

91UM0196C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Medvedev of the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center: "About Induction and Not Only...; What the Armenian People's Deputies Asked the Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] At the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces a meeting was held with representatives of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, V. Shirkhonyan and Ye. Abgaryan, at their request. Questions were discussed related to the state of the autumn induction of the republic youth for undergoing active regular military service.

As in the spring of the current year, the call-up here was actually undermined. As of today, the plan for this has been fulfilled by only 25.3 percent, and basically young persons of the nonindigenous nationality have gone to serve in the Army and Navy. These are the consequences of the decisions taken by the Republic Parliament and which run contrary to the Constitution and the USSR Law on Universal Military Service. The essence of them is to leave the draftees to serve exclusively on Armenian territory and organize nationality-based troop units.

The deputies from Armenia strongly demanded the implementation of this idea and this, as was pointed out at the meeting with the General Staff representatives, runs contrary to the principle of extraterritoriality in forming unified Armed Forces in our nation as well as according to the current legislation on defense questions.

It was also pointed out that the attempts being made in the republic to "legalize" instances of the refusal of induction and absence from the units without leave have actually impelled the young men into illegal actions and for this reason they merit condemnation from the moral viewpoint.

Participating in the meeting were the deputy chief of the general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Col Gen G. Krivosheyev, and representatives from the staff of the Transcaucasus Military District. It was proposed to the

deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet that they review their position over the induction of young people into the army. It was emphasized that the interests of national security and ensuring its dependable defense demand the unswerving execution of the Union-wide laws.

Session of Coordinating Council on Military-Political Elections

91UM0269A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "A Meeting of the Coordinating Council"]

[Text] A meeting of the Coordinating Council took place in the Central Committee of the CPSU under the chairmanship of Yu.A. Manayenkov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This council was formed for the purpose of conducting an administrative review of issues relating to the coming report meetings and election campaign.

It was emphasized at the meeting that in accordance with the directives of the 28th CPSU Congress regarding the radical restructuring ["perestroyka"] of the system of party-political work within the framework of military reform, the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee made a decision to conduct report, election, and organizational meetings and conferences from January through March of this year in the USSR Armed Forces, troops of the USSR KGB and MVD, and railway troops. Changes must be implemented in the present structure of party organs, a differentiation made in functions of party organizations and political organs, and the activities of party organizations must be brought into conformity with new tasks and conditions to accomplish these tasks. All the work in preparing and presenting reports and conducting elections is designed to stimulate action on the part of primary party organizations, to increase the vanguard role of communists in combat training and service, to unite personnel, and to increase the influence of the CPSU in military collectives.

The Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee has authorized party organs of the Armed Forces not to deduct in 1991 the total fees collected for the Central Committee fund, but to use them for financing new party structures and acquisitions, and for conducting work and independent financial-administrative activities of party committees and control commissions.

The focus of participants in meetings and conferences should be on concrete actions for implementing the measures of the resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress on basic directions of the party's military policy in the present day. It is important to determine the priority of these directions and to facilitate the renewal of party work, the formation of new party structures, and the confirmation of the authority of party organizations in the armed forces as a militant and well-tested detachment of Lenin's party.

Those participating in the discussion of current problems included Colonel-General N.I. Shlyaga, Colonel-General N.A. Moiseyev, Admiral V.I. Panin, A.N. Sosnitskov, Major-Generals V.P. Ososkov and B.S. Golyshev, Major-General of Aviation A.M. Sidorov, Lt Colonel N.A. Kleshchenkov, Captain S.M. Pishchugin, and other comrades. In their deliberations and conclusions, these participants relied on the collective opinion of many communists in the army and navy.

There were also interesting discussions on questions about regulating the course of active military duty for servicemen who will be exempt from fulfilling their service obligations because they are elected to the staff of electoral organs of social associations in the USSR Armed Forces, the troops of the USSR KGB, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and railway troops. Other interesting discussions were about the tone and competence of the press, reporting on the coming report meetings and election campaign, and on the establishment of closer ties between the new structures and local party organizations.

Basic directions for near-future activities of the Coordinating Committee were determined at this meeting.

Lt Gen Ovchinnikov on Changes in Political Organs

9JUM03084 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jan 91 Union Edition p 7

[Interview with Lieutenant General A.I. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "Is the Main Political Directorate Changing a Shop Sign?"]

[Text] **By a decree of the USSR president, the political organs of the USSR Armed Forces, troops of the USSR Committee of State Security, the interior troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the railway troops have been transformed.**

Lieutenant General A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, has discussed the new functions and structure of the political organs with our correspondent.

Aleksandr Ivanovich stressed: "First of all, this has to do with profoundly restructuring the entire system of political organs of the Army and the Navy rather than changing a shop sign. Previously, they were the organs of party leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, and the Main Political Directorate operated with the status of a CPSU Central Committee department, whereas now these organs have become an integral part of the organs of military administration, and will be created in keeping with the structure of troops and the nature of accomplished tasks.

"The minister of defense manages military-political work; the Main Military-Political Directorate of the

USSR Armed Forces has been entrusted with its direct organization. The chief of the directorate is first deputy minister."

[Litovkin] If CPSU directives no longer bind the military-political organs, what documents are they going to proceed from?

[Ovchinnikov] Along with the entire Armed Forces, they will proceed from the laws of the USSR, decisions of the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of the president of the country, resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers, orders and directives of the minister of defense, as well as military regulations which no one has canceled. In addition, there is a new directive document confirmed by a decree of the USSR president—General Regulations on Military-Political Organs of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Litovkin] Previously, commanders relied on the support of party organizations and directed their activities. Who is going to do this now?

[Ovchinnikov] Communists themselves through party meetings, party bureaus of small units, units, and vessels up to the All-Army Party Committee. They will be created on the basis of elections, and nobody will give anybody commands. The party organizations of the Army and the Navy are completely independent, and servicemen are guided in their service actions by the demands of the law. They cannot be bound by the decisions of political parties or mass social movements.

[Litovkin] Instead of one structure, two will appear in the Army—the Main Military-Political Directorate and the All-Army Party Committee. Is this to say that the number of general billets will increase?

[Ovchinnikov] No, it will not. Moreover, the structure and staff of, for example, the Main Military-Political Directorate, have been determined taking into account the reduction of the Armed Forces which is now under way. In a recent period of time alone, the number of general billets in the Army and the Navy has been reduced by more than 1,000. Just as in the entire USSR Armed Forces on the whole, reductions have affected one-third of the political officers' officer and general billets. This process is continuing.

[Litovkin] New military-political organs must engage in the social protection of servicemen and their families. How will this be actually done?

[Ovchinnikov] There is a program of social support for the servicemen and members of their families, as well as individuals discharged from active military service. It has been approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. It includes an entire array of measures aimed at improving the financial situation of soldiers, allocating them residential premises and all necessary social and cultural benefits. Considerable financial resources, 3.3 billion rubles, have been allocated for this program in the 1991 Union budget.

With a view to ensuring social justice and security of the servicemen, the military-political organs will coordinate the operation of proper services, interact closely with the soviets of people's deputies, monitor compliance with the USSR laws, state resolutions, and legal acts, and participate in the work of public associations and movements. Subunits staffed with specialists on social and legal issues will be formed within the structure of military-political organs for this particular purpose. I believe that it does not make sense to dwell on their functions in detail now. This is the topic of a special discussion.

General Staff Official on Joint Patrols

91UM0331A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center report on interview with Major General V.A. Solomatn, chief of the Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Why Patrols Are on the Streets"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press, on the basis of a joint order of the USSR minister of internal affairs and the USSR minister of defense, starting on 1 February of this year joint patrolling by militia workers and servicemen is being introduced in the city of Moscow, capitals of the Union and autonomous republics, kray and oblast centers, and in cities where there are military garrisons. Major General V.A. Solomatn, chief of the Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, comments on this decision.

[Solomatn] I would like to emphasize first of all that this order was published in fulfillment of a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers dated 11 October 1990 "On Urgent Measures to Reinforce Legality and Law and Order in the Country" and of instructions of the government of 27 October 1990.

As you know, patrolling in military garrisons is a normal practice. It is organized in accordance with the Regulations on Garrison and Guard Duty, which were approved, incidentally, by the USSR Supreme Soviet

Presidium on 30 July 1975. The purpose is to maintain order and high military discipline among servicemen on streets and in public places, and at railroad stations, terminals, seaports, and airports.

As for patrolling jointly with militia details, this was practiced previously as well. In some cities, at the request of local organs of authority, this is being done up to the present time, and it impacts to a significant degree on improvement in law and order. The extension of this practice to other large cities is brought about by the worsening crime situation. It has become unsafe for people to go out in the streets and public places, especially at night. The reinforcement of militia patrols with military personnel will unquestionably improve the situation in some measure.

[Correspondent] Describe them in more detail.

[Solomatn] In the organization of joint performance of service, the servicemen will be guided strictly by the requirements of the laws of the USSR and the Union republics. Militia employees and servicemen will not replace each other. That is, the militia guarantees public order, and servicemen in the patrol, discipline among servicemen. At the same time, they will not be indifferent witnesses if someone attempts to break the law or, especially, to commit a crime. The servicemen, unquestionably, will come to the aid of militia officials.

[Correspondent] Some say that the military will drive along the streets in BTR's (armored personnel carrier) and even with weapons...

[Solomatn] Far-fetched fears, although actually the joint order directs commanders of military units to have a permanent reserve of patrols on vehicles (BTR) and alert subunits in each garrison. They will be located on the territory of military compounds.

He who sees "a threat to democracy" in this part of the order, in my opinion, is pursuing some other kind of goal. I cannot evaluate all of this in any way other than as another attempt by certain persons to use any excuse to incite passions for anti-Army speculation.

German General Staff Officer on Withdrawal

91UM0213A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 51, Dec 90 p 5

[Interview with F. Kokh conducted in Bonn by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent Yu. Sigov under the rubric, "Germany Has Allocated 7.8 Billion Marks for Construction of Housing for Servicemen in the USSR": "Soviet Forces in Germany: What Is in Store for Them?"]

[Text] Recently, a treaty was signed between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which defines the conditions for Soviet forces stationed in unified Germany and calls for their complete withdrawal from German territory by 1994. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent Yu. Sigov discusses this in Bonn with Lieutenant Colonel F. Kokh, a spokesman for the Bundeswehr General Staff.

[Kokh] First of all, I would like to note that now Soviet forces will be deployed not on the territory of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but on the territory of a united German state, and they will be subject to FRG laws. This means that any transgression of the law, which is committed in a territory where Soviet forces are stationed, will be under the jurisdiction of the local authorities. At the same time, German laws in the spheres of health care, maintaining public order, as well as the rights to possess real estate apply to Soviet servicemen and members of their families (this is about 600 thousand people in all).

[Sigov] The FRG government has pledged to finance the construction of housing in the USSR for servicemen. What kind of housing will it be and who will be able to obtain it?

[Kokh] The Federal government has pledged to pay 12 billion Deutsche marks [DM] to the USSR by the end of 1994, of which DM7.8 billion will go for financing the construction of housing for Soviet servicemen leaving Germany. The homes for them will be constructed in the USSR, using primarily German workers. There are different designs—we are proposing single family dwellings and duplexes with 60-65 square meters of floor space. But the Soviet side also has other variants, in particular, the construction of high-rise apartments in places. There are proposals to invest German credit in the construction of brickyards, which will provide the necessary building materials. In any case, you yourselves know best what to do with the currency received from the FRG.

As we understand it, the housing built using German money will be earmarked exclusively for Western Group of Forces' officers and warrant officers, who are leaving Germany. I want to make it known right away that not everyone will get "German homes" (we are planning to build about 35 thousand of them), since there is certain to be several rotations of Soviet officers through Germany before the end of 1994 and it would be simply

impossible to provide all of them housing in the USSR at the expense of the Federal government.

[Sigov] How will the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Berlin be carried out? And will units from the other allied armies remain in Berlin?

[Kokh] We plan to remove not only Soviet forces from Berlin, but also American, British, and French forces, however this will be done gradually. It is planned to retain only a purely symbolic presence of troops in the city. Germany's complete control over Berlin will be established in the future and we will even use elements of the local police to guard war memorials, a function which Soviet, British, and American soldiers carry out at present.

[Sigov] After the unification of Germany, a considerable number of Soviet weapons, which were previously used by the army of the GDR, came into the Bundeswehr's possession. Does the FRG government intend to pay for them in some way?

[Kokh] An inventory of all weapons, "inherited" by the Bundeswehr from the army of the GDR, is currently being conducted. We must determine which of these weapons can be used, and which can merely be written off. As regards the military orders placed in the Soviet Union by the GDR government in its time, they will all be paid on delivery of the arms. This is our obligation. True, we are already conducting negotiations on so-called "compensatory deliveries" on account of these orders. Let us say that we do not need your tanks, which were built on the basis of orders from the former GDR, but we would purchase prime movers, tractors, and agricultural equipment instead.

[Sigov] What is your attitude toward the 24 MiG-29 Soviet fighters, which have been added to the Bundeswehr's armory through "inheritance"? Their value is not at all symbolic and they are considered one of the best military aircraft in the world...

[Kokh] Questions associated with the MiG-29's appearance in the Bundeswehr's armory are currently being discussed. And although a significant reduction of the "Luftwaffe" (the German Air Force) is planned, the technological level of the MiG's is such that we simply cannot give them up. Whereas all the other Soviet produced military aircraft will evidently be scrapped, the MiG-29s will remain in the Bundeswehr's armory. It will only be necessary to purchase spare parts for them. In the future, domestic production of similar aircraft, as well as spare parts, will be established in Germany.

[Sigov] It is no secret that scores of officers from the former GDR People's Army have undergone and continue to undergo training at Soviet military educational institutions. They probably represent a "stock of gold" for the FRG intelligence services. These people not only know the latest models of the various sorts of weapons

produced in the USSR, but are also familiar with contemporary developments in the Soviet Army's strategy and tactics for conducting combat operations...

[Kokh] Of course these people possess certain secrets which are military secrets of the Soviet Army. If they want to serve in the Bundeswehr, they can do so and not tell us anything about their training in the USSR. That is their business.

[Sigov] And how will you treat the German political worker-officers, who were trained at the V. I. Lenin Military Political Academy in Moscow?

[Kokh] All political workers in the former army of the GDR have already been discharged and political agencies disbanded. As a matter of principle, in our country members of various political parties—Christians, liberals, and members of different religious denominations serve in the Bundeswehr, but all of them are prohibited from propagandizing their own political and religious views among the troops.

[Sigov] What will be the conditions for performing military service in the Bundeswehr for individuals of German nationality, who are leaving the USSR for permanent residence in Germany, particularly if they have already served in the Soviet Army?

[Kokh] Like all other Germans, Soviet Germans coming to Germany for permanent residence may be called up for service in the Bundeswehr upon reaching their 18th birthday. But in our country one can refuse performance of military duty for religious convictions and then the conscripts perform alternative service.

[Sigov] And, finally, a question about the Soviet Army's real property, which will remain after its withdrawal from Germany. Will the FRG government pay the USSR compensation for it?

[Kokh] Negotiations on these issues are already being conducted. I think that individual facilities will be purchased outright and if we manage to reach an agreement, compensation, either in the form of money or the delivery of German goods wanted by the USSR, will be paid for the others.

State of, Desertions from Western Group of Forces

91UM0214A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 90
Second Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Izgarshev, PRAVDA special correspondent in Berlin-Moscow, under the rubric "Reporting from the Western Group of Forces": "On the First Line of Defense—A Time of Changes"]

[Text] A little more than a year ago things were simpler here: we lived and served on the first line of defense, in advance of the frontier posts, face to face with the aggressive bloc... Only then was it said this way.

And the Wall was a wall. And the green fences around our installations formed part of that iron curtain, about which the paid hirelings of imperialism, in our opinion, broadcast day and night from over the "knoll".

The Wall is gone now. The curtain has raised slightly, but in such a way that if one goes beyond the green fence, he will immediately find himself "surrounded". Oh, yes, now those who, according to the long-standing postulates, opposed us from that side are found behind and at the side. In general, wherever one looks there is NATO encirclement.

Private Sergey Yurchenko, a mechanic in the group communications center whom I met on the very first day of my temporary duty assignment, spoke with soldier's humor regarding this:

—Now one cannot immediately sort out whether we are our Western Group of Forces or their Eastern Group. We are here, as the saying now goes, not even as guests, but as friends...

Afterwards, I heard the fine Russian word "gosti" (guests) more than once. From Germans. But, incidentally, the purport in this formulation was divined not to be that which says a guest in the home is like God in the home, but that which says a guest pleases the host, or else: "there is the door—leave". Nevertheless, the way to the door has been pointed out. With all certainty...

But what kind of guests are we? This is prohibited and do not dare to do that. Do not fly, do not shoot, and do not bomb. The range facilities have been closed and the skies have been closed. How are we to train and perform our duty? No, we did not come to this land as guests, but for a completely different reason. And we ourselves think it is our own concern to make decisions, while conforming wisely to common sense and to the interests of the Motherland and of peace and security in the whole European community. Of course, also taking into account the interests of the German people who have united in a single state.

What is all this talk for? Let no one interpret it as grumbling because of the concluded agreements. Either bilateral, or according to the "four plus two" formula, or multilateral All-European... Everything there is in conformity with the present situation.

I admit, only one thing is disturbing. But of course, it is possible to leave even before the end of 1994. I understand that it might even be the best thing. But, indeed, if one estimates according to Malinin-Burenin, as they say, one can hardly make ends meet.

Judge for yourselves. We are withdrawing from Czechoslovakia within 18 months. From Hungary also. But there are ten times less troops there than on German soil, and approximately twenty times less equipment of various types. And another thing. The British and the French do not have anywhere near as many troops in Germany as we do. But they are not leaving earlier than

our troops, although their homes are only a stone's throw from there, especially for the French.

Take this figure into account. A tank division must haul away some 50 thousand tons of ammunition alone. They say, By the way, neighboring state, you absolutely will not transport ammunition on trains... Does this mean by sea? Yes, of course. And, allow me to ask, where does one unload rather dangerous cargo? As I was told at Group HQ, the Baltic republics have refused, the residents of Leningrad also. Have a steamship make the difficult trip into Murmansk or Arkhangelsk? How many transports will we have to charter? And it is a long journey. It will cost us a pretty penny!

And the troop trains? Tens of thousands of railroad cars that are so critical to our country. But we will probably find them. However, according to the latest press reports, the same neighboring Poland intends to "extract" handsome sums from their former colleague in socialist cooperation for the passage of railroad cars over their track.

Nevertheless, why is it that I have come up with these figures? I would like to believe that those, who are supposed to on the staff, have considered and computed everything. Better than we have and no worse than the Western economists. This is a firm and deep-seated belief among us Russians. It comes from a long-standing conviction that the Motherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was always, as a rule, under the direction of reasonable and reliable people, who are zealous about goodwill and the honor and dignity of the State.

Unfortunately, not all of the present actions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm this rule. But all the same I would like to believe, in spite of, as one might put it a little more mildly, individual snags. I understand that there can no longer be discussion about any payments for war damage inflicted upon our nation. We relinquished any payments ages ago for the benefit of the former GDR. What is there to regret about this? Although, by the way, another nation has made economic claims against Helmut Kohl's government just because the tanks from General Rommel's corps once rolled around in its sands, and Kohl's government agreed to satisfy the claims. Germany is paying many nations for the damages caused by the fascists. For those killed, for those taken prisoner, for those driven into slavery, and for the destroyed villages.

During that war, we lost, or rather, were deprived of 1,700 cities, 70 thousand villages, and millions of our people's lives. And the so-called demographic pitfalls are still making themselves felt. I am convinced that one of the main reasons for our present poverty, along with others of course, is the military disaster thrust upon us by the German fascists, and the losses caused by them.

Now we are receiving 15 billion marks from the Germans, of this six billion are for the maintenance of the Western Group of Forces until the end of 1994. 7.8 billion marks have been set aside for the construction of

housing for servicemen's families. The Germans have promised to build 36 thousand apartments for officers and warrant officers in the territory of our western military districts. It is not much, but, as the saying goes, thank you for even that.

But in the Western Group of Forces, with whomever I have discussed this sore subject, my interlocutors have expressed concern: will the money be wasted and in the conditions of an economic and financial crisis will it be thrown at other, perhaps, momentary goals? How many times have all sorts of promises, assertions, and commitments resounded from the lofty parliamentary and governmental tribunes, but, alas, they have often slipped away, like water into sand...

After returning to Moscow, I conveyed the officers' anxiety to the Ministry of Defense finance authorities.

Colonel General V. Babyev said to me, What are you talking about? Don't you know the Germans? They will control everything to the pfennig...

If only you were right, Vladimir Nikolayevich! But one of the newspapers, citing fully competent sources, recently reported that the money for officer's housing is being turned over to the Ministry of Defense. If this is the case, it appears that the officers' misgivings are not unfounded. I hope we will not be enticed by the gratuitous currency to other goals. True, General Babyev reassured me that German firms, which have been selected on a competitive basis, will do the building and that the owners of the currency will finance the construction themselves. But right here I learn that a government committee, headed by a first deputy minister of defense, is being established. Clearly, I cannot help trusting this lofty committee. But I will make a suggestion: perhaps it would make sense to create a public council out of a number of interested future tenants. Workers' control over distribution has been implemented by a presidential decree. An organization for officers' control over the construction of the housing is also a fully legitimate action. PRAVDA's military department is prepared to actively assist this public agency.

Our Western Group of Forces was always in full view of both our nation and all of Europe. It is a very powerful shock force. It was still being said quite recently: if the Soviet Armed Forces are the shield of the Motherland, the Western Group of Forces is the emblem on this shield. The best and newest weapons and combat equipment are there. The group also includes the best trained military and civilian contingent. In short, it has been given constant attention.

However, now it seems the attention has become even greater. True, it is of a different substance. "Two hundred soldiers from the army headquarters in Potsdam left the barracks and asked the German authorities for political asylum". "The wives of 400 officers have sent a letter to the FRG Chancellor requesting that their husbands not be sent back to the Soviet Union." "Armed

detachments of Soviet deserters have appeared in Tyuringiya. Residents are being asked to be careful". "Russians are polluting ground. They are dumping waste into the Havel River". "They are cluttering up the forests in the area of Burg. A local forest ranger declared,—One of the problems is that soldiers are lighting fires in the forest, roasting shashliks, and drinking vodka." "In Berlin and other cities Soviet soldiers are speculating in uniform items and trading in weapons".

One could go on ad infinitum. But I will respond to these "veracities". There is no army headquarters in Potsdam. Those 200 soldiers also do not exist. Like the 400 wives, their appeal to Herr Chancellor also does not exist. As regards the vodka and shashliks, I will not even begin to refute them—where could a soldier get these things? In exchange for what things?

And I saw the trading myself.

In the center of Berlin, near the Brandenburg Gates a brisk trade is conducted in military equipment and army paraphernalia. One can buy a major's uniform jacket, a guard unit device, shoulder boards, emblems from all branches of service, gas masks, and binoculars at the secondhand markets... This is the solemn truth. Just as it is also true that one can purchase items from the U.S., British and French armies, and the Bundeswehr there. But most of all—items from the former GDR National People's Army.

But you will not encounter Soviet soldiers as vendors there. And weapons are not traded. A false statement by the pen of glib colleagues.

In Berlin, and in other cities I saw more than one schoolboy, sometimes in our soldier's garrison cap and sometimes in an officer's service cap, which were adorned with Soviet Army emblems, cockades, and badges. At present, it seems to me that the whole world has become enamored of military accoutrements. I have seen time and again how foreign observers at our tactical exercises simply ravage the shelves of the military clothing department in the post exchanges.

In Moscow, I spoke with the commander of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services and with the chief of the military trade directorate regarding the foreign consumer interest in our military articles. And General of the Army V. Arkhipov and Lieutenant General N. Sadovnikov declared with one voice: "We will sell everything we have, we will not haul it home"

But here is the problem, the supplies of these items are not all that large. We do not have enough emblems, devices, stars, and cockades for ourselves.

And there is another detail concerning the selling. Since wartime, the legendary T-34s have been preserved in the tank regiments and placed on pedestals. Many of the other side's military museums have rushed to us with the suggestion to sell these rare exhibits. They promise tens of thousands in currency. Do you think we sold them?

Nothing of the kind! Instructions were not received and the T-34s were loaded on special trains, perhaps they will be used as scrap metal at home. They filled one of the tanks with gas and oil. A battery was installed. The regiment commander got behind the controls—and the wonder "relic" left for embarkation under its own power. That is some piece of equipment!

Our aviators also did not sell the "MIG" from the pedestal and distressed the foreign merchants.

What in the world are things coming to? The commander of the army, to whom the State has entrusted the lives of thousands of officers and soldiers and has given such colossal might that by his single word only God knows how much could be destroyed and reduced to ashes, if something unforeseen happened, is not allowed to dispose of an old tank on his own without prompting from above.

Perhaps I should draw a line under the subject of trade.

What about deserters? It is a well-known matter in our homeland that there is quite a number of army people on the run. Incited and encouraged by some unconstitutional acts which are being adopted in the little homelands of some soldiers, they are running away from the barracks, especially in the military construction units, to the protection of the new interpreters of national sovereignty.

Alas, there is even this type here, on the former first line of defense. For December, seven dozen soldiers and sergeants and three officers, if my memory does not fail me, were on the run. And one warrant officer. And recently a Lieutenant Colonel—regimental commander fled to the West.

Of course, the facts, from whatever side you roll them up, are disgraceful. At all times and in all nations the attitude toward desertion has been one and the same. But there can be no other attitude except general contempt, and all the more, toward those who abandon their duty station.

But here is something that I cannot pass over in silence. For a long time an unwritten rule has been firmly established in our country: a commander is responsible for the actions of his subordinates. Of course, one cannot help making him responsible and answerable: the commander is responsible for everything. But what should this responsibility be? I would not be wrong if I said that the hazing of new conscripts would have sharply declined if it had not been covered up by commanders. And why is it covered up? Because the commander is more responsible for the hazing than the "old timer". They will punish, not recommend for promotion, not send to training, and if a replacement is to be received, consider, is Kushka or Borzha the best option.

There are also severe penalties for all commanders in the chain of command from the immediate commander to the commander in chief for deserters.

However, it is not the "negatives" which define life in the group of forces. It is performing its service to the homeland with dignity and righteousness. It continues to be the emblem on the shield. But that is a separate discussion.

Officers Desert from Western Group of Forces

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[Article by Col V. Zhitarenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "A Regular Judas"]

[Text] A regular Judas. That is the only way now to categorize the former regimental commanding officer who betrayed his native land.

He was one of 11 children in the family of the worker Kolesnikov. His brothers and sisters grew up and left to work in the railroad car shop in the city of Obluchye in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Khabarovsk Shipyard, and the Birobidzhan Footwear Plant.

"But our Mishka became a military officer," the father and mother would say, speaking of their greatest pride.

And not a bad one, to believe his references: "Modest, diligent, and honest. The platoon commanded by Lt M. Kolesnikov is first in the regiment..." "He enjoys deserved respect with the men and officers... The company CO carries out his service duties irreproachably." "In the job of battalion chief of staff he showed himself to be an intelligent and politically mature officer..." "The documents he produced (as deputy chief of a division operations department) are outstanding for their depth of conception and solid knowledge of the probable enemy and the characteristics of waging combat actions..." "The regimental chief of staff has a good level of operational-tactical training and skillfully combines high standards with constant concern for his subordinates... He is worthy of promotion to the position of regimental CO..."

It is possible that there was nothing much behind all these resounding phrases: cliches are just cliches. All the same, a man known to be a poor specialist and organizer will hardly manage to become a unit CO. And incidentally, in the last reference they were already lining Kolesnikov up to become deputy CO of a division...

It would be better, of course, to look him in the eyes, listen to the man himself: why did he decide on treason? The logic of such a terrifying act would be more understandable. But that cannot be done now. I have on my desk a list of officers who served with Kolesnikov or who graduated from the military academy with him. But when I tried to talk with them it became clear from the very first ones that they remember only the bad things, for they are already well aware of the treason of their fellow cadet and officer. And what can you say about the officers of the regiment which he commanded until recently, and whose honor he

besmirched horribly. They are generally inclined to consider him a well-known Judas even though, as the reader will see further on, many of them were involved in Kolesnikov's transformation.

So let us turn to the most objective source, the officer's biographical data and the documents.

His first eight years of duty as an officer were spent in the Far Eastern Military District. That is where Viktor, his oldest son, was born. The second, Aleksey, was considered a Muscovite; he came into the world when his father was a cadet at the academy. At that time Moscow was a kind of holiday for the officer's family; after all, his wife too came from a large worker family in the Amur region. Then came the Carpathian Military District, but the garrisons there were so far from the oblast centers.

The Kolesnikovs generally took his assignment to the Western Group of Forces [WGF] as a kind of gift of fate.

Lt Col M. Kolesnikov commanded one of the regiments in the Western Group of Forces for just over a year. But in early October the division CO was forced, in evaluating his subordinate, to reach a harsh verdict: that he was not fully suitable for the position he held. It was not a subjective opinion he expressed; the facts confirmed it. If the number of crimes in the unit had tripled compared to 1989, if weapons and ammunition were simply disappearing because of mistakes in storing and keeping them, and if lateness in returning from leave had become almost customary in the unit—what could be done?

The author of these lines once served in the Western Group of Forces too, so I can testify: even in the old days you were unlikely to get away with such things. You would not only be demoted, but also sent off to the interior districts. At that time the Western Group of Forces command showed a kind of egotism: we do not need poor officers, it is best to ship the poor ones "beyond the Urals." And today, as experience shows, there is one more weighty reason to ship them off.

The army CO and Gen Arm V. Snetkov, commanding officer of the WGF, agreed with the division CO's opinion.

Then in early December it was discovered that Lt Col M. Kolesnikov was gone from the regiment, as were his family (wife and two sons) and Capt G. Moiseyenko, CO of the support company. The preliminary investigation established that on 29 November Kolesnikov and Moiseyenko, acting in conspiracy, crossed to the former FRG, taking with them three shells to the latest tank, one guided rocket shell, and a rocket from an antiaircraft complex. Military procuracy organs opened a criminal file under three articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code: treason against the homeland, desertion, and theft of ammunition.

Organizational conclusions were drawn, as the reader may have guessed, if nothing else then by the report in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on appointment of a new CO for the

WGF. But one of the youth newspapers has already rushed in to express its doubt about whether this was fair. Yet the same paper a short time before had reported that our troops in Germany were supposedly crossing over to the other side openly in pursuit of "big money," and for the same purpose were selling not only military ammunition but also weapons.

Also released from their positions were Col Gen A. Kolinichenko, chief of the WGF political directorate, Maj Gen A. Zhurov, division CO, Maj Gen V. Shipilov, chief of the WGF personnel directorate, Col N. Kadomtsev, chief of the division political branch, and Col A. Balashov, division chief of staff. Many other officials were given punishments. Because this incident highlighted another of the reasons that forced the USSR president and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense to review these personnel questions.

Let us trace the chronicle of recent events. A new commanding officer arrived in the regiment on 28 November. The senior officer assigned him to study the combat documents for two days and on the third present himself to the members of the large unit military council and then to personnel of the unit. And only when the time had come for the new regimental CO to take over the affairs and position of Kolesnikov did it come out that the latter was gone. Broadly speaking the division CO had tried to find his subordinate earlier; he had called the unit a number of times, but the deputy regimental CO would answer, "Kolesnikov is out at the site." And the division CO believed it. As it turned out, he believed liars. And he himself did not take the trouble to visit the regiment for four days.

What can be worse for the army than this kind of permissiveness, cover-up, and lack of control? And if this is being done at such a high level, certainly it is clear that the WGF command is to blame: they instilled this understanding of service duty.

As Maj S. Popov, our regular correspondent for the Western Group of Forces, reported to the editors, Lt Col M. Kolesnikov also neglected regimental affairs because of abuse of alcohol. In any case, when his apartment was opened it looked like a bottle storage shed. Did they know about this in the unit? They could not have helped but know—at least those deputies of the CO and the secretary of the party organization. But no steps were taken. What is more, when the decision had already been made to relieve the officer of his position and his work and party references were being prepared, the same old rosy phrases were used: "He is respected by the military collective. In daily life he is modest, morally stable, ideologically firm." Strange as it seems, Lt Col N. Kadomtsev, chief of the division political branch, agreed with this too. It was only the chief of the higher-ranking political organ who doubted the objectivity of the reference. Now who should know a man better, one who works closely with him or a remote senior officer? Under testing here it turned out to be the remote senior officer.

Those who were close to him failed to observe many things, or rather they tried not to notice. One more thing our regular correspondent reported: in his year of service in the WGF Kolesnikov bought a Volga car, then a Mercedes. If the officers and communists had blamed him for this, perhaps he for his part would not have closed his eyes to the fact that many of them suffer from the same "acquisitive reflexes." In recent times 102 private cars have appeared in the regiment. It is understandable when they buy a car apiece. But Kolesnikov's closest assistant, the same Capt G. Moiseyenko who fled with him, managed to buy and sell 12 cars. And if Lt Col B. Kochev, regimental political officer, bought and sold three, what talk can there be of the moral posture of the leadership?

It was only after Kolesnikov made his escape that the entire officer collective of the unit furiously condemned him. They were all truly shocked. But if you think about it, the lieutenant colonel's fall probably began when his passion for easy money replaced his concern for unit combat readiness and maintaining discipline and order in the regiment.

What can you say? Living conditions shape a person's character in unique ways. While officers in the internal districts often live very badly, in the WGF the officer finds himself in, let us say, relative comfort. But remembering that he will later have to return to "his own" circles, he cannot help thinking about setting his family up materially, at least for the immediate future. And whereas in times past we hypocritically kept quiet about this problem in general, today some people are practically bragging about the VCR's, computers, and foreign cars they have bought to resell. These wheeler dealers in uniform have long ago gone beyond reasonable limits. And the point here is not the selfish commerce in itself; it is that it cannot fail to be reflected in service affairs. This Kolesnikov without a thought spent many working weeks pursuing "foreign wealth," plainly neglecting regimental affairs. The capable officer inevitably descended to the level of a cheap merchant. And the final note of his "market attitude" toward the service was that he sold himself and, to be more convincing (he could show he was more than able to pay his way!), he took secret ammunition with him.

...But all this is just the "outer shell" of the motivation for treason. As we know, not even the Bible could give an unequivocal answer to the question: why do people become Judases? Perhaps only one thing can be said for sure, that it was gradual. Kolesnikov did not make his choice in November. I think it was when he began to doubt eternal values for the sake of immediate ones. When he decided that everything is bought and sold. Including honor, dignity, and conscience. And finally loyalty to duty, to the Homeland.

It is not for him that I am writing these lines. He and those like him are already deaf to hear, let alone understand on this level. It is for those who still stand firmly on the ground of faith. As they say: God forbid that you

should lose it! May you not stop being a son and brother, not become a cursed rolling stone...

The Western mass information media have not yet said a word about the defector Kolesnikov. But even if they break the vow of silence it is hardly likely that they will reveal all the secret aspects of what happened. There is, however, a version which says that some people could have recruited this officer who was hungry for material things and alcohol. And it is true that in his last month in the unit Kolesnikov studied secret and top secret materials with amazing diligence. This is hardly relevant to our discussion; we are not talking about those who have already paid or will pay for betrayal. We are talking about the one who was ready to sell anything for foreign currency. So I was most struck by another version, or more accurately by the logic of the man who expressed it, an officer of one of the Moscow headquarters.

"Kolesnikov did this simply in revenge because they only gave him one year to serve in Germany!"

And if thousands of officers will never be abroad for a single day, what will they do? Sell off their own mothers?

I hope the reader will not reproach me for inconsistency when I pose a question that is far from idle. What will the new CO of the Group of Forces be able to do?

Well, Col Gen M. Burlakov will see that division CO's find out about disappearing officers immediately, not on the fifth day. And officers being shipped to internal districts will be accompanied to Brest under reinforced supervision. And any possibility of unsanctioned removal of secret ammunition from the warehouses will be precluded; the permission for this will come from a senior officer, no lower, we suppose, than division CO...

But won't there be a scoundrel who will successfully overcome even these obstacles?

Is it really true that before, when West Berlin was ringed with a reinforced concrete wall and the FRG border was lined with barbed wire, there were no attempts by our servicemen to cross the line, to go "over the hill," as they say. Didn't they try to fly across the border in planes, and didn't they leave boot tracks on that very wall? Let us note that in past days the serviceman's life in any internal district was more dependable; at the very least his job was incomparably more prestigious. Today the fences around military units in the Baltic region, Moldavia, and the Transcaucasus are borders of much greater distrust than the former Berlin wall. And sometimes there is also open hostility, implanted by nationalists of all stripes and by pseudodemocrats. To paraphrase the statement of the characters in the movie "Chapayev," where can a poor officer go? It is far from a rhetorical question for him, if he sees the sparkle of Mercedes in Germany while in the Transbaykal Military District his family will get a 30-year-old shack to live in and in Vilnius he will be called an "occupier." And even in white-stoned Moscow there is a waiting list of thousands, which means many years, for housing, and ration coupons for cigarettes and sugar.

For the weak and failing in spirit the choice is clear.

I do not flatter myself with the hope that our waiting lines will disappear in the near future and every family will be offered a VCR or a Tavia car. The problems here are understood and will not be eliminated soon.

I am concerned that the Homeland not become the officer's evil stepmother, so that he will not even think of betraying it. So that in his own home he is not degraded with more fury than he is abroad.

And finally, I am concerned that it should not be constantly drummed into the head of not just our officers but of the whole society that to be a patriot today is ridiculous and that adopting a law on emigration from the USSR is virtually the paramount task.

If our press today is trying to make the traitor Vlasov, who has the blood of hundreds of thousands of our people on his hands, into a fighter for the people's interests, then why shouldn't the small-scale Judas Kolesnikov daydream that what he did was also good, that his time would come and he would ride into his native town of Obluchye "on a white horse"?

It is impossible here not to recall the devastating force of the attacks being made by some of our pro-Western, antipatriotic publications on the foundations of patriotic self-consciousness and the fundamental values of our people. No matter how mighty our fortresses may be, the siege is doing its work; cracks are appearing, sometimes even openings. I think with great sadness that if a regimental CO decided on such an act, what can we expect from the soldier or young officer who is much less experienced in life?

Who will answer for the present orgy of antipatriotism in the press and at demonstrations?

The army, I believe, is to blame for the fact that Kolesnikov and Moiseyenko were in its ranks. But what about the blame of those who are "shooting" their own people in the back?

I by no means intend to justify traitors. Once again, this is not addressed to them. I am not talking to platoon leader Sr Lt A. Zaytsev and his wife or the wife of battalion CO T. Belous; they deserted from this same regiment this year. I am not even speaking to the more than 170 other servicemen, members of their families, and Soviet Army civilian workers and employees from the WGF who are now being hunted.

The President and the national parliament—that is who must think about all these problems, and above all about ways to solve them. Incidentally, our country is probably the only one that places so little value on the training, experience, self-denial, and courage of the military man, as far as I know those to whom the officers defect are in no hurry at all to get rid of them, despite millions of their own people unemployed.

Nonetheless, as for the particular case, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the right and is obligated to petition the competent German authorities for Kolesnikov and Moiseyenko to be arrested and turned over to the WGF military procurator. The betrayal of the Homeland for mercenary reasons here is too obvious; this does not even, as they say, smell political. A friendly reception for the traitors would contrast too sharply to the background of the ever-improving relations between our countries.

Of course, it was a simple coincidence: in the family of Mikhail Andreyevich Kolesnikov, construction worker in the city of Obluchye in the Jewish Autonomous

Oblast, there were, counting the head of the family—let us call him the Teacher—12 disciples. One of them, as we already know, turned out to be a Judas.

Life has not stopped since Gospel times. Isn't this because there have proven to be incomparably more bright spirits, because they understand how to fight against evil and temptation, because they have become more cooperative, unified, and honest with one another?

For the same reason life today does not stop. For honorable people the Homeland remains the Homeland in any weather, the family remains the family, and the army is the army, defender against any evil.

Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service, Draft

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["Law of the Union of Socialist Republics On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service, Draft"]

[Text]

I. General Provisions

Article 1. THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY OBLIGATION

1. In accordance with the USSR Constitution, defense of the country is the most important function of the state and is the affair of all the people.

2. Universal military obligation is established in order to ensure the manning of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB Troops, the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Railroad Troops, and the USSR Civil Defense Troops (henceforth called the USSR Armed Forces and other troops), as well as to prepare the population for defense of the USSR.

Universal military obligation includes: training of citizens for military service; registration to conscription districts; military induction; performance (when conscripted or on a voluntary basis) of military service; service in the reserve; compliance with the rules of military registration.

In wartime universal military obligation also includes universal mandatory military training.

In the USSR the universal military obligation does not apply to foreign citizens and persons without citizenship who are permanently or temporarily residing on the territory of the USSR.

3. Citizens of the USSR discharge their universal military obligation regardless of origin, social or property status, race or national affiliation, education, language, attitude toward religion, type and character of work, political convictions, affiliation with public associations, and other circumstances.

4. Men who are fit by reason of health and age may be called to military service. In this regard they are obliged to:

- report at the order (summons) of the military commissar to register to a conscription district, to undergo medical certification and recertification, to go for training in a military specialty, for military induction, or for training assemblies;
- undergo training for military service and perform military service and service in the reserve;
- comply with the rules of military registration.

5. Women who have medical training or training in a specialty of a related corresponding military specialty may be placed on the military registry in accordance with a list determined by the USSR Council of Ministers. These women are obliged to report at the summons of the military commissariat to undergo medical certification and recertification and to comply with the rules of military registration.

In peacetime women may be designated for military service on a voluntary basis.

At the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, in wartime women who are on the military registry or who are undergoing universal military training may be called to military service.

6. USSR citizens discharge their universal military obligation from the start military training until they are removed from military registry.

Article 2. THE RELATION OF CITIZENS TO A UNIVERSAL MILITARY OBLIGATION

In terms of relation to a universal military obligation, USSR citizens include:

- those undergoing predraft training before registration to conscription districts—preinductees;
- registrants to conscription districts—inductees;
- those performing military service—service members;
- those performing non-troop service—conscripted employees;
- those in the reserve—service-obligated personnel.

Article 3. MILITARY SERVICE, NON-TROOP SERVICE, SERVICE IN THE RESERVE

1. Military service is a special type of state service in which USSR citizens discharge their universal military obligation in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the USSR KGB, the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Railway Troops and Civil Defense Troops of the USSR, or other military formations created in accordance with USSR laws, for their term or until reaching a maximum age established by this Law, and in wartime, until a special order (on demobilization of personnel).

2. The following forms of military service are established:

- compulsory military service of soldiers, seamen, and sergeants and senior NCOs, including contract military service;
- military service of women in the positions of soldiers, seamen, and sergeants and senior NCOs;
- military service of cadets (students) at military educational institutions (in this and subsequent articles military educational institution means military schools [uchilishcha], military institutes, military departments in civilian higher academic institutions, military academies, as well as military schools [shkoly]);

- military service of extended service personnel (extended military service);
- military service of army and navy warrant officers;
- military service of officer personnel.

3. Non-troop [vnevoyskovaya] service is a special form of state service in lieu of routine military service for terms established by this Law and not related to the use or operation of arms and military equipment, outside the USSR Armed Forces or other troops, at enterprises, institutions and organizations of the domestic economy, in the sphere of health care, social welfare, communal administration, and nature conservation, at the determination of the USSR Council of Ministers.

4. Service in the reserve consists of attending assemblies and following procedures and rules for induction to military service upon mobilization and in wartime.

5. Citizens of the USSR who are not conscripted to military service or who enter it voluntarily take the military oath of loyalty to the Motherland and the Soviet people, the text of which is approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Service-obligated personnel called to assemblies also take the military oath if they have not taken it previously.

6. The time spent in military service and non-troop service is counted in general labor time, time of work in specialty, and continuous labor time.

7. Because of the high goals, the increased hazard to life, and the hardships of military service, its priority is established over other types of state service and over work at enterprises, institutions, organizations, and public associations.

The priority of military service is expressed in the unconditional cessation of any other service when conscription, voluntary acceptance of citizens to military service, or a summons to assemblies takes place, in the special legal protection of the rights and personal dignity of service members, and in the bestowing of state benefits and advantages for service members and members of their families.

The priority of military service is ensured by special obligations of the state to service members to safeguard their legal, social, and material position.

No citizen of the USSR can be taken into state service if his relation to the universal military obligation is not regulated on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 4. MANPOWER ACQUISITION OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES AND OTHER TROOPS

The USSR Armed Forces and the other troops are manned on the extraterritorial principle through induction of citizens to military service on the basis of a universal military obligation and acceptance of citizens on a voluntary basis.

A reserve is created in order to bring the USSR Armed Forces and other troops up to strength at mobilization and to supply their needs in wartime.

The system of manpower acquisition of the USSR Armed Forces and other troops is defined by this Law and by decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers issued on its basis.

Article 5. COMPOSITION OF SERVICE MEMBERS AND SERVICE-OBLIGATED PERSONNEL

Service members and service-obligated personnel are divided into enlisted personnel, sergeants and senior NCOs, [army and navy] warrant officers, and officers.

Officers are divided into junior officers, senior officers, and general and flag officers.

Article 6. MILITARY RANKS

1. Every service members and service-obligated individual is assigned the corresponding military rank. Military ranks are subdivided into ranks for troop and ship-board personnel.

The following military ranks are established:

Troops	Ship-board Personnel
Common Soldiers	
Private (cadet)	Seaman (cadet)
Private First Class	Senior Seaman
Sergeants and Petty Officer Personnel	
Junior Sergeant	Petty Officer Second Class
Sergeant	Petty Officer First Class
Senior Sergeant	Chief Petty Officer
Ranking NCO [Starshina]	Master Chief Petty Officer
[Army and Navy] Warrant Officer Personnel	
Junior Warrant Officer	Junior Warrant Officer
Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer
Senior Warrant Officer	Senior Warrant Officer
Junior Officer Personnel	
Junior Lieutenant	Junior Lieutenant
Lieutenant	Lieutenant
Senior Lieutenant	Senior Lieutenant
Captain	Captain-Lieutenant
Senior-Grade Officers	
Major	Captain Third Rank
Lieutenant-Colonel	Captain Second Rank
Colonel	Captain First Rank
General and Flag Officers	
Major-General	Rear Admiral
Lieutenant-General	Vice Admiral

Colonel-General	Admiral
General of the Army	Fleet Admiral

Marshal of the Soviet Union

2. For officer personnel having medical or juridical education who are performing military service in the medical or juridical service, in military procuracies and military tribunals, or who are in the reserve and designated for such service, the words "of Medical Service" or "of Justice" respectively are appended to their military ranks.

3. For general and flag officers who are performing military service in aviation, the military rank of "Marshal of Aviation," equal to the military rank of "General of the Army," is established.

4. For service members performing military service in Guards units, on Guards ships, and in Guards tactical (operational) formations, the distinguishing Guards military ranks are established and are formed by adding the word "Guards" before the corresponding military ranks.

5. Officer and warrant officer personnel who have performed extended military service remain in their assigned military ranks for life. The word "Reserve" is added to the military ranks of these persons in the reserves, and the words "in Retirement" are added to the military ranks of persons who are retired.

6. The military ranks of general and flag officers are awarded by the President of the USSR to servicemen who successfully fill the positions appropriate for general and flag officers. The military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union is awarded for outstanding service in the cause of leading the USSR Armed Forces.

The procedures for awarding military ranks to other servicemen and also to service-obligated personnel, are determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

7. Persons having military ranks (except for those with the military rank of private or seaman) may be reduced in military rank by one grade or stripped of military rank with simultaneous demotion to private or seaman.

Reduction in military rank of persons of general or flag rank is done by the President of the USSR, that of other servicemen by procedures determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Removal of military rank occurs:

- by sentence of a court for conviction of a serious crime;
- by [order of] the President of the USSR, for general and flag officers, and for other service members, by procedures determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

The loss of USSR citizenship also entails loss of military rank.

8. Restoration of military rank is done by officials and organs who stripped the service member of his military rank.

9. It is forbidden to establish special ranks identical to the military ranks.

Article 7. MILITARY POSITIONS

1. Military positions (organic positions subject to filling by servicemen) and the military ranks corresponding to them which may be awarded to service members holding these positions, are provided for in the tables of organization and equipment of units on the basis of special lists.

The lists of positions to be filled by persons of general and flag rank are approved by the President of the USSR, and the lists of positions to be filled by other levels of service members by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

2. Military positions are subdivided into:

- positions of common soldiers;
- positions of sergeants and senior NCOs;
- positions of [army and navy] warrant officers;
- positions of officer personnel.

The appointment of service members to military positions from commanding general of an army, flotillas, or equivalent and higher positions is made by the President of the USSR at the recommendation of the USSR Minister of Defense. The rights of officials to make appointments to other military positions are determined by the USSR Ministry of Defense. The grounds for transfer of service members in service, and from one military position to another are, established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 8. THE MILITARY UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF SERVICE MEMBERS

1. Service members and service-obligated personnel at assemblies and performing their military service duties wear a military uniform with the insignia of their military rank and combat arm.

The military uniform and insignia of service members and the marshal's insignia, the "Marshal's Star" are established by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The rules for their wear are approved by the president of the USSR.

2. The wearing of the military uniform and the insignia of service members by citizens who do not have the right to do so, and the wearing of similar or identical uniforms and insignia, as well as desecration of the military uniform and insignia of service members, or disrespect toward them, are forbidden and are prosecuted by law.

II. Training of Pre-Inductees and Inductees For Military Service

Article 9. PREPARATION OF PREINDUCTEES AND INDUCTEES FOR MILITARY SERVICE, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE ORGANS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND OFFICIALS

1. Preparation of preinductees and inductees for military service is performed everywhere and includes: predraft youth training; training of inductees in military-technical specialties; training for admission to military educational institutions; military training of students (cadets) of higher educational institutions in the reserve officer program; physical training; treatment and convalescent work; improvement of the general educational level of youth who have not had secondary education; study of the Russian language by persons who do not speak it or speak it poorly; heroic-patriotic and international education.

2. Preparation of preinductees and inductees for military service is carried out under the overall leadership of the USSR Council of Ministers. In their designated areas, councils of ministers of union and autonomous republics, the executive committees of the Councils of People's Deputies of krais, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, autonomous districts, cities, rayons, settlements and villages, interested ministries, state committees and departments, and also enterprises, institutions, organizations, collective farms (kolkhoz), state farms (sovkhoz), and cooperatives and public associations, regardless of departmental affiliation, forms of responsibility and conditions of management, implement financing, material and technical support, provision of training facilities, and selection and training of directors, teachers, instructors, educators, trainers, and masters of production education and other specialists to conduct this training. They monitor its organization and conduct, and bear full responsibility for accomplishment of the whole group of measures for preparing preinductees and inductees for military service.

The USSR Ministry of Defense monitors the organization, conduct, and results of preparation of pre-inductees and inductees for military service in the country.

3. The directors of enterprises, institutions, organizations, and academic institutions bear responsibility for preparation of preinductees and inductees for military service.

Article 10. PREDRAFT TRAINING

1. Predraft training of youth, including training for civil defense, is conducted in general-education schools (including gymnasia, lyceums, and other types of secondary general academic institutions), professional-technical schools, and secondary special academic institutions beginning with the second-to-last year (in wartime with the 5th (6th) class), and also at training centers for directors and teachers (instructors) of predraft training.

2. Youths who have not taken predraft training at academic institutions, and who are not certified in predraft training at them, or who received unsatisfactory marks in this training discipline, upon graduation from the academic institutions and before induction into military service must everywhere undergo predraft training at defense-sports health camps, with interruption of work, and in wartime at enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Article 11. TRAINING OF INDUCTEES IN MILITARY-TECHNICAL SPECIALTIES

Inductees who have reached their 17th year are everywhere recruited, with interruption of work, to train in military-technical specialties at professional-technical schools with subject areas related to their military occupational specialties, and in training organizations of DOSAAF.

The number of inductees subject to training in military-technical specialties is determined by the USSR Council of Ministers, and the list of specialties and training programs by the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Article 12. MILITARY TRAINING OF STUDENTS (CADETS) OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAM

1. Military training of students (cadets) of daytime (resident) higher educational institutions (VUZ) in the reserve officer program is organized and conducted in military (naval) departments which are structural components of the VUZ. Military training in reserve officer programs is taken by male students, ages 17 to 27, who are fit for military service by reason of health, and military medical training is also taken by female students at medical VUZ'. Registration of students (cadets) for military training is by their personal request.

The list of military specialties for which military training of reserve officers is conducted at military (naval) departments is established by the USSR Defense Minister in coordination with the State Committee of the USSR for Public Education.

2. For students who have taken a full course of military training and have received their officer rank, their military training at the VUZ is counted as part of their routine military service.

Persons who have not performed their routine military service or non-troop service before entering a VUZ, and consequently have not received officer rank as a result of training at it, are called up to routine military service after graduation from the VUZ under procedures established by this Law.

3. The military training of students (cadets) is supervised by the USSR Council of Ministers. The councils of ministers of union republics, ministries, and state committees and departments whose jurisdiction includes higher academic institutions, jointly with the USSR Defense Minister create the necessary training facilities, support selection and training of the teaching staff of military departments, and monitor its conduct.

4. Military training is included in the training plans of the VUZ as an independent training discipline.

5. When participating in training assemblies (tours of duty in line units) students (cadets) have the rights and duties established by USSR law for service-obligated personnel called to assemblies.

Article 13. TRAINING FOR ADMISSION TO MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, PHYSICAL TRAINING, THERAPEUTIC-HEALTH CARE WORK, ENHANCEMENT OF THE GENERAL EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, STUDY OF RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, HEROIC-PATRIOTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

1. A year before entrance, familiarization assemblies or classes are held at military commissariats at places of residence with youth expressing the desire to enter military educational institutions.

Training for admission to military educational institutions is also done at Suvorov military schools, Nakhimov naval schools, and military music schools, and at special boarding schools with a deeper study of the Russian language and intensified military physical culture training, or with initial flight training.

2. Physical training of preinductees and inductees is done at educational institutions in accordance with the program of physical culture (education), at enterprises, institutions and organizations, cooperatives and kolkhoz, by organs of public education and committees of DOSAAF, in physical culture and sports by sports societies and clubs, military-patriotic associations, clubs and other organizations in accordance with the norms of the All-Union Physical Culture System "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR" (GTO).

3. Therapeutic-health care work with youth is organized and conducted at their place of residence, study, or work by organs and institutions of public health at treatment, preventive-treatment, and therapeutic and sanitarium facilities, with the development of adolescent offices, in close coordination with trade unions and other public associations.

Medical examinations of youths age 15-17 are performed annually by specialist physicians called on for medical certification of inductees. The necessary therapy and health-care measures are designated for those in need.

4. Enhancement of the level of general educational training of youth without a secondary education, and the study of the Russian language by persons who do not speak the Russian language or speak it poorly, are organized and conducted by organs of public education in general evening secondary schools and in courses for improvement of knowledge of the Russian language created by local Councils of People's Deputies and their executive organs on the basis of general education

schools, secondary special educational institutions, secondary professional-technical schools, and other types of general educational institutions.

5. Heroic-patriotic and international education of youth is conducted at the place of residence, study, or work by all state organs with active assistance of public associations in the course of work to train preinductees and inductees for military service in the spirit of loyalty to socialist choice, patriotism, internationalism, respect for the history of the fatherland and the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the Soviet people, and constant readiness to defend the Homeland.

Article 14. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS CALLED TO TRAIN FOR MILITARY SERVICE

1. All citizens called for predraft training, involving interruption of work, at defense-sports health camps and for military-technical specialist training at professional-technical schools and educational organizations of the DOSAAF retain their place of work and their position, and are paid an average wage in accordance with their place of basic work for the duration of their training time, including travel to the place of training or assemblies and back, if this is associated with travel from the permanent residence.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations, including cooperatives and collective farms in which these citizens work, pay expenses for the rental of housing for the period of their training or assemblies, and also the cost of travel to the place of training or assemblies and back.

2. For inductees who do not work or who work at an individual labor activity who are called to training in military-technical specialties, the executive committees of Councils of People's Deputies of the place of residence of these citizens pay an allowance for the time of their training in military-technical specialties at professional-technical schools and at DOSAAF educational organizations, in the amount established for students of professional-technical schools with a term of study of up to ten months, and pay their expenses for housing rental, and also the cost of travel to the place of training and back.

3. Attendance at classes by citizens called by military commissariats for predraft training in defense-sports health camps, training in military-technical specialties at professional-technical schools and educational organizations of the DOSAAF, and other measures for training of youth for military service, is mandatory. Inductees who do not attend classes and fail to participate in training measures for military service bear administrative responsibility in accordance with laws presently in force.

4. Calculation of the average wage cited in this and other articles of the Law, for blue and white collar workers, kolkhoz workers, and members of cooperatives, is done in accordance with laws presently in force.

III. Registration of Citizens to Conscription Districts. Conscription and Voluntary Military Enlistment

Article 15. REGISTRATION OF CITIZENS TO CONSCRIPTION DISTRICTS

1. The year they reach age 17, male citizens are subject to registration to conscription districts created in rayons, cities, and municipal rayons.

Registration of citizens to conscription districts is done annually, from January to March, by place of permanent or temporary (for more than one month) residence.

2. During registration to conscription districts, citizens are subject to mandatory medical certification by a physician specialist: a surgeon, therapist, neuropathologist, psychiatrist, oculist, otorhinolaryngologist, stomatologist, and if necessary by physicians of other specialties, with the goal of determining the fitness of the youth for military service, discovering those in need of closer examination, treatment, or medical observation, and also for psychological examination to determine the most advisable utilization during service.

3. The leaders of institutions and the persons indicated in Article 42 of this Law, and also executive committees of Councils of People's Deputies which have jurisdiction over the initial registration of service-obligated personnel, and enterprises, institutions, organizations, educational institutions and cooperatives will annually present to the corresponding rayon (municipal) military commissariats, at times established by the USSR Defense Minister, lists of citizens subject to registration to conscription districts.

4. In order to conduct the registration of citizens to conscription districts, induction commissions with the following composition are created in rayons (cities):

- chairman of the commission—a rayon (municipal) military commissar;
- members of the commission: physicians participating in the medical certification of citizens being registered to conscription districts and the chief of the professional psychological selection group of the rayon (municipal) military commissariat. The registration commission may also include representatives of local organs of state authority and control, organs of internal affairs, labor collectives, the public, and public associations.

The personnel makeup of a rayon (municipal) registration commission is approved by the executive committee of the rayon, municipal rayon, or municipal Council of People's Deputies.

5. Rayon (municipal) registration commissions must:
- organize medical certification of citizens being registered to conscription districts, and determine their preliminary assignment for use in military service;
 - discover and make a preliminary selection of candidates to be sent to military educational institutions;

- rationally distribute persons fit in terms of medical, psychological, and other indices for training in educational organizations of DOSAAF and professional-technical schools in programs for training inductees in a military-technical specialty;

- assign to preventive treatment and treatment facilities those persons found during registration to be in need of examination, treatment, or medical observation;

- assign to the corresponding educational institutions and courses those persons who have a low general educational training, and also those who cannot speak the Russian language or speak it poorly.

6. Citizens subject to registration must report to a conscription point for registration to a conscription district in the time period indicated in the personal notification of the military commissariat, and present the necessary documents. The list of documents presented by preinductees is determined by the USSR Defense Ministry and is indicated in the personal notification from the military commissariat.

The commission's decision regarding registration is announced to citizens registered to conscription districts, a certificate of registration to a conscription district is issued, and their rights and duties and the rules of military registration and procedures for undergoing training for military service are explained.

Article 16. INDUCTION AGE, THE INDUCTION OF CITIZENS FOR ROUTINE MILITARY SERVICE

1. For purposes of complete and quality manpower acquisition of troops and naval forces, the USSR Council of Ministers, the councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics, the executive committees of local Council's of People's Deputies, local organs of military command and control, and the military command conduct a number of special measures [which comprise] the induction of citizens to routine military service.

2. Male citizens of the USSR who have reached age 18 by the day of departure for their military units are inducted for routine military service in peacetime.

The induction of citizens to routine military service is everywhere conducted on the basis of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers twice annually, in April through June and in October through December. The decree is published in the mass media.

3. After announcement of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, each inductee, including those on temporary rolls, is obliged to report at the time and place indicated in the order of the military commissar or in the personal notification of the military commissariat. Citizens of draft age who have not performed routine military service and who are not on the military rolls who do not have legal grounds for this, and also inductees who have temporarily moved from their permanent place of residence to another location and who

have not registered there, are obliged to report to the military commissariat in their place of residence.

4. The managers of enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhoz, cooperatives and educational institutions are obliged to summon inductees from business travel and ensure their timely appearance at the induction station.

5. Change of conscription district by inductees who have reached age 18 and older is permitted from 1 January to 1 April and from 1 July to 1 October. At other times (from 1 April to 1 July and from 1 October to 31 December) a change of conscription district is permitted upon presentation of confirming documents to the military commissariat in cases when the inductees:

- have been transferred by the administration to work in another location;
- have moved to a new residence with their families or in connection with receipt of housing space;
- have been admitted to an educational institution and are moving to continue their education, or have graduated from an academic institution and are being sent to work in accordance with the [labor] distribution.

6. Valid reasons for failure to appear at induction points in the deadlines established by order of the military commissar or in accordance with the personal notifications of military commissariats may include:

- illness of the inductee which, as attested by a preventive treatment institution, has made it impossible for him to report to the induction point;
- an obstacle of a natural nature, when the impossibility of personal appearance is attested by the executive committee of the Council of People's Deputies or an organ of internal affairs at the residence of the inductee.

7. Citizens not subject to conscription to routine military service include:

- those released from induction (Article 19);
- those who are serving or have served a criminal sentence in the form of imprisonment at corrective labor institutions, including those provisionally and prematurely freed from court-ordered punishment in the form of imprisonment;
- those who are serving or have served a criminal sentence in the form of a restriction of freedom or corrective labor, including those provisionally and prematurely freed from the court-ordered punitive measures, provisionally convicted, and also persons who have received a postponement of punishment in the form of imprisonment, until the due removal or cancellation of the conviction;
- those against whom an inquiry or investigation is in progress, or against whom a criminal case is being considered by a court.

8. Conscription to routine military service of male USSR citizens who are living abroad is done in accordance with procedures established by this Law if they have a permanent residence in the USSR.

Article 17. INDUCTION COMMISSIONS, THEIR COMPOSITION, TASKS, WORK PROCEDURES, RIGHTS, AND DUTIES, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THEIR MEMBERS

1. In order to induct citizens to routine military service, induction commissions are formed in rayons, cities, and municipal rayons, and consist of:

- a chairman of the commission—a rayon (municipal) military commissar;
- members of the commission:
- a deputy chairman of an executive committee of a rayon (municipal) Council of People's Deputies;
- a chairman of a rayon (municipal) organ of internal affairs supervising the work of inspectors for minors affairs;
- a chairman or deputy chairman of a rayon (municipal) DOSAAF committee;
- a physician organizing and monitoring the work of medical specialists and intermediate medical personnel;
- chairmen of public associations and of labor collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and educational institutions.

The personnel of rayon (municipal) induction commissions are approved by the executive committee of the corresponding Council of People's Deputies.

2. The rayon (municipal) induction commission is given responsibility for:

- the organization of medical certification of inductees;
- making decisions regarding the induction of citizens to routine military service and determination of their utilization in military service;
- making decisions regarding the site of routine military service within the borders of a republic (military district) for inductees who are legally married;
- granting of an induction deferment or waiver on grounds provided for by this Law, for a period of up to one year;
- making decisions about sending inducted citizens who have expressed the desire to enroll in a military educational institution to take entrance examinations, or refusing to send these persons to take examinations;
- making decisions about sending materials to investigative organs concerning inductees who have evaded military induction.

The decisions of the induction commission are made by a majority of votes. Compliance with the decisions of induction commissions is the responsibility of the executive committees of the Councils of People's Deputies of rayons, cities, and municipal rayons.

The selection of inductees to perform military service in service branches and troop arms and their assignment to military units are carried out by procedures established by the USSR Defense Ministry.

3. The corresponding induction commissions are formed with the following composition to direct rayon (municipal) induction commissions and monitor their activity in

the union (without oblast division) and autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous districts:

- chairman of commission—a military commissar of an union or autonomous republic, a kray or oblast military commissar, a military commissar of an autonomous oblast or autonomous district;
- members of the commission:
- in induction commissions of union and autonomous republics, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of a republic, a deputy minister of internal affairs of a republic, a deputy minister of health of a republic, a deputy chairman of a DOSAAF central committee of a republic, representatives of republic public organizations (up to three);
- in kray and oblast induction commissions and induction commissions of autonomous oblasts and autonomous districts, a deputy chairman of an executive committee of a Council of People's Deputies, a deputy chief of a directorate (department) of internal affairs, a deputy chief of a directorate (department) of health, and a deputy chairman of a DOSAAF committee of the corresponding administrative territorial (national-territorial) entity, and representatives of kray, oblast, and district public associations (up to three).

The personnel of induction commissions of union and autonomous republics are approved by the councils of ministers of these republics, and the composition of kray and oblast induction commissions, and that of induction commissions of autonomous oblasts and autonomous districts by executive committees of the corresponding Councils of People's Deputies.

These commissions have responsibility for:

- organizing the medical examination of military inductees before they are sent to military units, and a corroborative medical certification of persons who have stated their disagreement with the results of medical certification and the decisions of the rayon (municipal) induction commissions;
- checking the correctness of induction deferments or waivers;
- checking the soundness of the military-professional assignment of inductees taking into account their experience, capabilities, interests, and other personal qualities;
- considering the complaints of citizen inductees and other persons about the actions of rayon (municipal) induction commissions;

Induction commissions of union and autonomous republics, and kray, oblast, and district induction commissions have the right to revise and nullify the decisions of rayon (municipal) induction commissions.

Decisions of induction commissions of union and autonomous republics, and kray, oblast, and district induction commissions may be appealed to a court by established legal procedures.

Appeal by inductees and other persons concerning the unfairness of decisions of rayon (municipal) induction commissions does not halt implementation of the decision.

4. All citizens inducted for routine military service undergo mandatory certification by medical specialist: a surgeon, therapist, neuropathologist, psychiatrist, oculist, otorhinolaryngologist, stomatologist, and if necessary by physicians of other specialties assigned from local treatment and prevention institutions.

In accordance with the results of medical certification, the rayon (municipal) induction commission makes a decision and announces it to the inductee on the basis of the Statute on expert military-medical examination approved by the USSR Council of Ministers:

- regarding fitness for military service;
- regarding temporary unfitness for military service for reasons of health, with the granting of a deferment for a period of up to one year;
- regarding unfitness for military service in peacetime for reasons of health, limited fitness in wartime, and registration in the reserve;
- regarding unfitness for military service with exclusion from military registration.

The decision of the induction commission regarding the results of medical certification of the inductee may be appealed to the higher induction commission or to the military medical commission of the military district, which provides a consultative opinion.

5. Members of induction commissions are obliged to observe the requirements of legislation. For an unconscious or biased attitude toward resolution of questions regarding routine military induction or the granting of an illegal deferment, the chairman and members of an induction commission, physicians, participating in the medical certification of inductees, and also other persons who tolerate abuse are made accountable by established procedures.

Article 18. DEFERMENT OF INDUCTION

1. Deferment of induction to routine military service is granted: for family circumstances, for reasons of health, for continuation of education, and in connection with deputy work.

2. A deferment of induction for family circumstances is granted to inductees who in accordance with laws presently in force are fulfilling their duties to support unemployable family members who require assistance, regardless of whether the inductees live with them or live separately, in the following cases:

- if there are no other persons obliged in accordance with current laws to support and provide assistance to the family members and have real capabilities for doing so;
- if, because of the induction, the average income of each unemployable family member of the inductee,

with allowance for all types of state assistance provided, will become lower than the subsistence minimum in the region of the country where they reside; —if the inductee cares for persons indicated in sub-section "a" and "b" of this section.

The following are considered unemployable family members of an inductee when determining his rights to a deferment for family circumstances:

- a) non-working brothers and sisters up to age 18, or older if they became group I or group II invalids before reaching age 18;
- b) a father, mother, grandfather or grandmother if they have reached pension age, for males age 60, for females age 55, or who are group I or group II invalids, or found by a labor medical commissions to be in need of constant care.

In addition, a deferment of induction for family circumstances is granted to those inductees who have as their dependent:

- a child up to age three;
- two or more children;
- a wife who is a group I or group II invalid;
- persons upon whom the inductee was dependent in connection with the death of parents, their prolonged illness or for other valid reasons for a period of no less than five years, under the conditions provided for by parts 2, 3, 4, and sub-section "b" of this section.

Given the corresponding notarized documents of interested parties and organs of social welfare, the inductee has the right to refuse the deferment of induction for family circumstances and to be inducted to routine military service.

3. Deferment of induction for reasons of health is granted to inductees who are found in a medical certification to be temporarily unfit for military service (Article 17 section 4).

Persons who receive a deferment of military service for reasons of health undergo periodic medical certification until they reach age 27, and in the event that they are found fit for military service they may be inducted to routine military service on general grounds.

4. Deferment of induction in order to continue education is granted:

- a) to inductees who are studying at legally recognized educational institutions, including night and correspondence institutions, until receipt of a general secondary or secondary special education, if they are no older than age 20, if they did not have a general secondary education before entering the educational institutions;
- b) to inductees up to age 27 who are studying at legally recognized daytime (non-correspondence) higher educational institutions, as long as the terms of their

registration and study at the higher educational institution correspond to the norms provided for by the Statute on Higher Schools approved by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Inductees expelled from higher educational institutions for lack of achievement, lack of discipline, or at their own wish, in the event of a second registration or enrolment in higher educational institutions do not have the right to a deferment in order to continue their education.

5. Deferment of induction in connection with work as a Deputy is granted to inductees who are People's Deputies for the period of their incumbency.

6. The USSR Council of Ministers is granted the right, in the event of special need, to determine categories of citizens who may be granted deferments of induction on other grounds. This decision of the USSR Council of Ministers is subject to approval at the subsequent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet with subsequent introduction of amendments to this Law.

7. Deferment of induction to routine military service is granted by decision of a rayon (municipal) induction commission, which is guided in this question only by this Law and by the decrees (decisions) of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Inductees who have lost their grounds for receipt of a deferment, and also persons who do not have the right to deferment or grounds to be released from induction as provided by Article 19 of this Law, who for various reasons are not inducted to routine military service in the established periods, must be inducted during the regular conscription before they reached the age of 27.

Article 19. WAIVER OF INDUCTION TO ROUTINE MILITARY SERVICE

In peacetime citizens are released from induction to routine military service if they are inductees:

- who voluntarily enter military service;
- who have undergone a complete course of student military training at a higher educational institution in the reserve officer program and who have received officer rank;
- who are found to be unfit for military service in peacetime for reasons of health, or are found to be fit with restrictions in wartime, or unfit for military service with exclusion from military registration;
- who on the basis of the decisions of executive committees of Councils of People's Deputies (Article 29) are assigned to perform non-troop service;
- who have not performed routine military or non-troop service before age 27, for various reasons;
- who are permanently living abroad, if they do not have a permanent residence in the USSR;
- whose brothers by blood have been killed or died in a period of military service. Inductees who have the right to be released from induction for this reason may be drafted to routine military service if they so desire.

Article 20. INDUCTION OF RESERVE OFFICERS INTO MILITARY SERVICE

Reserve officers up to age 28 who have not performed routine military or non-troop service may be inducted to military service in peacetime, by order of the USSR Defense Minister, for utilization in officer positions.

The number of reserve officers subject to induction to military service is determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 21. ACCEPTANCE INTO MILITARY SERVICE BY VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT

1. Citizens who meet the requirements for military service are admitted to military service on a voluntary basis:

- enlisted personnel and sergeants and senior NCOs who have performed routine military service for no less than six months—to military service as soldiers, seamen, sergeants and senior NCOs, and petty officers on a contractual basis;
- enlisted personnel and sergeants and senior NCOs upon expiration of routine military service by induction or contract, and also those in the reserve, aged 20 to 35, to extended military service;
- females age 18 to 35—to female military service in the positions of enlisted personnel, sergeants and senior NCOs;
- enlisted personnel, sergeants and senior NCOs who have performed routine or extended military service for no less than a year, service-obligated personnel who do not have the military rank of officer, and also females having the corresponding special training and higher or secondary special education, aged 19 to 35, to military service as army or navy warrant officers;
- citizens age 17 to 21 including those who have reached age 17 on the year of registration for training, and also service members and service-obligated personnel who do not possess officer rank age 18 to 23, who have expressed the desire to study at military educational institutions—to military service as cadets at military educational institutions;
- cadets of military educational institutions and reserve officers—to military service as sergeants and senior NCOs.

2. Citizens admitted to military service will undergo mandatory medical certification.

3. A contract concluded between the State and the USSR citizen, which defines the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the parties and the terms of its abrogation, is the basis for acceptance into military service on a voluntary basis. The procedures for acceptance of citizens into military service are established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Article 22. MATERIAL SUPPORT OF CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH INDUCTION OR ACCEPTANCE INTO MILITARY SERVICE

1. Depending on their work place (study), citizens inducted or enlisted in military service are paid severance pay by established procedures.

2. Citizens are released from work (study) for the time necessary to fulfill duties related to military registration, registration to a conscription district, and military induction or acceptance, with their retention of an average wage for their place of permanent work. An annual leave is granted to them before induction (acceptance) into military service, by procedures defined by labor laws.

3. Citizens who enroll in military educational institutions are released from work for the time needed to travel to the place where they take the examinations and back, and to take entrance examinations, with retention of their position and average wage of their permanent work place.

4. Citizens sent by military commissariats for dispensary or inpatient examination (treatment and medical certification), retain their place of work (study), their position, and the average wage (stipend) for all the time they are in the medical institution and are also compensated by the military commissariats for expenses to travel to the place of examination (treatment, certification) and back.

5. Transportation to the place of service and provision with food during travel of citizens inducted or enlisted in military service, and the transportation of citizens to places where they may take entrance examinations for a military educational institution and back are at the expense of the State.

Article 23. RESPONSIBILITY OF CITIZENS FOR DRAFT EVASION

USSR citizens bear criminal responsibility in accordance with the laws on draft evasion presently in force.

IV. Performance of Military Service

Article 24. PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY SERVICE. AGE LIMITS FOR MILITARY SERVICE

1. The procedures for the performance of military service by USSR citizens are defined by this Law, the USSR Law on the Status of Service Members, and other legislative documents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Statute on Performance of Military Service approved by the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. The maximum ages for military service are as follows:

- a) for routine service common soldiers, sergeants and senior NCOs, 30 years;
- b) for female service members in common soldier, sergeant and senior NCO positions, and also for extended-service members and army and navy warrant officers—45 years;
- c) for junior officer personnel—43 years;
- for senior-grade officers: majors, lieutenant-colonels, and their equivalents—45 years, for colonels and their equivalents—50 years.

—for general and flag officers—major-generals, lieutenant-generals, and their equivalents—55 years, for colonel-generals and their equivalents and higher—60 years.

Article 25. TERMS OF MILITARY SERVICE

The terms of military service are:

- for common soldiers, sergeants and senior NCOs performing routine military service: by induction, two years, and for those with higher education, one year by contract, two years and six months;
- for extended-service personnel, and for females admitted to military service in common soldier, sergeants and senior NCO positions, no less than two years;
- for army and navy warrant officers, no less than five years;
- for officers: inducted to military service from the reserve, two years, for those admitted by contract, no less than three years.

Upon conclusion of the terms of military service established in this article, military service may be extended by a newly concluded contract for a period of no less than three years each time until attainment of the maximum age of military service (Article 24).

Article 26. BEGINNING AND END OF MILITARY ACTIVE-DUTY STATUS

1. The military active-duty service is considered to have begun:

- for inductees, the day they report to the military commissariat for departure to a military unit, and an entry is made in the military registration documents;
- for females and service-obligated personnel chosen for military service, the day of departure for place of service indicated in the instruction issued by the military commissariat;
- for inductees and service-obligated personnel, the day of enrollment for training in a military educational institution.

2. The day on which the service member is excluded from the personnel rolls by order of the commander of the military unit in connection with discharge from military service is considered to be the end of military service.

Article 27. MILITARY SERVICE OF CADETS (STUDENTS) OF MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

1. Citizens studying at military educational institutions are in military service as cadets (students) and are referred to as cadets when they do not have a military rank of officer, and as students when they do have such rank.

2. USSR citizens who do not have military rank before entering a military educational institution or who have an enlisted rank are given the military rank of cadet

upon enrollment for training. Other military ranks awarded before enrollment in military educational institutions are retained.

Questions of performance of military service by cadets (students) are decided by the laws of the USSR, the Combined-arms Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, and other legislative documents of the USSR, the Statute on the Performance of Military Service, and the Statute on Military Educational Institutions.

Cadets perform military service:

- on an equal basis with routine service personnel, if they have not performed routine military service or have served for less than two years, including military service as cadets;
- on an equal basis with extended-service members, if they have served the established routine service terms, including military service as cadets.

After conclusion of the second year, an individual contract is concluded with cadets regarding their performance of military service as officers for a period of no less than 10 years after graduation from the military educational institution.

Cadets of higher military educational institutions with training periods of six or more years are awarded the military rank of junior lieutenant after they are promoted to their sixth year, after which they are called "students."

3. Cadets who are expelled from military educational institutions, if they have served the established terms of routine military service (counting the time of study in the military educational institution) and also if they have not concluded a contract after the second year, are discharged to the reserve.

Cadets expelled from military educational institutions from the first and second year, if they have not served their routine military service (counting their training time), are sent to military units to continue routine military service. In accordance with their completion of the established terms of routine military service, with allowance for training time at the military educational institution, they are discharged to the reserve in the regular discharge of routine service personnel to the reserve.

Article 28. DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY SERVICE

1. Discharge of service members from military service is:

- a) to the reserve if the retired personnel have not reached the maximum age for serving in the reserves and by reason of health are fit for military service in peacetime or wartime;
- b) to retirement, if the personnel discharged have reached the maximum age for service in the reserve or are found by the military medical commissions to be unfit for military service by reason of health, with exclusion from military registration.

2. Routine service personnel who have served their established terms of service are discharged to the reserves.

Routine service personnel who have served out their sentence in a disciplinary battalion, for whom the time of this sentence was counted in their term of military service, may be discharged to the reserve no earlier than six months after release from the disciplinary battalion.

3. Routine-service personnel are discharged from military service ahead of time:

- by reason of health on the basis of the decree of a military medical commission;
- for family circumstances when they have received the right to a deferment (Article 18) as a result of a change in the family situation;
- in connection with a court conviction for commission of a crime, to serve a sentence in a corrective labor institution.

4. In the event of need, routine-service members who have served their established terms of service may be kept in military service by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers for a period of up to two months.

5. Routine-service members discharged from military service are provided with a serviceable uniform in accordance with the list established by the USSR Defense Ministry, travel documents to their place of residence prior to induction to military service, and rations for the time of travel to their place of residence, and a one-time money allowance.

At the desire of routine-service members, they may be discharged to the reserve in their own civilian clothing.

6. Extended-service personnel and females who have performed military service in common soldier, sergeant, senior NCO, warrant officer and officer positions may be discharged from military service:

- upon completion of their term of service;
- for age, upon reaching the maximum age for military service (Article 24). By procedures determined by the USSR Council of Ministers, individual categories of service members may be discharged from military service for age if they have five or fewer years before they reach the established maximum age;
- for health reasons—on the basis of decrees of military medical commissions;
- due to a reduction in force, when it is impossible to use them in service in connection with personnel reductions or organizational measures;
- for family reasons or other important circumstances designated by the USSR Council of Ministers, at the request of the service member;
- for service incompatibility;
- in connection with commission of misdemeanors discrediting their military rank;
- in connection with a court conviction for commission of a crime.

In addition, officers who have the required length of service as officers as defined by the USSR Council of Ministers may be discharged from military service at their own desire.

7. Females performing military service in common soldier, sergeant or senior NCO positions, extended-service personnel, army and navy warrant officers, and officers may be retained in military service with their consent after reaching the maximum age of military service, by procedures defined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

8. Service personnel against whom criminal proceedings are being conducted, when grounds appear for their discharge, are discharged from military service in coordination with the corresponding investigative or judicial organs.

V. Non-Troop [Vnevoyskovaya] Service

Article 29. PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNMENT TO NON-TROOP SERVICE

1. Inductees fit by reason of health for military service who have reached age 18 and older whom convictions of conscience do not permit performance of military service are assigned in peacetime to perform non-troop service.

Justified applications requesting assignment to non-troop service are submitted by these citizens to the executive committee of the rayon, city, or municipal rayon Council of People's Deputies of their permanent residence, and copies to the rayon (municipal) military commissariat of the permanent military registration area in the period from 1 January to 1 March and from 1 July to 1 September of the semester in which they turn 18.

2. The executive committee of the rayon, city, and municipal rayon Council of People's Deputies studies the validity of the incoming requests of the inductees for assignment to non-troop service, makes decisions regarding their substance, informs the rayon (municipal) induction commission of this before the start of the next military induction, and sends the citizens to the sites where they will perform their non-troop service within the deadlines determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

3. Citizens released from routine military induction on grounds provided for by Articles 18 and 19 of this Law are not assigned to non-troop service.

4. Citizens who have performed peacetime non-troop service are inducted to military service in wartime on general grounds.

5. For evasion of assignment to non-troop service, absence without leave from place of service, or departure from place of service without leave, citizens bear criminal responsibility established by the current laws for these violations of law on an equal basis with routine service members.

Article 30. TERM AND PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMANCE OF NON-TROOP SERVICE

1. The term of non-troop service is set at three years.

Periods of absence from work without valid reasons, and of administrative arrests, are not included in the period of non-troop service.

2. Supervision of non-troop service is exercised by the USSR Council of Ministers, which establishes procedures for the performance of non-troop service in accordance with the current labor laws.

3. The time of performance of non-troops service is counted as routine service. Inducted employees and their families enjoy the rights, benefits, and advantages established for workers of enterprises, institutions and organizations in which they perform service.

Inducted employees cannot be released from work (discharged) at their own desire, and are not granted leave without pay or additional leaves.

4. Inducted employees may wear a special uniform different from military uniform. Models of uniforms for inducted employees and the rules for their wear are established by the USSR Defense Ministry.

VI. Service in the Reserve

Article 31. ENROLLMENT IN THE RESERVE. RESERVE CATEGORIES

1. Citizens discharged from military or non-troop service, and also those released from routine military induction (except for those excluded from military registration for reasons of health) are enrolled in the reserve.

Persons enrolled in the reserve undergo periodic medical certification.

2. The reserve is divided into two categories—category one and category two.

The category one reserve includes service-obligated personnel who have served their military service and received a military occupational specialty during their period of their service.

The category two reserve includes service-obligated personnel who have not received a military occupational specialty during their military service, those who have not been inducted to military service, and also persons who have performed non-troop service.

3. Service-obligated personnel who are enrolled in the category two reserve and during their time in the reserve have received a military occupational specialty at training assemblies or through the corresponding civilian profession are transferred to the category one reserve.

Women who are admitted to military rolls are in the category one reserve.

Article 32. MAXIMUM AGES FOR SERVICE IN THE RESERVE. RESERVE CLASSES

1. common soldiers, sergeants and senior NCOs, and army and navy warrant officers are in the reserve until age 50.

The reserve of enlisted personnel, sergeants and senior NCOs, and army and navy warrant officers in categories one and two is divided by age into three classes each:

- class one—up to age 35.
- class two—up to age 45.
- class three—up to age 50.

2. Officers are in the reserve until the following maximum ages:

a) in the class one reserve:

- junior officers—up to age 45.
- senior-grade officers: majors, lieutenant-colonels, and their equivalents, up to age 50; colonels and their equivalents, up to age 55.
- generals and flag officers, up to age 60.

b) in the class two reserve:

- junior officers, up to age 50.
- senior-grade officers, up to age 55.
- general and flag officers, up to age 65.

c) in the class 3 reserve:

- junior officers, up to age 55.
- senior-grade officers, up to age 60.
- general and flag officers, up to age 65.

3. Service-obligated women, regardless of the military rank awarded them, are enrolled in the class three reserve. The maximum age of service in the reserve for them is set at age 50 for officers and 45 for other service-obligated women.

Article 33. ATTENDANCE AT TRAINING AND ROLL-CALL MUSTERS

1. Service-obligated personnel are summoned to training and roll-call musters during the time they are in the reserve.

The rights and obligations of service-obligated personnel summoned to training musters, flowing from the conditions of military service, are established by this Law, the USSR Law "On the Status of Service Members," and the Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

2. Service-obligated personnel who do not have the military rank of officer are summoned to training musters during their time of service in the reserves.

- for class one, category one—up to four times for a period of up to three months each time.
- for class one, category two, up to six times for a period of up to three months each time.
- for class two, category one and two service-obligated personnel, one or two times for a period of up to two months each time.
- for class three, category one and two, for one training muster for a period up to one month.

3. Reserve officer personnel may be called to training musters in the time they are in the reserves

- for class one, annually for a period up to three months;
- for class two, for two musters with a duration of up to three months each;
- for class three—one two month muster

4. Service-obligated personnel may be called to musters for a period up to ten days in the period between training musters

5. The total time of training musters during the time of service in the reserves cannot exceed 30 months. Here the total time of musters of reserve officers includes time at training musters before they were awarded officer rank

6. The terms and duration of training musters of service-obligated personnel are determined by the USSR Defense Ministry in accordance with this Law, within the limits established by the USSR Council of Ministers

If it is necessary, the USSR Defense Minister has the right to hold service-obligated personnel at training musters for a period of up to two months beyond the terms established by this Law and also to increase the number of training musters within the limits of the total time of attendance at training musters established by this article

7. Service-obligated personnel who are called to training musters are given pay and allowances by procedures and in amounts established by the USSR Council of Ministers

Citizens called to training musters are released from work by established procedures for the entire time required to perform their duties in the callup and performance of the muster

Blue and white collar workers and kolkhoz workers called to training musters retain their position (job) for the entire time of the musters, including travel to the place of conduct of the assemblies and back, and are paid the average wage for their work position

The persons designated may not be discharged from work from the day they receive their callup notification until their return from the training musters, except in cases of full elimination of enterprises, institutions, and organizations. In these cases, the pay or other material compensation due the service-obligated individual is paid by the enterprise, institution, or organization being eliminated, or by their legal successors

If the service-obligated individual becomes ill during the time of the training muster and continues to be ill after their conclusion, his work place and position is retained for him, starting on the day the assembly ends he is paid an allowance for temporary employment disability instead of a wage in accordance with current laws

Article 34. WAIVERS FROM TRAINING MUSTERS

A waiver from training musters is granted to:

- a) engineer-technical workers and also production workers level three or higher on a six-level scale, level four or higher on a higher-level scale, who work at enterprises and institutions which are designated in the list established by the USSR Council of Ministers;
- b) managers and specialists and blue and white collar workers, working in the system of the USSR Defense Ministry, the USSR Committee of State Security, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- c) flight and technical personnel and blue and white collar workers of the Ministry of Civil Aviation directly supporting transport and involved in maintenance and repairing planes and airfield equipment, and also aviation training centers of USSR DOSAAF;
- d) seagoing personnel of vessels of a naval fleet, river fleet, and fishing fleet during a voyage, with the exception of reserve officers of the Navy;
- e) tractor and combine operators working in at a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, mechanics working at enterprises involved in the repair of agricultural equipment, sovkhoz directors, kolkhoz chairmen, and brigade leaders of kolkhoz and sovkhoz field brigades during agricultural sowing and harvest periods;
- f) students of higher and secondary educational institutions (including evening), students of correspondence departments and higher educational institutions during examination sessions;
- g) service-obligated personnel for a year after discharge to the reserve from military service;
- h) service-obligated personnel with children up to age one, or three children or more up to age 16, and also temporarily unemployed on the day of summons to the training sessions;
- i) service-obligated women

In individual cases, given valid reasons and submission of justifying documents by service members, a decision regarding release from training musters is made by the military commissar of the rayon (city) where the individual is on the military register

Article 35. AWARDING OF MILITARY RESERVE RANKS

1. Service members who have attended training musters and successfully passed examinations in the training program may be awarded the next-highest rank by procedures established by the USSR Council of Ministers

2. After attendance at training musters and passage of examinations as required in the program for the corresponding position, reserve officer personnel are awarded the next-highest military rank successively up to and including colonel and equivalent ranks

Article 36. TRANSFER OF SERVICE-OBLIGATED PERSONNEL TO RETIREMENT

Service-obligated personnel who have reached the maximum ages for service in the reserve, and also those found by military medical commissions to be unfit by reason of health for performance of military service with

exclusion from the military register, are removed from the military register, and service-obligated personnel indicated in section 5 Article 6 are removed from the military register and transferred to retirement.

VII. Military Registration of Service-Obligated Personnel and Inductees

Article 37. GENERAL RULES OF MILITARY REGISTRATION

All service-obligated personnel and inductees are subject to military registration. Military registration of service-obligated personnel and inductees is a general state system of registration and analysis of the inductee and service-obligated resources available in the country who are fit for military service and defense of the country. The system of military registration is tied to the passport system in force in the country; the functioning of the system of military registration is supported by the organs of the USSR Defense Ministry, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the local organs of state administration.

Military registration of all service-obligated personnel and inductees is done based on the place of residence, by procedures established by the USSR Defense Minister, and is subdivided into general, special, personnel qualitative, and personnel initial registration.

Article 38. GENERAL AND SPECIAL REGISTRATION

General military registration includes service-obligated personnel who are not reserved for the domestic economy in the period of mobilization and wartime, and inductees.

Special military registration includes service-obligated personnel who are duly reserved for the domestic economy for the period of mobilization and wartime.

Article 39. PERSONNEL QUALITATIVE REGISTRATION, PERSONNEL INITIAL REGISTRATION

The personnel qualitative registration of all service-obligated personnel and inductees is conducted in rayon (municipal) military commissariats.

In a rural area, and also in cities and towns which do not have military commissariats, the executive committees of municipal, town, and rural Councils of People's Deputies conduct personnel initial registration of all service-obligated personnel and inductees.

Enterprises, institutions, organizations, and educational institutions, regardless of departmental affiliation, forms of property and conditions of management, conduct personnel registration of all inductees and service-obligated personnel of the given enterprise, institution, and educational institution, and their managers bear responsibility for the completeness and quality of registration.

Article 40. MILITARY REGISTRATION AND REMOVAL FROM THE MILITARY REGISTER, EXCLUSION FROM THE MILITARY REGISTER

1. For purposes of military registration, upon arrival at their place of residence, all service members and inducted employees discharged to the reserve, and also persons released from a military service obligation and enrolled in the reserve are obligated to personally report to the corresponding military commissariat within a three-day period.

2. Upon changing place of residence (for a period for more than one and half months), departing on business, for study, vacation or medical treatment for a period of more than three months, service-obligated personnel and inductees are obliged to be removed from the military register in their place of residence, and upon arrival at their new or temporary place of residence (for a period of more than one and a half months), or place of business, study, vacation, or medical treatment for a period of more than three months, to enroll in the military register within a three-day period.

In wartime, the departure of service-obligated personnel and inductees from their place of permanent residence without permission of the rayon (municipal) military commissar is forbidden.

3. For removal from and enrollment in the military register in the cases indicated in section 2, military-obligated personnel must submit their military service card to the quarters-maintenance organization or to the enterprise, institution, or organization in charge of housing operations, along with their passport. Service-obligated personnel who leave a rural area or arrive in a rural area are obliged to personally appear with their military registration documents at the executive committee of the town or rural Council of People's Deputies to be included in the military register.

Reserve officers and inductees must personally report to the rayon (municipal) military commissariats for removal from or inclusion in a military register.

4. Inclusion in and removal from a military register of reserve officers who live in populated areas remote from military commissariats may also be carried out by the executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies who have responsibility for keeping the primary personnel register, by procedures established by the rayon (municipal) military commissariats.

Article 41. MILITARY REGISTRATION OF USSR CITIZENS LIVING ABROAD

Military registration of USSR citizens living abroad is done by the diplomatic (consular) representations of the USSR. Diplomatic (consular) representations are obliged to ensure that upon reaching age 18, male citizens of the USSR report to military commissariats at the place of residence in the USSR for military induction.

Article 42. DUTIES OF STATE ORGANS, ENTERPRISES, INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, OFFICIALS, AND SERVICE-OBLIGATED PERSONNEL IN COMPLYING WITH THE RULES OF MILITARY REGISTRATION

1. Executive committees of town and rural Councils of People's Deputies, managers of enterprises, institutes, organizations, and educational institutions are obliged at the request of military commissariats to inform service-obligated personnel and inductees of their summons to military commissariats and assist in their timely appearance at this summons.

2. Organs of internal affairs must:

- implement residence registration and change of residence of service-obligated personnel and inductees only when there are entries from military commissariats on the military registration documents regarding military registration or removal from the military register;
- provide military commissariats assistance and help in the military induction of civilians (callup to training musters), in monitoring citizen compliance with the rules of military registration, and in finding inductees and service-obligated personnel who are in violation of the established rules of military registration;
- conduct a search for persons who evade fulfillment of their general military service obligation and also performance of non-troop service.

3. Organs which register civilian documents are obliged within seven days to report to rayon (municipal) military commissariats regarding a change of last name, first name, or patronymic by service-obligated personnel or inductees, or about changes in the entries of civilian documents regarding the date or place of birth, and also about cases of death registration of these persons.

4. Organs of inquiry and preliminary investigation are obliged in a seven-day period to report concerning inductees against whom a criminal case has been lodged, and peoples courts must report entry into legal force of sentences against service-obligated personnel and inductees, to the rayon (municipal) military commissariats in which they are registered.

Military service cards of service-obligated personnel and draft registration cards of inductees sentenced to imprisonment, including those provisionally sentenced to imprisonment with mandatory labor, are transferred by the courts to the corresponding military commissariats.

5. Labor-medical commissions of experts, through the executive committees of local Councils of Peoples Deputies, must report within a seven-day period to the corresponding rayon (municipal) military commissariats regarding all service-obligated personnel and inductees found to be invalids and their invalid classification.

6. Managers of quarters and utilities and other organizations, enterprises, and institutions operating houses, and also landlords are obliged to promptly present

housing booklets, [residence] registration cards, and military registration documents of residents who are service-obligated personnel or inductees, to the corresponding military commissariats and executive committees of the local Councils of People's Deputies which have responsibility for keeping the initial personnel register, for their inclusion in the military register, removal from the register, or for reconciliation of registration data, ensure their compliance with the rules of military registration, and also inform service-obligated personnel of their summons to the military commissariats.

7. Service-obligated personnel and inductees must report to the registering organ in which they are on the military register when there is a change in their family situation, address of residence, education, or work place and position.

Article 43. RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATION OF MILITARY REGISTRATION RULES

1. The managers of enterprises, institutes, and organizations and educational institutions (regardless of departmental affiliation, forms of property, or conditions of management) who impede the fulfillment of military registration duties by citizens, or who do not meet the obligations provided for by this Law or established by the USSR Council of Ministers, will be subject to a warning or fine in the amount of up to a hundred rubles imposed by administrative commissions of the executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies.

2. For violation of the established rules of military registration, for failure to appear when summoned to a military commissariat without valid reasons, for damage or loss of military registration documents, for untimely reporting to the registration organ in which they are on the military register regarding a change of residence, education, place of work or position, service-obligated personnel and inductees are subject to a warning or fine in the amount of up to 50 rubles, imposed by the rayon (municipal) military commissariat.

3. A second violation of the rules of military registration provided for in sections 1 and 2 of this article, for which an individual has already been subjected to administrative punishment, is punishable by a fine of 100 to 200 rubles, if this violation does not entail criminal responsibility.

4. Service-obligated personnel and inductees who leave their place of permanent residence in wartime without permission of the rayon (municipal) military commissariat are prosecuted in accordance with wartime laws.

5. Imposition of administrative punishment is reported by the military commissar to the director of the higher authority, enterprise, institution, organization, or educational institution in the place of work (study) of the official, service-obligated individual, or inductee.

VIII. On Call-up for Mobilization and on Demobilization

Article 44. INDUCTION TO MILITARY SERVICE UPON MOBILIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT INDUCTIONS TO MILITARY SERVICE IN WARTIME

1. A total or partial mobilization is proclaimed by the President of the USSR. Under a threat of military attack on the USSR or under emergency conditions, the USSR President has the right without declaring mobilization to call up the necessary number of service-obligated personnel from reserve to military service for a period of up to three months. By request of the USSR President this period may be extended by the USSR Supreme Soviet for another three months.

The call-up of USSR citizens upon mobilization and subsequent wartime call-ups are done on the basis of decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Upon declaration of mobilization, all persons in military service at this time are kept until further notice, and service-obligated personnel are called into military service. Here the use of deferment and release from induction, established by Articles 18 and 19 of this Law is halted, except for deferments and releases for two reasons: for state of health and for living abroad without a permanent place of residence in the USSR.

The number of service-obligated personnel subject to call-up upon mobilization is set by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in subsequent wartime call-ups by the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. Upon declaration of mobilization and subsequent wartime call-ups, service-obligated personnel and inductees from age 17 to the maximum age for service in the reserve established by this Law, and women age 18 to 45 who are not on the military registry may be called to military service. In wartime, the induction age may be reduced and the maximum age for service in the reserve may be raised by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers.

3. Call-up to military service upon mobilization and subsequent wartime call-ups to military service are implemented by military commissariats.

It is forbidden to enroll citizens in military service, including on a voluntary basis, while bypassing military commissariats.

4. Upon proclamation of mobilization, for purposes of implementing a planned transition of the national domestic economy to work under wartime conditions and to ensure continuing work of ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, service-obligated personnel working in them may be granted a deferment of call-up upon military mobilization and subsequent wartime inductions by procedures established by the USSR Council of Ministers (reservation).

Article 45. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATE ORGANS, ENTERPRISES, INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, OFFICIALS, AND CITIZENS TO FULFILL MEASURES OF MOBILIZATION CALL-UP AND SUBSEQUENT WARTIME INDUCTIONS

1. Upon proclamation of mobilization and subsequent wartime inductions to military service, USSR citizens who are service-obligated personnel are obliged to report at places and times indicated in their mobilization instructions, in the received notifications of military commissariats or in other orders of the rayon (municipal) military commissariats.

2. Upon a proclamation of mobilization, local Councils of People's Deputies and the managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are obliged to ensure timely notification and appearance of service-obligated personnel at assembly points or military units.

3. Persons who do not report for a mobilization call-up or subsequent wartime call-up at the muster points at the times indicated to them, as well as the directors of ministries, departments, institutes, organizations, kolkhoz, cooperatives, and educational institutions, and other officials impeding the timely reporting of citizens following these inductions, bear criminal responsibility by wartime laws.

Article 46. MATERIAL SUPPORT OF CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH MOBILIZATION CALL-UP TO MILITARY SERVICE AND SUBSEQUENT WARTIME CALL-UP

1. Service-obligated personnel called-up to military service in mobilization and subsequent wartime call-ups receive a full accounting at their place of work (service); wages are paid for actually worked time, the established severance pay, and compensation for unused vacation.

Personnel called-up for mobilization and subsequent wartime call-ups retain the housing they occupied.

2. State support (allowances and pension) of families of citizens called to military service in wartime is based on current laws.

Article 47. DISCHARGE UPON DEMOBILIZATION

1. Discharge upon demobilization is done on the basis of decisions of the President of the USSR or USSR Supreme Soviet at times decided by the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. Service members discharged from military service upon demobilization are provided a full set of uniforms and footwear at the expense of the State. Transport of these service members to their place of residence and provision of rations en route are at the expense of the State.

Article 48. UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING OF CITIZENS

1. By decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, for purposes of preparing a militarily-trained contingent for wartime manpower acquisition, universal military training which is mandatory for all USSR citizens is introduced: men from ages 16 to 60; women ages 18 to 45 who do not have children or who have children older than age 8. It includes: the predraft training of youth in general education schools, professional-technical schools, secondary special educational institutions and other types of secondary educational institutions; military training of preinductees and inductees who are not studying in daytime (non-correspondence) educational institutions, and male service-obligated personnel who have not undergone military training, and female [service-obligated personnel].

Universal military training of citizens is conducted without separating persons involved in its performance from their production work or study, and is done at educational points at the place of work, study, or residence.

2. The organization and leadership of universal military training is the duty of the USSR Defense Ministry and the executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies. Organs of state authority and control, ministries and departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations jointly with the USSR Defense Ministry create the necessary training facilities and provide for the selection and training of directors of military training.

3. Executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies and the directors of enterprises, institutions, and organizations bear responsibility for citizens of the established ages undergoing universal military training.

4. Procedures for universal military training and the circle of persons released from it are defined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

IX. Concluding Provisions**Article 49. FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OF MEASURES RELATED TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE OBLIGATION**

1. Financial and material support of measures related to accomplishment of a universal military service obligation and performance of military service are at the expense of appropriations from the USSR state budget, the budgets of union and autonomous republics and local Councils of People's Deputies, and also the resources of ministries, state committees, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations by procedures established by the USSR Law on Defense, by this Law, and by other legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and decisions of the USSR Council

of Ministers adopted in accordance with the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. For the conduct of medical certification and examinations of citizens in cases provided for by this Law for induction and dispatch of inductees to military units, the councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics and the executive committees of Councils of People's Deputies must support the military commissariats with equipped induction (muster) points maintain public order, and allocate the necessary numbers of medical specialists and intermediate medical personnel, medications, instruments, medical and administrative equipment, and automotive transport.

3. Members of (residence) registration commissions, induction commissions, medical commissions in military commissariats, physicians and intermediate medical personnel, technical workers, and maintenance personnel assigned to work in conscription districts and muster points during registration and induction of citizens to military service or callup to training musters, during the conduct of medical certification and recertification of citizens, and the dispatch of inductees to assembly points, retain the average wage for their place of work during performance of these duties.

If the performance of these duties by the above persons involves travel from their place of permanent residence, the military commissariats compensate their travel expenses from the place of residence to the work place and back, and also pay a per diem and expenses for the rental of living quarters in accordance with the norms established for service business travel.

Article 50. PLENIPOTENTIARY POWERS OF THE USSR MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY, THE CHIEFS OF CIVIL DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND THE RAILWAY TROOPS

The rights of the USSR Minister of Defense provided for by Articles 7 and 28 (section 5) of this Law are also granted respectively to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, the Chairman of the USSR Committee of State Security, the chiefs of the USSR Civil Defense and Railway Troops with respect to the troops, institutions, educational institutions, and service members under them.

In order to ensure uniform implementation of this Law, the fundamental normative documents for its accomplishment issued by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by the Chairman of the USSR Committee of State Security, the chiefs of the Railway Troops, and the Troops of Civil Defense are subject to coordination with the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Article 51. LEGISLATION OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS REGARDING THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE OBLIGATION

On the basis of this Law, the union and autonomous republics may adopt legislative acts concerning questions of accomplishment of the universal military service

obligation by citizens of the republics. The legislative acts which they adopt on these questions should not contradict this Law, the USSR Defense Laws, or international treaties of the USSR.

Draft Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Status of Service Members

Section 1. General Provisions

Article 1. THE NATURE OF THE STATUS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

1. The purpose of the USSR Armed Forces, and the conditions and nature of military service determine the nature of the status of service members, which includes rights, duties, juridical responsibility, and guarantees of rights and implementation of the duties imposed on service members, established by the USSR Constitution and legislative and other legal acts issued on its basis.

Service members include: officer and warrant officer personnel, extended-service personnel, cadets of military educational institutions, and routine-service soldiers, seamen, and sergeants and senior NCOs, as well as female service members in enlisted, sergeants and senior NCO positions (henceforth female service members).

2. Service members enjoy the rights and freedoms of citizens of the USSR with restrictions determined by the conditions of military service. Constitutional and other general civic as well as military service duties are imposed on them.

Service members receive compensation for the special nature of military service.

3. No one has the right to deprive service members and members of their families of any rights or freedoms or to restrict them in their rights other than in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the laws of the USSR.

Restrictions of general civil rights and also the bestowal of additional rights on service members and imposition on them of additional duties arising from the conditions of military service are determined by this Law, military regulations, and other acts of legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Acts of legislation of the union and autonomous republics and legal acts which abridge or restrict the legal rights and freedoms of service members and members of their families do not have juridical force. Organs of state authority and control of union and autonomous republics, and local Councils of People's Deputies have the right to establish additional benefits and advantages for them which improve their social maintenance.

4. Service members bear juridical responsibility established for citizens of the USSR by legislation of the Union of Socialist Republics, and also by legislation of the union republic on whose territory they are performing military service or are located, with allowance for the specific features of their legal status.

5. The specific features of the status of service members in wartime are determined by wartime laws.

Article 2. PERSONS HAVING THE STATUS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

1. In accordance with this Law, USSR citizens in military service in the USSR Armed Forces, troops of the Committee for State Security of the USSR, the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Railway Troops, the USSR Troops of Civil Defense, and other military formations created in accordance with the legislation of the USSR, and also service-obligated personnel at training musters have the status of service members.

2. This Law regulates questions of social maintenance of family members of service members and also of persons discharged from military service to the reserve or retirement, and members of their families.

3. The rights and benefits of invalids and participants of the Great Patriotic War and other combat actions in defense of the USSR, who were service members or soldier-internationalists, and the families of fallen service members, are determined by this Law and by other legislative acts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and union and autonomous republics, and also by decrees of the government of the USSR.

4. The status of service members is retained over all time spent by service members as prisoners of war, and also in internment in neutral countries, if in the process they have not violated their military oath and have not committed crimes against the Motherland. Removal of service member status is decided by legal proceedings.

Article 3. ACQUISITION AND LOSS OF SERVICE MEMBER STATUS

1. The content and extent of rights, duties, and juridical responsibility of service members depend on whether they are performing military service duties or not.

2. Service members are performing their military service duties in all cases of actual accomplishment in a military unit, enterprise, organization, institute, military educational institution, or on a ship (henceforth a military unit) or outside of them, including during participation in combat actions, while in exercises, on combat alert duty (combat service), on duty and garrison details, at training musters, on temporary duty assignments, traveling to and from a place of service, and in other cases during accomplishment of duties provided for by laws and military regulations. Here officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel are acknowledged de facto to be performing their military service duties when they are in a military unit during the established service times and at other times if this is due to a service necessity, and routine service members for all the time they are in a military unit. If necessary, a service member

must enter into the performance of his duties at any time and in any place at the order of a commander (chief) or on his own initiative.

3. In performing military service duties related to receipt of command authority over civilians and the mandatory nature of demands put to them by service members, service members are representatives of authority. Disobedience to them or encroachment on them entail increased responsibility.

Article 5. LEGISLATION REGARDING THE STATUS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

Legislation regarding the status of service members consists of this Law and other acts of legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union and autonomous republics defining the rights, duties, and responsibility of service members and other persons having the status of service members, on the basis of the USSR Constitution and the Union Treaty, and with allowance for international legal acts.

Section II. The Rights of Service Members

Article 6. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

1. All service members are citizens of the USSR, and also simultaneously citizens of the union and autonomous republic from which they were inducted and on whose territory they are performing military service. They have an All-union passport.

2. Service members have the right to participate in elections, to put forward their candidacies, and to be elected to elective state organs in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics.

Service members who express the wish to run for people's deputy of the corresponding Council of People's Deputies inform their immediate commander (chief) of this.

The legal status of people's deputies who are service members is regulated by legislative acts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union and autonomous republics.

3. Service members have the right to join political parties, organizations, mass movements, and other public associations whose charter and activity do not contradict the USSR Constitution and legislation presently in force. The participation or non-participation of service members in the activity of a public association cannot serve as grounds for restriction of their rights or exert influence on their performance of military service.

In their service activity service members are guided by the demands of laws and are not bound by the decisions of political parties and mass public movements pursuing political goals.

It is forbidden to compel service members to join or quit any public associations.

Service members perform their activity in public associations in their non-service time and not to the detriment of their military service duties.

The legal status of service members released from service duties in connection with election to elective organs of public associations is determined by legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. Service members have the right to time free of military service duties to participate in meetings, street processions, and demonstrations conducted with the sanction of the relevant organs of state authority and administration.

Participation of military units (subunits) in the conduct of mass measures is determined by military regulations.

5. Service members are guaranteed freedom of speech and the press and freedom of convictions and their free expression on the condition that they keep state and military secrets, and also communications, telephone conversations, and telegraph messages which are the equivalent of secrets.

Article 7. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

1. Service members are guaranteed freedom of conscience. They have the right to practice any religion or not to practice any.

2. Religious convictions do not excuse service members from accomplishment of their military service duties.

3. The state and its organs are not obliged to satisfy the needs of service members flowing from their religious convictions.

Performance of religious rites is voluntary and may be done outside the limits of the military unit in times free of military service duties.

Article 8. PERSONAL IMMUNITY

As a USSR citizen, a service member is guaranteed personal immunity. He may be subjected to arrest only on the grounds of a court decision or with the sanction of procurators. A service member may be arrested by a commander (chief) as a disciplinary measure with detention in the guardhouse (brig) in accordance with the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Article 9. THE RIGHT TO WORK

1. Military service is an activity which is socially useful and necessary to the state. USSR citizens have an equal right to entry into military service. The time citizens spend in military service is counted in their labor service time.

For service members, time of military service in regions of the Far North and equivalent locations, in areas with

severe and unpleasant climates, and also service under special conditions is counted in labor service on favorable terms as established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Recruitment of service members during their period of military service for work and performance of other duties not arising from military service is permitted as established by the USSR Council of Ministers or the President of the USSR.

2. Service members (except for routine-service members) are allowed to perform individual labor activity in free time in the sphere of handicrafts or consumer service of the populace as established by the USSR Law "On Individual Labor Activity."

Service members are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic creativity, if this is not to the detriment of their accomplishment of military service duties.

3. In individual cases, service members (except for routine-service members) may be permitted by the commander of the military unit (chief of the institution or organization) on a personal basis to hold down another job in state and public enterprises, in institutions, and organizations associated with scientific, pedagogical, invention, consultative, or other activity.

4. Upon discharge from military service, service members are guaranteed employment with allowance for the education they have received and the specialty they have held.

Local Councils of People's Deputies and the managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations are obliged to provide work to service members discharged from military service with allowance for their specialty no later than a month from the day of their application. In the course of a month, if service members discharged from military service without the right to a pension are not employed, they are paid a monthly stipend amounting to the minimum wage of blue and white collar workers of the given region from the budget of the local Council of People's Deputies. Managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations have the duty to ensure priority assignment of workers who were officers, warrant officers, or extended-service personnel and have been discharged from military service to educational institutions of the system for training, retraining, and qualification enhancement of cadres.

Standing commissions are created in local Councils of People's Deputies, to include people's deputies, representatives of state and public organs and organizations, and organizations of military command and control, to find work for service members discharged from military service.

5. Commanders (chiefs) of military units and institutions and cadre organs of the USSR Armed Forces are obliged promptly to obtain information from the region

to which service members are to be discharged regarding the possibility of employment in their specialty.

In order to ensure the professional training for work in the domestic economy by service members subject to discharge, in military units and institutions where it is possible, or in the corresponding enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the given region, training of such persons in civilian specialties is organized at times free of service obligations.

6. In order to provide material aid and consumer services to service members discharged from military service, the local Councils of People's Deputies form a fund for their social protection from the resources paid by enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and from the payments of citizens.

7. Persons who before induction worked in enterprises, institutions or organizations retain the right to a job in the same enterprise, institution, or organization in their former or equivalent position.

8. Service members discharged from military service and accepted at the former place of work have the right to obtain material assistance for initial adjustment from the enterprise, institution, or organization.

Article 10. THE RIGHT TO MONETARY AND MATERIAL SUPPORT

1. The state creates the material and other conditions for service members necessary for them to meet their military service duties with allowance for its special nature and priority over other types of state service.

2. Service members have the right to state-provided pay and allowances in accordance with the conditions of military service, their qualification, military profession, military rank, and time of military service. Here the minimum amounts of pay for the positions held by junior-grade officers, warrant officers, and extended-service members cannot be lower than the average wage in the USSR.

When the wages of workers and specialists in the domestic economy and state employees are raised and there is a change in the cost-of-living index, the norms for pay and allowances of service members are also raised.

Procedures for providing pay and allowances to service members and changing the norms for this are established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

3. Service members who have incomes for each member of the family, which are lower than the standard subsistence minimum, are paid allowances by procedures and in amounts established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Service members with minor children once a year are paid material assistance amounting to 20 percent of the monthly cost of each child.

4. Service members and members of their families enjoy benefits with respect to taxes and collections in accordance with legislation presently in force.

5. Service members receive rations and clothing at state expense. They (except for routine-service members) have the right to monetary compensation for rations and clothing. When there is a change in the cost-of-living index, the norms for monetary compensation are revised.

6. Service members and members of their families have the right to benefits in travel by rail, air, river, sea, or automotive transport. Here routine-service members enjoy the free use of all types of municipal passenger transport (except taxis) and automotive transport in rural areas.

Article 11. THE RIGHT TO REST

1. Service members have the right to rest.

This right is ensured by establishing service time not exceeding 41 hours per week, and by granting days of weekly rest, holidays, annual and other paid leaves, and also daily breaks for rest and meals.

Duration and distribution of service time are determined by the schedule of the military unit and the service time-limit of officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel and female service members in accordance with the requirements for safeguarding constant combat readiness of the military unit (subunit).

The duration of the work week is established: for routine service personnel, students (cadets) of military educational institutions (training centers), a six-day week with one day off; for officers, warrant officers, extended service personnel, and female service members of other military units, a five-day week with two days off.

Exercises, voyages, live fires, and other measures related to safeguarding combat and mobilizational readiness are conducted strictly in accordance with plans on any days of the week, without restriction of the total duration of service time.

Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel, and also female service members in common soldier, sergeant and senior NCO positions, who are called on to perform military service at night, on days off or on holidays are given rest periods of the same duration on other days of the week or, at their discretion, these days may be added to their regular leave.

Mandatory leave of 20 days is established for routine-service personnel for their entire period of the military service, not counting the time necessary to travel to their leave location and back.

Short-term leaves are granted to routine-service personnel, and also additional leave to routine-service sergeants and senior NCOs holding positions of squad (crew) commander, deputy platoon leader, or ranking

sergeants and senior NCOs of companies (teams) as commendations in accordance with the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

At their wish, in one of their three last years of service before discharge to the reserve or retirement by reason of age, officers are granted a regular leave of three months to resolve questions related to their discharge from military service.

2. Routine-service personnel have the right to discharge from the location of the military unit. The duration and procedures of the discharge are established by military regulations.

Article 12. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING. PAYMENT FOR HOUSING PLOTS

1. Service members are provided with housing by the state.

2. Service members (except for routine-service personnel) and family members living with them are provided with housing which meets the requirements of legislation upon the arrival of the service member at his place of service, but no later than three months afterwards. Housing is distributed from the resources of the USSR Defense Ministry and other ministries, departments, and local Councils of People's Deputies in accordance with the norms, and is no less than that approved for the populace of the given region. Before receipt of permanent housing, service members and members of their families are registered for their place of service (using the address of the military unit and the address of temporary residence) and they are provided with service housing or paid monetary compensation, depending on their place of service, to lease (rent) temporary housing.

Cadets of higher military educational institutions having families are accommodated in family quarters, and in the event that there are no such quarters, they are paid a monetary compensation to lease (rent) temporary housing.

3. Officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel and female service members discharged into the reserve or retired due to age, illness, personnel reductions or family or other important circumstances, are provided by local Councils of People's Deputies with housing on a priority basis, but no later than three months from the day of arrival at their chosen place of residence, with allowance for the existing registration procedures. Housing is provided to warrant officers and extended-service personnel by the procedures indicated, on the condition that they have served 20 calendar years and more, but for those discharged in connection with a reduction in the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces, no less than five calendar years. For this purpose, three years before discharge of the service members for age, at the request of the commander, they are entered on the rolls of those requiring housing by the local Councils of People's Deputies of their chosen place of residence. The local Councils of People's Deputies will report to the

commander within three months regarding the inclusion of these service members on the housing waiting list.

Expenses to rent temporary housing borne by persons discharged to the reserve or retirement after three months from the day of arrival at the chosen place of residence and before receipt of housing, are paid by the local Councils of People's Deputies depending on the place of temporary residence of these persons in amounts and by procedures established by the USSR Council of People's Deputies.

Service members who become invalids in the period of performance of military service duties and are discharged in connection with this from military service are granted housing space in their chosen place of residence on a priority basis.

4. Officers holding the rank of colonel, its equivalent, or higher, both in military service and discharged into the reserve or retired and also commanders of military units, military instructors of military educational institutions, and service members having academic degrees are granted additional housing space in amounts established by the legislation in force.

5. For officers, warrant officers, and routine-service members and female service members sent for military service abroad, to regions of the Far North or to equivalent locales, to areas with severe climatic conditions where set terms of service are established for officer personnel, and also for officers having twenty calendar years of service or more who are reassigned to any other locale, their housing space (except for military housing space and that in closed or isolated military camps) is reserved for the entire time they are abroad or in the designated locales.

Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics may additionally provide for other grounds for reserving housing space.

6. Officers, warrant officers, extended-service personnel, and female service members on active duty, and also officers discharged to the reserve or to retirement by reason of age, state of health, personnel cuts, or family and other important circumstances, having 20 calendar years of service or more, pay for the housing occupied by them and family members living with them, and for communal services at a 50%

discount.

7. Service members (except for routine-service members) have the right to join housing construction (housing) cooperatives, and to acquire and build individual residences on favorable terms and by procedures determined by the USSR Council of Ministers, regardless of the duration of their military service in a given populated area.

Service members joining housing-construction (housing) cooperatives or constructing (purchasing) an individual

residence who do not have any other permanent residence are provided with interest-free financial assistance, depending on their place of service, to pay for their housing or bank loan received for individual housing construction: for those who have irreproachably performed military service for 15 calendar years or more, in the amount of 50 percent, and for 20 calendar years or more, in the amount of 100 percent.

Procedures and rules for providing interest-free financial aid in paying for cooperative housing or loans of the USSR Gosbank apply to members of housing-construction (housing) cooperatives and to individual builders who were service members as indicated in this point and were discharged from military service to the reserve or retirement.

Service members having 15 calendar years of service or more are granted the right to join housing-construction (housing) cooperatives of those populated areas where they will reside after discharge to the reserve or retirement.

Local Councils of People's Deputies are obliged to allocate building lots and provide aid in construction and acquisition of construction materials to officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel who express the wish to participate in individual housing construction or acquisition of homes, including in rural areas.

8. Service members (except for routine-service members) and also persons discharged from military service to the reserve and to retirement on the basis of age, state of health, personnel cuts, family circumstance or other important circumstances having twenty calendar years of service or more are released from payment of the land tax and rent for the land.

9. Officers and warrant officers discharged to the reserve or retirement for reason of age, state of health, personnel cuts, or family and other important circumstances and having a service time of 20 calendar years or more are provided state apartments occupied or granted to them in their chosen place of residence as their own property free of charge.

10. Officers called to short-term military service from the reserve for a period of two years, and also those enlisted in military service by a contract for up to three years, and members of the families, for the entire period of this service retain the housing which they occupied before assignment to military service from the reserve. They cannot be excluded from the waiting list for receipt of housing.

11. Routine-service members, except for seamen and petty officers on ships, are accommodated in barracks in accordance with the requirements of the Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Routine-service personnel retain the housing which they occupied before induction, and they cannot be excluded

from the waiting lists for receipt of housing. Families of routine-service personnel, if there are no persons with independent earnings in the family, pay for their housing in accordance with the existing minimal apartment rent established by the legislation in force.

12. Family members of service personnel and also persons discharged from military service to the reserve or retirement, and members of their families, who have been forced to leave life-threatening regions, are registered in their new permanent residence by local Councils of People's Deputies with no restriction. They are granted housing on a priority basis or at their desire they are granted a plot of land for construction of individual residences; they are given preference in entering housing-construction (housing) cooperatives, and apartments may be sold [to them] by the established procedures from state and public housing funds on advantageous terms determined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

13. In the event of a violation of the housing rules provided for by this article, service members discharged from military service to the reserve or retired and members of their families have the right to bring suit against the appropriate local Council of People's Deputies, organs of military command and control, or other state organ for satisfaction of their legal rights and compensation for damages should they be inflicted.

Article 13. RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF HEALTH AND COMPENSATION FOR HARM DONE TO HEALTH

1. Service members and also service-obligated personnel in training assemblies have the right to medical care implemented through the conduct of medical-hygiene, anti-epidemic, and medical preventive measures, through constant monitoring of the state of health, and through provision of all types of medical assistance, in medical subunits, units and institutions and the free provision of medicines and medications.

Service members must be provided outpatient or inpatient medical examinations.

2. If there are no military medical institutions in the place of service of the service members and also, if there is need to provide extraordinary medical aid, such aid is provided to them at civilian health care institutions regardless of their departmental affiliation free of charge.

3. Medical care of family members of service personnel is provided on a common basis with other civilians. If it is impossible to obtain medical aid in civilian health care institutions, they are provided with all types of medical assistance at the corresponding military medical institutions on an equal basis with service members.

4. Service members and family members (except for family members of routine-service personnel) have the right to sanatorium treatment at military sanatoriums and rest homes, to travel packages for rest at pensions

and tourist centers and also at civilian sanatoriums under advantageous payment terms for the travel packages.

5. The right to medical care and sanatorium treatment at military medical institutions and to rest at pensions and military tourist centers is retained for senior-grade and general and flag officers discharged to the reserve or retired for reason of age, state of health, personnel cuts, family or other important circumstances and having twenty or more years of service, and for other officers having the same time in service and discharged for illness, as well as for members of their families (with children up to age 16) and for the wives of deceased senior-grade and general and flag officers and pensioners who receive their pension because of loss of the breadwinner.

6. In the event that there is injury to health in performance of military service duties, service members have the right to compensation for the injury by procedures and under terms provided for by the Principles of Civil Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and union republics.

Article 14. THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION

1. Service members have the right to enroll in and study at military educational institutions and in qualification-enhancement courses.

2. Officers, warrant officers and extended-service personnel have the right to study in night and correspondence civilian educational institutions. Persons who excel in their studies are granted benefits.

3. Routine-service personnel are allowed to study in general night schools in the area where they are performing military service.

4. Persons called to military service while studying at educational institutions, retain the right to be enrolled for study in the educational institution and in the city where they were studying before induction when they are discharged to the reserve. Service members discharged from military service, if they have a positive reference from their military service, enjoy the right to non-competitive enrollment in higher and intermediate special educational institutions and admission to preparatory departments at higher educational institutions.

Officers discharged from military service for reasons of health, personnel reductions, family circumstances and other important circumstances, at the recommendation of the Officer's Assembly, are admitted to higher and intermediate special educational institutions without entrance examinations.

Article 15. THE RIGHT TO PENSION SUPPORT

1. The right to pension support of service members after their discharge from military service and of members of their families, is guaranteed by the state and is established by the USSR Law On Pension Support of Service

Members, and by other legislative acts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers issued in accordance with them.

2. Officers cannot be discharged from military service before acquiring the right to a pension for time in service, except for cases when their service is halted in connection with illness, at their own request in cases provided for by legislation, in connection with commission of misdemeanors discrediting the military rank of the officer, or court conviction for commission of a crime.

3. Amounts of pensions of invalids and participants of the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists who were officers, warrant officers and extended-service personnel cannot be lower than the amounts of pensions established by legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for analogous categories of service members discharged from military service.

4. Pensions to service members are paid by appropriations allocated for these purposes from the union budget. Payment of pensions to these persons in amounts and by procedures established by the USSR Law on Pension Support of Service Members is made regardless of their place of residence on the territory of the USSR.

Article 16. THE RIGHT TO AWARD OF MILITARY RANK, WEAR OF THE MILITARY UNIFORM, AND COMMENDATION

1. A service member has the right to timely award of the next military rank with allowance for training level, service, and position held. Service members demonstrating high morale and aggressiveness in performance of their military service duties, who accomplish their military duty in exemplary fashion, may be awarded the next military rank ahead of time, one level higher than the military rank envisaged for the position held, or one level higher than the awarded military rank.

A service member loses his military rank when his USSR citizenship ceases.

2. Service members have the right to wear the military uniform with the insignia of military rank and combat arm. This right may be granted to officers and warrant officers discharged to the reserve or retirement.

3. For zeal and excellence in service, service members have the right to a commendation, and they may be submitted for USSR state awards for bravery and valor displayed in performance of their military duty, and for exemplary accomplishment of military service obligations.

Article 17. THE RIGHT TO FILL POSITIONS AND TO REASSIGNMENT

A service member has the right to:

—hold a position in accordance with service qualification, military rank, and results achieved in service activity;

—enhance his qualifications;

—reassignment for reasons of health of the service member or members of his family, for family circumstances, and for completion of the established terms of service in locales with severe climatic conditions.

Service members also have the right to advancement in service. Officers, warrant officers and extended-service personnel generally realize this right on an alternative (competitive) basis.

Article 18. THE RIGHT OF SERVICE MEMBERS TO DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY SERVICE

1. Service members who have completed the terms of service established by law or defined by contract, and also those who have reached the age limit for military service, or have been found unfit for military service in peacetime for reasons of health, have the right to discharge to the reserves or to retirement.

By procedures defined by the USSR Council of Ministers, officers, warrant officers, and extended-service personnel may be discharged from military service at their request upon expiration of their terms of military service for family or other importance circumstances, and officers, in addition, upon completion of ten years of service in officer positions.

2. Service members have the right to discharge from military service to the populated areas where they permanently resided before induction or acceptance, and have the right to choose any other populated area for place of residence, with allowance for existing registration procedures.

Article 19. THE RIGHT TO CARRY, KEEP, AND USE WEAPONS

In performing their military service obligations, and if necessary also in their non-service time, service members have the right to carry, keep, and use their organic (personal) weapon by procedures determined by the laws of the USSR and military regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Article 20. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES, OTHER RIGHTS

1. Service members and members of their families may be paid monetary allowances in cases and by procedures defined by the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. Routine-service members have the right to free delivery of letters sent by the military unit. Letters and parcels addressed by routine-service personnel from their place of military service are sent free of charge. Personal clothing of civilians inducted to military service is sent as a free parcel.

3. Female service members enjoy all benefits provided for by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics in questions of improving the status of women and protection of motherhood and childhood for women in the USSR.

These benefits apply to fathers who are service members who are bringing up children without their mothers (in the event of their death, loss of parental rights, prolonged stay in a treatment facility, and in other cases when maternal care of the children is absent) and also to guardians (trustees) of minors.

Article 21. THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL PROTECTION OF FAMILIES OF SERVICE MEMBERS

1. Members of the families of officers, warrant officers and extended-service personnel are granted the following guarantees of their rights in questions of labor rights and social maintenance:

- priority right to work, and to remain in work during a reduction in the number or staff of workers. The chairmen of local Councils of People's Deputies, managers of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, chiefs of garrisons, and commanders of military units are obliged to take steps to find employment for the wives of service members no later than a month from the moment of their application;
- priority assignment to educational institutions for training, retraining, and qualification enhancement, with absence from work and pay for the period of training amounting to the average wage in the position for which they are being trained;
- organization of small enterprises, affiliates, shops, and sections (of plants) by local Councils of People's Deputies, ministries and departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, at the request of the military command in cities, towns, and populated areas in rural areas, where military units are located and where there are no opportunities to find employment for the family members of service personnel;
- annual provision of leave to wives (husbands) of service members (at their request) for the period of leave of the husband (wife);
- payment of allowances to wives (husbands) of service members for temporary unemployability in the amount of their received wage, regardless of time of work;
- payment of an allowance to wives (husbands) of service members amounting to the average monthly wage upon abrogation of a labor contract with them in connection with the transfer of the husband (wife) to service in another locale;
- assignment of wives (husbands) of service members who have graduated from higher and intermediate special educational institutions to work in the place of service of the husband (wife) and if there is no such opportunity, or at their choice, granting of the right to independent employment;
- inclusion in the total work time necessary for assignment of an old-age pension of the entire period of residence with the husband (wife) in areas where there were no opportunities for employment in their specialty, but no more than 15 years;

—payment of a month monetary allowance to non-working wives (husbands) of service members in the amount of the minimum wage established for blue and white collar workers in the USSR in the event that the wife (husband) cannot be employed in the place of service of the husband (wife).

2. Local Councils of People's Deputies provide material assistance to the families of routine-service personnel having incomes for each member of the family below the established living minimum, in amounts and by procedures established by the legislation of the union republics.

Abrogation of a labor contract with the wife of a routine-service member at the initiative of the administration is not permitted, except in the case of her systematic violation of labor discipline.

If an enterprise, institution, or organization is eliminated, employment should be found for the wives of routine-service members by the local Council of People's Deputies no later than two weeks after elimination of the enterprise, institution, or organization.

3. A monetary allowance is paid for children of routine-service personnel and for cadets of military educational institutions who are routine-service personnel or civilians.

4. No later than a month from the moment of application, local Councils of People's Deputies are obliged to settle the children of service members in nurseries and kindergartens or boarding schools in the place of residence regardless of departmental affiliation of these children's institutions. Service members are paid compensation for the cost of keeping the children in preschool institutions by procedures and in amounts established by the corresponding ministries and departments to which the service members are subordinate.

5. In the event of the killing (death) of a service member or person discharged from military service, his family retains the right to benefits which it enjoyed for another six months if others are not provided by legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

6. Families of dead service members are paid burial allowances by procedures and in amounts established by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 22. THE RIGHT TO SUGGESTIONS, REQUESTS, AND COMPLAINTS

1. Service members have the right to submit suggestions and requests, and also to make complaints to state organs, public organizations, and associations, and to organs of military command and control, except for complaints about military service matters, regarding unfair actions of officials, state organs, and public organizations and associations, and organs of military command and control, and also of citizens (including service members).

2. Complaints of service members regarding failure to provide a required allowance, illegal service instructions (actions) of commands (chiefs) and other service members and in other questions of military service relations, are submitted, considered, and resolved by procedures provided for by the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Service members also have the right to complain to military tribunals (military courts) regarding unfair actions of officials and organs of military command and control, which go beyond the limits of regulation-governed relations and which violate the rights and personal dignity of service members.

3. It is forbidden to impede the submission of a complaint and to subject the complainant to punishment and persecution for this. Those guilty of this will be prosecuted in accordance with legislation.

A service member submitting a complaint which contains deliberately false statements or slander will be prosecuted. In a dispute a service member has a right to appeal to a military tribunal (military court) for people's court for consideration of the case.

Article 23. PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

The rights of service members provided for by Articles 6 to 22 of this Law are implemented by procedures established by the USSR Law on Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service, this Law, and other legislative acts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and also acts of union and autonomous republics and the USSR Council of Ministers issued in accordance with them.

Article 24. RESTRICTIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF SERVICE MEMBERS ARISING FROM MILITARY SERVICE

1. Service members, depending on the nature and the conditions of military service and the characteristic features of their performance of service obligations, are restricted in the rights established for citizens of the USSR:

- Service members do not have the right to strike.
- Service members cannot be members of trade unions.
- Service members are forbidden to take part in private entrepreneurial activities and to be in paid positions in cooperatives which perform a production or mid-dleman activity.

The rest time of service members may be reduced (work time may be increased) by procedures determined by the Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Routine-service personnel are not allowed to study in civilian higher and intermediate special educational institutions.

Inductees and service members are forbidden to travel abroad for permanent residence.

Service members have a limited choice of place of residence and freedom of movement in connection with the conditions of garrisoning of military units.

2. Routine-service personnel are granted only one mandatory leave in the period of military service. The leave is reduced by the number of days of arrest of a service member in the guardhouse, but in all cases the leave granted him is no less than half of the established period.

Section III. Duties of Service Members

Article 25. GENERAL DUTIES

1. In addition to duties provided for USSR citizens, service members fulfill additional duties arising from the characteristic features of military service.

2. Service members are obliged:

- to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to strengthen its might, and to defend the laws and freedom of the Soviet people;
- to take the military oath, to loyally and devotedly serve the Motherland, and in wartime to defend the Fatherland;
- to strictly observe the Constitution of the USSR and the Laws of the USSR, and to obey the orders of commanders and chiefs;
- to perform other duties provided for by the regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

3. The service obligations of service members and procedures for their fulfillment of these obligations are defined by regulations of the USSR Armed Forces, and also by the normative acts issued on the basis of the decisions of the higher organs of state authority and administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 26. SPECIAL DUTIES

Service members perform special duties while on combat alert duty in combat service, on daily and garrison details, and when called on to eliminate the consequences of emergency circumstances. The content of these duties and procedures for their accomplishment are determined by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, military regulations, and other legal acts.

Section IV. Guarantees of Realization of the Status of Service Members

Article 27. THE DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE ORGANS, ENTERPRISES, INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND OFFICIALS TO ENSURE REALIZATION OF THE STATUS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

1. State organs, enterprises and their associations, institutions, organizations, officials and commanders (chiefs)

of organs of military command and control ensure realization of the status of service members within the limits of their authorities and duties. Officials guilty of nonfeasance or malfeasance of their duty to realize the rights and legitimate interests of service members and other persons to whom the status of service member applies bear responsibility in accordance with legislation.

The harm done to a service member by illegal actions of the organs and officials indicated in their performance of service obligations in the area of administrative control, including as a result of illegal conviction, illegal arraignment, illegal placement under guard as a means of suppression, is completely redressed in accordance with legislation.

2. Officers, warrant officers and extended-service personnel discharged from military service to the reserve who are stripped of their military rank or reduced in rank in connection with the designated illegal actions are restored to their former rank in military service, to a position no lower than that previously held in the former place of service or training at a military educational institution. The time from the day of illegal discharge to the day of restoration to military service, and the time of illegal detention under guard or serving of punishment as a result of illegal conviction is counted in the period of military service of the service members, in the required service time for military rank, in the required service time for the relevant positions, and in the required service time for designation of a pension, and for routine-service members, in their term of military service.

Previously occupied residences are returned within a month to service members deprived of their residences as a result of illegal actions committed against them, or within three months they must be granted equivalent furnished residences on a priority basis.

3. The harm done to service members as a result of illegal actions of investigative organs, preliminary investigative organs and procuracies or courts is compensated for by the USSR Defense Ministry and other ministries and departments by procedures determined by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and union republics.

Article 28. MANDATORY STATE PERSONAL INSURANCE OF SERVICE MEMBERS

Service members and also service-obligated personnel in training musters receive mandatory state personal insurance from the moment they start (are assigned) to military service (assemblies) in the event of their death, disfigurement (wound, concussive injury), loss of health in the period of performance of military service duties because of illegal actions of officials, accidents, or illnesses related to performance of military service.

Procedures, terms of insurance, and amounts of payment of insurance sums are established by the USSR Council of Ministers.)

Article 29. PROVISION OF HOUSING TO FAMILIES OF DECEASED SERVICE MEMBERS

When necessary the family of a service member killed in performance of military service is granted the right to priority receipt of a furnished apartment or improvement of housing conditions.

Article 30. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE DONE TO A SERVICE MEMBER FROM INJURY, DESTRUCTION OR LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

The damage done a service member and his family from injury, destruction, or loss of personal property in connection with the performance of military service obligations or military duty by service members is to be fully compensated with resources from the union budget, by procedures established by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics.

Article 31. DESIGNATED AGENTS OF MILITARY COLLECTIVES

In military units (subunits), in order to promote the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of service members, to establish comradely trust between commanders (chiefs) and subunits, to introduce proposals aimed at improvement of internal service, living conditions, professional training, non-troop social life, and to eliminate violations of legality, designated agents are elected from among the service members to work for the collective on the basis of social principles. Procedures for election and work of confidential agents are determined by regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Section V. Responsibility of Service Members. Responsibility for Violation of Laws on the Status of Service Members

Article 32. DISCIPLINARY, ADMINISTRATIVE, MATERIAL, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. Service members bear responsibility for their commission of violations of law in accordance with the legislation in force.

Service members, regardless of military rank and service position, are equal before the law.

2. Service members bear disciplinary responsibility according to procedures established by the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

3. Service members bear administrative responsibility on general principles for commission of violations of driving rules, rules of hunting, fishing, and conservation of fish reserves, customs regulations, and for contraband. Here administrative penalties in the form of a fine, corrective work, and administrative arrest cannot be used against them. Service members bear responsibility for commission of other administrative violations in

accordance with the rules of the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces.

4. Service members bear responsibility for material damage caused to the state in their performance of military service obligations in accordance with the Statute on Material Responsibility of Service Members.

5. Service members bear civil responsibility for failure to fulfillment or faulty fulfillment of duties provided for by civil law.

6. Service members bear criminal responsibility on general principles for commission of general criminal actions. For crimes against the established order of military service they bear responsibility in accordance with the USSR Law on Criminal Responsibility For Military Crimes.

7. In cases provided for by legislation, measures of social influence may be used against service members instead of juridical responsibility (except for material responsibility).

8. As a rule, a service member is liable to double jeopardy for a violation of the law. In the event that a violation of the law occurs, associated with the inflicting of material damages, the service member repays the damage, regardless of other types of legal proceedings instituted against him.

Article 33. THE CRIMINAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO SERVICE MEMBERS

1. Criminal cases against service members are prosecuted by the military procuracy and are within the jurisdiction of military tribunals (military courts).

2. The judicial system for criminal cases against service members is implemented in accordance with criminal procedural legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the union republics, if another is not established by law.

3. Service members against whom criminal proceedings are instituted may be kept in the garrison stockade as a preventive measure.

Article 34. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENCROACHMENT AGAINST SERVICE MEMBERS

1. Service members are under the protection of the state. Their lives, health, honor, and dignity are protected by law.

Failure to obey legitimate demands of service members who are performing their military service duties, insult, resistance, threats, violence, or encroachment on their lives, and also other actions directed against service members impeding the fulfillment of duties imposed on the service member will entail the legally established responsibility.

Preliminary investigation of the facts of the death of service members and service-obligated personnel called to training musters is performed jointly by the organs of the Military Procuracy and the USSR Committee of State Security.

Protection of the lives, health, honor, dignity, and property of family members of service members against criminal encroachments in connection with performance of the military duty of the latter is provided for by the legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and union republics.

Armor, Antiarmor Weapons Development Examined

91UM0162A Moscow *TEKHNIKA I MOLODEZHI* in Russian No 11, Oct 90 pp 46-49

[Unattributed article: "The Main Means of Protection"]

[Text] It was a hot autumn in 1973. The Middle East was ablaze. Israeli "Ben Gurions," "Super Shermans," M60A1's, and AMX-13's and T-54's, T-55's, and T-62's purchased from us by Syria and Egypt had met at the borders of the "Promised Land." Military experts carefully studied the reports from the front in order to summarize the "invaluable experience" which cannot be gained at any exercises or at some test range.

...On 9 October, a Syrian motorized infantry battalion was attacked by an Israeli tank company on the outskirts of Ayun-Khamud, and a battery of antitank missiles attached to the battalion came under an enemy air strike. Then the battalion commander moved soldiers ahead with shoulder-fired grenade launchers. Three Israeli tanks came to a standstill after the first salvo; two more after the second; the rest beat a hasty retreat.

...An Egyptian tank brigade was moving through Mitla Pass on the Sinai Peninsula when American-made Israeli "Hughes Cobra" helicopters suddenly appeared and launched antitank missiles at very low altitude. Half of the armored vehicles were immediately disabled.

...The Israelis complained that the French-made AMX-13 tanks did not live up to the hopes placed on them. Instead of swift maneuvering and accurate fire, their crews more often had to look for cover. On the contrary, the British "Centurions" stayed on the battlefield better, although even their 150-mm armor did not save the tank against 100-mm armor-piercing enemy artillery rounds.

A British journalist who was an eyewitness to the fighting wrote: "Thanks to the 'Malyutka' antitank missiles, a simple Syrian peasant ensconced in a foxhole was equal to a tank possessing lethal firepower."

A statistical analysis of the fighting is staggering: in 18 days the Israelis lost 840 tanks, and another 2,500 were knocked out of action. Artillery knocked out 22 percent of them; aviation, mines, and shoulder-fired grenade launchers 28 percent; and antitank missiles 50 percent. The opinion that infantry armed with grenade launchers and antitank missiles would quickly be neutralized by artillery and motorized riflemen accompanying the advancing tanks; that smoke, dust, and the combat situation itself would adversely affect the results of firing on tanks; and that the light and maneuverable vehicles would evade shelling without difficulty did not prove correct.

Once again, for the umpteenth time, a debate flared over the place of armored equipment in the system of weapons. They began to predict the "decline" of tanks, suggesting that they be replaced by helicopters, since the former had supposedly exhausted the reserve for

improvement. Indeed, the medium tanks had already caught up to the heavy tanks in weight; still, even the 300-mm frontal armor of the 54.8-ton British Chieftain was easily penetrated by an antitank missile! In the 1960's, tanks that combined mobility and fire, like the West German Leopard and the French AMX-13 and AMX-30, were considered advanced, but the events in the Middle East showed that their capabilities had been quite exaggerated.


However, American General Lawrence stated to congressmen: "On a highly dynamic battlefield in the future, we will have to defend ourselves against hordes of tanks in a situation very similar to that which prevailed in the Arab-Israeli War. We believe that the main means of protection against such a threat will be direct fire weapons mounted on the tank itself." It seems there is again confrontation, again competition between the projectile and armor?

We would remind you that in the 1950's the shaped charge was considered a tank's most dreaded enemy. Incidentally, the shaped-charge effect (concentration of gases forming during the detonation was discovered back in 1864 by military engineer M.M. Boroskov and put to use in engineering. In the 1920's, Professor M.Ya. Sukharevskiy studied this phenomenon, and a scientific interpretation was given by Academician M.A. Lavrentyev, Professor G.I. Pokrovskiy (who in the last years of his life was a member of the editorial board of *TEKHNIKA I MOLODEZHI*), and a number of other scientists. The Germans were the first to test it in war—reports came in from Spain in 1938 about "projectiles that burned through armor," which were supplied to the Franco forces by the German allies. Similar projectiles were used quite extensively in World War II, and later antitank grenade launchers and guided missiles began to be equipped with shaped charges.

Perhaps it is time to explain the shaped charge. Unlike a conventional charge, it has a funnel-shaped recess in the explosives with the funnel-shaped opening facing forward and its surface is encased with a 2-3 mm layer of copper, steel, and aluminum. When the projectile makes contact with armor, the explosives explode, the metal casing compresses and collapses into the rammer, expelling a red hot metallized jet 3-4 mm in diameter. It strikes the armor at a velocity of 9-12 km per second and a pressure of about 10 GPa and "gnaws" through it. At first the jet does not encounter any resistance from the steel; but then as it cools off, it settles on the edges of the hole. If the armor is thick enough, the jet may "wear out" altogether (true, excessively powerful armor makes a tank heavier, which is extremely undesirable). The fact that the red hot jet expands and melts the hole was the reason the legend about the burning through of tanks emerged.

So, the armor-penetrating capability of the shaped-charge jet depends on its velocity, density, and length. In order for it to achieve optimum parameters, the charge must explode at a very precise distance from the target.


Figure 1. Chobham Armor



Key:

- 1. Fastening bolt
- 2. Filler
- 3. High-hardness face plate
- 4. Back plate

Figure 2. Activation of Dynamic Protection




Key:

- 1. Main armor
- 2. Container with explosives
- 3. Explosives
- 4. Antitank missile
- 5. Triggering of dynamic protection element

otherwise the jet will not form or will lose its energy. Another thing, if the projectile makes contact with the target at an acute angle, the funnel deformed and you end up with a "ricochet."

Classic armor-piercing projectiles, a new generation of which appeared in the 1970's, are equally dangerous for

Figure 3. Configuration and Operation of a Shaped Charge



Key:

- 1. Conical shaped-charge funnel
- 2. Fuzes
- 3. Explosives
- 4. Shaped-charge effect
- 5. Armor


tanks. Thus, specialists of 10 NATO countries and Israel developed an arrow-like, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot round with a core made of the heavy alloy "vilet" (90 percent tungsten, 7.5 percent nickel, and 2.5 percent copper). Such a round, fired from a distance of 2 km, penetrates armor up to 150 mm thick. Further strengthening of armor-piercing projectiles involves using cores made of depleted uranium and increasing the ratio of their length to width to 20. Such ammunition appeared in the United States for the first time in 1976. Their armor-penetrating capability reached 180 mm and 310 mm in especially favorable firing conditions. It is clear that after such success of artillerymen, the development of third-generation tanks has dragged on somewhat. Nevertheless, their developers were able to find a solution.

For example, on the American M1, the slope angle of the frontal plate was increased to 83 degrees—the path of the round in the armor increased severalfold, and at such angles of contact armor-piercing discarding sabot rounds go to the side and shaped-charge rounds "ricochet."

From the experience of World War II we know that the top and bottom frontal plates account for 25 percent of the hits; the turret 45 percent; the forward side 21 percent; the rear side seven percent; and the rear only two percent. Therefore, they began concentrating the maximum armor in the most threatened areas. On the M1, say, the front of the turret was reinforced at the expense of the rear niche, and the forward part of the side was made 20 mm thicker than the rear side.


Back during World War II, additional side shields were placed on tanks, but in the 1950's and 1960's only the

Figure 4. According to the proposed variant for reinforcing protection of the American M60A3 tank using spaced armor, inside lining, and an outside layer, the effectiveness of armoring should increase by a factor of 1.8-2.



Key:
1. Hardened steel plate
2. Outside layer
3. Main armor
4. Inside lining


Figure 5. Configuration and Operation of a Fin-Stabilized, Discarding-Sabot Projectile



Key
1. "Actuating" core
2. Discarding sabot
3. Fin assembly with tracking flare
4. Buckling on back side of tank armor as projectile hits
5. Edges of hole
6. Core in armor

British continued to use them. All their tanks, beginning with the Centurion, has such protection, since the side was vulnerable, and to cover it the entire length with reinforced armor plating would mean to make the tank too heavy. It turned out that the light shields were just as

Figure 6. Increase in Effectiveness of American Anti-tank Weapons



Key:
B. Thickness of armor being penetrated (at an angle of 0 degrees for antitank missiles; at an angle of up to 60 degrees for armor-piercing rounds at 2,000 meters)
1. M1A2 (projected design)
2. M1A1 (with uranium armor)
3. M1A2 (projected design)
4. M1A1 (with uranium armor)
5. From armor-piercing round
6. From antitank guided missile

effective as monolithic armor, causing premature detonation of a conventional round and forming the shaped-charge jet at a greater than optimum distance.

Third-generation tanks still use heavy-duty shields made of composite armor (talked about below) covering the forward part of the side. They are up to 70 mm thick on the M1; on the Leopard they are even thicker—110 mm and also protect the turret. On the Israeli Merkava tanks, they placed steel chains on the turret that are drawn tight by balls. In addition, spare equipment cases attached along the side and additional external fuel tanks act as shields.

From shield protection it is one step to spaced armor, and from it to composite armor. The essence of spaced armor is that a solid plate is replaced by two or more placed a certain distance apart. Penetrating the first, the projectile core is compressed from all sides; internal pressure builds up in it, trying to explode it. If the armor is solid, this only increases the effect after penetrating the armor and increases the mass of fragments. But when there is a second plate in the round's path, its core hits it with the internal structure already ruptured. As far as the shaped-charge jet is concerned, it penetrates the first plate in the best conditions, but at the edge it flattens out and breaks up in the space between the armor.

Spaced armor plating was used in its pure form in the modernized A3 and A4 Leopards. But most of the third-generation tanks use composite armor, when the space between the steel plates is filled with material that

resists the effects of the shaped-charge jet. After theoretical research and numerous experiments it was established that ceramics and plastics with their low density are even able to extinguish the jet—this is explained by the high level of intermolecular bonds, on the destruction of which the shaped-charge jet is expended. We would note that the combination of such materials with armor makes it possible to decrease the weight of the protection noticeably.

Such a system was first tested in England on the experimental F.Y.42-11 tank in 1971. The new armor called Chobham, named after the town where the British scientific research center is located. They passed information about the new armor to U.S. and FRG specialists who were working jointly on the MBT-70 tank, and when the contract for the "international" tank was canceled, both sides used Chobham armor on their national equipment.

We would remind you of another term—tank survivability. The point is that in combat something will always be found that is capable of destroying or at least disabling the tank. As the conflicts in the Middle East have shown, a small hole is enough for a fire to break out inside a combat vehicle or to detonate the ammunition carried. Therefore, modern tanks are divided into isolated compartments; forward fuel tanks are shielded and filled with polyurethane foam. Incidentally, besides their main function, the fuel tanks also act as protection against shaped-charge rounds and against radiation.

Now the ammunition carried is not kept in one place. Part of it is located in the most protected side ammunition niche in the turret, separated from the gun room by armored hoods, and knockout plates are installed above them in the hull roof plate. The second batch of ammunition is stowed in an armored container in the floor of the gun room; it also has built-in knockout plates. On detonation, the blast wave blows them out and goes outwards. Sometimes artillery rounds are placed in containers with non-combustible liquid. But if fire still breaks out, a fire extinguishing system activates automatically in 60-100 milliseconds.

On the Israeli Merkava, increased survivability is ensured by positioning the powerplant in the forward, most vulnerable part: a hatch is located in the rear which the crew uses to abandon the disabled tank, using it as cover.

Red hot fragments pose the greatest danger for the crew and equipment. Even if the armor is not penetrated, pieces of heated metal break off inside at the point of the projectile's impact, striking the tank crewmen and disabling equipment. A modern 105-mm armor-piercing round, penetrating a 200-mm plate, drives inside the vehicle up to 7 kg of fragments, and a modern 120-mm round drives in up to 400 of them!

Therefore, they began covering the hull from within with a lining of polyurethane, teflon, or fiber glass plastic with carbon fiber. They restrain part of the fragments and

penetrating radiation. Body armor made of Kevlar fiber with additional pockets for armor plates and a hermetically sealed helmet to protect the head from fire and metal.

So, by the early 1980's, armored equipment had reached a qualitatively new level of development, which foreign experts compare with the transition in the mid-1930's to armor designed to defeat artillery projectiles.

But countermeasures in response to this also did not slow down—there appeared antitank guided missiles with tandem or slanted positioning of the focusing hollow and a proximity fuze; new powerful armor-piercing rounds; and ammunition that strikes the tank from above, where the armor is weaker. Thus, the modernized Tow-2 missile penetrates armor up to 850 mm thick, and a 120-mm round penetrates armor 330 mm thick. Tank designers again had to work on strengthening the protection of armored vehicles.

...Back in 1954, a patent was applied for in the United States for "Protection of Armored Objects Against Artillery Projectiles," according to which a projectile or rocket flying towards a tank was to be destroyed by a counter explosion. Similar devices were patented 10 years later in the FRG and five years later in the United States, and on 14 May 1974 the French published a description of the optimal design of such dynamic protection. Engineers of the Israeli firm Rafael implemented this design in 1982.

It consists of flat, rectangular containers of explosives that are triggered when a projectile or shaped-charge jet hits them, but do not react to bullets and fragments. The counter explosion reduces the effectiveness of the shaped charge by 60-80 percent; although armor-piercing rounds are not destroyed, they are deflected, which changes the angle at which they make contact with the armor, with all the ensuing consequences...

A new variant of dynamic protection is being developed for tanks of the 1990's—containers are placed between the spaced armor plates. This design has been called active armor.

Another idea has been borrowed from the seamen, who long ago used artillery systems with a high rate of fire to destroy incoming missiles. The firm Marconi, for example, manufactured an automatic 7.62-mm twin mount with an EHF-band radar; it is mounted on the turret of the Challenger. Its maximum firing range reaches 600-900 meters, and no more than 20 rounds are required to destroy the target.

As you can see, the competition between means of destruction and protection, begun by the manufactures of the sword and shield, still continues today.

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Role of Design Flaws in Aircraft Incidents

91UM02294 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Dec 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Sergey Doronin, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* military columnist: "Personal Safety Is Not Guaranteed"]

[Text] Major Yuriy Zakharevich's crew was forced to bail out in the ninth minute of flight. There was no other way out left for the airmen. A fire in the engines resulted in destruction of the aircraft in the air. Only three managed to escape—Lt Sergey Kosyrev, Lt Col Anatoliy Buryanov, and the commander. Pieces of flying metal cut the shroud lines of Capt Vladimir Shadrin's parachute.

The missile-carrier that burned out on the ground claimed another casualty. A person who was in the vicinity was fatally wounded by a fragment from an exploding oxygen bottle.

A board would later establish that a design flaw was the cause of the accident.

It seems, society already understood that military service is not just parades and inspections. Another aspect of it also comes to mind—in addition to everything else, it also entails danger to one's life.

But there are all kinds of danger. There is laxity, personal carelessness, poor training of personnel—all of these are a precursor to the majority of accidents. One out of every two deaths in the armed forces occurs for this reason.

There is also another thing. Imperfection in combat equipment that occurs in the stage of development and experimental and series production.

Flaws, imperfection... They should not be, but nevertheless exist. There is perhaps not a single branch of troops whose equipment is up to par without exception.

How can we not share the concern of N. Naruzhnyy, an air regiment commander of the North Sea Fleet, who talked about the qualitative condition of his unit's aircraft fleet at a meeting between the USSR President and the military people's deputies. The physically and morally obsolete aircraft which are constantly patched up and which are flown. I will be more precise: they carry modern weapons, but have navigational and radio systems from the past war.

In fact, no one can guarantee the personal safety of the TU-160 crews 100 percent, if I can put it this way. The operating period of the missile-carriers, extended several times, has reached a critical point. I will explain what this means: the aircraft may simply fall apart in the air. For the time being, there is only one thing left for the pilots to do—prepare themselves psychologically for unforeseen situations that occur due to equipment malfunctions in flight.

The example given is not the only one. Take, for example, the TU-142M that was modernized several

years ago. I understand the dissatisfaction of the pilots and engineering and technical personnel with it. You do not fly many hours with landing gear nacelles that disintegrate due to design flaws. Trouble is not far away. You may not take off, or you may crash on landing. Or you may demonstrate composure and heroism, saving an emergency vehicle.

Another thing is obvious. Some of these aircraft in Naval Aviation and Long-Range Aviation, instead of a proud life in the sky, drag out a miserable existence on the ground. What kind of professionalism and high combat readiness do we have with such a state of affairs?

All of this could have been avoided if the designers were not unyielding in their mistake and did not look in the wrong places for the parties responsible. By decreasing the aircraft's weight by several hundred kilograms (for the sake of installing additional equipment), they focused all their attention on testing the onboard equipment during flight tests. If the equipment somehow justified the hopes being placed on it, the lightened nacelles did not hold up under extended operation.

The litigation between the aviators and designers has lasted since 1985. Only recently was a decision made about a plant modification of aircraft that are in service, for which the army, not the designers, is paying. As you can understand, this will cost a fortune.

What kind of equipment and armament should we have? The answer is clear: similar in combat capabilities to foreign equipment and armament, or even better. Of course, all this costs a pretty penny. But no one will economize on defense for the sake of the very process of economizing. The state gives all the very best to defense. Demanding one thing in exchange—quality, combat effectiveness, reliability.

Why then does the navy receive submarines whose noise level exceeds all permissible limits? On whose whim and with whose input was obviously useless communications equipment, which test results confirmed, forced on the troops? This venture, you cannot pick another word, simultaneously drained the state treasury of a tidy sum. The creative "search" of the developer was estimated at 16.8 million rubles [R]. Add to that another R20.6 million, which measures the cost of the incomplete equipment manufactured by industry.

It is a shame, of course, that money was thrown away because of someone's professional negligence and dishonorableness. It is gone forever. We can take consolation in one thing: nothing threatened a human life in this case.

However, it sometimes happens differently. When a designer's oversight and rejects result not only in equipment malfunctions.

...The eighth and ninth compartments with its people were burned out on a nuclear-powered submarine surfacing from a great depth: the main propulsion assistant,

Capt-Lt Viktor Milovanov, and Sr Lt Sergey Yarchuk were able to maintain speed. And they remained at the nuclear propulsion control panel.

Here are a few lines from a letter from R. Minyayev, engineering officer: "...not every person could have immediately controlled two reactors in an emergency situation with two hands, and then, a half hour later, bring other mechanisms to the initial position. I remember how Milovanov, with blood foaming on his lips and in a semi-conscious state, crawled up to the central control compartment."

The tragedy in February 1972, which took the lives of 28 submariners, occurred because of a design flaw.

The greatest cost is in human life. The army cannot avoid this as long as there are oversights and technical miscalculations in developing equipment and armament. I cannot say how many such incidents happened before, since these facts are not made public. What we do know is an exception to the rule. But if you systematize even those bits of information that have leaked out into the press, you can understand what the scale of tragedies may be.

The crash of a military transport aircraft with 48 paratroopers on board at the end of last year in the vicinity of Baku. Pilots were not at fault—it was the equipment...

It would seem that it is clear where to give credit. It is also clear to whom we should give it. Nevertheless, the system of protection does not always work. Col Gen (Ret) Yu. Mansurov, a person of duty and honor, who in his time was not afraid to go alone against those who had already seen the flawed TU-144 on the country's passenger airlines and who held out to the end in this struggle, explains this simply: mutual connivance.

In the order of things, adjustments toward simplifying tactical and technical assignments, which determine the characteristics of future experimental models. Their unreliability and safety as a result. Postponing the deadlines for their manufacture. State testing completed by the signing of documents, where sometimes hundreds or even thousands of comments were listed. Often they were not minor ones, but allowed putting the item in the inventory...with subsequent modification. This modification then dragged on for years, devouring considerable resources. This is how the customer, the developer, and the manufacturer end up tied together.

The aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov" [Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov] (formerly the "Tbilisi") also went through all of this. I will not make false allegations against the shipbuilders. They built what the designers had been working on for more than one year. And they worked pretty well, I would add. That is, if you consider them as a whole.

But there are details, so to speak, of a technical nature. Without taking them into account, one cannot talk about

the absolute perfection of the cruiser and be confident that it will fully justify the hopes placed on it. The customer—the military department—brought quite a few of them to light. Even more observations were gathered by the governmental commission.

I do not want the readers to get the opinion: How can it happen that an unfinished cruiser would take its place among operating ships? In general it was ready, personnel began mastering the equipment and armament. In this situation, something else is not understandable—the persistent repetition of previous mistakes. And officers of the crew talk about this with resentment.

How can you control a ship normally when the plan position indicator on the bridge malfunctions? That is the only way. That is how the designers planned it. How can you support flights from a snow-covered, ice-coated deck? There was no gas-jet machine before, and there is none now. How to rescue a pilot or throw a burning aircraft overboard if, like before, there is no appropriate equipment?

Things sometimes reached the point of being strange. How much the commander demanded and pleaded: computers and software were needed for controlling the ship and checking and selecting a variant of crew actions in emergencies... An elementary mistake can be costly. He finally persuaded them. Not the designers but the fleet leadership helped—they gave him the computers. They were not new but they were still computers.

"We often run into a closed door with our questions," the ship specialists shared their pain. "It is just that the designers regard our opinions as a nuisance."

For example, the living conditions on the cruiser are quite far from ideal. To this they reply: the Americans have it even worse. But after a month-long cruise, the entire American crew relaxes on shore for couple of weeks. We spend a minimum of six months without leaving the ship.

Or take the fluoroscope, how can physicians work without it? How can they diagnose the injured? Our design does not have one, they did not provide for one. Or did they forget? There are over 2,000 personnel on board.

I can imagine what the daily procedure for receiving provisions will turn the seamen's life into. Its delivery on board from depots, loading, unloading: storage rooms are located below, and they have to go get them and go get them.

"We pointed this out to the developers back during the construction stage," says the commander of the cruiser, Capt 1st Rank V. Yarygin. "And they did nothing. State testing showed that the entire crew would have to be put into action, there is no other way."

The commander is right: he does not need loaders, he needs reliable specialists. They train in exercises, training sessions, and during the course of servicing

equipment and weapons, not in housekeeping work. And all these aspects are not secondary. They have a direct bearing on the crew's combat readiness and also on people's safety.

A number of fundamentally important questions never were resolved on a single level because industry is most strictly forbidden to do anything without the knowledge and approval of the production design bureau and because it is difficult and not to his advantage for the designer to change something. It is easier to torpedo a complaint by a simple and smooth method: classify the remark as a proposal that one does not have to be in a hurry to implement and that can be left for later.

When it comes to "small things," here the crew specialists sometimes act by appeals to the plant management to help the Navy and sometimes, as it has become so fashionable, by barter: a bottle of booze and several kilograms of butter presented to a worker are stronger than any bans.

Is this not why more and more often reports full of drama burst into our already uneasy life: somewhere again an aircraft engine has malfunctioned, a helicopter has crashed, or there has been emergency on a submarine... Sometimes we find out about those who ended up in trouble. But when will we find out about those who could have prevented this trouble but did not do so?

From the editor. This article touches upon only part of a very important problem to which we wanted to call attention. The present procedure of ordering, developing, and manufacturing experimental and series models of equipment and armament is in need of review in a series of its fundamental aspects. This has to do with the existing system of monitoring their quality, reliability, and safety in operation; ensuring real independence of customers and military acceptance from departments and industry; questions of financing scientific research and experimental design work, weapons acquisition...

We think the readers have something to share with us on this account. We await your responses. The telephone number to contact us is 257-25-20.

Apathetic Official Response to Aircraft Break-In

91UM0253A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Commanding Officer Major S. Stepanov, and other crew members (seven signatures in all): "Involuntary 'Pinkertons'"]

[Text] When we were flying from the Far East to the Northern Fleet on 2 November last year, we made a stopover at an airport of the Transbaykal Military District. While we were gone, someone broke into the cockpit of the plane and stole 3,500 rubles' worth of the crew's personal possessions.

We were told at the airport that this was far from the first time someone had broken into planes and helicopters in recent months. Not one of the break-ins, however, had been investigated properly. Our repeated appeals to the aviation unit command, the special section, and the military procuracy of the garrison did not produce any results either.

The military procuracy of the garrison did not conduct a particularly thorough investigation. It was not until 6 November, four days after the break-in, that an investigator came to look over the crime scene (there is no other name for it). By that time we had essentially been forced to conduct our own investigation of the circumstances of the break-in. We learned, for example, that the items had apparently been taken away in a GAZ-66 automobile, the tread marks of which we discovered near the plane immediately following the break-in. We also learned that the driver of one such automobile at the airport was absent from work for several hours that same evening. Apparently, the items were transferred from the car to a shed near the flight ramp area, which we determined from the marks the parachute bags had left when they were dragged through the snow and from the chocolate wrappers we found there. The chocolate had to be ours, because it has been more than a year since it was issued in the flight cafeteria at this airport, and the stamp on the wrappers was the same as the stamp on the chocolate we had received in Vladivostok.

Besides this, on the day we flew out of the airport, some Polet cigarettes were discovered among the possessions of a private (we know his name). These are the cigarettes we had, and they are not sold anywhere at the airport and were not issued to the soldiers here. On the evening of 2 November, this private was absent for several hours from the dispensary where he was supposed to be. He had no excuse for his absence.

The most amazing thing about the story is that a sentry was within 50 meters of the plane at the time of the break-in, but he was never even questioned.

We submitted our findings and a diagram we had drawn up ourselves to the garrison military procuracy, but there have been no results. There has been no reply to an inquiry we sent to Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Krylov. For this reason, we are wondering why people who cannot or will not do the work we were forced to do ourselves are being paid for this work.

Lift Engine Shutdown Leads to V/STOL Accident

91UM0311A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank M. Borikov of the Northern Fleet: "An Aircraft Tamed"]

[Text] Under an ukase of the USSR President, Captain Ye. Lobanov was awarded the order For Personal Courage.

That day the V/STOL combat trainer aircraft under the command of Major A. Korolev and Captain D. Smirnov was carrying out a training sortie. In coming in for a landing at an altitude of several meters the unforeseen happened, one of the two lift engines failed. The aircraft nosed down sharply and headed to the ground. The crew's attempts to rectify the situation were unsuccessful. The automatic eject system was activated and the pilots landed safely.

When the aircraft struck the concrete hard the second lift engine also halted but the lift-thrust engine continued operating and the aircraft, at first moving forward a bit,

began to move in reverse at an increasing speed. Running off the runway the aircraft became stuck in the snow. Flying in all directions were loose snow as well as clumps of dirt, sand and stones scattered by the jet of gas from the operating engine. There was a real threat that the aircraft would catch on fire and explode. And then decisiveness was shown by Captain Lobanov who during the flights headed the technical assistance team. At risk to his own life he ran up to the aircraft, made his way into the cockpit and shut down the engine.

Captain E. Lobanov is the chief of a maintenance unit in an aviation detachment. He has become the first in the fleet's air forces to be awarded the order For Personal Courage.

People's Deputy Accuses Chernavin of Cover-up in Komsomolets Findings

91UM02164 Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 50
Dec 90 p 6

[Article by Reserve Lieutenant Aleksandr Yemelyanenko, USSR People's Deputy, "Unsolicited Report: An Open Letter to Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy"]

[Text] Vladimir Nikolayevich, allow me to address you, a deputy minister of defense, at my own behest, not at a closed press conference, and not with a deputy's letter through your secretariat. All of this has already been done, including several personal meetings, which did not yield the anticipated results. Once an audience lasted about four hours, which very much surprised your special assistant in the anteroom. But even then the majority of the questions in my notebook remained unanswered. What can one do if a monologue is your favorite style. Thus, do not judge too severely: the circumstances force addressing you publicly, from the pages of a newspaper.

First and foremost—as an official and as a prominent military leader, who is endowed with great authority and is personally responsible for the state of affairs in the Soviet Navy. And in addition, Comrade Commander in Chief, you also are a USSR People's Deputy, a fact to which you yourself repeatedly drew attention during our meetings. And so let us have it out openly, in the presence of those who voted for us. I hope that SOBESEDNIK is read not only in Severodvinsk, the cradle of the submarine fleet where you named a journalist as your deputy, but also in the Lenkoransky Rayon of Azerbaijan, from which you were elected. It has turned out that because of my duties as a deputy and a journalist I had occasion to become closely involved—all be it at various stages—with the work of a government commission for the investigation into the "Komsomolets" nuclear submarine disaster. I met and talked with many experts, who participated in the commission's work, listened to and compared various appraisals and points of view concerning the accident, analyzed the points of view, examined documents, and had an opportunity to attend several special sessions and working meetings with the cochairmen of the commission.

And a strange circumstance was discovered: the more resolutely and firmly a person defended his position on questions of principle, the faster he obtained the label of a resentful, vindictive, and malicious failure... Officers, who only yesterday constituted the personnel backbone of the submarine fleet, have been publicly accused of incompetence and of malevolence and slander against the fleet as soon as they dared to express opinions contrary to the position of their command element and to your position, and that means also contrary to the position of Main Naval Staff. However, the matter did not end with labels and criticism: the truth seekers were simply gotten rid of, making way for younger and more complaisant officers. In due course, such a fate befell

Captain 1st Rank A. Khrapovich, the commander of a missile-armed submarine in the Pacific fleet. He was transferred to serve at a training center and from there he was immediately transferred to the reserve, as soon as he disobeyed once again and consented to be a candidate for deputy... This summer, Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov, the Deputy Commander of the Naval Academy was given the sack—do not contradict the Commander in Chief? And such psychological pressure was applied to Captain 1st Rank Yu. Zelenskiy, the former commander of the "Komsomolets's" first crew, that he hardly dared to speak candidly in front of the government commission's members!

Who will be next? I simply cannot risk giving the surnames of officers, with whom I am maintaining a correspondence.

Thus, our reason for having things out with you, Comrade Fleet Admiral, is more than serious.

I will be frank, there are sufficiently conclusive grounds to think that the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy—that is to say you, being by appointment a member of the government commission for the investigation into the disaster of the "Komsomolets" nuclear-powered submarine, not only did not promote an objective and comprehensive analysis of the accident, but on the contrary—through your actions, both direct and indirect, you removed from the field of professional analysis a number of principal questions, events, and problems, which had a direct causal and investigational relationship with the loss of the submarine and 42 crewmen.

It was easy to do this. From the very beginning of the investigation, you personally directed the activities of all eight sections of the Navy working committee, which prepared materials for the members of the government commission, and essentially molded and substantiated its conclusions.

I took the quotation cited as a paragraph above from an address by submarine officers, Navy veterans, representatives of the shipbuilding industry, and relatives of the dead sailors to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security. Their meeting was arranged at the initiative of a group of people's deputies shortly after the publication of the government commission's conclusive findings.

The participants of the meeting declared that the published document did not contain sufficiently complete information about all the causes of the accident, about what lessons were learned from the tragedy in the Norwegian Sea and what specific steps were taken by Navy leaders in this connection, and how the builders and designers of warships reacted. It would seem that the situation itself requires the Navy command authorities to start a dialogue and give comprehensive information to the deputies and the Navy community. But you, Comrade Commander in Chief, have repeatedly, as the saying goes, rejected invitations from the threshold: "We do not consider it necessary!..." And not only did you

yourself avoid the meeting, after forbidding officers from the Main Naval Staff, including your deputies, from participating in it, but you also prevented the official travel to Moscow by submarine officers, who were personally invited on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee.

And this is another reason to give some thought to the motives and logic of your actions...

But, as you know, the meeting took place. People, who have committed their heart and soul to the Navy, were able not merely to express their grief, but to work out a coordinated program of action, and to realize that only together will they be a force. IZVESTIYA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA actively commented on this event and Central Television broadcasted a detailed account on the program "Serving the Motherland".

When Reserve Vice Admiral Chernov and Roza Alekseyevna Markova, the mother of Senior Lieutenant Sergey Markov, who died in the accident on the "Komsomolets" parted, they agreed to gather together in their native Leningrad the surviving crewmen and the relatives of those who perished. Eighteen months have passed and they have failed to gather all together in any way to talk humanely—not with an investigator nor with the members of the commission, but among themselves. On behalf of the families with whom she has maintained contact, Roza Alekseyevna asked me to come also.

On the day before the appointed date, I made a call to Leningrad to clarify some details. And at the same time without any particular hope, I suggested that Roza Alekseyevna inform the cochairs of the government commission about the meeting and I gave her their office telephone numbers. I also gave her the telephone number of your anteroom, Comrade Commander in Chief, just in case. I was unaware of what happened later: the day flew by hectically, I was at the train station at midnight and in Leningrad in the morning. And how amazed I was when appearing at the Central Navy Museum at the appointed hour, I saw a hall filled to capacity, a great number of Admiral's and Captain 1st Rank's shoulder boards, and O. Baklanov, a Central Committee secretary; L. Rezunov, deputy minister of the Shipbuilding Industry; and your deputy, Admiral V. Zaytsev, the chief of the Main Directorate for Maintenance and Repairs (GUER) at the presidium's table. And a minute later, B. Gidasov, the first secretary of the Leningrad CPSU obkom, took the last unoccupied chair in the presidium.

So this is your system! As soon as it became known that a Central Committee Secretary, after speaking on the telephone with Markova, had decided to come, everything began to move instantaneously, commands and orders began to fly forth, the museum's staff was set on its feet, and Vice Admiral A. Steblyanko, the chief of the Political Section at the Leningrad naval base received strict directives...

And on the whole, it is good that the meeting took place in this structure. Even though it was at least six months

late, on the other hand those who came from Moscow learned much that was new to them. One cannot relate everything in a letter—I will cite only a few details.

Mothers and widows, who have lost the people most near and dear to them and have cried their eyes out for eighteen months, have begun to speak the language of professional submariners: "How did it happen that the high-pressure air on the submarine did not cut off in time? What was Captain 1st Rank Kolyada, the senior officer on board, doing during the fire? Why are submarine crews still being supplied with individual breathing devices of 1959 vintage?"

And only every now and then a mother's sob.

One cannot get anything out of them. Our sons have the right only to die before their time

Mariya Alekseyevna Smirnova, barely suppressing her tears, addressed the Central Committee Secretary—Do you remember April 12th? Almost maddened with grief, I was unable to say anything at that time—I delivered a letter. You promised to write to me, you said in so many words: "I will write..." A response came from the Northern Fleet Headquarters. But the truth that I was seeking turned out badly for my oldest son. Quite recently he was a staff specialist and the best torpedo man in the unit, he intended to enter the academy, and suddenly I learned that he is being transferred to the reserve. I taught both my sons to live according to their conscience. Both went off to the Navy. My youngest son died and my oldest son told me: "Mama, no one needs your truth..."

Fatvana Speranskaya, the widow of Captain-Lieutenant Igor Speranskiy, an engineer in a sonar and acoustic group, gathered her strength and stood up,—But there is no denying that words are worthless. There is no grave, they promised to erect a monument, and put up a memorial plaque at the Popov Naval School, from which Volodin and Naumenko graduated a while back. For a year I kept going to the political section and I finally got in to see them, but when they unveiled the memorials—they did not get around to inviting the families of relatives...

Roza Alekseyevna Markova talked about those who were not able to come.—And they treated Tanya Yudinaya's family so callously! Slava was always at sea—with the first crew, and later on with the second, and he did not have time to legalize an adoption, although he was rearing children and they called him father... But there were no documents—there also is no pension... Tanya was essentially forced to curtail her contract and leave the North.

Meanwhile, a dictating machine was impassively stating the following declaration:—They have behaved this way not only with Yudinaya. Maksimchuk, the widow of the ship's dead political officer, was a financier in the unit, however they denied an extension of her contract, ordering her to leave the military installation. Moreover, they had the nerve to reproach: "The wife of a political

officer, what kind of example are you setting?." A report addressed to the Commander of the Northern Fleet did not even help, she was left with same choice: either leave and expect the promised housing in the Ukraine, or expect no housing whatever on the military base.

—Allow me to speak,—Captain 3rd Rank Sergey Bogdanov, an officer in the special section and one of the 27 submariners who survived the icy hell of the Barents Sea, rose to his full height.—It is right that we talk about those who perished here, but interest in the survivors disappeared as soon as the commission left. I do not want to talk about everyone, but the command element's attitude toward the majority of us has become cool. Rehabilitation under the conditions, in which we underwent it, in essence, accomplished nothing. I feel that recurring and thorough medical examinations were lacking altogether. But even before we were put in the hospital for three days, official reports appeared in the press: all are healthy...

Pointing at the clock with a very expressive gesture, B Gidasov, the secretary of the Leningrad CPSU obkom asked to speak.

—I have to be at another important engagement right now, but I share your feelings and concern. And before leaving, I want you to know that the road to Smolny is open to you. We will always help in any way we can.

It would be nice if this meeting were shown on Central Television, but without deletions. Two operators with video cameras filmed it from beginning to end. During a break, one of the operators proudly acknowledged: it is being done specially for the Commander in Chief. Does that mean exclusively for you and by your order, Vladimir Nikolayevich? And indeed, why should one go anywhere on his day off, contemplate the tears of mothers and widows, listen to reproaches and respond to the interminable and painful "whys?..." It is much easier to watch a video tape recording in your office. To tell you the truth, I had heard about your predilection for video before, it is rumored that you have the tenacious gaze of a producer and certain skills in montage: cutting out, switching places, and recording... I am still waiting for your surname to start appearing in the credits of programs dealing with naval themes.

Nevertheless, neither you personally, nor the Main Staff, led by you have neglected the literary fraternity. Even at this point it must be said that you frequently give odds to your political directorate. Once in conversation, you admitted that the Navy newspapers do not always follow in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's wake, one has to go up to the bridge himself and teach the obstinate to be wise...

Comrade Commander in Chief, I dare report that your lessons have been beneficial. In any case, not one of the four Navy newspapers dared to publish "An Address..." which was approved at a meeting of submarine officers, Navy veterans, and representatives of the shipbuilding industry on 5-6 October in Moscow. I will add that they did not even find time to reply to an informational letter

sent by the vice-chairman of a USSR Supreme Soviet Committee. There is no denying that this is schooling!

It is observed word for word in every paragraph of those "collective" letters which have been and continue to be periodically organized in the fleets and units with a single alleged purpose: to protect oneself from attacks and to carry the truth in the highest instance to the people. One of these recurrent letters, which was received by two parliamentary committees, contains more than 50 signatures—from Captain-Lieutenant to Rear Admiral, commander of a submarine task force. I do not feel quite right about such unanimity in a command...

By the way, Comrade Commander in Chief, I completely forgot to convey to you, from everyone who knew Vitaliy Vasilyevich Zaytsev, your deputy and chief of the Navy's Main Directorate for Maintenance and Repairs, the "feeling of deep satisfaction" on the occasion of his promotion to the next higher military rank. The newspapers with the text of the government commission on the "Komsomolets's" conclusive findings, in which along with the design deficiencies of the ship, errors committed by the crew owing to insufficient knowledge of their own submarine's operational characteristics are acknowledged, have not yet had time to turn yellow—but the Navy's chief of maintenance is now a full admiral. Now that is what I call real adherence to principle. Each according to his deserts: the chief of the Navy's Emergency Rescue and Salvage Service, who made an irrelevant reply to the Minister of Defense, is retired without lengthy court proceedings, there was a report about this in the press; and the chief of GUER is made a member of the government commission to substantiate and defend the Commander in Chief's point of view. And it seems Vitaliy Vasilyevich handled the task, which you set for him, well. Our congratulations to him...

Generally speaking, it should be noted that you know how to take care of your own circle. During the time that has passed since the "Komsomolets" disaster, F. Novoselov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Naval Shipbuilding, and V. Panin, the chief of the Navy Political Directorate and a member of the Military Council, have become full admirals; and K. Makarov, the chief of the Main Naval Staff, is now already a Fleet Admiral, just like you are... I entertain myself with the hope that this letter will be seen by the Minister of Defense, and maybe even the President himself—and it will become in our history one more Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union...

On this occasion how could one fail to remember deserts! Did you not build the largest submarine in the world? It is a well-known fact. And even though it is said that one can hear it at a distance of a thousand miles—its missiles fly considerably farther... Aircraft carriers besides—admittedly expensive, but modern. True, they are laid up for the most part and there are discrepancies with carrier aviation, but this is already in another department... And

with regard to accidents—where do they not happen these days? From the moment of your entry into the position of commander in chief, no more than three nuclear-powered submarines have been lost. Sorry, two: when the first was lost in 1983, you were still the chief of the Main Staff and first deputy commander in chief of the Navy... But when the missile-armed submarine sank in the Atlantic in 1986 and when the "Komsomolets" was lost in 1989, you were making decisions fully on your own by then. By way of illustration, concerning Rear Admiral O. Yerofov's promotion. According to your order he transferred command of the flotilla, in which the "Komsomolets" was included, to Rear Admiral V. Reshetov, his chief of staff, and he himself assumed the position of chief of staff of the Northern Fleet (now what a swing that is!), replacing in that post Vice Admiral Yu. Patrushev, who departed for a new duty assignment under favorable conditions.

These crucial transfers were made by you and at your representation even before the government commission's conclusions were examined by the President of the USSR's Defense Council. One cannot say anything with confidence. If you thereby raised your own authority in the eyes of your inner circle! And why after this you were given by the USSR Council of Ministers' State Military Industrial Commission the assignment of studying conjointly with the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry "The Analysis of the 'Komsomolets' Submarine Crew's Actions During the Struggle for Survivability...", which was accomplished at the Naval Academy under the guidance of Vice Admiral Chernov?! You personally went to Leningrad and gave your own analysis of the "Komsomolets" accident to the students of the academy, from which Chernov had been prematurely fired.

The story goes that you outdid yourself in this solo performance, and after the break, fully half of the audience still remained to hear you out. But the officers put questions in the margins of the synopsis of your lecture in vain, and having read many of Pikul's books on the Russian Navy, they waited in vain for a dialogue with their commander in chief. You regarded such "democracy" as inconceivable: as soon as your speech was finished, Admiral Ponikarovskiy, the commander of the academy closed the engagement with the prescribed command "Comrade Officers!"

And the day before you said, not without some pride: "I have personally visited the Pacific, Northern, and Black Sea Fleets with my analysis... Now, in order to close the loop, I am going to the academy in Leningrad..." One can imagine how much previously unknown information the officers of those fleets picked up—those, of course, who were lucky enough to attend your analyses, if one may call them so. Now they know for certain that Hero of the Soviet Union Chernov, about whom PRAVDA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote with great enthusiasm and using your words, Comrade Commander in Chief, called him "number one submariner", is not a hero at all, but an arrogant and incompetent retired serviceman, who betrayed the interests of submariners.

And those of them who have spoken out openly in the press—Reserve Officers I. Kolton, A. Gorbachev, V. Stefanovskiy, G. Melkov, A. Khraptovich, and others—they are, according to your classification, schemers and failures settling a personal score...

In corroboration of what has been said, I could keep on citing letters from your former and present subordinates—letters, which, alas, do not reach you, but which stream into the editorial offices after every article that is in the slightest degree honest or candid broadcast about the Navy. And although I permitted myself to rely on certain facts, I did not resort to plagiarism: let this LETTER, which came to fruition over a long and difficult time, remain a LETTER. With my personal responsibility for everything that is stated above, as the laws of that genre demand.

Honorably,
Reserve Lieutenant Aleksandr Yemelyanenkoy

If one can learn a lesson from this, I would call it the lesson of an honest man's absolute defenselessness against the cynical and haughty arbitrary rule, which you are cultivating in the Navy. This is a lesson of an overt and almost insulting lack of respect for an audience, which is listening to your words. A lack of respect, which verges on complete indifference to what your subordinates think of you. And whatever is said at this time, and whatever goals are proclaimed, you have objectively set yourself in opposition to the healthy forces in the Navy.

Cruiser 'Admiral Senyavin' Retired

91UM0215A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 48 Dec 90 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Flags Are Lowered"]

[Text] The Admiral Senyavin has been retired. For many decades the cruiser with this name sailed the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

Year after year, its crew has traditionally been considered one of the best in the fleet for its combat proficiency. And the fact that many former leaders of the country and of the Soviet Army and Navy, for instance, L. Brezhnev, D. Ustinov, and S. Gorshkov, while visiting the Far East, considered it an honor to put to sea on the cruiser is indicative of this.

There were also tragic pages in the history of the Admiral Senyavin. Once there was an explosion in the forward turret of the main battery. The accident killed thirty seven young sailors.

The cruiser was "taken out" of the Navy in accordance with a plan to reduce the force level of the fleet. The ritual of lowering the USSR State flag and the flag of the Soviet Navy on the Admiral Senyavin took place in Vladivostok. The warship has completed all of its authorized service life, and now, apparently, it will be used for peaceful purposes.

Residents Ask RSFSR to Investigate Defense Activity Safety in Maritime Kray

91WN0219D Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 52, 22-29 Dec 90 p 4

[Letter to the Editor]

[Text] We are residents of the settlement of Shkotovo-22 (Dunay Settlement), Maritime Kray.

On the night of 30-31 August of this year there was a fire at naval artillery dumps located not far from the settlement, as a result of which ammunition stored there began to explode. The bursts scattered artillery projectiles over the entire district, and they even fell in the settlement. There were cases where dwellings, garages, a schoolyard, children's day care centers and other buildings were hit. The settlement's inhabitants hid all night in a bomb shelter, in basements, behind the walls of houses, and behind bayshore cliffs. Luckily for us, most of the projectiles did not explode when they fell.

The same sort of fire occurred at the same dumps in 1978. The command of the Pacific Fleet did not reach the right conclusions and did not implement the right measures, as a result of which a second incident occurred, presenting a danger to the inhabitants of territory on which naval facilities are located.

In 1985 the nuclear reactor of a submarine standing in our bay for repairs exploded. As the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY recently reported, the Gulf of Amur was recently contaminated. You could imagine, then, what happened in our locale. All of these incidents are still being concealed from the public. We are certain that every effort is being taken to cover up this last incident as well.

There are still many dumps containing ammunition of various types, radioactive waste and rocket fuel burial grounds and other naval facilities just around our settlement alone. Given the present situation in the country and in the navy, accidents of even greater horror can be anticipated. The inhabitants of the territory are hostages of the navy. All of this is happening because the land on which we live belongs for practical purposes to the USSR Ministry of Defense; the local soviets have no real power here, and public organs are not maintaining any sort of surveillance over naval activities.

We would very much like the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to send a commission here to investigate the accidents and the navy's activities in Maritime Kray in general. And also to examine the question as to returning all land on which the USSR Ministry of Defense is conducting its business to its real owner—the local soviets—together with all ensuing rights.

Inhabitants of the settlement of Shkotovo-22 (Dunay Settlement), 116 signatures

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V Adm Chernov on Disagreement with Naval Staff Over Komsomolets Finding

91UM0219A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Reserve Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov: "Ship Damage Control: Have We Learned a Lesson from 'Komsomolets' Loss?"; first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov is 60 years old. He has devoted 42 years to the Navy. He is one of only a few submariners who have been awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union honor in peacetime.

I must confess that I never expected that I would be looking for support via a newspaper intended for youth. I find myself in the unusual position of suddenly appearing in the public eye. Well, let me take up each topic one at a time.

The government commission that investigated the loss of the submarine "Komsomolets" and 42 crew members released its findings in the beginning of September. As a person and a professional who was closely associated with the work of the government commission, I was familiar with the bitter contest of opinions, evaluations, points of view, and—alas! arrogance—that preceded the writing of the document.

The commission's findings were concurred with by many submariners and Navy veterans known to me; they were also supported by representatives of industry and the special design office that participated in the "round table" meeting organized in Moscow by a group of people's deputies.

The two days of work resulted in an appeal to the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Problems of Defense and State Security for a review of the government commissions' findings and supplementary materials. The meeting's participants expressed their readiness to extend their full cooperation and, if necessary, to take part personally in preparing and conducting the respective parliamentary hearings. The participants assembled two working groups to pursue this purpose. I was designated to head one of them, which was given the name of "Analysis."

I attribute my colleagues' trust in me to my being in charge of the detailed "Analysis of Damage Control Actions Taken by the Crew of the Nuclear Submarine 'Komsomolets' on 7 April 1989 in the Norwegian Sea," which had been written under my supervision in the Leningrad Naval Academy back in the fall of the previous year.

I can state at the outset that this investigation was not intended to expose any crew members as perpetrators of improper acts. Its aim was to focus on lessons that should be learned from the truly serious accident. Lessons that should be learned and, more importantly, put into practice in combat and special training of hundreds

of other crews of nuclear submarines and in the organization of their daily service, which was the reason for the necessary, as we saw it, changes and supplements to the Navy Regulations and the Damage Control Manual.

Of course, no advantage will accrue by merely introducing changes into the documents if adjustments are not made in the training center plans; if simulation training is not pulled out of its wretched situation; if compulsion is allowed to remain in crew selection; if the personal loyalty principle continues to be cultivated in Navy personnel policy.

The "Komsomolets" tragedy was for me a personal tragedy. I accepted the craft for service in a combined unit, accompanied Yu. Zelenskiy's crew on their deep dive cruise, and was chairman of her sea trials commission. For those reasons, a thorough examination of the causes of the ship's loss was for me a matter of a Naval officer's honor and a debt I owed those who lost their lives.

We in working on the "Analysis..." strove to maintain maximum balance and objectivity. The fact that eventually emerged - indicating that the craft, as well as the crew, could have been saved - shows the Norwegian Sea occurrence in an entirely different light. Unfortunately, these truthful conclusions were not considered suitable to Navy Main Staff; more accurately, they did not fit in with Navy Commander in Chief Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin's intent to focus all the government commission's attention on the ship's design shortcomings and obvious failings in organization of the rescue and salvage service.

There is an explanation for these actions: The loss of three nuclear submarines in a row, virtually one after the other, could be the cause of reaching definite conclusions. To prevent this, the accent was shifted to "the materiel"—the thinking being: when will attention move away from the crew? In a word, a concept, an idea, was put forth, then there was a search for proof of that.

Until the last days of my Navy service (I entered the reserve on 16 August 1990), I repeatedly requested the commander not to reject the findings reached by the "Analysis..."; not to limit the matter to my "education" via personal and telephone conversations. I asked for a discussion, but Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin forbade discussion. He responded to my request to organize expert follow-up of the "Analysis..." by way of refusal.

In submitting to the USSR Supreme Soviet committee the materials produced by our working group "Analysis" by request of my comrades, I could not ignore the fact that Navy Commander in Chief Fleet Admiral Chernavin, who was a member of the government commission that investigated the accident suffered by the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets," did nothing to encourage objective and thorough analysis of the occurrence; rather, in his actions, both direct and indirect, he removed from the field of professional examination a

whole number of fundamental questions that have a direct bearing on the loss of the craft.

Also, since these facts were beyond the scope of the government commission's investigation, their effect on the cause of the accident have not been determined, and, to put it mildly, no preventive measures indicated.

After exhausting all possibilities of "getting my foot in the door" to higher Navy levels, including the commander in chief proper and submitting requests through the chain of command, I resorted to appealing for help to USSR people's deputies. This resulted in the organization of the above mentioned meeting of submarine officers, Navy veterans, and representatives of the shipbuilding industry. However, the Navy command authorities and political organs both completely ignored the event. Nevertheless, when the materials produced at this meeting became a matter of interest to the USSR Supreme Soviet committee, in the Navy Main Staff and Political Directorate there was a sound of general quarters.

In accordance with the existing plan, at first signal flares were fired off in the form of collective letters sent from the Navy to USSR and RSFSR people's deputies, claiming that everything was clear as things stood - there was no need for additional hearings. Next, four Navy newspapers struck an almost simultaneous blow against the October meeting participants, including the author of this article. Soon afterward the Navy's high-circulation newspapers fired a salvo of comments and petty fault-finding. The seditionaries were also the target of heavy artillery fire, in that one and the same author wrote two articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, using the well-known formula "I know nothing about it, have never experienced it, but wish to pass judgement anyway," exposed the "unbridled arrogance of malicious retired officers."

There is no need to restate the disordered ranks of "arguments" against examining the issue by parliamentary committee. They all amount to accusing the working group "Analysis" of attempting to "discredit the results of the government commission's work" and opening up a "second round" of investigation. That is the thinking that for some reason prevails, even though the appeal to parliamentary committee leads to an entirely different conclusion: The government commission's work would in no way be discredited by examination of the proposed issues in committee session; such a session would rather be enabled, for it would be based on the very findings.

Parliamentary examination of the results produced by the government commission by all accounts is not of interest to the other side. The Shipbuilding Industry Staff may not be setting up any visible obstacles, but the secret hope there is that the matter will not be taken up in parliamentary hearings. The hope, apparently the same as in the days of old, is that the troublemakers will also be cut short in Navy Staff. That is why my comrades and I are counting on support by making an appeal to the

readers of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. We can do much if we work together. In any event, we are hopeful that parliamentary hearings, in spite of all the efforts exerted by Navy Main Staff, will be held in the beginning of January.

Two Pacific Fleet SU-17UM's Collide

Collision Reported

91UM0315A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Yuriy Balakirev in Vladivostok: "Collision Over Peter the Great Bay"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Two shore-based Pacific Fleet aircraft collided on Wednesday over Askold Island in Peter the Great Bay.

One of the airplanes struck the water squarely and fell to pieces. Two pilots were thrown onto the water surface. Their bodies were picked up by military rescuers. The other aircraft entered the water at a sharp angle and sank into the depths; efforts to find the pilots have been unsuccessful. Although the sea depths there are moderate, the search for the personnel and craft is severely

hampered by bottom clutter, with the additional difficulty of weather conditions restricting the application of available resources.

According to a statement issued by Vice Admiral V. Kalabin, chief of staff of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, the collision involved attack aircraft trainers being flown by young pilots and their instructors on a training flight.

The cause of the accident is under investigation.

Aircraft Type Identified

91UM0315B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Palagutin: "An Accident Over Water"]

[Text] Two "twin" SU-17UM aircraft of the Pacific Ocean Fleet suffered an accident over Peter the Great Bay while performing a training flight. They fell to the water in the vicinity of Askold Island, 100 kilometers from Vladivostok. To date the bodies of two pilots have been found. A search is under way for the remaining two pilots and the "black boxes," the flight recording devices.

Early History of Missile Forces

91UM0241A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Belousov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "They Were Conceived at Kapustin Yar"]

[Text] How were the Strategic Rocket Forces established? They began, of course, with the first stake...

The government's decision to establish a new branch of the USSR Armed Forces was approved in late 1959. But even before that, in December, 1950, one of the first stakes was driven at Kapustin Yar. It was here that the 23d Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the RVGK [Rocket Troops of the High Command] began to form. Its job would be to set up the first Soviet missile complex, designated R-1. The brigade was commanded by Colonel M. Grigorev, later promoted to Colonel-General and named First Deputy Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

These were most difficult times! The bare steppes were blown by winds from every direction. Tents served as barracks. There were no roads. Food and water were in short supply. There was no mail delivery for a long time. But combat training continued day in and day out. A new, never-before-seen weapon had to be mastered. The missile. And to this end there was nothing too tough to endure.

This is how the lieutenants and captains who served in the 1950's described their lives then during a meeting

with students and the professional pedagogical staff of the F. E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy. The meeting was opened by the chief of the academy's political section, Major-General Yu. Ustinov. Veterans from the brigade who addressed the audience were: USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Yu. Yashin; retired Colonel V. Gavrilenko; one of the creators of our country's first rockets and two-time recipient of the Hero of Socialist Labor medal, Academician V. Kuznetsov; and one of the students from the academy's leadership branch, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Nikitin. Afterwards a Ministry of Defense order was read announcing awards for the brigade veterans. In accepting the personal gifts, the members of the first rocket troops responded in military fashion, "I serve the Soviet Union". Indeed they do serve, even if it is in the reserves or in retirement. Thanks to them there is no generation gap, and the traditions of the Rocket Forces continue to multiply.

It is customary to say that the Strategic Rocket Forces are menacing. But in my conversation with Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin he referred to them as the most peace-keeping branch of the armed forces. Why? Because they have never engaged in combat nor taken part in any military action. Hopefully they never will have to. But we must not forget the origin of the Rocket Troops. They came into existence when we were forced to drive the first stake, having made a realistic assessment of the threat facing us. And we must continue even today to be realists.

Commander Odessa MD Discusses Problems of Reform

91UM01984 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview, published under the heading "The Military Reform: Problems, Proposals," with Col Gen I. Morozov, USSR people's deputy and commander of the Odessa Military District by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Col N. Mulyar: "While Debates Are Underway..."]

[Text] Among the problems which are raised particularly often in debates over the military reform—and this was also brought up during the November meeting between the USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and the servicemen deputies, is the question of the democratization of Army and Navy life. The USSR People's Deputy and Commander of the Odessa Military District, Col Gen I. Morozov, shares his views on this question with the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Col N. Mulyar.

[Mulyar] Comrade colonel general, I realize that the words "commander" and "democracy" have far from the same root. Nevertheless, a mutual exclusion is impracticable here....

[Morozov] That is just the word, impracticable. Just look how widely we are now discussing problems which recently did not even exist. The servicemen—and not only the people's deputies—are becoming the active co-authors of legislative enactments on defense questions being worked out by the Union Parliament. Scores of proposals to improve these questions have been sent recently just from the troops of our district to the center.

[Mulyar] And what are the results?

[Morozov] The work on the documents which will govern our life, as you know, is continuing. But to judge from the drafts of these, many desires of the Army and Navy community, including those formulated in our proposals, as far as I understand, will be taken into account.

In truth, we must not skip ahead as the legislators have still not said their word. And here I side with those commanders of districts, fleets and troop groups which, in answering the questions in the express questionnaire of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA concerning the military reform, have emphasized the vital necessity of accelerating the legislative process which is tied to its implementation. In the situation where the nation does not have a law on defense or on the status of the serviceman, and when the status of the troops has not been defined on the territories of the Union republics which have declared their sovereignty, things are particularly bad for the army.

In certain republics, as is known, the interests of national defense are completely ignored. What is the purpose, for example, of the current induction campaign in Moldova,

the People's Front of which in their official documents call us occupiers and endeavor to boycott the induction.

The illegal actions of individual leaders are also pouring oil on the flames. Thus, the executive committee of the Faleshtskiy Rayon Soviet approved an illegal decision that all draftees and reserve personnel are to be transferred from subordination to the military commissariat directly to it. And in the Ungeny City Executive Committee, the Chairman V. Para and his Deputy V. Russu have gone even farther. They have stopped and returned home the draftees being called up for medical examination. And the results of the induction show just what this causes. As of today, from Moldova about 50 percent of the draftees of the designated plan have been called up.

This is a misfortune not only for our district. The decisions of many Union republic supreme soviets on service in the army and on establishing their own armed forces and armed formations ultimately result in a situation where the carrying out of the USSR Law on Universal Military Service has recently been in jeopardy. Why, in creating a state under the law, are we so irresponsible to the existing laws? I would like to believe that the speech by the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. Yazov upon instructions of the USSR President over Central Television will bring many to their senses, common sense will prevail and the idea set out in the draft of the new Union Treaty concerning unified Armed Forces will gain the upper hand in the minds of the people of all the sovereign republics.

[Mulyar] Obviously within the army itself, perestroika would be more tangible today if we had the enforceable enactments which corresponded to the current conditions. For instance, the new combined-arms regulations....

[Morozov] As I have already said, we lack a legal base for carrying out a profound military reform. I feel that this was one of the reasons for the fact that the USSR President in his speech on 17 November turned to the Supreme Soviet with a request to immediately pass laws which would allow the army to carry out its functions. M.S. Gorbachev in a report at the 4th Congress of USSR People's Deputies also spoke about the need to condemn any defamation and discrimination against the Armed Forces.

Of course, we would like to have regulations which meet the spirit of the times more quickly. New formations have appeared and there are fundamental differences in their organization of service. Great difficulties are also arising in organizing service in line with the cutback in the troops. The old regulations, for instance for garrison and guard duty, were written not for units where there is scarcely enough personnel for a single shift of daily detail. For example, take the units where Col K. Pavlov or Lt Col L. Karasev are the commanders. Here there are more posts for guarding facilities than there are personnel. It was necessary to send personnel from other units. This is a clear violation but there was no other way

out. Facilities with equipment cannot be left unguarded. There are now many such "truncated" units in the army. What should we do with them?

Many provisions of the current combined-arms regulations are also out of date from the viewpoint of the democratization of the nation and the army. Reality has outstripped the laws of our life written during the times of stagnation. At the same time, it is perfectly obvious that in organizing service and work with the personnel, we cannot ignore that school of democracy through which the youth pass prior to induction. And this includes the school of republic legislation which at times denies the provisions of the USSR Constitution.

All the same, I cannot agree with those who see in the future USSR laws governing defense questions a panacea against all the current problems of the army. While discussions are underway on just what the army should be, it is important, it seems to me, not to get rid of the finest features which exist in it. In this sense it is difficult to overestimate, for example, the role of such a democratic institution created by perestroika in the Army and Navy as the Officer Assembly. It must revive and give a new content to the finest traditions of our officer corps.

[Mulyar] But, Ivan Sergeyevich [Morozov], conversations have already been heard that the Officer Assemblies have not justified the hopes which have been placed on them.

[Morozov] They have not proven effective where this remarkable, in my view, initiative has been drowned in formalism. In some places the work of the councils of the Officer Assemblies is reduced to writing out the minutes of the meetings or collecting funds for various measures, more often of an entertainment sort. But there has been even worse. In particular, where Guards Lt Col Postnikov-Streltsov is the chairman of the Officer Assembly, there was an accident involving the death of a person. As an investigation showed, this could have been avoided if the officials had clearly performed their duties. The guilty parties were strictly punished. An order was issued on this question. And then speaking before the Officer Assembly were the political worker, Lt Col V. Gonchar, the party committee secretary, Lt Col A. Glova, and the deputy commander for weapons, Lt Col A. Gulayev, and the assembly adopted a motion to petition the district commander for canceling the provisions of his order to punish the guilty parties. Supposedly they were good people....

In truth, the district has many Officer Assemblies which have shown themselves to be effective in resolving many urgent problems. But, as with any new form of work, this requires improvement. The experience acquired in the district has shown that up to 80 percent of the questions examined by the Officer Assemblies relate to the problems of the social protection of the servicemen. This is quite understandable as there are numerous problems here. But at the same time, in the course of the military reform, the reason and initiative of the army community

should be focused primarily on increasing combat readiness, the quality of skills of the units and subunits, and on restoring the traditions of officer honor and dignity.

A definite refocusing of the awareness of the officer personnel precisely on these questions, in my view, should be reflected both in the Regulations Governing the Officer Assemblies as well as in their practical work. Moreover, it is not obligatory, it seems to me, for the chairman of the assembly to be the commander. His time, as a rule, is limited and he must resolve hundreds of questions. For this reason it would be more effective, I feel, if these functions were turned over to the best prepared officer who has unfailing authority from among, for example, the deputy commanders, he should be given definite status and the necessary amount of money provided from the unit's budget for the needs of the assembly.

[Mulyar] And now, in returning to the beginning of our conversation about the relationship of the concept of "commander" and "democracy," I would like to draw attention to an area of military affairs which, as life indicates, has been least subjected to change. I have in mind combat training.

[Morozov] As you know, after the Afghan War we ceased declaring the infallibility of our troop training. A sober view appeared about what we were to learn and how. And the new military doctrine has forced those who organize combat training and direct it to revise many established views. The new realities of the so-called theaters of operations have also required this.

The district troops, for example, are stationed in the south of the Ukraine and Moldova. These are the southwestern borders of the Soviet Union and the forward assembly area of the USSR Armed Forces. If one considers that in the long run the Warsaw Pact will be eliminated, this places particular obligations on us in defending the southern sector of our nation. We are carefully following the situation, and we are considering the changes occurring in the world, including on the southeastern flank of NATO. Considering this, we are working out the questions of combat training and settling other tasks.

Regardless of statements by individual republic leaders, I feel that in the future the troops will be stationed where this is required to ensure the nation's defense capability. This was also stated clearly by the minister of defense. Consequently, the effectiveness of combat training will depend largely upon the ability of its organizers to completely consider the local factor. Considering this, clearly, a troop training program should be worked out for the various regions. It is also a question of its democratization. Certainly an improvement in the organization and establishment of the troops considering their purpose requires that each commander seek out his own ways for carrying out the tasks confronting them in a manner which to the greatest degree conforms to the interests of combat training.

This, of course, does not mean that the existing general principles for training the troops have lost their meaning. Combined-arms training of a specialist for any combat arms or Armed Service should, in my view, in the future comprise an important share in the course of his training. On this level, in the district troops much is being done for furthering the creativity of the commanders and improving their personal training. The chief emphasis is on developing in all ranks of officers practical, firm skills in organizing combat and all-round support, in mastering the new types of weapons and military equipment and improving educational skills in organizing and conducting exercises and training.

In speaking about the organization of combat training, of course, one must mention the difficulties. These are growing under the conditions of converting to a market. Even now, we are feeling interruptions in logistical support for the normal process of troop training. The purchasing of necessary materials and articles for the

needs of combat training has virtually halted. Here a negative role has been played by introducing consumer cards (rationing coupons) on Ukrainian territory. We see the way out of the arising situation in organizing centralized district logistical bases similar to the food dumps. A second way is to purchase goods through the retail network by written order under specially assigned limits and funds of the USSR Gosnab [State Supply Committee]. And of course, there must be strictest economy. In line with this it is important, in my view, to somewhat restructure the management of combat training. Its tables of organization must not merely have highly-trained specialists in the military area but also economist officers. Under market conditions a ruble allocated for combat training should work more efficiently. For this reason, more and more often we must give some thought to just how much one or another exercise or training session costs and what benefit it brings to the combat skills of the troops.

All Troops out of Chernobyl

91UM0239A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Lieutenant-General N. Bondarchuk, chief of staff and deputy chief, USSR Civil Defense: "There are no Soldiers in Chernobyl"]

[Text] On 20 November 1990 the final military personnel departed Chernobyl. And no longer is there a single member of the military participating in alleviating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station. And neither will they be called upon to do so in the future. So it is a moot point when it comes to the subject of volunteers being among the soldiers who were sent there. The desires of certain draftees [to serve there] is understandable. As patriots of their native land, they are ready to serve where the need

is greatest. But those soldiers obviously not completely understood the essence of the article, "Chernobyl: The Dangerous Calm", published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 15 July 1990. But that article was about putting together specialized brigades of highly paid specialists made up of civilian volunteers. Some of these brigades are already at work.

Presently work within the 30-kilometer zone is being organized primarily by the production organization "Pripyat". Much is being done by the executive committees of the Congresses of People's Deputies at all levels. The volume of work is still extremely significant. For example in just one of the regional centers 16 brigades of civilian specialists are busy decontaminating the ground, replacing roofs on houses and reconstructing the roads. Who works in these brigades is not decided by military officials, but rather by civilian authorities.

Maj-Gen Shenin on Use of Food Reserve

91UM0231A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj-Gen V. Shenin, Central Food Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin: "The Food Reserve"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Questions put by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent are answered by Directorate Chief Major General V. Shenin, Central Food Directorate.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Semenovich, our readers, particularly parents of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, would like to be informed on the present situation regarding food supply for the troops.

[Shenin] The soldier's rations, which are completely adequate for the needs of the man in uniform, have not been reduced. On the contrary, a decision has been made to improve the quality (which was recently discussed in this newspaper). However, the overall difficult food situation in the country does have an effect on provisioning. Many republics and oblasts are falling short of the deliveries called for by the state order. This is true for Voronezh, Moscow, Chita, and Astrakhan oblasts, and Khabarovsk and Maritime krais.

[Correspondent] What action is taken in such a case?

[Shenin] I believe that the government should take emergency measures to assure state shipments. This is axiomatic for any country. As a result of delivery shortfalls, the Central Food Directorate must manipulate its internal reserves. The major one, one of those most affected, is our Army agriculture. We have at present 83 military sovkhozes, four economically accountable enterprises, 80 specialized dairy farms, and about 9,000 subsidiary farms in military units, enterprises, and institutions. A new sovkhoz will be added as of 1 January 1991.

[Correspondent] I know that voices were previously heard crying for the liquidation of agricultural enterprises in the Army, the complaint being that this was keeping the Army from engaging in combat training.

[Shenin] Theoretically, that may be true. It is possible that it may come to that. However, practically, it is another story. You can see that we are helped out by this basic resource in this period of transition to a market economy.

[Correspondent] It is a fact that this year has been full of paradoxes and even absurdity for the country, what with the unprecedented production of crops that in many places was not harvested. This also affects food supplies for the troops. What is the situation on our military farms?

[Shenin] I do not wish to brag; indeed, now is not the time to do so. Nevertheless, I might say that we have

enjoyed even more success than in previous years. In only 10 months we produced 90,000 tons of meat, 300,000 tons of grains, and large amounts of other agricultural products. Preliminary estimates indicate that we will be able to feed the Army with our meat for three and a half months; potatoes and vegetables, four months; eggs, seven months; milk, the entire year.

[Correspondent] How was the Army able to be so successful?

[Shenin] I can answer that with one word: organization. I can however add something else: cultural and communal facilities. Working in the Northern Caucasus is Hero of Socialist Labor V. Ivanovskiy, the famous military sovkhoz chairman. "Prokhladnoye," the military sovkhoz he manages, every year makes quality improvements and increases its agricultural output. "Discipline and order" is not only his favorite expression, but also the guiding principle for all blue- and white-collar workers on that sovkhoz. Of no little importance is the fact that, along with affirmation of order on the sovkhoz, there is increasing improvement in well-being of the people. Being built for them are good houses offering all conveniences, a clubhouse, school, a nursery for children. Such examples abound. There has been a good showing made by sovkhozes located in Turkestan, North Caucasus, Kiev, Carpathian, and Odessa military districts, and in the Northern Fleet.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, what can be grown in the North?

[Shenin] Where there is a wish, much can be done. For example, it is hard as you can understand to supply northerners with vegetables in winter, and for that reason they have their own hothouses, in which in winter tomatoes grow red and cucumbers green. Also specialized dairy farms (employing trucked-in feed, of course) provide personnel and their dependents with milk.

We also have unprofitable sovkhozes. For example, in 1989 there were two sovkhozes operating at a loss; their operation was affected by difficult climatic conditions. However, we do not go along with this loss. It is simply a matter of our not knowing how to manage under difficult conditions; we are not good at implementing advanced technologies into agricultural production. Now, in the transition to a market economy, we will be taking decisive measures to improve profitability of loss-encumbered areas.

[Correspondent] Subsidiary farms will make a contribution to resolving the food problem.

[Shenin] I can tell you outright that in every case where a commander and rear services workers put their heart and soul into their development and exhibit initiative, everything goes well. I can cite several examples. An antiaircraft artillery regiment has organized an animal husbandry complex, one that I would say is as good as anything in the West, largely because of the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel A. Marchenko. The personnel's meat

requirements are met totally and the potato and vegetable needs are satisfied for six months out of the year. For a period of 15 months, the motor transportation unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Usanov has been feeding itself on its own meat, milk, and eggs. The plans of a rear services enterprise (Colonel A. Makarov, chief) include not only supplying noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel with food grown on a subsidiary farm (a goal that has nearly been attained), but also making food products available for sale to dependents of officers and warrant officers. Here is an example of how a military commissary works in Sverdlovsk: A subsidiary farm headed by Colonel M. Sosnovskiy is raising as many as 4,000 head of swine and producing five million eggs per year.

[Correspondent] Now, Vitaliy Semenovich, let us have a look at the development of military agroenterprises through the prism of the coming market economy. What is your opinion of private farming?

[Shenin] In principle, I have nothing against that kind of farming wherever conditions are conducive to it. However, it is first necessary to develop and improve sovkhoses, which with skillful production organization are capable of working better than private farms. Of prime importance here is granting sovkhoses independence—not in word, but in deed.

[Correspondent] I recently paid a visit to the "Turkstanets" sovkhos, where I saw how the workers—Koreans—grow onions. They are in the fields from dawn to dusk. The onions are excellent. And their earnings are high.

[Shenin] That is true. That is because they are working toward an end result; they know what they will receive for overfulfilling the plans. The onion crop is shipped by air and railroad to the Far North and Far East for use by personnel stationed on remote posts.

Also of great importance in the change to a market economy will be small subsidiary industries.

We are doing quite a bit to encourage their development. In 83 military sovkhoses there are shops processing groats and grains and producing vitamin meal; 20 farms are processing meat and dairy products; 13, vegetables and fruits; 31, manufacturing construction articles out of wood, etc. Here I can single out sovkhoses located in the Kiev, North Caucasus, Turkstan, and Carpathian military districts. Thus, for example, in the agroenterprise headed by A. Zhelengovskiy, a canning shop produces 1,500 cans of meat and other products per shift. In the sovkhos "Lvovskiy" (I. Pribula, chairman), cage animal farming is progressing well; feathers from the poultry farm are used to make pillows. The sovkhos "Alma-Atinskii" (A. Shkurenko, chairman) produces sheepskins and sheepskin coats. All this is guided by profit and economic incentive. The products are intended mostly for sale to the servicemen and their dependents.

[Correspondent] Will a market economy necessarily give rise to the need to satisfy new economic conditions to assure productive work?

[Shenin] Naturally. We will have to accomplish a number of important tasks. This would entail, first, maximum use of economic levers and putting an end to wage leveling; second, creation of conditions in sovkhoses such that labor collectives would have a stake in labor productivity increase and product quality improvement; third, initiation of planning at the bottom, keeping in mind the capabilities of teams and the individual person in addition to that of the sovkhos. So that each worker would know his share of labor and what he will be paid for this labor.

We also propose to establish for districts and fleets definite tasks relative to production of agroproducts, which mandatorily would be intended for shipment to troops, with the remaining output staying at the particular sovkhos for sale to servicemen's dependents.

[Correspondent] What are your plans for the future?

[Shenin] To provide troops by the end of 1995 out of our own food resources with meat sufficient for four and a half months, potatoes and vegetables for eight months, and cover the total requirement for milk.

Unit Income from Civilian Work Ceases

91UM02634 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Major N. Vorovskiy, adjunct of the Military Financial and Economic Faculty of the Moscow Financial Institute: "When There Is No Incentive"]

[Text] A comment in the 28 September 1990 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, in an article entitled "Come on You Soldiers, Hurry Up," has compelled me to take pen in hand. The article described how once again the army has come to the aid of Muscovites to help with the procurement of fruit and vegetables.

In turn, while carrying out the duties of the chief of the financial service of the Kantemirov Guards Tank Division, my job required that I get involved with drawing up contracts and organizing joint estimates with Moscow fruit and vegetable associations. On more than one occasion I personally had to visit city bases and I was convinced that the soldiers and officers are working as hard as they can. But, as a finance officer, I was disturbed by the following: the military servicemen are not receiving bonuses for the hard work they have been doing over a period of several months. The officers and soldiers are being paid 3 rubles and 50 kopecks per day; but this money is only partial compensation for their expenses in the capital. Career enlisted personnel are not receiving any cash awards at all.

Today it is clear to everyone that paid labor is always more productive. For example, experience in participating in gathering the harvest attests to this fact. In the so-called "virgin land battalions" when the transportation plan is overfulfilled the officers, reserve and career enlisted personnel receive bonuses and battalion drivers receive cash awards.

At present the money earned by the soldiers is handed over to the supply financial organs. It is true that in 1987 and 1988 as an exception permission was given to spend some of this money for improving the social and living conditions of personnel. Several thousand rubles for an organization the size of a formation is not a large sum of money; but in conditions of a tight budget even this amount of money solved several problems. But in 1989, in spite of the fact that the Kantemir Guards Division at the vegetable bases worked just as hard as it did in past years, we have not been paid a single kopeck.

We understand that today the army, as never before, needs internal sources of financing, which are accumulated in the center. But since we are forced to take personnel away from combat training, I believe that they should receive material incentives for their labor. Ultimately, this will promote the growth of labor productivity.

Call for Bids on Turn-Key Housing

91UM0301A Moscow KRISNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Jan 91 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Housing Construction For USSR Servicemen"]

[Text] The customer—USSR Ministry of Defense—through V/O "Souyzvneshstroyimport" (Moscow, 103009, Tverskoy boulevard, 6; phone: 290-06-84, 290-00-80, telex: 411434 Sovstrim; fax: 291-79-61) and V/O "Tekhnoeksport" (Moscow, 113324, Ovchinnikovskaya embankment, 18/1; phone: 220-17-82, 220-18-04; telex: 411338 Vote; fax: 230-20-80) invites firms/organizations to apply for preliminary evaluation concerning further participation in a tender for the construction of "turn-key" residential housing for the military in the USSR. The construction should include the infrastructure (utilities and cultural and community facilities).

The construction will be financed by the FRG through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau bank, Frankfurt-am-Main.

Tenders for Top-Priority Construction

Tender No. 1. Residential development of 1,056 apartments (about 60,000 square meters total area) in the city of Shaykovka, Kaluga Oblast.

Commission:

—670 apartments in December 1991.

—386 apartments in January-March 1992

Tender No. 2. Residential development of 720 apartments (about 41,000 square meters total area) in the city of Borisov, Belorussia.

Commission:

—480 apartments in December 1991.

—240 apartments in January-March 1992.

Tender No. 3. Residential development of 1,276 apartments (about 73,000 square meters total area) in the city of Vladikavkaz.

Commission:

—850 apartments in December 1991.

—426 apartments in January-March 1992.

Tender No 4. Residential development of 1,500 apartments (about 85,000 square meters total area) in the city of Krivoy Rog.

Commission:

—1,000 apartments in December 1991.

—500 apartments in January-March 1992.

Preliminary Evaluation. Basic Requirements

—The primary contractor should have not less than 10 years of experience in civil and residential construction. It is desirable that the contractor have experience of work in the USSR. The contractor must be familiar with Soviet construction norms and regulations as well as with the peculiarities of the Soviet market in construction services.

—The annual turnover of the primary contractor should be not less than 500 million deutsche marks.

—The cost of at least one completed project in the area of either civil or residential construction should be not less than 50 million deutsche marks.

—The prime contractor should provide affirmation of its credit standing from a first-class bank. In case of being contracted it should provide a guarantee from a first-class bank totalling 20 percent of its share in construction costs.

Various firms and/or consortiums may enter the contest, in which case they need to indicate the leader with contractor experience.

Similar preliminary evaluation requirements are available in Moscow, at the V/O "Souyzvneshstroyimport" and V/O "Tekhnoeksport," as well as in Munich, at the firm "Dorsch Consult" (Hansastraße 20, D-8000, Munich, 21, phone: 089-5797551, fax: 5212862), as of 23 January, 1991.

Three sets of preliminary evaluation documents on each tender should be submitted to the V/O "Souyzvneshstroyimport" or V/O "Tekhnoeksport" and one set should be sent to the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Palmengartenstr. 5-9, D-6000, Frankfurt-am-Main) not later than 1700, 6 February 1991.

The information on the results of the preliminary evaluation will be available until 25 February 1991.

Tender

Through 28 February 1991, the firms selected after the preliminary evaluation will be able to obtain the tender documents at the following address: Moscow, Karbyshev Boulevard, No. 8, "Zagranekhstroy."

Firms may submit their bidding offers to the V/O "Soyuz-vneshstroyimport" or to the V/O "Tekhnoeksport" not later than 1700, Moscow time, on 25 March 1991.

Papers submitted will not be returned.

Inquiries should be directed to the V/O "Soyuz-vneshstroyimport" (phone: 290-00-80), the V/O "Tekhnoeksport" (phone: 220-13-21), and the firm "Dorsch Consult" (phone: (0)89-3797351).

Northern Fleet Appeal on Desertions

91UM0238A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain Third Rank, P. Ishchenko: "They Are Urged to Desert Even by Their Relatives"]

[Text] The Northern Fleet Military Council has issued an appeal to the Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.

Recently draftees from the Transcaucasus republics stationed at garrisons throughout the fleet are receiving frequent visits from relatives who are using deceit to get them to return home. This was indeed true in the case of the desertions of Seaman M. Oyaiani, L. Gokhiya, M. Manasyan, and S. Enokyan; Petty Officer Second Class K. Margaryan; Privates A. Gazybekov, F. Atakshiev, and others. In citing the appeal, "can it be that desertion, a shameful thing which has plagued all nations in every era, has taken on a new meaning for the diligent and proud people in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, where the honor and valor of the fighting man, the defender of the fatherland, has always been held in high esteem?"

The military council and other organizations within the fleet express their hope that the organs of authority in the Transcaucasus republics will return to the true path those who surrendered to their weaknesses and return them to the military units to which they are assigned.

Mothers' Committee Participates in Udmurt Conscription Commission

91UM0299A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel N. Savelyev: "Mothers in the Conscription Commissions"]

[Text] By decision of the Udmurt ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers and local soviets of people's deputies, members of the Republic Committee of Soldiers' Mothers have been introduced into the membership of conscription commissions.

In the very first days of activity in their new roles, the women have been able to refute rumors to the effect that military registration and enlistment offices have been "fishing" everywhere for recruits and indiscriminately dispatching them for service in the Army. The women are convinced that the military is accomplishing painstaking, careful work with each youth and taking into account his family circumstances.

Committee members are visiting enterprises and establishments where conscripts are working. They are visiting schools and billets, conducting explanatory discussions on the necessity of fulfilling our constitutional duty. Extremely active in this work are G. Sokova, G. Patsura, and T. Kiseleva.

The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has established contact with many military units where emissaries of the republic are serving. It has set up correspondence with commanders.

Four months have passed since the creation of the Udmurt Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. Understandably it is too early to be summarizing any major results. Nonetheless, the committee has already resolved a great many problems over this period. Most importantly—an end has been put to rumors agitating society.

Zhukovskiy Air Academy Reorientation Toward Science

91UM0208A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen of Aviation V. Kremlev, chief, Military Air Engineering Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Rudenko: "Perestroyka Needs Intellectuals"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Military Air Engineering Academy imeni Professor N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, which until 1934 was the only aviation-type higher educational institution in the world, has produced over the years outstanding aircraft designers, many military commanders, leaders of the defense industry, prominent scientists, and cosmonauts.

However, this all belongs to the glory of the past, so to speak. Time imposes new demands. Are they being met by the academy? This question was the first put by our correspondent to Colonel General V. Kremlev, chief of the academy, professor, and candidate of technical sciences.

[Kremlev] I must say that life itself places us in a position whereby we have no recourse but to seek new and more effective approaches to teaching and scientific work. Otherwise, we run the risk of falling badly behind the developed Western countries in such an important direction of scientific and technical progress as aviation.

Since we even now are producing specialists for the first decades of the 21st century, we must equip the students with knowledge geared to tomorrow's requirements. Education should keep ahead of the latest technical equipment in hands of troops.

[Correspondent] Do you mean to say that the problem is one of scrapping the existing situation, whereby averaged programs are producing averaged engineers?

[Kremlev] Precisely. The academy cannot orient itself to producing run-of-the-mill engineers. This seemingly undeniable truism was for a long time ignored. It is no secret that we in the last 30 or 40 years produced mainly users, with little interest in graduating specialists in science-intensive fields. As a result, the people working in scientific research institutions, VUZ's, design offices, the central apparatus, and in other structures determining scientific and technical progress often lacked the education and inclination for research work.

It is a fact that it is the individual person that enables scientific and technical progress. To educate the individual person, we had to make radical changes in the programs of instruction, change our approach to student selection, and extend the length of study.

For example, last year we started to accept the most gifted secondary school graduates for study in the six-year program. We hope that after graduating they will

stay on for graduate study and take assignment to an NII [scientific research institution]. This year, we started to accept commissioned technicians who will also pursue a six-year study program.

We have high hopes for the third category of students: mathematicians who come here as graduates of civilian VUZ's. In two years they will be systems mathematicians, i.e., specialists who can see a problem as a whole. They are people who are especially gifted.

We have also changed the curriculum for the fourth category of our students - graduates of higher engineering aviation schools. Now they will study for three years, not two years as in the past.

We believe that these measures will make it possible to effect a substantial increase in the intellectual level of Air Force engineering personnel.

[Correspondent] Vitaliy Yakovlevich, one of perestroyka's most important efforts is as we all know computerization and re-equipment. This is one of the principal problems of many military academies and higher schools. What can you tell us about this as it pertains to your institution?

[Kremlev] There are problems, of course. However, I would be less than honest if I were to say that they are not being resolved. We have in this regard the understanding and support of the Military Council and the office of the Air Forces commander in chief. We have been given virtually everything we asked for: new aircraft, engines, missiles, and computing equipment, including 200 personal computers.

We have today a computer or monitor connected to a computer for every three or four students. This makes it possible to provide each student with about 500 hours of computer time in the six-year program. We wish to arrive at the point in two or three years whereby each student will have a personal computer and his own data bank, so that he can use this bank to further the interests of his future profession.

[Correspondent] A constant complaint about higher schools has been dissatisfaction with the contribution made to the development of science. What is your opinion as to the level of scientific work being performed in the academy, and what are the prospects of this work?

[Kremlev] On our academy's staff there are 85 doctors and about 500 candidates of technical sciences; we have post-graduate and doctoral study, scientific councils, and our own scientific schools, headed by prominent scientists. The latter includes the school of Major General of Aviation V. Sidorin, the famous electronics and laser technology specialist. There is the school of Major General of Aviation G. Kondratenkov. Radar concepts developed under the supervision of this scientist make it possible to create systems that effect complete control and observation of air space, land, and water areas. World acclaim has been won by the school of Reserve

Colonel P. Kolomytsev, a highly prominent materials science specialist, and the schools of Hero of Socialist Labor Reserve Major General of Aviation A. Krasovskiy and of Colonel O. Babich, and of many other scientists.

All this scientific and intellectual potential is geared to the resolution of the main task of military reform: strengthening the country's defense. We are concentrating our best forces on those areas in which we lag behind. The point here is that each candidate's dissertation resolves a definite task in the interests of the Air Forces, while a doctoral dissertation resolves a major scientific problem.

In this connection, we are not excluding students from participating in research work. Approximately half the diploma papers are presently honoring requests made by the chief engineer of the Air Forces, and also by directorates and services of the Air Forces Main Staff.

Participation in research is a mandatory requirement levied on the teaching staff.

[Correspondent] To create, there must be an atmosphere of mutual understanding and good will. To what extent have democratization and glasnost processes affected the military school?

[Kremlev] In the most direct way. This is reflected in our academy in active participation of students in the work of scientific councils, for example. Today they comprise about 10 percent of the total makeup of the scientific councils, but we are planning on raising this in the near future to 20 to 25 percent. The students should know what is going on in the academy.

Another sign of democratization is a new approach to job assignment of our graduates. Now the students themselves make the decisions. Taken into consideration are more than 20 criteria, which include the student's rating at graduation from the academy; where the student served before admittance into the academy; makeup of his family; his state of health, etc. For four years we have had no complaints about job assignment.

[Correspondent] The country - and this includes the Armed Forces - is at the threshold of adopting a market economy with its new economic relationships. Is the academy prepared for these changes?

[Kremlev] There is no single answer to that. The market concept compels us to do much reviewing and changing. Let me stress that we are producing not merely an aircraft engineer, but a production leader, be this in an aviation regiment, motor vehicle repair enterprise, or research institute. We plan to set up in the academy a military economics center, the major function of which will be to equip students with a wide range of economic knowledge with the view to making the change to the market system.

We are also thinking about finding a legal basis to sell our scientific and technical output under market conditions. We have a fund of technologies that we could offer

for sale; the money earned could be used to resolve pressing social and scientific problems.

I am speaking about the so-called dual-purpose endeavors, whereby the end products can be used in the Army and in the national economy. For example, for several years our scientists worked on a technology for coating turbine blades of aircraft engines, a process that resulted in greater reliability, longer service life, and other advantages. The process is currently in use to coat engine blades of the Su-27, MiG-29, and other aircraft. Why not employ this kind of technology in the automotive, machine construction, and other branches of industry involved with the manufacture of power plants?

We also have a substantial background in anticorrosive coatings, rapid repair of pipes, and many aspects of programming: algorithm formulation, automatic control systems, etc.

Unfortunately, we cannot distribute our end products as we see fit, since the preparation of legal documents governing the academy's commercial activity has not yet been completed.

Nevertheless, I would not like to end our conversation on such a pessimistic note. The main thing is that the academy is establishing an authority of knowledge, creativity, and common-sense innovation. That is a sure sign of our being able to implement the changes dictated by the times.

Chief of Finance School Interviewed

91UM0208B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Dec 90 First Edition p 6

[Interview with Maj Gen V. Yanushkevich, chief of the Higher Military Finance School, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col Yurkin: "In a Market Environment"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] There has been organized in the Yaroslavl Higher Military Finance School a kind of scientific production complex designed to devise techniques of teaching specialists how to work in a market environment and provide cadets and officers' dependents with food items.

This complex is the first of its kind in the USSR Armed Forces. It can serve as a good start for the resolution of difficult economic problems. This is the subject of the conversation our correspondent held with Major General V. Yanushkevich, chief of the school.

[Correspondent] Vasily Antonovich, what is the complex, and why is it said to be of the scientific production kind?

[Yanushkevich] It is no secret that we in Yaroslavl, the ancient Russian city, do suffer interruptions in the bread supply. I will not even mention other food items. The situation is such that a cadet's ration for, say, meat, is exactly four times that of an officer's family.

Such a - let me be frank - grievous situation made us think and look for a way out of this blind alley. And we found one: We set up a meat-producing complex and organized hothouse gardening. We do everything with our own resources. Our people realize that the situation will not improve if we do not help ourselves.

In setting up the complex, we also had other purposes in mind. Namely, it is important for us to train specialists who are able to work under the new economic conditions. That is why all the departments are cost accountable, and a part of them, such as beekeeping, will in time be put on a lease basis.

The different kinds of activities make it possible to teach in a practical as well as theoretical way the methods that are conducive to attaining optimum results. Accounting, forecasting, searching for the most advantageous approaches—that is what the future specialists will be taught on this unique training ground.

[Correspondent] Can your experience be applied in other military VUZ's, units, and subunits?

[Yanushkevich] It is not possible to apply experience - even the best - verbatim. Each school, each unit has its peculiarities, and one must act accordingly. In our case, for example, we had to start at the beginning. How did we do it?

We bought up old cattle-breeding buildings in an abandoned village, then entered into a land use contract. We erected pigsties and utility buildings. But first we started to build a road on the basis of share participation.

With regard to the hothouse activity, we once more had to do something original. We were allotted land that belonged to the Ministry of Defense. A radar company was previously stationed near the road, and we had to take over for it, so to speak, after the reduction. We cut

down the forest and refurbished the buildings. We now have hothouses -about 2,000 square meters' worth.

[Correspondent] What did you do with the company's residential quarters?

[Yanushkevich] We made the house which served as living quarters for the families of the radar officers into a recreation facility, while we fitted the former barracks out as a room in which people coming here for a rest can play games and keep the recreation equipment.

Active recreation includes working in the garden. We have planted currants and strawberries, and there is a garden. We have planted an apple orchard; this is the second year that beekeeping is in progress. Those who work more, combining labor with recreation in the open air, are entitled to purchase products at favorable rates.

Our complex is designed to produce 60 to 80 tons of meat a year; whatever amount of milk is required will also be produced. We will have a dairy herd, with the prospect of processing the products in the Swedish manner. I can say that the military commissariat used to supply about 50 tons of meat and sausage products. Deliveries dropped off substantially in the last few years, with the market price higher than our officers and warrant officers could pay. I hope that in the near future there is a cancellation of the existing procedure, whereby only the amount of meat produced above the plan may be sold to servicemen's families. Selling pork at the artificial price specified in the plan kills all incentive and undermines the economic activity. Add to that feed outlays. Costs are also considerable for acquisition of superior stock of sows and agricultural machinery.

In a word, what we plan to do in two years' time is provide apartments to all who need them and feed people.

Afghanistan—'As It Was'—A Historian's Commentary

91UM0292A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 90 (signed to press 3 May 90) pp 66-71

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel V.G. Safronov under the rubric "Afghanistan: Results and Conclusions": "As It Was (A Historian's Commentary)"]

[Text] A military coup was carried out in April of 1978 in one of the most backward countries of Asia—Afghanistan—under the command of the chief of staff of the country's air force and air-defense forces, Abdul (Kadyr).

The coup, which was met with enthusiasm by the popular masses of Afghanistan, laid the foundation for profound socio-political changes in Afghan society. They were anti-imperialist and anti-feudal in their basic substance.

The pursuit of reforms, however, immediately encountered the resistance of the tribal-feudal aristocracy, representatives of the compradore bourgeoisie, the reactionaries among the clergy and the advocates of a return to the monarchy.

The resistance of domestic reactionaries, with the assistance and energetic "aid" of foreign imperialist circles, and first and foremost the United States, took on the nature of armed struggle against the new authorities. Afghanistan was dragged into a long and bloody civil war.

Three principal periods can be delineated in the history of the development of the military and political events on the field of battle against the counter-revolutionaries: the rise of civil war and the profound crisis of state power (April 1978 to December 1979); the attempts to end the civil war using military means (December 1979 to May 1986); and, the implementation of a policy of national reconciliation (May 1986 to the present).

The revolutionary transformations in Afghanistan were accomplished under conditions of the harshest legacy from the past. The country was at the stage of transition from feudalism to capitalism in an economic regard, with profound vestiges of tribal institutions and a communal-patriarchal way of life. About 3 of the 16.6 million Afghans led a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. More than 80 percent of the country's inhabitants were totally illiterate. The standard of living of the people was one of the lowest in the world. It is a multilingual and multiracial country that was torn by ethnic strife (the principal nationality of the country, the Pashtos, are 8.2-million strong, i.e. about 50 percent of the population, and the other half is comprised of 3.3 million Tajiks, about 2 million Uzbeks, about 0.5 million Turkmens, 0.5 million Hazaras and other smaller nationalities).

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), being the leading political and state power for the construction of a new life, bore all of the imprints of the immaturity of the class and national structure of Afghan society. The principal and overwhelming portion of its members was people from the intelligentsia (teachers, students, officers, officials), and the percentage of people from physical labor was minimal. Many party members were seriously infected with nationalistic prejudices. Although the party was formally unified, it actually consisted of two hostile factions (wings): "Parcham" ("Banner") headed by Babrak Karmal, and "Khalq" ("People"), whose leader was Taraki.

It was more the tribal affiliations of the members, rather than fundamental differences on issues of revolutionary theory and practice, that were the foundation of the hostility between the factions.

The coming to power of one of the leaders of the Khalq wing, H. Amin, a political adventurer and rabid Pashto national-chauvinist despite his arch-revolutionary phraseology, after the villainous murder of Taraki was a genuine disaster for the party and the cause of the whole revolution. Amin began to designate people loyal to him for the leading posts in the party and the state, proceeding from considerations of kinship, personal devotion and national affiliations. He and his cronies, in violation of revolutionary legality, began carrying out arrests and torture, first and foremost of their adversaries in the party—the Parchamists.

An adventurer and ultra-leftist course of the accelerated construction of socialism was taken (and this is in a country where capitalist relations had only just been born). The construction of such a pseudo-socialism was pursued by command methods without regard for national traditions, religious convictions and the country's economic capabilities.

All of this caused dissatisfaction among broad segments of the population that foreign and domestic reactionaries were not slow to take advantage of, gathering forces for armed struggle. The principal source for the formation of its combat detachments was the growing stream of refugees from Afghanistan. Torn from their homes and deprived of all means of existence, they often became *dushman* (enemies) by force of vital circumstances rather than by conviction.

The first base for the training of bands formed for action on the territory of Afghanistan was created on Pakistani territory as early as May of 1978. There were about 80 such bases by the spring of 1980. Tens of thousands of "soldiers" for the counter-revolutionary troops were trained, armed and prepared for sending onto Afghan territory with the aid of military specialists from the United States, Pakistan and Egypt.

No few such centers were also created on the territory of Iran, as well as in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Afghan reactionaries made use of Islam as their ideological weapon, since it had enormous ideological force in the formation of the social consciousness of the country and had an impressive religious apparatus at its disposal (more than 250,000 mullahs and others serving the cult, in the main hostile to democratic reforms). The reactionary clergy, making skillful use of the ultra-leftist deviations of the government on religious issues, call all orthodox Muslims to a "holy war" against the apostates and atheists.

The separatist movement of national minorities within the country was another powerful source for the formation of the ranks of the counter-revolutionaries.

The national frictions between the Pashtos and the representatives of the national minorities of Afghanistan have deep historical roots (the violent unification of national areas in the creation of the Afghan state) and contemporary social-economic causes (the economic inequality of the nationalities, wherein the ruling and largest nationality—the Pashtos, consisting largely of nomads—are one of the most backward in the country in terms of economic and cultural development, while the representatives of most of the national minorities are farmers with a large national community, economic development and culture), which creates fertile ground for national strife and armed clashes of the "progressive" national and ethnic minorities of the northern and western reaches with the central authorities, historically backed by the "backward" Pashtos populating the remaining portions of the country.

Armed uprisings began in Nuristan in October of 1978, and revolts broke out in March of 1979 in Herat, then in April and May in Baghlan, Oruzgan, Farah, Badghis, Ghowr, Lowgar and later by chain reaction in a number of the other provinces of Afghanistan.

"Free Nuristan" was proclaimed in the spring of 1979, and in August the independent Islamic Hazarajat arose with its own troops—the "Union of Islamic Warriors" with 3,000 people. Armed uprisings began against the central authorities in Kabul by other nationalities as well. A real possibility of the collapse of the state and the dismemberment of the country arose.

While the dushman were operating in small groups and were limited basically to acts of terrorism and sabotage at the start of the armed struggle of the counter-revolution in 1978 and the beginning of 1979, the size of some of their detachments was now 500-1,000 or more. Many areas of the country fell under their complete control, and they began to strengthen local bodies of authority there in the form of "Islamic committees." The strengthened armed formations of the counter-revolution went over to the offensive in the cities of Herat, Qandahar, Jalalabad and Khowst. Powerful waves rolled across the cities of Ghazni, Gardez and Asmar, among others, in the summer and fall of 1979.

Attempts were made repeatedly in June through August to raise the revolt in Kabul and its environs and seize the capital's airport.

The ringleaders of the counter-revolution had done everything possible since the very beginning to destroy the Afghan army—the chief bulwark of the central authorities in Kabul—from within, and had achieved substantial results in that matter.

The PDPA, after the April Revolution, adopted a policy of improving the old army (in the ranks of which the revolutionary movement had been born) rather than breaking it up.

The former military command of the army had to a considerable extent disintegrated in the course of the revolution—some of the officers at the supreme and middle levels had perished, while others had fled abroad. Officers that were principally from the junior ranks advanced to command positions. The revolutionary processes of democratization of the old army, however, were substantially disrupted with the coming to power of the adventurist Amin group in the country. The factional struggle to eliminate the Parchamists moved into the ranks of the armed forces as well, and first and foremost the officer corps. Many officers who opposed the "wing," or non-party representatives of the national minorities, were discharged. Many of them were arrested and executed. The officer corps came to be disorganized. Desertion became a mass phenomenon among the lower ranks.

The progressive disintegration of the army was an ominous sign of the more and more apparent demise of the republic under the conditions of a general offensive of the armed forces of the counter-revolution that had begun. Not only the danger of the Afghan people losing all of the revolutionary conquests of April of 1978, but also the creation of a pro-imperialist state hostile to the Soviet Union on its border, had become acute.

Regular units of the Soviet Union, under these extreme circumstances, entered Afghanistan to protect the young republic against the offensive of the forces of counter-revolution and imperialism. The fight against the enemies of the Afghan revolution entered a new phase in its development.

The legal foundation for the entry of Soviet troops was the Treaty of Friendship, Neighborly Relations and Collaboration of 1978 between the USSR and the DRA, which provided for such a step "for the purpose of ensuring the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries"¹. (Requests for the entry of Soviet troops onto the territory of Afghanistan had been received repeatedly from the government of Afghanistan, but the Soviet leadership had felt up until December of 1979 that the Afghan government was itself able to handle the counter-revolutionaries.)

The entry of the Soviet troops was accomplished along two roadways—from the Kushka region to Herat and

Qandahar, and through Termez with the forcing of the Amu-Darya in the direction of Kabul. An airborne assault on the military airfield at Bagram in the environs of Kabul was executed at the same time. The Soviet troops set about the elimination of the counter-revolutionary centers of the rebels in conjunction with units of the Afghan army.

The Amin regime was overthrown on 27 Dec 79 as the result of an uprising of units of the Afghan army loyal to the ideals of the revolution. The dictator was arrested, sentenced and executed. Babrak Karmal became chairman of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister of the republic and general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. One of the first measures of the new leadership was an amnesty for political prisoners, as the result of which 15,000 people won their freedom from prison. Steps were taken for the return of refugees to the motherland. These steps served the aim of reviving the political climate in the country and, especially, raising the fighting ability of the Afghan army.

The Soviet troops, however, bore the brunt of the fight against the armed detachments of the opposition by virtue of the serious disorganization and still weak fighting ability of the Afghan army. Major counter-revolutionary groupings were smashed in the areas of Feyzabad, Taloqan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities, while major formations of separatists were eliminated in Nuristan and Hazarajat.

The leaders of the Afghan opposition, having encountered a powerful and real force, quickly concluded that if they kept their major groupings in unchanged form, they would be smashed. Rejecting the tactics of actions using large detachments, they broke up their formations into groups and detachments numbering from 20 to 100 men and went over to partisan operations.

The Soviet troops were facing new questions of combat operations against small and exceedingly mobile groups of dushman using maneuvering tactics. Attempts by the commanders to organize an offensive against the detachments of dushman using large troop formations with their pursuit according to the rules of classic warfare had no impact.

Flaws in the training of the Soviet troops in a number of areas also had an effect. Their own experience in fighting the *basmachestvo* in Central Asia during the Stalin years was completely forgotten, or rather buried through the efforts of Stalinist military theoreticians like K.Ye. Voroshilov, while the very rich contemporary experience of other countries in conducting partisan and anti-partisan actions in the regional wars of 1945-80 was unfortunately also ignored in the peacetime training of Soviet troops, which was directed only toward the study of classical and traditional forms of combat operations. The large amount of experience in partisan operations during the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 also did not receive proper study among the troops.

Our army had moreover never been envisaged for use in such situations.

That is why our soldiers, officers and generals who were sent to Afghanistan were forced to become familiar with the tactical rudiments of the science of fighting bandit gangs, right in battle, from the ground up.

The basic transition to maneuvering raids, using detached and reinforced battalions with the widespread use of envelopment and outflanking maneuvers and airborne assaults by helicopters using airborne assault groups around 1981-82, was testimony to this cumulative experience. But even they did not have the necessary result, since the mobile detachments of dushman, who knew the terrain very well, as a rule, found ways and opportunities for pulling their principal forces out without pursuit and destruction.

A number of shortcomings were also revealed in the heavy modern equipment in operations under conditions of mountainous and impassable terrain. This pertains to the preparation of artillery pieces for firing in the mountains, the main thing being that the artillery was firmly tied to the roads, and there was no man-pack mountain artillery; the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, in the majority of cases, had no operating room to be employed and often became useless. And such a most effective type of troops for action in mountainous and desert terrain as cavalry (which, by the way, performed great service in the fight against *basmachestvo* in the mountains and deserts of Central Asia in the 1920s) had been disbanded due to lack of necessity in modern "thermonuclear" warfare.

The opportunities for the use of modern jet aircraft also proved to be limited under mountainous conditions.

The combat helicopters were the most menacing weapon for operations against the dushman. The losses of helicopters increased sharply, however, with the appearance of various portable anti-aircraft missile systems, such as the American Stinger or the British Blowpipe, among the weaponry of the rebels. The rebels were also successful in firing on the helicopters using DShK [Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machineguns] and shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, principally of Chinese manufacture.

It was becoming more and more obvious to the Soviet command that the rebels would not be able to be routed completely using combat equipment, at least that in the existing complement.

The main reasons for the military failures and the preservation, and even somewhat of an expansion, of the scale of the partisan war of the Afghan mujahedin, however, were in the political rather than the military sphere.

The Parchamists who had come to power, headed by Babrak Karmal, did not justify the hopes placed in them by the popular masses. Rehabilitating Parchamists

recently condemned by Amin, the leadership of Babrak Karmal itself took the path of violence and oppression, but now against the representatives of the opposition Khalq wing that had been driven from power. The PDPA party was rent by acute and irreconcilable internal strife as before. The situation became particularly acute in agriculture due to the pursuit of poorly thought-out and premature transformations in the Afghan village.

The Afghan government army remained little able to fight under the conditions of political instability in the country, despite the considerable increase in its size and the outfitting of the units with Soviet military hardware and weaponry.

The Soviet troops were thus forced by the very logic of the circumstances to be drawn deeper into the course of the civil war, which had extremely negative political consequences.

The Soviet government and military command, when introducing its troops onto the territory of Afghanistan, had not borne in mind the factors of national history of that country and its many centuries of warfare against various conquerors. The idea that any foreigner who entered the country with gun in hand, even with the best of intentions, was a foreign occupier was firmly ensconced in the mind of the Afghan.

Our commanders, it seems to me, committed another error as well. A large percentage of the soldiers in Soviet units who were initially sent to Afghanistan were representatives of our Central Asian peoples (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens). The commanders were obviously proceeding from considerations that soldiers of those nationalities would find greater understanding among the indigenous inhabitants of Afghanistan. It had, in fact, the opposite effect. The Pashto tribes, which had become an active element of the anti-government movement, had historically always been hostile to the national minorities to the north. The appearance of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens from an alien country was an additional irritating factor that was skillfully used by the agitators and propagandists of the counter-revolution.

The forces of armed opposition were growing. Whereas the size of the active mujahedin formations on Afghan territory was about 45,000 people in 1981-83, it was 150,000 by 1986. And even though the combined Soviet-Afghan armed forces operating in Afghanistan had reached around 400,000 by that time (about 100,000 soldiers and officers of which were Soviet), they could reliably control only about 23 percent of the country's territory. The cities and the major highways connecting them remained under the control of the government. The overwhelming majority of the rural regions were controlled by the Islamic committees of the mujahedin.

The scope of the armed struggle of the opposition also increased, more and more taking the form of offensive and defensive maneuvering actions by large semi-regular formations. Attempts were made, starting in the second

half of 1984, to create "Islamic regiments" consisting of 3-5 battalions (each battalion consisted of three companies, and each company of three platoons; the overall size of an "Islamic regiment" was 500-900 people) based on individual bands of mujahedin, and they united into "fronts" from one to several thousand strong. These semi-regular formations were armed not only with firearms and large-caliber machine guns, but mountain artillery, mortars and missiles as well. The rebels created base regions with a well-organized multi-tiered system of fire and engineer-prepared obstacles in difficult-to-reach mountain terrain to base their formations.

Regional groups and detachments comprised the main force of the rebels. Their aims, organizational forms and tactics for waging combat operations were determined by the local tribal and religious authorities—the "field commanders"—while the operational zone was restricted to the area of residence of the mujahedin. These formations, as a rule, had no permanent complement or organization. The dushman melted into among the local inhabitants in the event of danger, which made their detection virtually impossible. The composition of the groups and detachments was homogeneous in a socio-ethnic regard—local inhabitants of one national ethnic group. Their commanders in most cases had no permanent contacts with the foreign organizations of the Afghan counter-revolution, but their chief advantage was the active support of the indigenous population.

The semi-regular formations were initially created from among Afghan refugees at bases and camps in Pakistan and Iran. The dushman had quite good military training and were well armed. The actions of those formations were not linked to any one region and were of a highly maneuverable nature. The detachments and groups received specific tasks, after the fulfillment of which, as a rule, they returned to their bases for re-equipping, re-arming and rest. Their numbers, according to the estimates of Western experts, were no more than 5-8 percent of the total size of the forces of the Afghan opposition.

These ganglike formations included many classless elements, and their actions themselves were of a primarily violent nature in relation to the local population (violent conscription, plundering, murder etc.). The bandits themselves created a definite wall of alienation from the Afghan people by their actions. They were essentially mercenaries of the imperialist circles and the Afghan reactionaries. The formations in this category were emigre organizations of the opposition that varied in class composition, political goals and platforms and were rent by internal contradictions and ideological struggle, by virtue of which their chief weakness was a lack of combat interaction, and frequently even armed confrontations among themselves.

Terrorist groups that operated in the cities were another constituent element of the armed formations of the counter-revolution. They possessed a far-flung network

of highly conspiratorial cells. The bosses of the underground, aside from performing terrorist acts and sabotage and instigating mass disorder, had the assignment of penetrating the state and party apparatus, army and intelligence services of the Republic of Afghanistan, with the aim of bringing down state power from within.

One of the chief tasks of the struggle with the armed opposition was depriving it of sources of reinforcements, i.e. solving the question of the return of Afghan refugees to the motherland. But the solution of that problem depended directly on the correctness of the general political course taken by the government. The number of refugees had in practice grown to five million people (of whom three million were in Pakistan) rather than decreased as the result of gross errors committed during the rule of Babrak Karmal.

All of the attempts undertaken using military methods to close off the entry routes for fresh reserves of mujahedin onto Afghan territory were unsuccessful. Ambush operations by Soviet troops on the routes for the movement of caravans did not always prove to be effective. The movements of Soviet subunits and units to carry out those operations and their taking of ambush positions were often not able to be concealed from enemy reconnaissance. Even if the ambush was able to be organized successfully, the success of the operation was highly problematical. The caravans of mujahedin were supported by a well-tested system of march security. Their forward reconnaissance patrols would come upon the ambush, and the principal forces of the caravan penetrated deep into the territory in encirclement.

It can in effect be considered that the border remained open for the penetration of new bandit formations and the entry of weaponry and munitions from outside the country.

An awareness that the chief means of struggle against the armed opposition should be well thought-out socio-economic, political and organized propaganda measures by the authorities, rather than military operations by regular troops, led to a definite modification of the operational tactics of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan—they rejected the execution of a host of "field" operations against individual detachments and groups of dushman, and concentrated their principal efforts on holding strategically important areas and ensuring the operation of the engineering services on which the question of supplying the local population with essential products and goods—and, consequently, to a considerable extent the success of the administrative, economic and political activity of the state authorities—depended directly.

No less than 60 percent of the Soviet forces present took part in the performance of that mission. The remaining units (primarily air-assault) took part in the execution of sweeping operations to rout the major bases and formations of the rebels. Examples of such successful operations were the Konar operation in a canyon that

stretched 170 kilometers from Jalalabad to Barikot (a major airborne helicopter assault was distinctive in it) in 1985, an operation to rout a well-equipped mujahedin base at Jawar in the Khowst region in 1986, and the largest joint operation of the war by Soviet and Afghan troops, called Magistral, in the province of Paktia to deliver national-economic freight from Gardez to Khowst with the rout of major rebel forces blocking the road (manpower from five divisions took part in it).

A trend toward the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from active combat activity and the transfer of the initiative to the Afghan armed forces was noted starting in the spring of 1985, while the Soviet units retained only the tasks of air, artillery and engineer support for their operations.

Gradually all of the "local" operations to rout individual bands, comb the terrain, organize shelling, blockade individual seats of resistance etc. came to be performed primarily by Afghan units.

Work was begun to create local armed detachments for self-defense via negotiations with the local tribal leaders and elders. Anti-government activity ceased in places where this was successful and the inhabitants, who were sick of the fratricidal warfare, gladly returned to peaceful labor.

The establishment of peace with a number of Pashto tribes on the border with Pakistan was a great political success for the state authorities. There were also positive results from the negotiations with the local leaders and religious authorities in a whole series of regions of Afghanistan, especially in the north.

Life itself thus began to bring political methods of settling Afghan problems and reconciling the hostile parties to the fore more and more actively. The war in Afghanistan entered a third and fundamentally new period in its history at the start of 1986. The stage of "national reconciliation" had begun.

The adoption of the policy of national reconciliation reflected the climate that actually existed in the country, where it was impossible to achieve an end to the war using military means. The incarnation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after the performance of a whole set of steps, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, that created the grounding necessary for it.

The main and decisive step was the decision of the Soviet government, in coordination with the Afghan leadership, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, provided that the armed assistance to the Afghan rebels on the part of Pakistan and other countries ceased as well.

The signing of an Afghanistan treaty by the foreign ministers of four interested nations (Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States) in Geneva

on 14 Apr 88 was the concluding international act in the resolution of the Afghan issue.

The Najibullah government sought a way of bringing the policy of national reconciliation to life. The principal task in the realm of party life became the reinforcement and consolidation of the ranks of the PDPA and the eradication of the factional activity of the two wings that was so ruinous to the party.

A policy of the development of relations with all countries and non-alignment with any blocs was adopted in the realm of foreign policy.

The conversion of the army of the republic into a force able to defend Afghanistan independently was planned in the military realm. Measures began to be taken in the army to reinforce military discipline for this purpose, a determined struggle against desertion was begun, and complete freedom of religion was ensured (mullahs had been part of the army since 1985, and courses to train them had been started).

The task of creating voluntary self-defense detachments and the conclusion of compromise agreements with local national and religious authorities and "field commanders" was posed in the area of providing for the peaceful labor of Afghans.

The solution of the problem of covering the border with Pakistan depended largely on the mutual relations with the nomadic Pashto tribes that knew the mountain paths across the border. Especial attention was thus devoted to questions of establishing peace with them.

The question of relations with Shiite Iran, and the armed detachments of its adherents and fellow believers in Afghanistan itself, was a complex and difficult-to-solve problem of the policy of reconciliation and cease-fire in Afghanistan. Iran did not recognize the Geneva treaty among the four parties, and had refused to sign it as an interested fifth party. It did not submit to the influence of the international authorities and did not intend to repudiate armed assistance, across the Iranian-Afghan border, to the bandit formations that were close to it in spirit, or to eliminate the centers for the training of mujahedin on its territory.

The most substantial issue on a purely military plane, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, was the resolution of three central questions: how strong the armed forces of the republic would be in an organizational, moral and political regard (the size and armament of the forces were sufficient to protect the country against the counter-revolutionary forces); what position the local and regional detachments of mujahedin headed by the "field commanders" would take in the civil war (it was instructive that most of these detachments took a wait-and-see stance with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops); and, would the problem of the return of refugees to the country be able to be solved

(preventing those who were "irreconcilable" the opportunity of replenishing their ranks using the refugees would be disastrous for them).

The solution of all these problems, as I have already emphasized above, was determined not so much by the course of the combat operations as by the successes of the policy of national reconciliation, the considered and well thought-out nature of the solutions and the actions of the country's state and political leaders.

The Soviet press has repeatedly raised the question of whether we had to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. We must know the concrete historical facts in order to answer it correctly, and not be guided by emotions, albeit even understandable ones. A study of the military aspect of the development of events in Afghanistan makes it possible to conclude objectively that the Afghan leadership in 1979, not possessing a combat-ready army and not enjoying the universal support of the popular masses, would not have been able to halt the onslaught of the counter-revolutionary forces using its own manpower. The whole territory of the country would undoubtedly have been occupied by opposition detachments. The chief question thus consisted of how much the political forces that were in power were meeting the tasks of the revolutionary transformation of the country, so as to render them internationalist assistance using regular troops. And that is the province of political rather than military leaders. But the decision to introduce a limited contingent of Soviet troops into a neighboring country should undoubtedly not be made as the result of "secret meditations" by a small group of politicians, as occurred in practice in 1979.

Something else is also undoubted. The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, dragging on for years, and their involvement in civil war and the fight against a mass anti-government movement—i.e. essentially the solution of a sovereign country's internal problems via the application of force—have no historical justification, and the human casualties suffered in connection with it have no moral absolution².

It must be understood herein that the mistakes of former leaders in no way diminish the honor and dignity of the Soviet internationalist soldiers—our officers and soldiers who selflessly and heroically fulfilled their soldier's duty in Afghanistan with full conviction in the missions they were assigned.

[Note]—The honorarium for this article was transferred to account No. 700344 for the fund to aid wounded internationalist soldiers.

Footnotes

1. NOVOYE VREMYA, 1980, No 17, p 23.
2. The losses among Soviet troops in battle against the mujahedin were 13,310 killed, 35,478 wounded and 311 missing as of 25 May 88.

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Publication of 'Mein Kampf' Assailed

91UM0306A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 52,
25-31 Dec 90 pp 34-35

[Article by Kronid Lyubarskiy: "Mein Kampf? Nein!"]

[Text] A Soviet military journal prints Hitler's testament.

There are books which, however worthy of indignation they may be, nonetheless demand a thorough discussion of them. One must attempt to dissuade if not the author, then those who read and believe what she/he has to say. But then there are books, any arguments about which are completely out of place.

In the November edition of VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) has begun to be printed along with an introduction by the journal's editors. The published text along with the introduction together make up the necessary grounds for prosecution under Article 74 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Article 11 of the USSR Law "On criminal liability for state crimes"): "Propaganda and agitation with the goal of provoking racial or national hatred or discord."

In the extremely brief introduction, the unification of Germany is mentioned and the fear is expressed that "future leaders of the German people" might begin once again to read *Mein Kampf*. The editors then go on to write: "It is not hard to buy the book in stores there and thousands of skinheads in Germany have been studying the work for some time. We should also know what they are reading in order to know what they might think."

I don't know who told the editors of VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL what about the availability of *Mein Kampf* in Germany, but I, a person who has lived for 13 years here, know its laws and how they are applied. One can read in the Legal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany:

"[Subsection]86. The distribution of propaganda materials of unconstitutional organizations.

(1) Those who distribute or possess, produce and import with the aim of distributing propagandistic materials on the territory governed by this law:

1. of a party declared unconstitutional by a Federal Constitutional Court or a party or association so acknowledged (without right of appeal);

2. of an association outlawed (without right of appeal) because it works against the constitutional structure or against mutual understanding among peoples or one declared (without right of appeal) to be such an outlawed association;

3. of a government, association or department located outside of the territory covered by this law which works in the interests of one of the aforementioned parties or associations; or

4. propagandistic materials whose content has the aim of continuing the work of the former national-socialist organization—may be deprived of their liberty for up to three years or be subject to financial penalty.

(2) Propagandistic materials referred to in (1) are to be considered any publications, the content of which is contrary to a free democratic structure or the idea of mutual understanding among peoples."

This law is strictly observed (as are all laws in Germany). According to this law, any reprint of *Mein Kampf* and the sale of the work in stores is prohibited. (Possession of antique editions of Hitler's book and other similar works for scientific, scholarly or literary purposes is not forbidden; I possess a 1935 edition reprinted in Shanghai by the Union of Russian Fascists). Crimes which come under [subsection]86 are extremely rare; I recall only one incident which took place in 1988 (and not connected with *Mein Kampf*).

For a skinhead or any young person in Germany today, finding a copy of *Mein Kampf* from which to study is about as difficult as finding in the Soviet Union today a copy of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*. Young people do not study from such texts, but from ones similar to the following:

"In our country, a new generation has grown up to assume political responsibility. Our young people are not responsible for what happened over 40 years ago. But they are responsible for the historical consequences.

We in the older generation owe to young people not the fulfilment of dreams but honesty. We must help younger people to understand why it is vital to keep memories alive. We want to help them to accept historical truth soberly, not one-sidedly, without taking refuge in utopian doctrines, but also without moral arrogance.

From our own history we learn what man is capable of. For that reason we must not imagine that we are quite different and have become better. There is no ultimately achievable moral perfection. We have learned as human beings, and as human beings we remain in danger. But we have the strength to overcome such danger again and again.

Hitler's constant approach was to stir up prejudices, enmity and hatred. What is asked of young people today is this: do not let yourselves be forced into enmity and hatred of other people, of Russians or Americans, Jews or Turks, of alternatives or conservatives, blacks or whites.

Let us honour freedom.

Let us work for peace.

Let us respect the rule of law.

Let us be true to our own conception of justice.

Let us face up as well as we can to the truth."

This is what Richard von Weizsacker, one of the most popular politicians in Germany, said in the Bundestag on 8 May 1985. (Weizsacker's speech was published in issue 41, 1990 of NEW TIMES).

Nowadays, while subscribers to VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL are getting their November issues in the mail, an unprecedented movement is sweeping across Germany under the slogans: "Herz fur Russland," - "Our hearts for Russia," "Help for Russia," "Help for Leningrad," etc. On television every day account numbers in banks opened by 17 major humanitarian organizations are broadcast and government and non-government organizations and foundations, churches, newspapers, TV networks, ordinary citizens, young and old, are gathering money and sending millions of food packages to the Soviet Union.

Europe has just officially declared an end to the Cold War signing the Paris Charter. Europe has begun disarmament and the occupying powers are removing their troops from German soil. Today Europeans are confident of lasting peace in future.

In response to this, the Soviet military journal warns: "Watch out! There they are, genuine Germans, our enemies over the centuries! Know what they think, what they read today, what is being prepared for us! And keep the powder dry!"

If this is not "provoking racial or national hatred or discord" then what is it?

At one time one could read in VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL articles by Karem Rash which caused such a scandal under the heading "Army and Culture":

"The army must be the school of the nation."

"What is the army? It is the old foundation of Russian and Soviet statehood..."

"Perestroika is a regrouping of forces before attack..."

"Out of the Kremlin's Spassky gate will ride a horseman on a white steed..."

Nikolai Andreyev in OGONYOK at the time called Rash's revelations "ordinary rashism" which at that time might have appeared to some to be a scathing play on words. Now that we are talking about *Mein Kampf*, nobody thinks that way anymore.

Soviet Defense Minister Yazov took VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL to task for its publication of *Mein Kampf*, calling it a mistake, though making note

of the "good intentions" of its editors. I hope that the USSR Procurator's office finds a more exact legal qualification of the publication.

Finally, one observation. The authors of the introduction to *Mein Kampf* in VOENNO-ISTORICHESKY ZHURNAL are right about one thing. In recent months, neo-Nazi tendencies have begun gaining strength in Germany and that is ringing alarm bells here. But note that this neo-Nazism is coming from the East, from the former GDR. It is being disseminated by skinheads and non-skinheads who have never read *Mein Kampf*, who have studied only Marx and Lenin, those same works which our own Leningrad- or Moscow-based neo-fascists studied, painting Swastikas on the doors of Jewish flats and marching in broad daylight on Hitler's birthday.

They have never read the work of their idol either. It is impossible to get and few of them can read German.

Now they will be able to read him.

Actions of PVO Advisers in Vietnam Against Low Altitude Attackers

911 M02304 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Dec 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Missile Ambushes"]

[Text] "As far as surface-to-air missiles [SAM] are concerned, they hit the target fairly accurately, and it is often impossible for us to escape them. I was already at the target when I saw missiles heading towards me. Then came a blow of staggering force. Now I am a prisoner..."

From interrogation testimony of U.S. Navy Major John Sidney McCain

On 24 July 1965, an extraordinary event in military affairs took place 50 km northeast of Hanoi in the Ha Son Binh Province near the village of Ching Ha—the first engagement of antiaircraft missile subunits against supersonic aircraft. Soviet and Vietnamese missile launcher crewmen in an area subjected to heavy bombing by U.S. aviation set up an ambush—they used a combat tactic which since then has been effectively utilized in subsequent military conflicts. However, everything in succession.

...The heat and humidity, it seemed, saturated the bamboo thickets, the palm trees, the ponds with flowering lotus—everything that is called the jungle. There was no way Lt Col Boris Mozhayev's artillery battalion could get used to the tropical conditions. Both the days and nights were difficult. Of course, the 20-year-old operators, Jr Sgt Anatoliy Bondarenko, PFC Vladimir Timchenko, and PFC Yuriy Panushov, endured the heat easier than the battalion commander—a frontline soldier who was old enough to be their father. They arrived in the tropics in April 1965 and became part of the first training center for training Vietnamese missile launcher

crewmembers. None of them had assumed that in two and a half months they would turn out to be the first to use SAM's against combat aircraft.

"At that time I was a senior lieutenant, a guidance control officer of a SAM site, and, naturally, was training future guidance control officers," recalls Col (Res) Vladislav Konstantinov. "It was a four-month training program; we were supposed to fit everything into this time period. But then there was talk that we needed to reduce the training period; the Vietnamese were insisting on an earlier departure to the positions. They explained this by the difficult situation—U.S. aviation was bombing many Vietnamese cities on a daily basis. Then they apparently were counting on the rapid mastery of equipment by Vietnamese officers called back home from the Soviet Air Defense Military Academy. In my view, the Vietnamese leadership also wanted to be convinced of the effectiveness of surface-to-air missile weapons: what, they said, are the Russians supplying us. Then the order came—depart for positions on 22 July, and with the same system that was used during training missions; there was no time to bring in a new system."

Two battalions began to prepare for combat. Their crews were headed by officers of the Vietnamese People's Army, Capt Nguyen Van Thanh and Capt Nguyen Van Ninh. Actually, Lt Col Mozhayev and Lt Col Fedor Ilykh were in charge. The equipment was put in order in about five to six days, and all spare parts, tools, and accessories were used. Operations were also performed which in a different situation would have been authorized to perform only in special shops. They worked with diligence. Every person understood that there must be no mistakes.

How to wage combat more effectively? Where to meet the enemy? How best to avoid a strike? The sudden order raised dozens of questions. The leader of the Soviet missilemen in Vietnam, Col Aleksandr Dzya, gathered together the group of officers. The chief of the training center, Col Mikhail Tsygankov, Lt Col Fedor Ilykh, Lt Col Boris Mozhayev, and Lt Col Ivan Proskurnin—each of them was offered the chance to express his opinion. That is when the word "ambush" was heard. The essence was to meet aircraft at a location unexpected for them, fire, and move to a different location.

They selected the point of the first ambush on the flight path of U.S. aircraft to Hanoi—on the recommendation of the Vietnamese leadership. They immediately began "studying" the tactics of the Americans. In addition to older models of aircraft (A-1E Skyraider, A-4D Skyhawk), the newest supersonic F-105D and F-4 Phantom aircraft were taking part in the raids on the capital. They often approached the planned targets at low altitudes. Forces for suppressing antiaircraft weapons were assigned only at the time of making the attack. In short the Americans did not anticipate any threat to themselves en route. Hence the decision to meet the enemy where he was not expecting antiaircraft weapons.

The departure for the positions was prepared in secrecy, and the march was made at night. For the position they selected an elevation that did not stand out against the background of the Vietnamese landscape. It was no simple matter to set up three launchers in the pitch darkness. A heavy workload was placed on Capt Eduard Voronin's subordinates—the launcher crewmembers. Local residents came to their assistance. Both women and old men, who had experienced the American bombing, dug shelters. Everything was ready by morning. Around them were up to 10 Vietnamese batteries of antiaircraft artillery. Apparently, this was just in case things did not turn out for the missile launcher crewmembers. When the radars were first turned on, they detected a large number of targets in the air, but at maximum range. Everyone lived with the foreboding of a fight—the first duel between the missile crews and combat aviation.

The reader can say that the weapons had already been used against a specific enemy prior to July 1965, and he would be right. A spy flight over our country by an American U-2 Lockheed, piloted by Francis Powers, was stopped on 1 May 1960. A similar aircraft was destroyed on 27 October 1962 over Cuba, where it had intruded by decision of the U.S. strategic intelligence services during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Those duels can only partly be called combat. They took place in peacetime, and the SAM launcher crewmembers were opposing reconnaissance aircraft not combat aircraft, but here...

"No one could have known how the combat would develop," says Vladislav Konstantinov. "In our heart, of course, we hoped for a successful outcome. Our crew was basically recruited in the Urals, and we all knew how Powers was shot down... We tried not to give away our position. We turned the radar on from time to time. You would turn the radar on and see: targets at a range of 30-35 km. This was maximum range for firing. The operators would glance at me, and I at the battalion commander. 'Let's wait, Vladislav, let's wait.' Lt Col Mozhayev understood my position. 'We must be certain to hit them.' The Vietnamese missile crewmembers and their commander, Capt Nguyen Van Thanh, were full of curiosity and concern. We were all drenched in sweat. It was approaching noon, and the heat in the crew cabin was unbearable.

"After lunch we turned on the missile guidance radar and detected a target with a heading towards us. We made use of the emitter efficiently. They could suddenly get a fix on us, and we knew the might of American aviation. It was already 60 km to the target, and we turned on the antenna again—the blip on the screen was large. I reported to Mozhayev: it was bomber, no one on the combat crew had ever encountered such returns from fighters. It was 1430 hours, 1431, 1432... The time and the enemy were drawing closer. The enemy did not see us, and he himself was like on a saucer. Everyone had calmed down, the nervousness had passed. It was 1440 hours. The command came: 'Fire!' The seconds of waiting had dragged on. The officers and soldiers located in other cabins said that these were the most agonizing

seconds in their life. Then came the first detonation. The target began to separate right on the radar scopes, and another target appeared. A second missile rushed toward it. The manual tracking operator, Yuriy Panushov, reported that the elevation of the target was dropping sharply—a sign of target destruction. The second blip held steady on the scope for some time, but it also began to descend sharply and disappeared. I reported that the target had been destroyed and two missiles expended. There was an outburst of joy..."

They were confident in Boris Mozhayev's battalion that one target had been shot down for sure, and probably a second one, too. It was reported from the crash site that two aircraft had been destroyed. It turned out to be a pleasant surprise that the missile crewmen had shot down "Phantoms" from the first group sent to Vietnam for testing in a combat situation. The Americans were flying with complete unconcern at an altitude of three to four km, confident of the impunity of the flight. The crew of one "Phantom" perished, and the crew of the second was captured. The airmen said that they felt the aircraft shake, it went out of control, and they had to eject. They learned about this the next day in the battalion.

Immediately after the firing, it was necessary to leave—this is the point of an ambush. A thunderstorm broke out while they were closing down the system, and the antenna could not be rolled up. They stowed it in the body of the vehicle with the entire crew. Col Tsygankov caught up with the battalion on the march at night and congratulated them on mission accomplishment directly in the bus. Then he spoke in a deep voice: "Ilyikh also guessed the aircraft path, and the 'Phantom' dropped with a crash."

Now 24 July is celebrated as the Vietnamese People's Army Surface-to-Air Missile Troops Day. The missile crewmen had destroyed the 399th, 400th, and 401st American aircraft since the start of the aggression. The Vietnamese made commemorative badges from the wreckage of the 400th aircraft and presented them to people who distinguished themselves. The first to receive them were Boris Mozhayev, battalion commander; Sr Lt Vladislav Konstantinov, the missile guidance officer, who returned from Vietnam with the Red Banner and Red Star orders; Capt's Valentin Brusnikin and Eduard Voronin; Sr Lt's Vladimir Shelitov, Boris Kolesnik, Valentin Todorashko, and Valentin Pustovoytov; Jr Sgt Anatoliy Bondarenko; and PFC's Vladimir Timchenko and Yuriy Panushov.

After 24 July, missile ambushes began to be practiced by all battalions. Four ambushes were set up in mid-August in the southern part of North Vietnam in the provinces of Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa. That same battalion of Mozhayev destroyed three more targets. A battalion whose crews were headed by Lt Col Ivan Proskurnin conducted a classic operation. Four aircraft were shot down with three missiles. The Americans considered the vicinity of the 17th parallel to be their private domain

and, therefore, were flying so close that one aircraft was knocked down by fragments of a missile that hit a different target. All flights by American aviation were halted for two weeks in the southern part of North Vietnam. Their radio stations reported that the Vietnamese had used very long-range Russian SAM's and were firing them from below Hanoi toward the 17th parallel. For some reason the Americans denied the missile launch crewmen high maneuvering capabilities of the subunits on the ground.

U.S. Air Force losses began to grow. The Americans were changing tactics, but the main thing was that they were improving armament and equipping aircraft with Shrike antiradar missiles with a passive homing head. Now, if a pilot got a fix on a missile radar, he launched a Shrike, which rushed along the beam and, as a rule, struck the antenna. The complexity of combating it was determined by its small radar-echoing area. The Americans used more than 5,000 Shrikes in Vietnam, but this did not help them stand the test against SAM systems. Our specialists, and later Vietnamese specialists, learned to combat the foreign inventions. How? They turned the beam sharply to the side, and then turned off the radar. The Shrikes fell, as a rule, three to four km from the position. And the missile crewmen did not allow repeat attacks against themselves. After firing, they packed up and quickly changed position.

Lt Col Fedor Ilyikh became the recognized master of the ambush, a sort of ace in Vietnam. In the 18 battles his crew had, it shot down 24 American aircraft. There is no missile launch crewman in the Air Defense Forces that has such marks.

I doubt whether Fedor Ilyikh himself figured he would become the master of the ambush. A lad from the village of Verkhnyaya Chumayka, Altay Kray, he went through the Great Patriotic War as a senior radio operator and a radio station chief of a separate signal battalion. After the war, he dealt more with the radar troops than with the surface-to-air missile troops. Only in 1963 was he assigned as a battalion commander, and two years later he was in Vietnam. "Our Ilyikh was a person of genuine talent," recalls Maj Gen (Ret) Georgiy Belov, at that time the leader of the Soviet military specialists in Vietnam. "It seemed that God himself had intended him to become a SAM crewman. He sensed where and when to set up an ambush and how to conduct it. Col Aleksandr Dzyza, who was in charge of the missile crewmen, also had a high opinion of him. "In the fall of 1965, on behalf of the chief of the General Staff, I submitted a recommendation for awarding the title Hero of the Soviet Union to Lt Col Ilyikh. But, alas, Ilyikh was awarded the Order of Lenin; he had received the Order of the Red Star somewhat earlier."

Followers of Fedor Ilyikh were found not only among our missile crewmen but also among the Vietnamese crewmen. Thus, the collective of the unit commanded by Chanh Sanh shot down 196 enemy aircraft; the crew headed by Sr Lt Fam Chyong U hit targets 43 times; and the crew of Sr Lt Nguyen Suan Dai hit targets about 40

times. The U.S. Air Force lost more than 1,000 jet aircraft alone to SAM's. "These are the most deadly projectiles that have ever been launched from the ground against aircraft," noted the magazine *AIR FORCE SPACE DIGEST*.

Our missile crewmen continued the tradition of ambushes in the summer of 1970 in Egypt, which was subjected Israeli aggression. But there they used not only these but also more modern missile systems. Having organized an ambush in the desert sands of North Africa in the vicinity of Abu Suweir, battalions commanded by Lt Col Konstantin Popov and Lt Col Nikolay Kutyntsev destroyed five aircraft (one was shot down by the "Shilka" crew of Jr Sgt G. Perevozchikov). What is

more, the ambushes were given a new, interesting extension. It was no longer battalions but small tactical air defense groups that went out to intercept enemy aircraft. They included a surface-to-air missile system, several self-propelled "Shilka" automatic antiaircraft guns, and man-portable "Strela" systems. Such a combination of armament made it possible to repel attacks by various offensive air weapons, both high-altitude and low-flying.

Now credit is beginning to be given to the feat of those who repelled the raids of American aviation in the jungles of Vietnam and to the organizers of the first ambushes. There is now an opportunity to talk and write about the combat operations in which they participated. But the experience itself, quite recent experience, is not being studied in air defense units or in military educational institutions. One can only regret this.

Early Air War Against Iraq Viewed

91UM0313A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Ponomarev: "The Picture Begins To Clear"]

[Text] It has long been observed that nowhere do people lie as much as in hunting and at war. Nor have the events in the Persian Gulf been any exception in this respect. Moreover, deception, disinformation, and falsification had been made the basis of the "psychological warfare" which both sides had unleashed against one another even before the start of combat operations and which they are still actively continuing. "Psychological operations," THE NEW YORK TIMES emphasizes, "have been sanctioned by three secret directives, which were signed by President Bush."

This enabled the French TF-1 television company to conclude: "There is under way a real 'war of news releases,' which play down one's own losses and exaggerate the losses of the enemy." There is nothing unusual in this under the conditions of wartime. But such a "war," of course, complicates a sober assessment of what is going on and prevents a sufficiently confident forecast of the development of events in the future. Nor for this reason should my observations be taken as the truth in the last instance. But the picture is beginning to clear, and certain trends are emerging increasingly distinctly.

From the very outset the United States and its allies put the emphasis on inflicting a devastating assault against Iraq from the air. Operations developed in accordance with the prescription offered 70-80 years ago by the Italian General G. Douhet. He believed that, having gained domination in the air, it was possible achieving total victory with attacks on the enemy's government and economic centers. True, this doctrine was not borne out during World War II and also in the course of military operations in Korea and Vietnam. But even today it appears very attractive to many prominent military figures of the West. It is believed that the modern level of development of technology makes it possible with air strikes if not to conclusively crush the enemy, then, at least, to inflict on him a decisive defeat.

It was in accordance with this script that military operations in the Persian Gulf originally developed. Allied aircraft have already carried out more than 10,000 combat sorties. Most important centers and military targets of Iraq have been subjected to missile and bombing attacks. However, despite the numerous high-flown reports of the multinational force command, decisive success in the course of the aerial Blitzkrieg has not been achieved. The first reports on this score have had to be disavowed. Nonetheless, combat operations are unfolding with a preponderance in favor of the anti-Iraq coalition. Various reasons are being cited here. We may distinguish among them, in my view, the following.

First, the Pentagon and the command of the multinational force succeeded to a certain extent in achieving operational-tactical surprise. It does not seem that Iraq was expecting military operations to be initiated as early as the night of 17 January.

Second, the American Armed Forces are saturated with the latest types of weapons and combat equipment. This applies primarily to electronic warfare, which has been employed on such an extensive scale for the first time in the history of warfare and which has seriously hampered the operations of Iraq's air defense, aircraft, and command and communications system. The extensive use—also for the first time in history—of precision, "smart" weapons created on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology—laser, electronic, and so forth, pertains here. The use of such weapons has made it possible to achieve exceptional accuracy of target destruction.

Third, mention has to be made of certain blunders of the Iraqi command. It was initially unable, evidently, to organize due countermeasures to the attackers. The experience of the eight-year war against Iran, in the course of which Baghdad had clear military-technical superiority, did it a poor turn and engendered smugness and complacency.

However, as far as it is possible to judge, Iraq's regular military forces ultimately proved capable of countering the latest weapons and methods of armed struggle. In addition, Iraq has declared with a certain amount of justification that it has won the "first round" and that "Bush's game, based on the achievement of a swift victory with the aid of the latest technology, has failed."

What is at the basis of such statements? Contrary to the first communiques of American military figures and the news media, Iraq's air defense system has not been smashed. It is now being said that Iraq deliberately did not use its full might in the course of the first attacks in order not to reveal it to the enemy ahead of time. Baghdad has also succeeded in preserving the bulk of its combat aircraft, dispersed and concealed in shelters ahead of time. The initial reports concerning the destruction of Iraqi missiles capable of striking at a range of the order of 600 km have not been confirmed—the American air assaults were carried out to a considerable extent against skillfully prepared mockups and other decoys. The reports on the alleged total elimination of nuclear centers and chemical and biological weapons centers were also exaggerated, to put it mildly.

Nonetheless, Baghdad's statement about winning the "first round" also pertains to the sphere of clear exaggeration. Yes, Washington is already talking increasingly now about the fact that the war is assuming a protracted nature and will last not days but a minimum of several weeks and perhaps months and that it will be necessary to commit large-scale ground forces to the fighting. But this does not, for all that, change the overall picture. Allied superiority in the air and at sea—even given

approximate equivalence on land—speaks for itself. It is no accident that Iraq has been unable to wrest the strategic initiative from the allies, carry out active operations against their air force, and transfer combat operations to the ground fronts.

Baghdad's assertiveness is being manifested only in the launching of Scud missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and also Israel. However, these attacks are having no purely military effect. To some extent because the missiles have been modified for an increase in range, but made considerably heavier here and may now carry a relatively small charge of conventional explosive. And, most importantly, the Americans have had a very considerable means of combating them. We are talking about the Patriot missiles, which can destroy aerial targets, including enemy missiles, at a range of up to 100 km or altitudes of 30 down to 1.5 km. Estimated kill probability is, it is reported, 0.9. These estimates have been borne out by practice also to some extent.

Reports are coming out of the Persian Gulf zone increasingly to the effect that, together with the continuing intensive air raids against targets in Iraq and Kuwait, the ground forces are beginning to display greater activity.

Washington has approved a plan for a flanking attack by these forces, bypassing the grouping of Iraqi forces concentrated in Kuwait and southern Iraq. The special combat group "Ripper" composed of subunits of Marines, whose job it will be to be the first to attack the so-called "Saddam line"—a system of fortifications along the Saudi-Kuwait border—is being formed also. But this will be the next stage of the military operations.

As far as we can tell, such a development of events can hardly be avoided. S. Husayn is flat-out refusing to comply with the demand of the world community for a withdrawal of forces from Kuwait. And the United States is beginning to talk ever more loudly about the fact that the mission of its armed forces should not be confined to the liberation of Kuwait. The war should be prosecuted, allegedly, until Iraq has been completely smashed and its military potential wiped out.

Washington and the other capitals also understand that a high price will have to be paid for the achievement of this goal. A more sober mood has come to replace the first days' euphoria. There is no longer any talk of a swift and bloodless victory.

Military Built Water Purification Stations in Karakalpak

91UM0233B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
18 Oct 90 First Edition p 6

[Unattributed article: "To the Residents of the Aral Area"]

[Text] TURKESTAN MILITARY DISTRICT. Servicemen of the military district have begun implementing a large-scale plan to guarantee residents of the Aral area—an ecological disaster zone—with good quality drinking water.

Pursuant to an agreement with the government of Karakalpakiya, twelve distillation units have been set up in three districts of the autonomous republic, namely: Muynak, Leninabad, and Kungrad. The military is supplying ecologically pure water to schools and hospitals, and are teaching residents how to use army technology. They intend to transfer the distillation units to them in the near future.

This activity is taking place within the framework of conversion. The military sold 22 distillation units and eight drilling units to the Priaral hydro-geological expedition. They will be assembled in open reservoirs that have low quality drinking water.

Price Rise at Gagarin Aviation Association

91UM0233A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Colonel V. Usoltsev: "From Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur": "Conversion and the Social Protection of Workers"]

[Text] The local ministry has literally forced the Aviation Production Association imeni Yu.A. Gagarin to accept automated lines for packing grain in amounts of sixty pieces, for next year, for the price of 350,000 rubles each. At the same time, the cost-price of this new production that is not characteristic of aviation building is predicted by the economists to reach a total ranging from 850,000 rubles to 1.5 million rubles. Obviously, this kind of conversion threatens the Far Easterners with huge losses. And this, in turn, will be reflected in the wages of the workers of the APA imeni Yu. A. Gagarin, their standard of living, and their vacation time. In addition, not to be excluded is the drain from the Association of highly qualified personnel who are now engaged in producing the Su-27, the best fighter aircraft in the world, and the loss of scientific-technical potential.

Similar difficulties and not thinking through these activities by "those at the top" have also already been encountered at the very beginning of the conversion by other enterprises working for "defense." This is exactly what was talked about during the regional working conference on "Conversion and the Social Protection of

Workers," held in Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur. Participating in the conference were representatives of Far Eastern defense industry enterprises and associations, managers of a number of "civilian" enterprises in the region, and employees of industrial branch ministries, the Far Eastern Section of the USSR Academy of Sciences, higher educational establishments, planning organizations, and banks, as well as organs of the kray and city party and councils.

Many constructive proposals were made during the conference. Participants of this meeting came to the unanimous conclusion that it is necessary to be in constant touch with each other and to have an organ that would coordinate joint activities. It was decided to create an association of enterprises and associations of the Far East and their own commercial bank.

Finance Ministry Kills Transcaucasus Incentive Plan

91UM0228A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by S. Romanovskiy: "A Mine from the Ministry of Finance"]

[Text] The military prepared a Christmas present for soldiers' mothers who regularly picket the building of the Ministry of Defense. Beginning in December 1990, personnel for the Caucasus Military District will be selected on a volunteer basis.

Enlisted men and officers desiring to serve in Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan will receive bonuses established by the Ministry of Defense: Officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men serving re-enlistment terms will receive one and a half times their salary; for one month's service they will receive credit for one and a half months (and in case of an extraordinary or military situation, for three months). The tour of uninterrupted duty in the Transcaucasus MD is a maximum of five years. Housing living space [in sq m], based on previous housing space, is guaranteed. Enlisted men and sergeant volunteers are "authorized" 105-130 rubles per month. Mandatory leave is guaranteed: 20 days for enlisted men and 25 days for sergeants, excluding travel time. Upon being discharged into the reserves, they receive two months' salary.

But... the USSR Ministry of Finance, to which the General Staff sent its "implementation proposals," cut them to pieces. There is no money. But in order not to be embarrassed in front of Russians who are dying today in Karabakh, the financial wizards found a way out: It is forbidden to pay a re-enlisted soldier without signing a contract with him. But inasmuch as there is no Law on Recruitment in the Armed Forces of the USSR by Contract, there can be no additional payments.

Legally—correct. But is it moral? Are there many who would put their heads in the way of a bullet for seven rubles a month? On December 11th, notwithstanding the

"no" of the Finance Ministry, D. Yazov sent his concept paper on the voluntary staffing of the Transcaucasus MD to the USSR Council of Ministers. He is still waiting for an answer.

But this is not even the sad part of the story. Not waiting for the government's answer, the General Staff sent a directive out to the field: Recruit volunteers for the south. Officers and generals of the General Staff say that there is not one word about bonuses in this directive. According to Lieutenant-General I. Matveyev, Chief of Administration of the General Staff, the requirements of the Transcaucasus MD have already been met (by "volunteers") by 32% with new staffing and by 72% with graduates of "training schools"! There are three republics in the Transcaucasus district. This means that these percentages stand for thousands of people. Who would have thought that we have so many patriots who do not care for money.

Why is it that soldiers who had been scared by the Transcaucasus voluntarily left for the mountains? Because they believed the Ministry of Defense. Some, I think, hoped to help their families with the money; others hoped to take a "100%" leave. Political officers, meanwhile, were saying that the Council of Ministers will sign all the papers any day now...

It looks as if this first step of transforming the military into a professional army will turn into a fiasco. According to the above-mentioned Matveyev, the directive will have to be rescinded soon and they will have to go back to the old recruiting method. I do not blame the military. They came out with an initiative and "pushed" it for a whole month. But before I extend my sympathies to them, I have a question for the Minister of Defense of the USSR: What will happen to the soldiers who were deceived? Will those who want to leave be released or, because of their trustfulness, will they remain hostages until their enlistments end?

Conversion: Beryllium Mine To Produce Emeralds for Jewelry

914.102584 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Jan 91
Second Edition p 8

[Article by Vladimir Chertkov, PRAVDA special correspondent, reporting from Sverdlovsk Oblast: "Green Magic in the Night...": "They Now Want To Make Women's Ornaments Where Once Nuclear Fuel Was Mined"]

[Text] *Beryllium is a strategic raw material. Can it be used only for lethal purposes? No—it can also be guided by life and yield precious stones*

The military-industrial complex is at a crossroads, staring into the abyss: which way to turn? Bereft of the firm ground they once stood on, people are frightened by coming changes. But now they are getting a new lease on life.

People are frightened now that they have finally realized that they have to live

Uranium mines and nuclear reactors are being shut down: cause to celebrate, but in people's eyes you see the questions. "Where are we going to work?" "We do not know how to do anything else." "Why set out on an unfamiliar path?" The express train has been switched to a peace track: how can people not realize that the old track on which we were so comfortably traveling was leading to disaster?

But permit me... You want to say: but we are threatened by something else. You may say that we live on a minuscule speck in the Universe, and that Nature could crush it with ease, like a nut, sweep it away like a spider's web. And yet... Yes, our mother is the planet, but life on it is designed for life, long and wonderful life. And there is an abundance of all sorts of reserves in underground storehouses, darkness and light and warmth in abundance, and many beneficial creatures, and water, and oceans of oxygen: know this and rejoice. Man. But no: as he dug uranium from the ground and grew nuclear mushrooms Man awakened terrifying dreams, in comparison with which the Deluge was just another ordinary mishap. Man pushed himself toward the abyss and since they paid him money for doing so he was almost cheerful about it and gave no thought at all to the possible end of the world...

I have just come back from a region where a reactor is being disassembled. The man who escorted me was angry. "They built and they built..."

People are frightened now that they have finally realized that they have to live.

They are closing the reactor and the uranium mine! How will we survive? "We mined beryllium, which is needed for the construction of submarines and fighter planes, without which, you know... And now suddenly this!" I was in a town called Malyshev in the Urals, when this "suddenly" had already come to pass—and been good for everyone. They began mining emeralds, prized throughout the world as precious stones second only to rubies and ahead of diamonds. What woman does not dream of having this green wonder in her ear or around her neck? In my mind's eye I see an emperor's crown with stones the color of the grass in May and a smart pangolin lying like a living emerald in the sun. Now here it is frozen, preparing to run, under museum glass. A mineral? There are nights, especially just before New Year's, when it seems that everything here comes to life. The stones shift on the shelves, remembering who brought them here, and under the gaze of the Lady of Copper Mountain who walks silently through the halls mysteries occur which would astound you. Have you ever seen how a tiny drop of chromite, dissolving precisely into beryllium, is transformed into an emerald? This is not somewhere in the depths, but here under the moonlight and an ordinary roof. I leaf through Bazhov's "Fairy Tales" when I want to escape from wearisome

black and doleful white, when in winter suddenly I cannot go on without spring and summer.

Emerald (the ancient Greeks called it the "shining stone") is a variety and a companion of beryllium, but it seems to me that everything hinges on emerald. For me personally it and it alone is the king of stones: warm, giving human beings strength and tranquility. And it was long forgotten in the village of Malyshev at a special enterprise (they also mined uranium there), and indeed what good was it to the military-industrial complex if what was sought was minerals which would help clutch the world by the throat? There is only one emerald mine in the Soviet Union—this one. The site was discovered in 1831 by an old peasant, tar worker Maksim Kozhevnikov. He looked at the unfamiliar stone, unaware that it could be found over a relatively wide area and not just on the surface. A core sample recently taken from a depth of 658 meters was found to contain an emerald.

I am amazed, simply amazed... It is no wonder, because under the facets of an emerald a wave flows, like someone's hidden tear, and a subtle image appears in it. How easily I have flung from my hand nuggets of gold and uncut diamonds, but this stone enchanted me, and it seemed that if I were to speak to it it would answer. But would it be good to contact the genie which twinkled at me as we parted?

Production controllers L. Markova and N. Chichevskaya carried the stone to the safe, and I thought: "A pity that not a single hand went up." The enterprise's director, V. Zelev, trying to arouse some interest in the stones of the Urals, had asked a group of schoolchildren: "Who has read Bazhov's 'Fairy Tales'?"

Veniamin Gennadyevich was dumfounded when he did not see a single hand raised. These children have been deprived not only of bread. They do not know about the Brothers Grimm and Hoffman—fine. The terrible violent injections to which they have been subjected have etched "Little Earth" and "Virgin Soil" into their minds. But Bazhov... Children have missed their own world. Life is a road, and any turning back means losing something up ahead.

Zelev is looking for successors, and that is why he had assembled the kids. He himself has spent 23 years underground (mining uranium), and all in all he has "worked in the mountain," as he puts it, for 30 years. Though big and heavy he is extraordinarily nimble. You cannot predict what he will be doing a second from now; one moment he is sitting across from you, the next he is already bringing over to show you a mineral which makes paints extremely durable... now he brings a picture of a cluster of emerald crystals... Then you cease to notice the director or hear his voice. You catch your breath. You look at the dark green gems and you realize at once that the earth yields something like this extremely rarely. Even the work of a great artist can be copied, but that which is created by Nature—never.

Always just a single copy. Approximately 10,000 carats. A stone which is among the 10 best emeralds in the world and displays its hues brilliantly even in a photograph, and it seems that it would shine through even in a black-and-white photograph. Yet when it was found about a year ago it was not rated very highly by our experts. Suddenly I have a horrifying thought: we might have sold it abroad...

Recently the emerald was shown to Dr. William Caints, the director of the Earth Resources Institute of the University of South Carolina and a recognized authority in the field. The first thing he said was: "Oooooo!"

He called it the best emerald in the world. At once its value shot up. It belongs in the USSR Diamond Repository. Then the American was shown two other emeralds, the Novogodniy and the Zvezdar. Even though the visitor was still under the influence of his impression of the first emerald—the Shakhterskaya Slava—he also gave them high marks: "These could be of interest to any museum in the world."

I spent several hours walking through the mine, with chief geologist A. Laskovenkov telling me about Urals stones all the while. We seem to have forgotten about them, perhaps because Bazhov is no longer read by children. We see the Urals as an old, worked-out quarry. Do we value what we have? Buyers are already making inquiries in the settlement. They take raw stones and cut them abroad in ways we are incapable of doing. The very first thing our homegrown jewelers do, though you may laugh, is to force the little stones into standard shapes, cutting away all the beauty just so that they will fit into certain settings. You, on the contrary, reveal their essence and preserve all their "anatomy." There is one on your palm. It reminds one of a horse's head. Then I remember a newspaper photo that Zelev showed me: Zambia, a light shed and under it a long table and six workers sorting raw emeralds, and behind each of them a heavily armed guard—this was meant to show me how much these legend-enshrouded stones are valued.

"An Israeli firm where emigrants from Russia work took the job of helping us guard the emeralds and get into the international market, which is very difficult," said Zelev. "Our partners, for example, propose sorting the emeralds in the northern half of the building, where the light is diffused. Direct sunlight makes it difficult to judge the qualities of a stone."

Emeralds like a firm hand and keen vision and do not like volatile, psychologically unstable, emotional people.

"All sorts of things can happen at home," confides master gemcutter T. Arsenyeva, "but it is best not to come to work when you are agitated—no good will come of it. If you don't get the right cut the slightest bit of sunlight will extinguish the fire."

But there is something magical about an emerald when a calm person works with it, when someone spins and turns it under the light, saying: "Well, show us something

else." There is an expression—"critical play"—and in my mind that is something between great and bad, and it seems that Mikhail Orlov was looking for some light in the stone which cannot be captured. He carried an emerald from one work table to another, then finally cried out. He was working with the Vitaliy Emerald, which was named for local miner Vitaliy Vasilyev, who had recently passed away. Stones with names are entrusted only to master gemcutters; you will remember how the Lady of Copper Mountain valued them, how she made the rounds of all of them to find a master craftsman who could feel and understand the soul of the stone.

...Night. There is only a single guard at the mine. The very time for the stones to speak.

"Oh, I have lain in the dark for so many years, though I am filled with light... I should be paired with the Patricia from Columbia—how fine we would look together!"

"But it weighs 800 carats, and look at you—hah!"

"You forget that I am from the Urals, and the unknown is always alluring. And have you heard how delighted the gemcutter was with me?"

"When these people mined uranium and beryllium they did not tell fairy tales around us, but now..."

"They have changed greatly and finally realized as they beheld our beauty that they have to live."

Where there are fairy tales there is life.

Krasilnikov Critique of Defense Ministry Draft Law

91UM0246A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview of Yu. Krasilnikov by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dolgikh: "'Defense' on the Road Toward the Market"]

[Text] Conversion. This word entered our "perestroika" vocabulary three years ago. But here is what is interesting: specialists still have not determined the precise idea behind this concept. There is a lot of talk, but deeds.....

Without doubt there is need for a law on conversion. A law that would define the legal, organizational and social-economic underpinnings of the work of the defense industry organizations and the branches of industry that are linked with them during the time that they are switching to new forms of economic management. Recently yet another draft law was examined in the subcommittee on industry of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and once again the draft was rejected. What is it that does not suit the lawmakers? Yu. Krasilnikov, the chairman of the subcommittee, responds to this and other questions as posed by our correspondent.

[Krasilnikov] This draft, which, by the way, was drawn up within the USSR Ministry of Defense, makes no mention of the primary condition, without which, in our opinion, it is impossible to perform conversion. That condition is as follows: the army must be an army and industry must be an industry. And here is what is taking place at present: just as before, the Ministry of Defense is "swallowing" everything that it receives from the "defense industry." It simply is compelled to do so because of the relationships that have evolved. In other words, the main thing that needs to be done is to separate the army from industry, thereby eliminating the military representative system, which has already become an anachronism.

[Dolgikh] Is it really so bad when the troops receive equipment that has a guarantee of reliability?

[Krasilnikov] Unfortunately, the military representatives do not provide such a guarantee. Their mere presence at a plant in the role of customer forces people to give more attention to military products. They are specific customers and they have money. But the civil product line at this same plant, for which there is only an abstract customer who cannot scrutinize the product, is manufactured haphazardly. In general, these stereotypes must be isolated, not by orders or shouting, but through the introduction of normal market relationships. By the way, as regards the market. It presupposes first of all that everything is out in the open. Otherwise, how can I, as a plant director, conclude contracts with other enterprises if I do not know what their capabilities are.

[Dolgikh] Yuriy Georgiyevich, not so long ago you yourself were working in a defense industry plant, where you were occupied with the problems of new technology. How are things going at present for the defense industry people?

[Krasilnikov] Very poorly. Especially for those who still depend upon aid "from above" and who are waiting for instructions and guidance. I will tell you about my own plant. When conversion "crashed onto the scene," we also were waiting. And we kept on waiting until the end. They required us to manufacture a certain type of agricultural unit. Yes, it was something that was needed. But we had to start from scratch to manufacture it, starting with the "nail." What would it cost? It was very expensive. And this meant that either we destroy ourselves or destroy agriculture. We attempted to refuse. Where possible we threatened not to take the plan into consideration. Take that! In the future we were somewhat wiser. They put in a production line to produce engines for pumping natural gas. This was easy for us to do. In addition, they offered to use our gas turbines as local electric power stations—one such unit can provide electricity for a small city. There were quite a few who desired to have such power units, and not just within the USSR.

Today, those who work for defense are set apart from all other enterprises. This must not be. There can be no market for just a part of the national economic complex.

[Dolgikh] We know that for 1991 the budget of many ministries will be reduced. How, in your opinion, will they reduce allocations for scientific-research and experimental-design work in the next year?

[Krasilnikov] Yes, at any price we must maintain the high scientific-technical potential of the defense industry. But not by pumping profits into unprofitable branches, as, by the way, is prescribed in the draft law on conversion that we were discussing above. No, we must create a general economic field and material support for scientific research institutes and design bureaus.

[Dolgikh] In the draft law on conversion it is stipulated that its basic attitudes derive from articles laid out in the law on defense, which still does not exist. It turns out that without passage of the second law the first law cannot be passed. And here we are on the threshold of the market system.

[Krasilnikov] We will not wait for the law on defense. There is enough military doctrine and concept of military reform already in existence and there are enough international contracts already concluded. We will come up with a law on conversion based upon these things.

[Dolgikh] But when exactly will it appear?

[Krasilnikov] I think it will be ready by the middle of January. We cannot drag this out any more. The situation is very tense. People are weary of indecisiveness.

Of course, not all of Yu. Krasilnikov's ideas are indisputable. Nonetheless, in my opinion, this point of view represents the specific interest.

SS-20 Conversion for Non-Military Launches

91UM0264B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

["Briefing for the Readers, Telephone number: 941-21-94": "Missiles Reduced and Launched into Space"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that the missiles being removed from deployment within the framework of reductions are being destroyed. Can it really be that they cannot be used for peaceful space work?

S. Sorokin, Barnaul

Of course, the use of combat missiles for peaceful purposes is much more advantageous than their destruction. For this reason it is not surprising that Soviet specialists, including, for example, designers at the Tekhnopribor [Technical Instruments] Association, are seeking to create the three-stage, solid fuel "Start" missile carrier, which weighs 40-45 tons, using the SS-20 IRBM. The "Start" is launched from a mobile launcher. All assemblies and materials not subject to destruction within the framework of international treaties or which are not prohibited for peaceful uses are being used in the "Start" missile carrier. In the opinion of specialists over a five-year period of time we will be able to manufacture nearly 300 missile carriers in this manner.

This will promote the conversion process and make it possible to save large amounts of materials and financial assets. For example, the "Start" missiles thus built can carry scientific equipment weighing nearly 200 kilograms into space orbits of up to 500 kilometers.

The above information was received within the press group of the space units of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

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